

REVIEWS BY

**The Socialist Revolutionaries
and the Russian Anti-War
Movement, 1914–1917**

BY

The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Anti-War Movement, 1914–1917

Michael Melancon

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To my mother



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

IG	Initiative Group (of Mensheviks)
<i>I. Z.</i>	<i>Istoricheskie zapiski</i>
<i>K.A.</i>	<i>Krasnyi arkhiv</i>
<i>K.L.</i>	<i>Krasnaia letopis'</i>
<i>L.R.</i>	<i>Letopis' revoliutsii</i>
<i>Mezhraionka</i>	Interdistrict Committee (of SDs) (<i>Mezhdu-raionnyi komitet</i>)
PC	Petersburg Committee (of SRs or Bolsheviks)
<i>P.R.</i>	<i>Proletarskaia revoliutsiia</i>
PSR	Party of Socialist Revolutionaries
SD	Social Democrat
SR	Socialist Revolutionary
WIC	War-Industries Committee
<i>zemgor</i>	Union of Zemstvos and Cities (<i>Soiuz zemstv i gorodov</i>)

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Introduction

The Russian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) did not prevail in the struggles for power during 1917 and 1918. For several decades thereafter, their historiographical fate threatened to recapitulate their political one in that little appeared in print about their history and demise. The picture began to change during the 1950s and 1960s, when Oliver Radkey and K. V. Gusev published their research about the role of the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and their radical progeny, the Left SRs, in the events of 1917–1918.¹ More recently, Maureen Perrie, Manfred Hildermeier, Christopher Rice, and I have examined SR programs and activities during the first decade of the century.² This increased attention has enhanced our knowledge of the SR involvement in the Russian revolutionary movement between 1900 and 1917. For example, recent scholarship has suggested that the SRs did not prefer terrorism (which they did practice) to mass organization and propaganda, that they had an active involvement in the urban workers' movement and were not therefore entirely preoccupied with the peasantry, and that they maintained a considerable level of activity inside Russia during the years after the 1905 Revolution. Still, despite this increased information about the SRs, many areas remain to be explored.

This study focuses on SR activities during World War I up to and through the February Revolution. The topic is sufficiently unfamiliar as to require a summary of my chief findings, which will, in essence, introduce the study with its conclusions. Evidence about

the PSR during the war indicates the following: From the very beginning, most SRs both in the West European emigration and at home turned against Russia's participation in World War I. The initial opposition to the war among SRs was both widespread and intransigent, and even during the first months the PSR actively generated oral and printed anti-war propaganda. By mid-1915, SR anti-war sentiment had further widened and deepened so that it encompassed the great majority of the party organizations inside Russia, many of which adopted the position known as "defeatism." Thus by mid-1915, when the mood in Russia began to turn against the government, the SRs were well positioned to expand their efforts against the war and against tsarism. As much as anyone, the SRs helped establish in the minds of workers, soldiers, peasants, and students an identity of anti-war and antigovernment feelings, a very threatening development for the tsarist regime. Furthermore, many party leaders and activists staked out socialist terrain in their vision of the immediate postrevolutionary future: they aimed their propaganda not only against the tsar, the nobles, and the bureaucrats, but against the bourgeoisie, the liberals, and capitalism itself. Although a moderate pro-war wing did exist, in the main the wartime PSR was a revolutionary socialist rather than reformist socialist organization.

Both at the fronts and in the garrisons, the SRs organized efforts to propagandize Russia's armed forces, a circumstance that has a bearing on the party's successes in the armed forces during 1917. Historical commentary has sometimes attributed SR influence among soldiers and sailors to the peasant nature of Russia's armed forces. Considering the tertiary priority the party had to assign to the peasants during the decade prior to February 1917, this explanation is incomplete. Of course, during the war the PSR often referred to peasant-oriented themes in its appeals to the armed forces, but the party's success in this realm issued primarily from direct organized mass propaganda that above all spoke to the soldiers about their plight as soldiers.

As regards Russia's proletariat, after the outbreak of the war the SRs continued their pre-war tendency to devote their major efforts to that class. Most SR organizations existed and operated in the empire's towns and cities. Since much of the party intelligentsia was

pro-war and withdrew from active involvement in the underground organizations, the worker orientation of the SRs, if anything, intensified during the war years. The bulk of SR anti-war and antitsarist propaganda addressed the workers, although most of it raised issues of interest for the peasants and soldiers as well. Overall, SR activities in the empire's proletarian milieu, including in crucial Petrograd, roughly equaled that of the Social Democrats (SDs).

Exploring the history of one party, in this case the SRs, during the war era, a period in which the story of the revolutionary movement is a *tabula rasa*, yields interesting results of broad significance. The SRs were a major factor in a quite lively environment of socialist activities, by and large of a cooperative nature; one example was the joint struggle against the election of workers' groups in the War-Industries Committees (organizations of financiers and industrialists dedicated to military production). The SRs had always been proponents of close cooperation and even unity with other socialist groups.³ Whether because of SR sponsorship or because of the exigencies of wartime Russia (perhaps a combination of the two), revolutionaries of various factions forged an especially close alliance. This alliance entailed joint conferences, agreements about lines of anti-war agitation, and coordination of strikes, demonstrations, and mass meetings.

But the truly striking aspect of this spirit of cooperation was the formation of joint party organizations. After July 1914, various configurations of SRs, Left Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Bundists, and anarchists formed joint committees in a remarkable range of cities and towns, a not necessarily exhaustive listing of which included Smolensk, Minsk, Kronshtadt, Chernigov, Nikolaev, Mariupol, Odessa, Lugansk, Kherson, Kharkov, Kazan, Orenburg, Tomsk, Krasnoiarsk, and Iakutsk. Even where joint committees did not arise, collective action was almost universally the rule; socialists and anarchists regularly coordinated their positions and activities—and often published joint proclamations—in Petrograd, Moscow, Tula, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Voronezh, Saratov, Samara, Ekaterinoslav, Briansk, and many other places. Virtually without exception, wartime strike committees, unions, insurance funds, and cooperatives, all of which served as centers for socialist actions, had joint party leadership, not to mention membership. Meanwhile, the Right socialists (Right

SRs, Right Mensheviks, Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, and Bundists), whose views evolved toward the Left during the war, also blocked together with one another and, at times, with the Left socialists. The existence of a collective revolutionary movement on such a wide basis for two years before the February Revolution is a matter of significance.

In Petrograd, where the movement that led to the fall of tsarism began, the SRs and the other leftist parties had participated directly in long- and short-term propaganda against the government. As the crisis of Russian society deepened during the winter of 1917, the Left socialists promoted strikes and demonstrations; when disturbances began on 23 February in association with International Women's Day (a socialist celebration), they did everything in their power to prolong and deepen the movement, including the publication of leaflets, the use of verbal agitation, and the direct leadership of mass action in the factories and in the streets. Both activists and leaders took part in Petrograd's February revolutionary crisis. In order to coordinate their activities, the leaders of all major socialist groups in Petrograd met together repeatedly during the period of revolutionary disorders; additionally, the leftists among them met separately to work out slogans to be used in proclamations and in the factories and streets. As the revolution neared, the practice of cooperation intensified. No one party had a primary role, but the SRs were deeply involved in providing guidance and leadership to the workers, soldiers, and students who made the February Revolution. The implications of the long-term wartime revolutionary movement, when considered in light of evidence about the way the SRs and other socialists became involved in the February crisis, suggests the need for reevaluating the nature of the February Revolution.

The view that the tsarist regime collapsed of its own weight has a prominent place in commentary about the February Revolution. However, evidence about the attitudes and actions of the autocracy during the war suggests that it never lost its will to resist attack. Literally, from the war's outbreak until the midafternoon of 27 February, the regime relentlessly threw secret and uniformed police, Cossacks, and troops at its opponents. The use of agents provocateurs attained previously unheard-of levels, and the rate of arrests, trials, and shootings in the streets never for a moment waned. The

regime entered its death throes only when police proved insufficient and Cossacks and troops proved unwilling to carry out its oppressive orders. Since revolutionaries had long focused on the armed forces, even the disaffection of the soldiers and their crucial rebellion did not stem solely from an elemental disgust with the government.

When, following Chamberlin, we think of the February Revolution as "one of the most leaderless, spontaneous, and anonymous revolutions of all time," haven't we created a misleading proposition? With the partial exception of the October Revolution, which of the world's great revolutions occurred because of advanced planning by identifiable leaders and groups? In any case, the concept of an entirely spontaneous revolution does not square with all the evidence about or account for everything that occurred during the early months of 1917 in Russia. Viewed in the historical perspective of the previous months and years, the vast and now familiar events of February 1917 begin to take on a somewhat different coloration. Of course, wartime conditions contributed to mass disaffection, but socialists always viewed the conditions of war as grist for the mills of revolutionary propaganda (the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution set the recent example in Russia).

Since the SRs (and other revolutionary groups) were active inside Russia before and during the revolutionary crisis and since until now no one has studied their activities closely during this period, any history of their pre-February wartime record would shed light on the revolution. With his own motivations, George Katkov once noted: "The theory of a spontaneous, elemental . . . movement of the Petrograd proletariat is only an admission of our inability to explain the course of events." Very recently, Hasegawa has subjected the theory of a spontaneous February Revolution to cogent criticism by noting the involvement of middle-level party activists in the strikes and demonstrations that led to the uprising.⁴ This study of the SRs will, I hope, shed a little more light on the subject and further overcome "our inability to explain the course of events."

Although Soviet historiography has had little incentive to allow access to sources about the SR contribution to the socialist movement, the nationwide record of SR activities among the mass segments of the population remains discernible. The sources suggest that the SRs were a considerable force for revolutionary change; by

1915, even the cautious Right SRs turned against the tsarist regime. Neither the tsarist police nor contemporary revolutionaries had any doubt as to the potential of the SRs to help foment a revolt with radical goals. Up to the very end, the old regime reserved its worst for the SRs by sending them in greater numbers than members of other parties to Siberian hard labor and, self-destructively, into the armies at the front ("Whom the gods will destroy, they first make mad"). In his famous memoirs, the Left Menshevik N. Sukhanov referred to the SRs (and the Bolsheviks) during February 1917 as "advocates of an immediate dictatorship of the Soviet." Similarly, the Soviet historian Burdzhakov has referred to the "leftist danger" of Bolshevik and Left SR street demonstrations during February–March 1917.⁵

Just after February, such disparate observers as M. Rodzianko, V. Maklakov, and I. Tseretelli noticed throughout the capital a sea of flags with the SR slogan *Zemlia i volia* (Land and Liberty).⁶ During the first half of 1917 (and in many areas of the country far longer), SR popularity swept the country; a logical assumption is that this standing reflected the party's role in bringing about the revolution in the first place (how they lost their influence is another matter). Developments within the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (and other socialist groups with mass constituencies) had a dialectical relationship with the revolutionizing process within Russian society: the SRs both responded to and helped shape these processes. Thus we can enhance our understanding of the dynamics of the Russian revolution by recapturing the heritage of the PSR, the most thoroughly indigenous of Russia's revolutionary parties.

Clearly, the SRs of this study do not fit traditional concepts about the party or its role in the Russian revolutionary movement. In addition, since few studies about the wartime socialist parties exist, a historical context is generally lacking. Thus, at first glance the SRs as portrayed here may impress some readers as unfamiliar interlopers in terra incognita; of course, final judgments must await examination of the evidence in its entirety.

The chapters of this study, which briefly examine SR history between 1907 and 1914 (chapter 1) and then in great detail between July 1914 and late February 1917 (chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6), have as a secondary theme the exploration of the other parties and factions

with whom the SRs, both Right and Left, worked closely. Chapter 5 therefore briefly investigates the wartime programs and activities of the various Social Democratic groups and the anarchists; chapter 7, which concerns the February Revolution in Petrograd, focuses on the socialist blocks in which the SRs participated as much as on the SRs themselves, an emphasis that, I believe, both accurately reflects the realities of socialist involvement in tsarism's last crisis and offers the best opportunity to understand the motivations and actions of the SRs and all the socialists in these crucial events.

1

Stormy Petrels

(The SRs before World War I, 1907–1914)

Half in admiration, half in consternation, Lenin used the epithet “stormy petrels” during 1907 to characterize (and dismiss) recent SR efforts among the urban proletariat.¹ Regardless of its accuracy or inaccuracy in the sense intended, it aptly captures the radical intensity of Socialist Revolutionary activities before, during, and after the 1905–1907 revolution, the legacy of which, especially as regards the post-1907 period, is now largely lost in the historiographical record of early twentieth-century Russia. This chapter will outline SR activities between 1907 and the outbreak of the war in July 1914, thus filling in an important interstice in our historical awareness of the SR party and laying the groundwork for understanding the party’s attitudes and actions during the war.²

In the immediate post-1907 years, the SRs, like other revolutionaries, faced the grim task of surviving the fierce onslaught of renewed tsarist repression. Having itself barely survived the 1905 cataclysm, the autocracy, again in the ascendancy, gave every sign of intending to maintain itself indefinitely, indeed, permanently. According to most indications, the tsarist police turned first to the problem of neutralizing and, if possible, destroying SR organizations inside Russia, although Social Democratic groups soon experienced identically malign attention.

With numerous well-aimed blows, by late 1907 and early 1908 the tsarist regime destroyed mass SR-oriented organizations such as the all-Russian peasant, railroad, and teachers’ unions; most of the for-

merly powerful party military organizations also soon succumbed to the attacks; national, regional, provincial, and city committees and leaders vanished into the maelstrom; arrests penetrated even into city districts, where the SRs had their largest cadres. Lest they too suffer the familiar fate of imprisonment and Siberian exile, leaders of stature such as V.M. Chernov, M. Rakitnikov, V. Rudnev, N. Avksentiev, and M. Natanson again escaped into West European exile. At the very bottom of the party structure, activists and the rank and file found themselves cut off entirely from party communications. The national organization so carefully constructed between 1904 and 1907 had disappeared. As Chernov recognized in 1908, "The Central Committee [in exile] is confronted with organizations in various towns, unconnected with one another, which have irregular relations with the mass organizations proper."³

Still, all was not lost for the SRs, nor for other revolutionary parties that suffered similar fates. Already during 1905–1907 all the socialists, and the anarcho-syndicalists as well, had participated in the construction of an empire-wide network of workers' organizations that included labor unions, cooperatives, educational-cultural societies, and, a little later, sickness insurance funds. As socialist life languished among other segments of the population, it survived, not to say flourished, among the proletariat. Second only to the Menshevik SDs, the SRs played a great role in the founding and administration of labor organizations, which now, because of the new Fundamental Laws of the Empire, had a quasi-legal status. Thus, like other revolutionaries, the SRs maintained a shadowy, but widespread, organizational existence within the labor organizations, which they used for meeting places, agitation, and contacts both with workers and with other radical groups. As regards unions and other labor groups, the SRs also developed a program that reflected their particular outlook on Russia's problems (they held that labor organizations should have both economic-social functions and revolutionary goals) and did all they could to influence organized labor in a direction consonant with that program. When in late 1907 and early 1908, the PSR found itself at a numerical and programmatic disadvantage to the SDs (that is, the Mensheviks) in the labor movement, they adopted ultimately successful measures to increase their presence and influence in workers' groups.⁴

After the well-known 1906 defection of the extreme right and left wings of the party (which resulted in the creation of two new splinter parties—the moderate Popular Socialists and the arch-radical SR-Maximalists), the PSR as a whole, even after the onset of tsarist repression, maintained a quite radical stance on the major issues facing them. During 1906 and 1907, the SRs repeatedly called for the revival of the workers' soviets, which they hoped would act as focal points of a new revolutionary outburst; in 1907 the party's Second Congress espoused the creation of "worker, soldier and peasant soviets," thus presaging by ten years the reality of 1917. They urged that labor unions and cooperatives retain their political goals, along with economic and cultural endeavors; in cases in which labor unions could not eke out legal existences, the SRs insisted that the party members within them form illegal underground unions.⁵

The party's thoroughgoing rejection of reformist measures caused problems when the opportunity arose to elect SRs into the Duma (the parliamentary body promised by the 1905 October Manifesto and enacted by the 1906 Fundamental Laws). Like the Bolsheviks, the SRs eschewed participation in the elections to the First Duma in mid-1906 and performed a volte-face as regards the Second Duma elections of early 1907, in which they did surprisingly well in the urban proletarian curias.⁶ Thereafter, alone of the major socialist parties, the SRs remained aloof from Duma elections, although the Trudoviks (SR-oriented delegates representing the peasantry in the Duma) were for all practical purposes SRs in disguise; one of the principal Trudovik leaders, A. Kerensky, was a member of the PSR from 1905.

From 1906 on, the SRs espoused a Left bloc policy on all matters concerning Russia's quasi-parliamentary body. Since it was important to prevent the election of conservative, or, worse, reactionary Black Hundreds candidates in the various curias, during the complicated electoral processes the SRs blocked with the Bolsheviks, and under the SRs' tutelage the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists also joined the Left bloc. At times between 1906 and 1912, the Duma Left bloc extended to the Mensheviks and the Kadets (the liberal Constitutional Democrats), who had allied to form a more or less permanent Left-centrist bloc.⁷

Outside the realm of Duma politics, the SRs also ardently sup-

ported both the concept and the practice of Left bloc activities. During early 1906, the party's First Congress had espoused a "permanent bloc" with populist-oriented groups and "tactical alliances" with the SDs, with whom the SRs should convene joint conferences. During the latter part of the 1905–1907 revolution and its harsh aftermath (1908–1910), all the parties found it necessary to pool scarce human and technical resources in order to survive at all, as a consequence of which the scope of joint actions broadened considerably.

After the dissolution of the First Duma during the summer of 1906, the SR and SD central committees, the SD and Trudovik Duma factions, and the all-Russian Peasant Union (an SR-aligned organization) issued a series of joint proclamations and held an inter-party conference in hopes of reviving the Petersburg Soviet. As the Soviet historian Argun describes the resulting situation, "the leftist parties . . . called jointly for a general strike, an armed uprising, [and] the nonpayment of taxes." During 1907, top-level Menshevik and Bolshevik SDs recommended cooperation with the SRs. In fact during 1906–1909, SRs and SDs allied together in an array of endeavors, including the so-called soviets of the unemployed that arose in over thirty cities to aid needy workers; in joint partisan detachments in the Urals, along the Volga, and in Georgia, Latvia, and Poland; and in multiparty military organizations in the garrisons of Vladivostok, Kharbin, Khabarovsk, and Kronshtadt. SRs and SDs also held joint conferences and led strikes together in Kiev, Petersburg, Kazan, Smolensk, Petrozavodsk, Kharkov, the Urals, and Tashkent.⁸

Despite their dedication to revolutionary work, the SRs had little choice but to adapt to the new conditions of the post-1907 reaction. The tsarist police noted that during 1907–1908 all the socialists, including the SRs, advocated a softening of direct revolutionary agitation, combined with entry into all manner of social organizations "in order to work from within." The PSR continued to insist that party members in labor unions, cooperatives, and other mass organizations do whatever they could to keep alive the ultimate revolutionary goals.⁹

By 1909, however, some important SR leaders such as N. Sletov, K. Breshko-Breshkovskaia, N. Avksentiev, and V. Voronov founded

the *Pochin* (New beginnings) group, which advocated a renunciation of illegal underground work in favor of reformist endeavors, especially in labor organizations, rural cooperatives, and the *zemstvos* (elected rural district councils). This group, also known as the Right SRs or SR-Liquidators (for their wish to "liquidate" the underground organizations), never become as influential within the PSR as their Menshevik-Liquidator counterparts did among the SDs; nevertheless, because of their personal prominence, they attracted a good deal of attention, sparked lively interparty debates, and won some support, especially from the party intelligentsia. Many important party leaders—V. Chernov, N. Rakitnikov, M. Natanson, G. Ulianov, and others—and the large majority of the SR cadres firmly rejected the views of the party's right wing; the leading party publications regularly polemicized against the heresy.¹⁰

For various reasons, the 1908–1910 era was a virtual trial by fire for the SRs. Tsarist repression and the liquidator movement were by no means the sole causes. The discovery that the party leader Evno Azev was a police agent demoralized SRs everywhere and caused lingering doubts about the movement's viability. Furthermore, as though to balance the Right SR advocacy of moderate policies, a group to the Left called the Left SRs (similar to but not identical with the Left SRs of 1917–1918) pushed a radical program that included the continuation of terrorism, which the party was in the process of deemphasizing. The commentaries of the party leaders M. Zenzinov and Chernov capture the situation within the PSR during this difficult period: "We set ourselves modest goals . . . and labored above all that the flickering flame of our party did not die out forever"; "conditions caused doubts about the party's survivability, the vitality of its program, which many considered utopian"; "an ideological stupor, a condition of confusion and incomprehension reigned."¹¹

Still, care must be taken to exaggerate neither the extent nor the permanence of the SRs' plight. During 1909, at the depth of the reaction, delegates reported to the Fifth Party Council that party organizations, some of considerable size, survived in Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Baku, in the Urals, and in parts of Siberia and South Russia. In reporting the tendency of the PSR to revive by 1910, the Soviet historian K. Gusev notes, surely with some over-

statement, the existence of twelve regional committees, thirty-nine provincial committees, and many lower-level committees and groups, including several military organizations. At least partially confirming Gusev's expansive picture are reports from within the PSR, from the police, from memoirists, and from various secondary sources that indicate SR organizations and activities between 1910 and mid-1914 in more than fifty cities, towns, and provinces across the empire.¹²

Despite the well-known difficulty of revolutionary work among Russia's peasantry and military personnel during the reactionary era, the SRs did not entirely abandon these fields of endeavor. After the 1907–1908 destruction of the party's official peasant-oriented organizations (the SR Peasant Union and numerous rural committees at various levels), SR armed detachments continued to operate in some provinces, especially in Voronezh and Iaroslavl, until as late as 1912. As rural party structures per se declined or expired, party activists avoided complete isolation and irrelevance by entrenching themselves in zemstvos and rural cooperatives. By 1910, however, the PSR reported to the Socialist International the existence of party organizations dedicated to work among the peasants in ten Urals, Volga, and Ukrainian provinces. In 1912, the police reported the existence of an SR "North Volga Organization" centered in Iaroslavl, and in 1914 the SRs reported to the International on party organizations "especially dedicated to rural action" in Poltava, Kiev, Khar'kov, Chernigov, Voronezh, Kherson, in the North Caucasus, the Baltic provinces, the North Volga region, Mogilev, Vitebsk, and Siberia. If remotely accurate, these reports suggest a revival of efforts in the villages after the deepest years of the reaction.¹³

Although most revolutionary garrison organizations, including those of the SRs, did not outlive the fury of the government repression of 1907–1908, the situation was somewhat different in the navy. Both in the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets and in the Caspian, Volga, and Don coast guards, the SRs maintained their underground organizations long after their SD counterparts had passed out of existence. From 1907 on, the SRs, alone of the major revolutionary parties, issued a newspaper, *Za narod* (For the people), for military personnel, which police often confiscated during searches and arrests in garrisons and on board ships. Since the secret police reported

that the SR fleet organizations maintained contact with party organizations inside Russia and in the emigration, it is likely that the PSR distributed *Za narod* to the fleet on a more or less regular basis. The Soviet historian Gusev also notes that between 1907 and 1914 the SRs maintained their Union of Officers.¹⁴ SR activism in the military, even in the depths of the reaction, may help explain the party's later successes in the armed forces.

The 1910 economic expansion and a slight softening toward the socialist parties by the government led to an upswing in revolutionary activity. For the first time in several years, the Petersburg SRs, SDs, and liberals organized mass student-worker demonstrations for the occasions of the deaths of Lev Tolstoi and the SR terrorist Egor Sazonov. In various industrial towns across the empire, revolutionary circles and then actual committees sprang to life again. For instance, in Ufa and Chernigov SR and SD students cooperated to recreate long dormant workers' circles among artisans and factory workers. By 1912, in both towns SR and SD organizations were functioning again and were even so bold as to call workers' *massovki* (mass meetings).

In Petersburg and elsewhere, the SRs reached their maximum influence in the organized labor movement. Through the auspices of their Workers' Bureau, founded in 1909 to coordinate the party's efforts in workers' groups, the SRs in the capital moved into dominant positions in many important unions, including the metalworkers', textile workers', bakers', and tailors' unions. Likewise, in Briansk (Orel Province), Baku, Omsk, Astrakhan, Simferopol, Voronezh, and elsewhere, SRs played important, often leading, roles in unions, cooperatives, and educational societies. In the Caucasus, the SRs operated a large illegal merchant marine union that issued its own newspaper and called several strikes. Party activists also began to recreate railroad locals in many areas.¹⁵

The PSRs' revolutionary resolve had not weakened during the years of reaction. Twice, in 1910 and again in 1913, they attempted to spark what they hoped would become nationwide uprisings through their Baltic and Black Sea sailors' organizations. During 1912, the secret police reported that, along with the SDs, the Bund, and the Polish Socialists, the SRs were sending emissaries around to industrial centers such as Lodz, Iuzovka, and Ivanovo to foment an

uprising to be initiated by the railroad and postal-telegraph workers on the example of October 1905. During both 1911 and 1912, the SRs agitated widely for an uprising; on the occasion of the 1912 jubilee of the House of Romanov, the SRs issued proclamations and organized antidynastic demonstrations in Petersburg, Moscow, Chernigov, Baku, Kiev, and several areas in the Urals and Eastern Siberia.¹⁶

After the April 1912 Lena Goldfields massacre, strikes and demonstrations of all kinds covered the map of the empire and, until the outbreak of the war, continued at a high pace. The Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SRs published workers' papers in Petersburg and other industrial centers. Numerous union newspapers also appeared and carried the political message of whichever party predominated in the given union; in not a few cases, SRs comprised the editorial staffs of such papers. Even during the reactionary era, the SRs had won a considerable worker following by regularly issuing revolutionary tracts such as *Khitraia mekhanika* (Clever trick) and *Konek-Skakunek* (A fast horse) that were widely accessible to workers of modest education. The government cast an especially baleful eye at the SR Petersburg paper, which it closed down and fined and to whose editors it meted out jail terms two and three times the length of those of the staffs of the Bolshevik and Menshevik papers.¹⁷ Although the SRs yielded some of their influence in labor organizations to the Bolsheviks, who at the expense of both Mensheviks and SRs experienced considerable successes during 1913 and early 1914, they remained an active force in all aspects of the workers' movement; SR publications focused on the workers more than on any other social group during this period.¹⁸

During the last several years of the pre-war period, the Left block tactics long favored by the SRs intensified. Joint SR-SD student councils, which previously had been rare, became common in cities with large high school and university populations. During 1912, in the capital the SR-SD student group instituted the May Committees, which aimed at stimulating worker demonstrations for May Day. In Moscow the SRs and SDs cooperated in attempting to recreate a citywide union bureau. During 1913 and 1914, SRs and SDs held joint conferences at factory, district, and citywide levels for various occasions in a wide range of towns, including Petersburg,

Kiev, Samara, Ufa, and Perm. In 1913 the SR and SD leaders of various Caspian, Don, Volga, and Black Sea merchant marine locals formed a powerful union that issued its own newspaper, *Moriak* (Sailor), and led several widespread strikes. The citywide strike committees that arose in Baku, Ekaterinoslav, and Petersburg during the late spring and early summer of 1914 had SR, Bolshevik, and Menshevik contingents. In many areas, various combinations of SD, SR, Bundist, and Polish Socialists issued joint proclamations. Symbolic of the special SR-Bolshevik affinity (their radical stances on many issues provided strong incentives for joint work) were a series of joint proclamations issued by the Petersburg SR and Bolshevik committees during the spring and summer of 1914, including those for the anniversary of the Lena massacre, for May Day, and for the general strike during July.¹⁹

Despite severe repression and internal strife, between the 1905 Revolution and the outbreak of World War I the SRs established a record of activism with a distinctly radical tone. Thus, the sternly oppositionist tactics of most SRs *during* the war, a postulate of this study, occurred in a continuum. Likewise, Right SR support of the war effort continued the moderate policies of the pre-war SR-Liquidator movement. Other themes of SR history stretch through both the pre-war and war eras. Because of the relative ease of agitating among the urban workers, between 1907 and mid-1914 and again between 1914 and February 1917 the SRs were primarily an urban party, devoting their greatest energies to the factory workers. Second in their priorities were the soldiers and sailors, who, especially during the war, became apt subjects for propaganda. Third were the peasants, to whom, of course, the SRs would return with a vengeance after the February Revolution. In light of these often unfamiliar circumstances, the record of the wartime PSR, on which this book focuses, becomes more comprehensible than it otherwise might be.

2

The SRs Abroad

As the European crisis that followed the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand ripened in the heat of the long summer and approached its denouement, all seemed in order among European socialists. Since early in the century the congresses of the Socialist International had taken a firm position: in case of an all-European war, the various socialist parties would oppose the conflict as imperialist. Their members in national parliaments would vote against war credits, and they would all deliver a staunch internationalist message to the proletariat of their respective nations. Even as the crisis flared into war, this solemn hallowed pledge seemed inviolable. Yet once nation moved against nation and the bloodletting began, patriotism at once overpowered internationalism as French, English, German, and Austrian socialists cheered their countries and armies with a fervor identical to that of the rest of their countrymen. Most of the leaders of the proletariat suddenly found their homeland in the bourgeois national state, just where they had passionately proclaimed it could not exist (of course, revisionism had contributed to this adjustment). A few exceptions proved the rule; among the German Social Democrats Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht spoke out quickly and forcefully against the madness seizing the continent, and one or two brave souls elsewhere tried to call the Second International to an accounting, but across Western and Central Europe these lonely voices drowned in the harsh blare of military fanfare.

The fateful question of what to do about the war posed itself quite

differently for socialists of the Russian Empire, where over the last few decades gains for the laboring masses and for the parties that attempted to speak for them were more paltry than in other parts of Europe. In the Russian Duma only a handful of Social Democrats and Trudoviks (Laborites) represented the peasant and proletarian masses, while wealthy educated society, a tiny minority of the population, dominated the legislative body, which in any case had little real power. After a brief partial respite for a year or two after the October 1905 Manifesto, ever since 1907 the tsarist autocracy had mercilessly hounded the socialist parties, who of course both before and after reciprocated with virulent antigovernmental propaganda and agitation. In this battle the government had the upper hand; socialist organizations went back into the underground; many leaders suffered arrest and found themselves in Siberian exile. To escape this fate the heads of the various parties and factions withdrew again into West European exile, where several years later the outbreak of war found them.

Despite their distance from Russia, the socialist leaders in the emigration adopted positions and made decisions about various issues, including the war, of great importance not just for an abstract understanding of socialist ideology but a comprehension of the socialist movement at home; even when the leaders abroad could not issue direct orders, they did set the general guidelines by which party organizations at home operated. During the first month or so of the war, however, no clear picture emerged of how the top Russian socialists would respond to this event. V. I. Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, spent the first few weeks of the war under house arrest in Austria, where he had been living when the nations declared war. Immediately upon his release into Switzerland, Lenin began to issue his famous anti-war statements that called for Russia's defeat. When refined, Lenin's defeatism eventually called for all European socialists to work toward the defeat of their own governments and to turn the imperialist war into civil war and European-wide revolution. Few even of Lenin's fellow Bolsheviks adhered to this stance, but it certainly galvanized the attention of Russian and European socialists. Other leaders of the Russian Social Democrats, L. Martov and P. Axelrod of the Mensheviks; A. Lunarcharsky, who was close to the Bolsheviks; and L. Trotsky, who represented those wishing to

unite various factions of the party, also—with various nuances, none of which included defeatism—turned their voices and pens against the war. Even the Right Menshevik leader G. Plekhanov seemed to make it unanimous when he publicly lauded the Social Democratic Duma faction, which in alliance with the Trudoviks refused to vote for war credits. Within a few weeks, however, he turned irrevocably in favor not only of Russia's defense but of her victory; he did not conceal that "love of Russia" was his ultima ratio. Still, few Mensheviks rallied to Plekhanov's cause; by and large émigré Russian Social Democracy lived up to its pre-war internationalist oaths. What about their Socialist Revolutionary comrades?

The Dilemma: Roots of a Split

The outbreak of World War I confronted the SRs (and other socialists) in the West European emigration with a terrible dilemma. Separated from home by hundreds of miles and two military fronts, they had to make fateful decisions about the war deprived of firsthand knowledge of its impact on comrades inside Russia and, even more importantly, on the country as a whole. To make matters worse, émigré party leaders found no unanimity among themselves. Having already staked out opposite positions on such cardinal questions as whether or not the PSR should continue to operate as a revolutionary party, individuals such as Chernov, Natanson, and Rakitnikov on one side and Avksentiev, A. Argunov, and Voronov on the other could hardly agree on an issue so divisive as the war.

As Chernov quickly noted in his wartime writings, positions on certain issues before the war largely determined stances on the war itself. Right SRs of the pre-war *Pochin* group such as Sletov, Rudnev, Argunov, and Avksentiev, became the leaders of the defensist or pro-war movement in the party. They had already abandoned the idea of revolution in Russia and favored instead reformist policies. Once the war began, they naturally found the prospect of revolution even more objectionable than before and considered positively reprehensible any deliberate steps to make a revolution or to hinder in any way the war effort. Thus Right SRs, who as socialists, albeit moderate ones, had little liking for the tsarist regime and the classes associated with it, now found an identity of interests with tsarism. Con-

servatives, liberals, and moderate socialists each had their own vision of what Russian economic, social, and political life should be but, for the duration of the war, agreed on the necessity of working within the existing system toward the sacred goal of winning the war. For them, patriotic sentiments took precedence over political divergencies.

The war and related issues presented themselves in a different light to the larger segment of the PSR, which had maintained its revolutionary fervor. For these SRs, the war itself and the disastrous incompetence with which the regime conducted it further underscored the need for revolution. Although not absent, patriotic feelings did not predominate in the thinking of the leftist or "internationalist" socialists. Having totally rejected the tsarist regime, they were more likely than their reformist comrades to adhere to the internationalism to which socialism decades earlier had committed itself.

Yet, anti-war feeling in the PSR was not only widespread but, for many, quite radical, extending all the way to defeatism (a position that espoused the Russian government's defeat in the war). That this phenomenon was not accidental is indicated by the PSR's unusually staunch rejection of militarism in earlier years. At both the 1907 Stuttgart and the 1910 Copenhagen International Congresses, the official SR delegations, led by F. V. Volkhovskii, joined with the younger Liebknecht, leader of the left-wing German Social Democrats, to offer inflammatory anti-war resolutions that espoused propaganda against war in the armed forces and among draft-age youths. On both occasions moderate socialist majorities defeated the resolutions. At the 1912 Basel International Congress, the PSR proclaimed:

Modern war is the inevitable result of the capitalist system. . . . The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries declares war against war . . . [and] will with all its force oppose drawing our country into a fratricidal war. . . . The duty of the party is to protect the working class . . . [against] the insatiable appetite of Russian imperialism. . . . The Party should utilize growing political unrest in the struggle against tsarism and capitalism.

Finally, even as war threatened in late July 1914, I. Rubanovich, the SR delegate to the Brussels Conference of the International Socialist

Bureau, who soon became an ardent defensist, outlined an anti-war stance for the PSR:

The Russian situation is different from the rest of Europe. . . . Tsarism is isolated. . . . The mobilization shows that its aims are bellicose. . . . The Russian proletariat is more revolutionary than the party. There is no doubt that if there is a war the situation will become more revolutionary still. And then, if necessary, the party will resort to highly effective means.¹

Thus SRs opposed to the war had recourse not only to normal socialist anti-war statements (almost everywhere observed more in the breach than in practice) but to a more radical SR tradition. Both internationalism and defeatism were firmly grounded in numerous official SR public statements and programs.

Meeting at Beaugy

On Saturday, 22 August 1914, a contingent of distinguished SR émigré leaders gathered at the dairy farm of E. E. Lazarev in the picturesque Swiss village of Beaugy-sur-Clarens to discuss what to do about the outbreak of the war. Rudnev, a moderate participant, later mistakingly recalled that this was the last attempt by SRs in the emigration to act in a unified manner during the war. Oliver Radkey has noted that those present displayed several different attitudes toward the war. T. Hasegawa suggests that the Beaugy Conference was one of the foundations of Russian socialist defensism.² This is doubtlessly true, but the conference also laid the basis for internationalism and even defeatism in the PSR. Consequently, the Beaugy conference was a key event in the history of wartime Russian socialism.

The Right wing at the conference consisted of V. Bunakov, Avksentiev, and Rudnev, whereas the Left had as its most forceful spokesman Chernov and Natanson; the balance of the fifteen delegates stood somewhere in between. Speaking for the Right, Bunakov asserted that German militarism threatened the democratic entente of France and England. Since Germany also threatened Russia, who had allied itself with the entente, her war effort deserved support. During the war, Russia required reform, rather than revolution.



Victor Chernov, party leader and theorist, SR-Internationalist, Geneva and Paris, 1914–1917. Courtesy New York Public Library.

Consequently, socialists must abandon their normal role for the duration of the war; the only goal for socialists was “the war and its successful conduct.”

For the Left, Chernov presented the matter in a starkly different light: “Our front [as socialists] is against the war, in defense of the socialist international, which is threatened by it.” This war was not defensive for Russia, claimed Chernov, since it had dynastic rather than national goals. A defeat in the war would be only the Russian

government's defeat, the result of which would be a "people's government." The party, stated Chernov,

cannot remain as a mere onlooker, but must set about to influence events. It must prepare arms and . . . influence the masses to the extent possible. We must be ready for revolution and plan it. We must send an active group into Russia, a kernel around which the party forces we have sown will gather. [We must] be prepared for appropriate action.

Although he later renounced defeatism, at this and other times Chernov came very close to outlining a revolutionary defeatist stance for the PSR during the war.

The venerable Natanson approved Chernov's idea of sending activists into Russia and urged the party to put aside all internal strife. As a radical, however, Natanson stated the case for Russia's defeat more clearly than had Chernov: "A great evil would result if Russia defeated Germany. This would be against the interests of the people since it would preserve the existing order." Natanson recommended that the party turn not to the bourgeois intelligentsia but "to the workers and peasants. Reveal to them the corruption of the government and the criminality of the war." Natanson felt that the party should await the right moment for revolution, but "this is hard to imagine without Russia's defeat." Evidently inspired by Natanson's fervor, Chernov echoed him by proclaiming a Russian victory "dangerous" since it would carry the Russian empire to Constantinople. "Our role in victory or defeat is to protest nationalism with extreme means as do Liebknecht and Luxembourg."

The moderates clearly found Chernov's and Natanson's views incomprehensible. In response to Chernov's call for revolutionary action, Rudnev queried in disbelief, "What do you mean—before the end of the war or after it?" Avksentiev made a impassioned plea: "We can't remain neutral; it is a question of the existence of nations. . . . We can't desire anything hindering the war effort. Our role is to organize the campaign in the villages and cities to aid the war." Avksentiev then offered the opinion "There could exist no war protest movement in Russia." Another rightest said, "The whole people lives the war, lives for self-defense. No one is interested in party slogans." A third prognosticated, "There could be no revolt during the war." Bunakov then summed up the pro-war position:



Mark Natanson, early populist organizer, leader of SR-Internationalist movement, Geneva, 1914-17.
Courtesy New York Public Library.

Don't send groups to Russia. . . . This will be seen as anti-Russian. Don't let the *narod* perish. In time of war we all have common aims. While the struggle is not decided, what special aims can socialism and socialists possibly have? What importance is the economic class struggle?

The right wing socialists displayed a conviction, later proved illusory, that the whole Russian people would support the war as ardently as they did.

Chernov and Natanson then explained the leftist program in greater detail. Chernov asserted, "It is necessary to reveal in a so-

cialist manner the anti-people's character of the tsarist policy in the war. . . . We should work not for victory, but for revolution." According to Natanson, for socialists "the problem is what to tell the people; the war is not in their interest. The interests of the ruling classes and the people are contrary in spite of the war. . . . If the masses rise against the war, this is more important than victory of one side or another."

After a grueling debate, during which neither side conceded anything at all, a majority of those present approved the leftist resolution to send a group to Russia for the purpose of organizing party forces for revolution.

The Beaugy Conference then discussed more briefly the problem of the International. Chernov and Natanson took the stance eventually adopted by all leftist socialists in Europe: the Second International, having failed to live up to its commitments to oppose the war, was bankrupt. As soon as possible, they thought, an international conference of anti-war socialists should meet to create a new International, an idea that foreshadowed the 1915 and 1916 Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. As Chernov put it, "The old International is dead! Long live the International!" Bunakov, Avksentiev, and Rudnev opposed outright any international conferences or creation of a new International. Speaking for the Right, Rudnev extolled the Second International for failing to oppose the war, drawing from Chernov the acerbic comment that such praise was "worse than any burial." The majority of SRs present agreed in principle with Chernov and Natanson but felt that, since feelings on all sides were still running high, the idea of convening a European socialist conference was premature.

The Beaugy Conference revealed a split in the PSR over the war so profound that the two positions actually represented antipodal perceptions of a whole range of crucial issues. As noted, the most ardent proponents of the war, Bunakov, Avksentiev, and Rudnev, were founders and supporters of the reformist *Pochin* group, whereas the anti-war leaders Chernov and Natanson represented the central core of the party, which had maintained its dedication to the cause of revolution. The war exacerbated differences that had originated during 1908–1910, a development that did not augur well for the possibility of any conciliation of the two sides. In any case, the con-

flicting pro- and anti-war SR programs arose in full bloom right from the outset of World War I.

The SR Anti-War Movement Is Born

For a time, SR leaders continued their attempts to reach a unified approach to the burning issue of the war. During October 1914, the Paris Group of SRs debated the issue of socialist volunteerism into the allied armies. The pro-war faction, led by B. Voronov, naturally approved of volunteerism, and the anti-war forces, whose chief spokesmen in this case were Chernov and Lavretskii, condemned it. Voronov thought that every socialist living in France should join the French Army in order to fight German imperialism; another rightist felt that Germany's defeat would end European militarism. Lavretskii characterized volunteerism as "a mistake," and Chernov lectured about the duties of socialists, which he defined as acting in such a way that at the end of the war they could exert an influence in the remaking of Europe. "If German militarism is bad," stated Chernov, "so is Russian tsarism."

A few weeks later, SR leaders met in Chernov's apartment in Lausanne, Switzerland, for what the Okhranka described as "an intimate discussion." Avksentiev, Rudnev, Bunakov, and Lazarev represented the pro-war group; Natanson, Varvara Natanson, I. Sidorych, and Chernov, who chaired the meeting, spoke for the anti-war alignment. Chernov characterized the positions of Natanson, who espoused full opposition, and Avksentiev, who advocated full support, as the two extremes. Still others, noted Chernov, felt that Russian socialists should remain neutral and work toward the summoning of an international socialist conference that would work out a position for all socialists.³ Although Chernov did not ascribe this intermediate stance to anyone in particular, it was likely his position since attempting to mediate between starkly opposed radical and moderate views was quite characteristic of Chernov. Regardless, during fall 1914 his anti-war work had just begun.

By the end of November, Right and Left SRs were no longer meeting together. A Right SR conference issued a pro-war statement that called for a Russian victory. A Left SR conference responded by is-

suing a counterresolution, signed by Chernov, Rakitnikov, Ol'ga Rakitnikov, and several others, that condemned the war and, according to an *Okhranka* (tsarist secret police) report, censured the Russian government.⁴ The mid-November appearance in Paris of an anti-war newspaper edited by Chernov had precipitated the final split, after which the PSR's right and left wings worked separately and at cross purposes, until the February Revolution brought about an uneasy, temporary rapprochement.

The first issue of Chernov's internationalist daily *Mysl'* appeared on 15 November 1914. Along with the Left Menshevik *Golos* and the Bolshevik *Sotsial-Demokrat*, *Mysl'* helped set the tone for the predominant internationalist movement among Russian socialists in the West European emigration. Most prominent among an extensive list of *Mysl'* contributors were Chernov (under the nom de guerre Iurii Gardenin), N. Rakitnikov (under the name N. Maksimov), O. Rakitnikov, Ol'ga Chernov, V. V. Leonovich (under the name V. Angarskii), and Boris Kamkov.⁵ From the very beginning, the French censors whited out all material it considered offensive, which meant that the most radical articles could not be printed, a problem that also confronted the Left Menshevik *Golos* but not Lenin's *Sotsial-Demokrat*, which appeared in neutral Switzerland. Lenin, who followed *Mysl'* and its successors *Zhizn'* and *Otkliki zhizni* closely and who fretted if he missed a single issue, nevertheless denigrated the contents of the SR dailies, commenting at one point, "In Paris an SR daily *Mysl'* has come out (archtrivial phrases toying with 'leftism'). [It consists of] sayings of intellectuals, today rrevolutionary, tomorrow . . . ? You can't believe them two kopecks worth [linguistic oddities in the original]." ⁶

Despite Lenin's accusations and the problem of the censors, *Mysl'* managed to lay down in clear terms its line on the war and related issues; thus *Mysl'* forged the Left SR movement in the emigration and helped foster the movement at home (even deep inside Russia the police called anti-war SRs "Chernovites" or "Myslites"). *Mysl'*s writers took a position that combined bitter condemnation of the government with utter hostility to the war, ridicule of the idea of Russian victory, and ceaseless calls for revolution either during the war or immediately after it. In the articles that escaped the censor's pen, *Mysl'* did not advocate Russia's defeat but referred to it as a

possible outcome, preferable to Russia's victory; *Mysl'*'s attitude on the war as the matrix of revolution constitutes the crux of its position. In a December 1914 article, Chernov advised anti-war socialists to enter social organizations inside Russia, "assigning [yourselves] one task—to reveal to the eyes of society the inescapable conflict that is already maturing"; a few days later, he predicted a time "when the revolutionary struggle against the war . . . will be obligatory." Almost daily Chernov reverted to the theme of the inevitability of revolution: "The interests of the people and the government . . . can't coincide in this war. . . . The conflict between the people and the government is inescapable. . . . Be ready. . . !" Early in 1915, other *Mysl'* writers insisted on the necessity for "the struggle against [the government] even during the war" and told socialists to "agitate, especially if conditions are ripe for peace and for revolution" and to "be prepared."⁸ In this connection, Chernov also called for socialists to enter the Russian army "with explicitly revolutionary aims," a point of interest since during 1915 and 1916 SRs inside Russia actively espoused an identical program.⁹

Mysl' attacked volunteerism, which it portrayed as futile, disruptive of the socialist cause, a disease plaguing émigré socialists of all factions.¹⁰ *Mysl'* writers aimed their polemical daggers against pro-war socialists and praised their anti-war opponents. When the Right Menshevik N. Iordanskii called the war a "people's war," one author queried with malice why, if this was so, so few had volunteered, so that the tsarist army depended for its existence almost entirely on the draft?¹¹ *Mysl'* lauded Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg as among the few German Social Democrats to oppose the war and reprinted several of Liebknecht's anti-war proclamations. In one article, Boris Kamkov extolled Liebknecht's opposing the main tendency of his party by coming out "not on the side of force, but on the side of socialist duty" against the war.¹²

On the question of the International, *Mysl'* adhered to the ideas that Chernov and Natanson had already expressed at the Beaugy Conference. Chernov ridiculed the Right socialist view that wartime meetings of the International were impossible: "Do you think," he asked them, "that Germany and German Social Democracy are Sodom and Gomorrha?" In Chernov's view, socialists should avoid attributing war guilt and, on the basis of the needs of world social-



Left to right: E. Lazarev, N. D. Chaikovskii, and E. K. Breshko-Breshkovskaia ("Little Grandmother of the Russian Revolution"). Early populist organizers and defensist SRs during the war. The August 1914 party conference at Beaugy-sur-Clarens, Switzerland, took place on Lazarev's dairy farm. Courtesy New York Public Library.

ism, should work out a single program, which should incorporate the concept of conscious interference in the war. This would put socialists everywhere "in conflict with the bourgeois and reactionary elements" and would lead to a "clash," as the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress had already determined. Chernov warned, "Only parties working toward these goals will have the moral authority to found the Third International."¹³ One writer noted the popularity in some circles of the slogan "The Fatherland is in danger!" and concluded the slogan was correct, except that for socialists the International was the Fatherland. Foreshadowing the later Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, already in late 1914 *Mysl'* advocated the prompt convening of an international conference "to deal with the war, not avoid it." The slogan offered by the anti-war SRs was "The International is dead! Long live the International!"¹⁴

Mysl' articles often reported on the effects of the war in the villages and in the cities, noted manifestations of unrest in Russia, and commented hopefully on the growth of an anti-war movement in-

side Russia and elsewhere. One writer correctly prophesied "Old bureaucratic-autocratic Rus' is at an end."¹⁵

As noted, the only leftist plank not found on the pages of the SR daily was open advocacy of Russia's defeat (of course, the French censors would have deleted such material in any case). Nevertheless, many *Mysl'* articles implied Russia's defeat; other factors indicate that defeatism was not unheard-of among those associated with *Mysl'* and its successor papers. During the spring of 1915, a small SR paper, *Nashe ekho* (Our echo), appeared for a time in Paris under the editorship of the moderate internationalist B. Kanskii (Friedberg). On the pages of his newspaper, Kanskii described an incident from the previous fall in which one of the "arch-internationalists" from *Mysl'* declared at a meeting of Paris SRs that

if the Germans actually threatened the national-cultural values of Russia, then the defense of Russia would really be a lawful affair for socialists. But I do not see that the threat is real and therefore from the revolutionary point of view the defeat of Russia is more useful than victory and socialists must contribute to that defeat.¹⁶

Since both Chernov and Natanson had made similar arguments as early as August, a reasonable conclusion is that some of the internationalist SRs were defeatists.

Considerable evidence that pertains to the PSR in the emigration (and at home) indicates that the sizable majority of the party's cadres opposed the war. Persons of the stature of Chernov, the Natansons, the Rakitnikovs, Ulianov, and Kamkov headed the internationalist movement within the party. At war's outbreak, the Foreign Delegation of the Central Committee, the acting head of the PSR, split in half on the war (just as did the Bolshevik Committee), with Chernov, Natanson, Lavretskii, and N. Lazerkevich forming the anti-war group.¹⁷ Thereafter, the internationalists regularly published émigré newspapers, whereas the Right SRs managed to issue only a handful of issues of one or two papers throughout the entire war era. The pro-war faction would never have maintained such a low profile, especially in France, where the government was quite supportive, unless the audience for this viewpoint was small. The more important phenomenon, especially as regards party cadres, was the internationalist movement.

The Split Deepens

With much fanfare, pro-war socialists promoted the early 1915 London Conference of Allied Socialists (that is, of France, England, and Russia). The concept of a meeting of socialists from one side of the world conflict was not a felicitous one from the viewpoint of the internationalists, and few leftists attended. The Bolshevik delegate I. Maiskii attempted to read a rather provocative declaration, was deprived of the floor, and left. The Right SRs Argunov and Rubanovich and the Left SRs Chernov and Natanson participated. Since most of those attending favored the war, the resolution passed by the conference called for an Allied victory over German militarism. Instead of voting against the resolution, Natanson and Chernov abstained, drawing the ire of Martov, who inquired in the Left Menshevik paper *Nashe slovo* why they had not voted against the resolution. Somewhat lamely, Chernov explained that since the beginning of the war the SR-Internationalists had been appealing for a general socialist conference aimed at the creation of the Third International, an idea in which the SDs had as yet shown no interest. He and Natanson allegedly abstained in order not to jeopardize a future role in the founding of a new International.¹⁸

The resolution that Chernov and Natanson unsuccessfully introduced in London provides a clearer insight into their actual views than their curious abstention. The resolution, part of which appeared in *Mysl'*, warned against what it termed an illusion that a defeat of Germany would produce democracy and an end to militarism; neither side in the war deserved idealization, insisted the leftist document. Instead, socialists should be working to re-establish working-class and socialist unity through a new International. The two leftist leaders especially condemned the right socialist slogans advocating "the disarmament of socialists" and "civil peace during the war," policies, they claimed, that would only strengthen the most conservative elements in Russian society at the expense of those with the most cause for discontent. Only a peoples' movement of all warring nations could bring about a solid peace based on an end to secret diplomacy, treaties, alliances, and armaments. The correct slogan, continued Chernov and Natanson, was not the pacifist "Peace at all costs" but "peace on conditions favorable to the

working classes."¹⁹ The latter slogan signified an end to the war through internationalist revolution, the only conceivable outcome that could be "favorable to the working classes."

Although the Right SRs widely propagandized the London Conference and its pro-war resolution, most SRs, observed the moderate A. Ronsin, "displayed a strange passiveness about the affair." *Nashe ekho* subsequently complained about the "accidental and fictitious" representation of Russian socialism at the conference and quoted a resolution passed by the Kent section of the British Socialist party that protested "this caricature of a conference of so-called socialists, pretending to represent the socialist parties of the 'allied countries.'" The editor of *Nashe ekho*, Kanskii, hoped that soon a "real International would gather, solidly tied to the masses by a single spirit and a single will."²⁰

Even as the London Conference was gathering, the Montpelier Group of SRs issued a resolution that, along with the usual anti-war planks, demanded "the immediate convocation of an international congress or at least a conference of socialists of all warring nations" and "that socialists not summon neutral nations into the war."²¹ Obviously intended as a rebuke to the rationale of the London Conference, this resolution coincided with the views of many émigré SRs. In *Zhizn'*, the London Group of Aid to the PSR called for a full meeting of émigré SRs to erase the impression left by the London Conference. A few weeks later the moderate Paris Group of Aid to the PSR sided with the London SRs and, furthermore, advocated that the PSR as a whole endorse and support *Mysl'*, since, according to the Paris SRs, its positions "coincided with the interests of the party as a whole." The Clarens Group of SRs also endorsed the idea of an SR conference to discuss the war. The lack of response to the pro-war conference and the anti-war animus displayed even by centrist SRs did not bode well for the right wing's plan to line up Russian socialists behind the war effort.

Although there is no indication that more than a small minority of émigré SRs ever favored the war, evidence does suggest that by spring 1915 the hundreds of SRs in Western Europe were moving even further to the left. An Okhranka report from late May 1915 noted: "More and more often [émigré SRs] adhere to the . . . anti-national tendency, as it is called, the 'Myslites', adherents of Cher-

nov and his paper *Mysl'*, later called *Zhizn'*. In Switzerland the SRs are very much against a Russian victory." A second police report from the same month stated that the previously quite moderate Beaugy SRs were now demanding an end to the war, active efforts for peace, and utilization of mass anti-war sentiment to achieve the desired goal. At this time the Beaugy SRs endorsed an anti-war resolution recently issued by the most radical SRs in Western Europe, the Geneva Group of Assistance to the PSR. A few months later the Lausanne Group of Aid to the PSR lined up behind the leftists.²²

The Travails of *Mysl'* and *Zhizn'*

Just when the SRs were undergoing a radicalization process, and perhaps because of it, the French police, who during the war cooperated with the tsarist Okhranka, closed in on the internationalist SR papers. By mid-March 1915, the censors attacked *Mysl'* articles so vociferously that, complained Chernov, its "pages had come to look like a map of unexplored Africa." Shortly thereafter, the Chernov group changed the name of *Mysl'* to *Zhizn'* (Life). Not deceived and under direct pressure from the tsarist government, the French authorities responded not only by increasing censorship but by forbidding meetings, reading of reports, public lectures, or any other activities aimed at fundraising for *Zhizn'*.²³ When the editors broached the possibility of moving the paper to Switzerland, which exercised no censorship, the French printers, perhaps loath to lose the business, warned that, if the paper moved, the French government would ban it entirely, an undesirable outcome since the socialist public was much larger in France than in Switzerland. Nevertheless, by late May the censorship had become so onerous that *Zhizn'* moved to Geneva, where it became a weekly. As predicted, the French authorities banned the paper at the border, circulation dropped, and fundraising in Switzerland proved difficult. *Zhizn'* continued publication until early 1916, when the internationalist SRs replaced it with two new publications, *Na chuzhbine* (On Foreign Soil) and *Otkliki zhizni* (Echoes of Life), in Geneva and Paris, respectively.²⁴ Thus the internationalists attempted to reach as broad a spectrum of the socialist public as possible.



Boris Kamkov, leading SR-Internationalist, Geneva, 1914-17. Courtesy New York Public Library.

Zhizn's numerous contributors, virtually the identical group associated with *Mysl'*, with the notable addition of the elder George Kennan, continued the earlier paper's positions on the war and revolution. However, differences between the internationalists of the Chernov-Rakitnikov wing and defeatists of the Natanson-Kamkov wing surfaced more clearly in *Zhizn'* than in *Mysl'*. After a polemical flurry between Dikii (an internationalist) and G. Dalin (a defeatist), Dalin claimed that for all the good accomplished by *Mysl'*, it had also caused considerable harm by "the indefiniteness of its po-

sitions and its fear of a final rupture with the patriotic elements in our party." In a shaft aimed at Chernov, Dalin then characterized some *Mysl'* writing as "unclear, foggy, and containing unreconciled contradictions."²⁵ In fact, both *Mysl'* and *Zhizn'* contained articles that expressed various nuances of opinion about the war issue. Just as anti-war SDs such as Martov, Trotsky, and Lenin espoused quite different policies, so Chernov, Rakitnikov, Natanson, Kamkov, and Dalin were united more by their opposition to the war than by their programs for what should be done about it.

A set of twenty theses published in a July issue of *Zhizn'* managed at one and the same time to suggest both the anti-war revolutionary passion of the left wing of the PSR and the indecisiveness of the Chernov faction. The theses noted the special character of the war with its absolutist *and* capitalist tendencies. Since capitalism was moving into its imperialist phase, the socialist and workers' movements must begin a struggle against bourgeois class domination to extend much further than pacifistic criticism of existing political regimes; it must pass over to the realm of irrevocable action (that is, revolution) against contemporary bourgeois society. On the question of war guilt, the theses laid the blame at the doors of all the major powers, but then (moving into Chernovian ambiguity) suggested that, although socialists should desire the victory of neither side, a comparative analysis of outcomes, based on perceptions of who started the war, was possible; this analysis would not, however, determine the course of tactics and socialists should prepare for various eventualities. Workers and soldiers should participate only in the struggle against the war, but socialists should not call for the proletariat in one country to cease participating in defense as long as socialists in opposing countries did not do likewise. The last point represents Chernov's concept of reciprocity, which he first outlined at Beaugy and which radical leftists like Natanson had rejected ever since. Despite Chernov's occasional equivocations and the limitations imposed by censorship, *Mysl'* and *Zhizn'* displayed a steady resolve against the war, tsarism, and capitalism.

By fall 1915 *Zhizn'* writers, spurred on by the enthusiastic response to the Zimmerwald Conference and news of unrest inside Russia, converted the call for revolution into a drumbeat. On 5 September Chernov announced, that only "decisive action by decisive people [that is, revolution carried out by revolutionaries] would cure

Russia's ills." In mid-October an editorial warned against allowing the ruling classes to survive the current catastrophe; the only goal was "revolution," and the only means to that goal was "to turn the current modern European crisis into a revolutionary crisis." In early December a group of regular *Zhizn'* writers proclaimed revolution the immediate task of the laboring classes of Russia and other warring countries. Finally, on 2 January 1916 Chernov ended an article with the slogans: "Strike at once! Make the revolution!"²⁶

During the first eighteen months of the war, activities of pro-war SRs in Western Europe did not remotely approach those of the anti-war forces. Even the moderates of the center, who seemed to like the internationalists better than the defensists, issued only the obscure and irregular *Nashe ekho*. The first outright pro-war or defensist SR émigré paper was *Za rubezhom* (Beyond the border), which had a run of only three issues between March and July 1915.²⁷ Thus, during a period when the defensists languished in near-silence, the internationalist SRs overcame formidable obstacles to issue regular newspapers, circumstances that again suggest that most émigré SRs inclined to the Left, rather than to the Right.

The Two Socialist Alliances

During the war era, an especially well-defined system of blocs that cut across party lines characterized the socialist movement. Within each of the three major socialist parties—the SRs, the Mensheviks, and the Bolsheviks—splits arose over the war issue. Pro-war feeling was more or less as common among Bolsheviks as among SRs and Mensheviks, and, with varying degrees of intensity, anti-war sentiment found deep roots in all three parties.²⁸ Almost alone in European socialism, Russian socialists on the whole remained faithful to pre-war vows to oppose any international conflict. Regardless, both those who opposed the war and those who supported it formed coalitions. For the war's duration, attitudes toward the war determined alliances more than did party designations.

Left Mensheviks, Left SRs, and anti-war Bolsheviks formed the Left socialist bloc; Right Mensheviks and Right SRs constituted the pro-war bloc, with sympathetic Bolsheviks usually remaining somewhat aloof, or, like G. Aleksinskii, joining the ranks of the

Mensheviks. Even this scheme does not exhaust the complexities of the situation: internationalist SRs who were not defeatist had as their closest allies the Menshevik-Internationalists, whereas defeatist SRs were closest to the Bolsheviks. The relationship between the most radical SRs and the Bolsheviks led Right SRs to make the charge, both contemporaneously and later, that the whole internationalist SR movement came to its position, which right-wing socialists found incomprehensible, solely under the tutelage of the Bolsheviks.²⁹ The August 1914 Beaugy Conference demonstrates to the contrary that SR anti-war sentiment both of the internationalists (Chernov and Rakitnikov) and of the defeatists (Natanson and Kamkov) emerged simultaneously with the outbreak of the war, before Lenin articulated his position, and reflected long-held values and programs. Cooperation among anti-war SRs, Bolsheviks, and Mensheviks represented a similarity of views on the important questions of the day.

In 1914 and 1915 the most visible personages in the Left socialist block were the Left Menshevik Martov, the nonaligned SD Trotsky, the Bolshevik Lunacharsky, and Chernov. During fall 1914 the French secret police reported that these four were the leading figures in Russian émigré circles, who constantly appeared together at meetings and conferences where they "argued the same case." According to the French police, whose grasp of Russian politics was imperfect, Chernov was the leader, the others his lieutenants.³⁰ The French prefecture also noticed a strong unification movement not only among the various SD branches but between the SDs and SRs. Lunacharsky played the chief role in convening a June 1915 SR-SD unification conference, with SRs from the Chernov wing in attendance, that bore no concrete results. Regarding the same period (summer and fall 1915), the *Okhranka* reported that Trotsky "acts as the unifying element between the Social Democratic and Socialist Revolutionary parties." In November 1915 four hundred Russian socialists of various parties met in Geneva and issued a declaration that greeted "the dawn of the Second Russian Revolution," which would, they thought, "lead to world revolution."³¹

The pro-war socialist movement took much longer to coalesce and to move into action of any sort. During the first terrible fall of the war, many pro-war Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, SRs and anarchists enlisted into the French Army, but the tide of enlistments quickly

slowed to a halt. Finally, on 23 September 1915, more than a year after the outbreak of the conflict, pro-war SRs and Mensheviks met in Lausanne to launch a highly publicized and ambitious pro-war newspaper edited by the Right SRs Argunov, Bunakov, Avksentiev, and Voronov; the Right Mensheviks Plekhanov and A. Liubimov; and the former Bolshevik Aleksinskii.³² The four SRs were the former editors of the paper *Za rubezhom*, which, after appearing in only three issues during the spring and summer of 1915, was discontinued in favor of the new joint endeavor that bore the title *Prizyv* (The call).

Prizyv gave unstinting support to Russia's war effort; desired an Allied, and, above all, a Russian victory; and, at first, denied any social or political goal for socialists other than pro-war activities. The paper favored the government's attempt to have workers' groups elected to the War-Industries Committees (organizations of major industrialists engaged in the manufacture of war materials), repeatedly denied the existence of a serious anti-war movement inside Russia, and opposed industrial strikes that "would aid the external enemy" by hampering Russian war production. Nevertheless, *Prizyv* did not entirely abjure agitational-propagandistic work for socialists; in fact, *Prizyv* writers gradually turned against the tsarist government, which pursued the war so ineptly. *Prizyv* insisted, however, that antitsarist activities not hinder the war effort.³³

The program the *Prizyv* group adopted early in the fall of 1915 marked a new, important stage in the evolution of Russian pro-war socialism. Whereas previously defensist socialists had played a passive role, both in the emigration and at home, they now took a more aggressive stance by turning away from their previous unquestioning support of the tsarist regime. Lenin and other leftist socialists recognized the significance of this development. Still, in some respects the roles of Lenin's *Sotsial-Demokrat* and the Right socialist *Prizyv* were analogous. Both papers served as focal points of discussion, titillated everyone, and caused scandal in opposing camps but found relatively few outright adherents. That by fall 1915, after a year of the direst warfare, only forty-five SRs and SDs, of the many hundreds in the emigration, associated themselves with the *Prizyv* group suggests again the weak appeal pro-war sentiment had among rank-and-file Russian socialists.

Naturally, *Prizyv* claimed on its pages to represent the views of

the majority of "the comrades at home," a claim the Left could make more accurately. Regardless, the formation of the two blocs highlights an important general phenomenon within the Russian socialist movement: various wings of the parties almost always aligned themselves into blocks that, on the basis of major current political issues such as the war, sliced across party lines, a phenomenon that deserves greater attention than it has yet received.

The SRs and the Zimmerwald Movement

On 17 September 1915, a meeting of SRs from Berne, Lausanne, and Geneva, including Chernov, B. Vnorovskii, J. Dikker, Natanson, I. Starynkevich, D. Gavronskii, and A. Ustinov, reached a decision, according to the *Okhranka*, to coordinate their actions and "make contacts in Russia."³⁴ Although the Beaugy Conference of a year earlier had voted to send activists to Russia, wartime conditions had as yet precluded close contact with party comrades at home. By fall 1915, however, the atmosphere in Russia was changing and both SDs and SRs began to contemplate forging closer ties with party organizations back home. A few weeks after the first meeting, an expanded conference of anti-war SRs from all over Switzerland took as its main topic the situation inside Russia. Chernov and other speakers noted that the war was turning the masses against the government, and Chernov advocated revolutionary propaganda among the civilian population and in the armed forces. The conference concluded that the time had come to set up underground routes for channeling revolutionary literature into Russia.³⁵

Thus the movement of late summer and fall 1915 to call an international socialist conference (which the anti-war SRs had first advocated in late 1914) arose in an environment of hardening views about the war; anti-war socialists of various nations were now willing to meet together, even if they came from countries on opposite sides of the battle lines. On general principle the so-called Zimmerwald movement, which had as its goal to coordinate anti-war measures among all socialists, received enthusiastic support from internationalist SRs, but its timing was also especially opportune for the leftist SRs, who just then were organizing their own practical measures against the war.

Thirty-eight socialists from eleven countries met at the little village of Zimmerwald outside Geneva to discuss the war. Of these, twelve were from Russia and Poland, including the Mensheviks Axelrod and Martov, the Bolsheviks Lenin and Zinoviev, the Latvian SD Ia. Berzin, the nonaligned SD Trotsky, the Bundist P. Lemanskii, and the SRs Chernov and Natanson.³⁶ The famous Zimmerwald Conference, as well as its successor at Kienthal, was characterized by a spirit of socialist cooperation. As Lenin later expressed it rather gingerly, "During the war we concluded a certain compromise with . . . the Left Mensheviks (Martov) and part of the Socialist Revolutionaries (Chernov, Natanson), sitting together with them at Zimmerwald and Kienthal and publishing with them general manifestoes. . . ." ³⁷

Still, there were differences of opinion among the various individuals and groups in the Zimmerwald movement. For instance, when Chernov accurately reported at Zimmerwald that the SR Foreign Delegation of the Central Committee and local party committees inside Russia were internationalist and that the latter were issuing numerous anti-war proclamations, the Bolshevik *Sotsial-Demokrat* chided Chernov for "phrase-mongering" and "bragging": "Where is it easier to build 'Potemkin villages' than in front of the foreign comrades?" ³⁸ Likewise, even the SR delegation of two was not unanimous. Chernov and Natanson both voted in favor of the anti-war manifesto issued at Zimmerwald, and Natanson, along with Lenin and Axelrod, also signed the document. Chernov, however, criticized it for failing to mention Romanov dynastic aims in the war and for seeming to place the wartime burden entirely on the proletariat, whereas in Russia the peasantry suffered most; in the end he refused to sign the manifesto for which he had, with reservations, voted. Subsequently, Chernov repeated his criticisms in *Zhizn'* and in a speech in Geneva claimed that Zimmerwald had failed to found a new International because it had inadequate representation; Natanson retained his enthusiasm, later claiming, "Zimmerwald gave birth to the new International and Kienthal christened it." ³⁹

Despite Natanson's mysterious announcement at the end of the Zimmerwald deliberations that he and Chernov represented both the anti-war and pro-war factions of the PSR, the Right SRs positively anathematized the Zimmerwald Conference, its manifesto, and the Kienthal Conference that followed it. The conference was

indeed a watershed in the splits both in the PSR and in the Russian socialist movement. During the winter of 1915–1916 the Foreign Delegation of the Central Committee, which now had a four-two majority against the war, issued a declaration that admitted the division over the war issue; the party, claimed the declaration, was “split to such an extent that neither side can take responsibility for the political actions of the other.”⁴⁰ The Okhranka mistook this for the formation of two separate parties.⁴¹ Shortly thereafter, the Lausanne Group of SRs (Internationalists) issued a proclamation that hailed the Zimmerwald Manifesto, requested party unity, and advised the creation of “groups of aid to the PSR [that would] remain faithful to party precepts, not casting down internationalist and revolutionary banners in the face of the triumphant march of military madness temporarily seizing Europe.” The Lausanne Left SRs also accused party members who entered the *Prizyv* group of violating party unity: “The confines of the party have become too narrow for them.”⁴²

Pro-war SRs from Lausanne and Clarens issued a counterproclamation, printed in *Prizyv* and *Zhizn'*, that blamed the leftists for the split:

The Lausanne internationalists definitely indicated that they do not wish to work together with comrades who recognize the right to self-defense [in the war]. . . . This unwillingness . . . was stated so categorically that we did not succeed in preventing this sad event [the split in the party] . . . [for which] the Lausanne Group of Aid to the PSR cannot avoid taking responsibility.⁴³

According to the Right SRs, Chernov and Natanson were the villains in dividing the party. Each side blamed the other for the split and each laid claim to the loyalty of SRs at home.

The SR Internationalists, the Home Front, and a Spy

The first year of the war had been a difficult one for all the émigré socialists, but, by fall 1915, the leftist SRs had laid firm foundations for new attempts to translate their anti-war sentiment into practical activities. Through reestablished communications with organiza-

tions inside Russia, SR anti-war groups centered primarily in Switzerland learned of a growing anti-war revolutionary movement in Russia. As Chernov had reported to the Zimmerwald Conference, numerous SR organizations had come out against the war and were engaged in revolutionary agitation. On the basis of this exciting information, the leftist SR leaders Chernov, Natanson, Kamkov, P. Prozhian, and a certain A. Tsivin hatched a scheme to travel incognito to Russia through underground channels for the purpose of providing leadership for the growing, but disorganized, revolutionary movement at home. In late January 1916, the *Okhranka* reported that Chernov, Natanson, and Kamkov already had false passports. The plan also involved the demise of *Zhizn'*, which was in dire financial straits.⁴⁴

For some reason the return trip to Russia fell through. Kamkov and Natanson remained in Switzerland and assumed control of the SR Internationalist movement, in which Natanson's role was especially great; Chernov seems to have gone to Italy, where he played a less active role in anti-war activities than earlier.⁴⁵ Perhaps they got wind of the provocateur surely in their midst; the *Okhranka* was so well informed about their endeavors that it had detailed descriptions of their forged passports, including pseudonyms they employed. Had they gone, the police would surely have intercepted them at the border. Nevertheless, somewhat later in the year another Left SR, P. Aleksandrovich, successfully traveled to Russia, where he became deeply involved in the revolutionary underground in Petrograd during the last months of the old regime.

The case of Tsivin, one of the SRs the *Okhranka* mentioned in connection with the plan to go to Russia, is of interest since he was a spy, not for the *Okhranka* but for the Austrians and Germans. As an active party member since 1905, Tsivin had intimate ties with the entire PSR and especially with the left wing, with which he was associated. Tsivin seems to have made rather grandiose overestimates of his position as a leader of the SR Internationalists, promising his Austrian and German contacts, for instance, "to set in motion revolutionary and pacifistic propaganda among Russian prisoners-of-war in Austria and inside Russia itself" and to recruit people from the camps to send to Russia as underground anti-war agents. The Austrians and Germans became aware of his self-

aggrandizement but still valued his general descriptions of the SR anti-war movement both in the emigration and inside Russia, which in both cases corresponded with information they had received from other sources.

Romberg, an official from the German Embassy in Switzerland, described the SR spy's representations as follows. Tsivin felt that the war had turned many formerly oppositionist liberals in Russia into patriotic citizens, but that in the long run it improved the prospects for revolution. In Tsivin's words,

The SR Party was gaining more and more ground, both behind the front and at the front itself. Its followers numbered hundreds of thousands, and even many army officers belonged to the party. More and more people were tiring of the war. The next aim of the [SRs] was to work for a quick end to the war. The party's real program could not be put into effect until the end of the war. . . . The interests of the Central powers and the party therefore coincided. The furtherance of revolutionary propaganda would, on the one hand, make it more difficult for the Russian government to continue the war and, on the other, would also strengthen the desire of the reactionary government for peace.

Tsivin also described in detail the distribution of revolutionary propaganda inside Russia that, according to Romberg, agreed with data the Germans had received from Keskula, a Finnish revolutionary with close ties to the Russian socialist parties. Romberg concluded, "There was no reason to doubt that the SRs could be counted on to help shorten the war considerably. In the long run prospects were exceedingly good."⁴⁶ Tsivin's reports, whose general outlines are corroborated in other sources, provide valuable and rare insights from within the SR Internationalist faction into the outlook of left-ist SRs in 1915 and 1916.

The SR Internationalists and the Kienthal Conference

During the winter and spring of 1916, the expanding part of European socialism that adhered to the Zimmerwald movement planned and carried out a second conference at Kienthal. Martov for the Left Mensheviks, Lenin and G. Zinoviev for the Bolsheviks, and Natan-

son for the Left SRs took part in the expanded session of the International Socialist Bureau that met in Berne from 5 through 9 February 1916 to plan the Kienthal gathering. At the conference itself, which opened in late April, Martov and Axelrod represented the Left Mensheviks; Lenin, Zinoviev, and I. Armand the Bolsheviks; and Natanson, V. Lunkevich, and Lavretskii (the latter two under the names "Savel'ev" and "Vlasov") the SR Internationalists.⁴⁷

An especially radical tone, first set by the French Left socialists when they delivered a sharp rebuke to their pro-war comrades for voting for war credits in the French Assembly, predominated throughout the conference sessions. By this time even the anti-war Zimmerwald movement witnessed splits; the so-called Zimmerwald Left, including the Bolshevik and Left SR delegates, followed the example of the French in issuing a pronouncement on the subject of war credits in the various parliaments.⁴⁸ The Kienthal resolution or manifesto on the subjects of the war and the new International manifested a sharpened leftist position, to which the leftist SRs, led by Natanson, contributed and subscribed. It rigorously delineated the class basis of the war, urged workers of city and village to realize who profited from it, attacked illusions about bourgeois pacifism, declared that the only way to prevent future wars was "for working people to seize governmental power and capitalist property," and asserted a victory of socialism as the only path to peace. Finally, it urged the peoples of the warring nations to demand an immediate peace and to "rise up in a struggle against the war."⁴⁹

Among additional actions, the Kienthal Conference set up a commission, consisting of Meir, Hoffman, Grimm, Modiglian, Radek, Brizon, and Natanson, to write a resolution on the question of how the proletariat should relate to the war. The resolution worked out by the Left socialists called for the proletariat to prevent annexations by any of the warring powers by means of "revolutionary mass struggle for socialism."⁵⁰

As had its predecessor at Zimmerwald, the Kienthal Conference dismayed the Right SRs. Avksentiev and Bunakov, two former Central Committee members who had resigned to join the *Prizyv* group, wrote a letter printed in *Prizyv* sharply critical of representatives of the Foreign Delegation of the SR Central Committee—Chernov and Natanson at Zimmerwald and Natanson, Araratskii-Lunkevich, and Lavretskii at Kienthal—for participating in the two Left socialist

gatherings. They maintained that, in the absence of a conference to provide guidance on the thorny war issue, the current Foreign Delegation, with its four anti-war and two pro-war members, was not representative of the party and therefore should not have sent delegates to these events. Lunkevich and Lavretskii effectively rebutted the Right SRs by pointing out in the Left SR paper *Otkliki zhizni* that the Foreign Delegation had sent delegates to congresses of the International in 1910 and 1912 and, more recently, to the pro-war London Conference in early 1915 without objections from anyone. As a symbol of the party in difficult circumstances, they concluded, the Foreign Delegation of the SR Central Committee could not refrain from taking part in international conferences.⁵¹

Slogans associated with the Zimmerwald-Kienthal movement—"Demand an immediate armistice!," "Down with the war!," "Long live peace!," "Peace without annexations!," and "Long live international socialism!"—quickly became battle cries for most SR organizations both in the emigration and at home. The SR Foreign Delegation issued two bulletins about the Kienthal Conference. In July 1916 the Petersburg SR Committee wrote a letter to the Foreign Delegation that announced its support for the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Manifestoes.⁵² Many SR organizations in Russia issued such declarations; indicative of the enormous popularity of the anti-war conferences among SRs is the fact that even party leaders such as Kerensky and A. Gots, normally viewed as pro-war, felt impelled to claim to adhere to the principles of Zimmerwaldism. The membership of the PSR continued to find its center of gravity to the Left rather than to the Right.

Otkliki zhizni and Na chuzhbine

During the period of early 1916 when Chernov, Natanson, Kamkov, and other leftist SRs intended to return to Russia, they agreed upon the demise of the financially troubled *Zhizn'*. When the return home proved impossible, the Left SRs, minus Chernov, who left for Italy, decided to issue two new publications that might overcome the problems that had confronted *Zhizn'*: *Otkliki zhizni* (Echoes of life), to appear in Paris, and *Na chuzhbine* (On foreign soil), to

appear in Geneva. Historians have shown some awareness of *Na chuzhbine* as an SR Internationalist paper, whereas *Otkliki zhizni* has unaccountably dropped into complete obscurity. Much of the writing in *Otkliki zhizni*, which was in no way of less interest than that of the other paper, was done by persons already identified with the SR Internationalist movement, most of whom had long contributed to *Mysl'* and *Zhizn'*, including A. Ronsin, V. Dikii, Inessa Andreeva, Kamkov, V. Nikolaevich, and Lazerkevich.

Indicative of a somewhat more radical tone now that Chernov no longer exercised direct editorial control was the rapid exclusion of A. Ronsin as a regular contributor on the basis that his views were "too moderate," as a notice in *Otkliki zhizni* stated. Throughout the thirteen issues of the paper between early 1916 and early 1917, its writers polemicized with Right socialists, triumphantly reported manifestations of the waxing revolutionary movement at home, openly supported revolutionary agitation within the armed forces, and opposed the formation of workers' groups in the War-Industries Committees (WICs), an issue that sparked considerable debate between Left and Right socialists. One article accused the "social-patriots" (pro-war socialists) of undermining socialist solidarity by opposing the attempts to create a new International: "For them 'Love of the Fatherland' covers everything, literally everything."⁵³ *Otkliki zhizni* also published an analysis of a report Natanson made to the Kienthal Conference on the PSR's activities in Russia but noted, "For understandable reasons we . . . were obliged to exclude from this outline all more explicit indications, such as places where the revolutionary movement has stated to develop especially powerfully, as well as the activities of our party organizations."⁵⁴

The publication of *Na chuzhbine* in Geneva caused a special scandal among Right SRs, which as late as mid-1917 reached the pages of the central SR organ, *Delo naroda*. In November 1915, the prominent Left SR activist M. Levinson (G. Dalin) suggested to a general meeting of the very radical Geneva group of SRs that they undertake to propagandize Russian prisoners of war. Subsequently, the Geneva SRs founded a special commission with the imposing title Society of Intellectual Aid for Russian Prisoners-of-War in Germany and Austria and endowed it with the task of supplying the unfortunates with SR literature, vast quantities of which had been stored in ware-

houses ever since 1907. Appointed to the commission were the Austro-German spy Tsivin (who mentioned this undertaking to his superiors), as well as very prominent party leaders such as Natanson, Kamkov, Ulianov, A. Shreider, and Levinson. The commission decided to supplement the somewhat dated older materials with the journal *Na chuzhbine*, which it published throughout 1916 and part of 1917.⁵⁵

The Okhranka attributed the initiative for the paper's publication to Chernov, Natanson, and Kamkov but described an editorial board of J. Dikker as editor-in-chief, Tsivin, V. Nalivaiskii, V. Vnorovskii, A. Cherniavskii, and B. Kliushin. Vnorovskii later recalled that the chief editor had in fact been the former Duma deputy G. Ulianov; additionally, A. Shreider and M. Levinson claimed to have been on the board.⁵⁶ Whatever its exact composition, the staff of *Na chuzhbine* was such that it was the most radical of the SR Internationalist émigré papers.

Like the other leftist SR publications, *Na chuzhbine* identified itself with various Left socialist causes: it published numerous articles that opposed the war, described the hardships for workers and peasants occasioned by the conflict, opposed workers' groups in the War-Industries Committees, praised the Zimmerwald-Kienthal movement, attacked right-wing socialists, and espoused the creation of the Third International. *Na chuzhbine* also regularly advocated the overthrow of the tsarist regime. An editorial in the January 1916 inaugural issue noted that the Duma, which represented only the propertied classes, could not save Russia: only a constituent assembly could rescue the country. How was the constituent assembly to be achieved, queried the editorial? "By daring action," it answered, using an Aesopian term for revolution. Other articles drew attention to the tsarist government's constant deception of the people and to its brutality: "But so it will be until the people themselves take power in their own hands"; "The battle is not over, the day soon approaches when 'the people and the army will move hand in hand against the common enemy and tyrant.'"

As the year 1916 played itself out in tragedy at the war front and at home, *Na chuzhbine* writers became even more strident. As one author declared, "We have dallied long enough, [tsarist power] has

mutilated Russia and brought her sorrow enough—it is time for it to go to rest.” Another scorned the concept of “civil peace” at home and admonished, “It is time for the laboring people to realize that only in struggle will they attain their rights.” Finally, an article from early 1917, just weeks before the February Revolution, correctly prognosticated, “Revolution and the Constituent Assembly—these are our orders of the day.” On 17 March 1917 *Na chuzhbine* triumphantly proclaimed: “In Russia there is revolution. The armed forces along with the people have elected a provisional government—taking part in it are a Soviet of Workers’ Deputies and representatives of the armed forces.”⁵⁷

The Russian government was sufficiently concerned about *Na chuzhbine*, which the SRs distributed not only to prisoners of war but to the public in Switzerland as well, that its mission in Berne repeatedly demanded of the Swiss authorities that they shut the paper down. Fortunately for the Left SRs, the Swiss government took an insouciant attitude toward revolutionary activities and ignored both *Na chuzhbine* and the Bolshevik *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The Swiss authorities replied that, in this case, “The contents can perhaps be designated ‘revolutionary’ by Russian conceptions, but not by ours.”⁵⁸

When in mid-1917, in an apparent attempt to blacken the rapidly growing leftist movement inside Russia, the Right SRs attacked their leftist comrades for publishing *Na chuzhbine* and for supplying it to Russian prisoners of war, the Left SRs hotly defended the paper. Levinson stated, “To the credit of the editors, *Na chuzhbine* from beginning to end had a restrained character, serving the purpose of international revolution honorably.” Kamkov found all charges against Chernov and other participants “baseless.” N. Sviatitskii, a moderate internationalist who had spent the war years in Petrograd, responded that indeed the paper had gone to prisoners of war: “What should [the émigré SRs] have done, allow only Black Hundred literature to be sent there?”⁵⁹

Despite Left SR protestations, the revolutionary purity of *Na chuzhbine* had had a flaw: Tsivin had been on the paper’s staff. By summer 1917 the Kadet (liberal Constitutional Democratic party) newspaper *Rech’* (Speech) had gotten hold of a somewhat garbled



Alexander Tsivin, SR-Internationalist and spy for the Austrians and Germans, Geneva, 1914–17. Courtesy Hoover Institution.

version of Tsivin's involvement with the publication of *Na chuzhbine* and printed a story that named a certain "Zaionts" as an SR allegedly associated with the paper and asserted that this individual had had contacts with Austrian agents. Other stories followed: that Zaionts also had had contacts with German agents, that the Germans and Austrians had aided the paper's distribution, and so forth. The Kadets had evidently confused Zaionts, a shadowy figure in the emigration who was not an SR, with Tsivin, who had indeed informed the Germans and Austrians of the paper and its purpose, of which they approved. Oddly, the Austrian commanders had nonetheless usually blocked entry of the paper into their camps. Shreider claimed in *Delo naroda* that *Na chuzhbine* had entered German camps only because their guard checks were less thorough, an unlikely sounding proposition.

German documents indicate that the émigré Left SRs did not know of Tsivin's German-Austrian connection; these classified documents, intended entirely for internal use, repeatedly reiterate that the SRs did not know of and must not find out about Tsivin's activities, since that would end his usefulness.⁶⁰ Nor is it certain that even in 1917 the Left SRs were aware of Tsivin's earlier treachery or of the confusion between "Zaionts" and Tsivin. Vnorovskii later indignantly (and correctly) denied that anyone named Zaionts had belonged to *Na chuzhbine's* staff.⁶¹ An element of mystery remains. Evidently never unmasked, Tsivin returned to Russia after the February Revolution, was shunned by the SRs (perhaps for the wrong reasons), joined the Communist party under the name Piatnitskii (not to be confused with the prominent Bolshevik O. Piatnitskii), and after a few years perished of a lung ailment.⁶²

The Émigré Left SRs and the Onset of the Revolution

As indicated by their writings in the leftist newspapers, the Left SRs had a clear sense of the impending revolution in Russia and manifested a corresponding intention to intervene to further the movement there. An April 1916 meeting of Geneva SRs, attended by Vnorovskii, Dikker, V. Nalivaiskii, S. Varkov, Kliushin, and a number of other SRs, passed resolutions that espoused the intensification of class war, the organization of strikes in factories and workshops producing ammunition, and, on the railroad, desertions from the ranks of the armed forces, terrorist acts against government bureaucrats, and expropriation of large industrial concerns and banks.⁶³ This program evinced an immediacy lacking in earlier SR Internationalist resolutions, as radical as they may have been.

Later in April a wider meeting of SRs from Geneva, Lausanne, and Montre with most of the above-named individuals, plus Natanson, A. Rosenberg, and the infamous Tsivin, in attendance issued a similarly radical set of resolutions: since imperialist and dynastic empires had started the war, which was therefore injurious to the laboring masses, SRs condemned it and called for its quickest end on the basis of the Zimmerwald principles; the bourgeoisie, the ene-

mies of the nation, stood at the head of the government; defensist socialists were betraying socialism; finally, the Kienthal Conference should not be recognized as having founded the Third International.⁶⁴ Chernov was not included in the list of those attending; still, the reference to "dynastic empires" and the lack of enthusiasm for the Kienthal Conference suggest his influence, if not his actual hand, in the formulation of the resolutions.

These resolutions and programs raise an important question: were they hypothetical statements or were they, as they seem, instructions to the PSR at home? Especially during the first year or so of the war, émigré party centers had only the weakest communications with party organizations inside Russia, which were in any case severely damaged; under such conditions the issuing of instructions was out of the question. At one point, Tsivin reported to the German and Austrian agents that Natanson was in "constant contact" with the PSR inside Russia, a claim that gains in credence since he did not place himself at the center of this network. The April 1916 resolutions called for terrorist acts and expropriations at home; Tsivin drastically improved his status with the Germans by successfully predicting several terrorist acts that later took place inside Russia, the most important of which was a huge explosion in the wharves of the Arkhangelsk port, which according to the Germans, caused 100 million rubles in damage and was reported in the Swiss press.⁶⁵ He could have known in advance of these acts only if the émigré party centers to which he belonged planned and ordered them. Unfortunately, insufficient evidence precludes any final conclusions about this interesting issue.

A closely related question concerns the dispatching of agents to Russia, which the Beaugy Conference had approved during the first month of the war. The plan, which involved the displacement of the entire leftist leadership of the party—Chernov, Natanson, Kamkov, and others—from Switzerland to Russia in early 1916, proved unachievable. Tsivin specified to the foreign agents that SRs regularly made the trip to Russia by way of Norway and then to Arkhangelsk, where they received help from soldiers associated with the SR military organization, but details about names and numbers are lacking; for one case, however, there is information. During the spring, the Foreign Delegation of the Central Committee decided to dispatch

the Left SR activist Aleksandrovich to Russia for the purpose of organizing anti-war forces there; perhaps the leadership had formulated the radical April resolutions so that he could carry them to Petersburg, where he was ordered to travel.

The Bolshevik activist A. Shliapnikov recalled meeting Aleksandrovich in Christianson, Norway, in April:

I met the SR Internationalist Pierre Orage [the colorful pseudonym for the worker-SR Aleksandrovich] . . . [who] was arranging the reception of literature directed against the war, which by my own choice and for information I forwarded with ours to Russia. In summer of 1916, comrade Aleksandrovich, using my connections, went to Russia.⁶⁶

The impression left by Shliapnikov that the SRs were dependent on the Bolsheviks for communications with Russia may be taken with a grain of salt, but this and other evidence confirms Aleksandrovich's entry into Russia, where he played an interesting role in leading SR forces of Petrograd before and during the February Revolution.

By summer 1916, SR Internationalists in the emigration displayed a growing conviction that revolution in Russia was imminent. They published several bulletins filled with reports about the rise of the revolutionary movement. Especially revealing in this regard is a letter Lenin wrote to Zinoviev in early summer: "Natanson told me that they [the leftist SRs] are considering a 'rapprochement' with those of the 'defensists' who say: *first* a revolution, afterwards defense. Ask him . . . if he would like to inform us of the results of these negotiations."⁶⁷ Ever since the Beaugy Conference Natanson had argued that the SRs should base their anti-war revolutionary movement on an alliance with the peasantry and workers, not with the bourgeoisie, with the single qualification that, once revolution approached, a temporary alliance with the bourgeoisie would be appropriate. A call for negotiations with defensist socialists, whose positions were so close to that of the bourgeois liberals, signified that the SR Internationalists felt that the time had come to broaden their alliances for the impending task, the overthrow of tsarism: thus Lenin's interest in and failure to condemn Natanson's plans.

As the Left socialist slogan described this policy: "March apart, [but when revolution approaches] strike together."

A Mystery and a Farce

The mystery concerns the whereabouts and activities of Chernov during the last year before the February Revolution. When Chernov arrived in Russia during the spring of 1917, his views had clearly moderated; although he later regretted it, during the fateful revolutionary events of 1917, he made his alliances with the very Right SR forces against whom he had earlier led the struggle. The last clear reports of Chernov before 1917 pertain to early 1916, when he and other leaders formulated their abortive plan to return to Russia, after which he allegedly went to Italy. Thereafter, Okhranka reports fail to mention his attendance at conferences and meetings, although some resolutions passed at these gatherings show signs of Chernov's ideas. Fascinatingly, Tsivin told his Austro-German mentors that Chernov traveled incognito to Russia in May 1916.⁶⁸ Although no other direct evidence supports this, it would help explain Chernov's extended absence from the scene in Switzerland. Perhaps his experiences in Russia, if he indeed went there, changed his mind about the war, about which he had always been a little more moderate than Natanson and other Left SRs. Chernov's memoirs are silent about the whole year in question and about his change in views; holding his counsel, even until his death, about a secret trip, cloaked in high intrigue, for mysterious purposes and with incalculable results, would be characteristic of Chernov.

The farce involved the Russian battle cruiser *Askol'd*, which during January 1916 put into port in Toulon for extensive and prolonged repairs. The Russian sailors from the ship encountered Russian émigrés in the cafés of the town, some of whom were revolutionaries more than happy to provide them with subversive literature. At Easter, a group of *Askol'd* sailors took leave and traveled to Paris, where the large socialist public immediately again discovered them in the cafés and restaurants of the capital. Rumors of their presence spread like wildfire through the various socialist networks. A scramble to propagandize them in one or another direction broke out, the chief

line of demarcation being not so much SR versus SD as internationalists versus defensists. Although the leaders of the various socialist groups maintained serene indifference, the rank and file engaged in a free-for-all; along the boulevards of Paris, anti-war socialists tried to imbue the hapless sailors with the "spirit of Zimmerwald," while the defensists preached to them of the "spirit of patriotism." The *Askol'd* sailors finally returned to Toulon, wined, dined, and burdened with stacks of literature of every point of view.⁶⁹

Conclusion

The SR anti-war movement was a significant phenomenon in the European emigration, which, until the February Revolution, comprised numerous party leaders and a large corps of activists. Although a number of SRs of great importance in the party hierarchy—Sletov, Avksentiev, Argunov, and Rudnev—supported the war, the list of party leaders opposed—Chernov, Natanson, Rakitnikov, and Ulianov—was more impressive. Evidence indicates that as time went by the rank and file, some of whom hesitated during the first period of the war, inclined more and more to the anti-war position. As suggested by their weak publication efforts and their failure to attract support for the pro-war London Conference, the defensists had scant following, which seems to have shrunk as time passed. The isolation of the right wing inside the party may have accounted for the decision of two pro-war SR Central Committee members to resign their positions in order to enter the *Prizyv* group, outside the PSR. The handful of SRs who joined or supported the *Prizyv* movement also suggests the unpopularity of the pro-war position, whereas literally hundreds of émigré SRs lined up with the internationalists.

Anti-war feelings within the émigré PSR arose early, grew out of long-held SR attitudes, and included viewpoints all the way from mild internationalism to defeatism. The rejection by many SRs of Russia's involvement in the war was therefore deep-seated. The large and growing number of SRs who spoke out against the war were quite assertive. They published newspapers and other literature that espoused their revolutionary anti-war stance, participated

in the anti-war conferences in Switzerland, tried to propagandize even the Russian prisoners of war, and attempted to intervene in and influence events inside Russia with the purpose of overthrowing the government and stopping the war.

Although neither pro-war nor anti-war leaders could establish dependable, regular ties with party members and organizations inside Russia, the programs they outlined in their publications had an effect on leaders and activists at home. For instance, the following chapters present evidence that SRs at home were aware of and acted under the influence of *Mysl'-Zhizn'* or *Prizyv*. Many SR groups inside Russia issued proclamations with the Zimmerwald and Kienthal slogans, and almost all party organizations followed the émigré leadership in condemning the WIC workers' groups. As suggested by Oberuchev's extensive coded correspondence with party members inside Russia and by Tsivin's advance knowledge of SR terrorist actions, instructions did sometimes reach the home front from abroad, and the sending of Aleksandrovich to Petrograd indicates that contacts were not only by mail. Furthermore, the split over the war issue, about which émigré Right and Left SRs debated so passionately between July 1914 and February 1917, would play a key role in the working out of the party's fate clear through 1917 and 1918. Thus the affairs of the PSR in Western Europe were a significant factor in Russian life both during the war and in the revolutionary events of 1917-18.

3

The SRs in the Capitals

All too quickly the populace of the huge Russian Empire had to face the consequences of the war that so many had seemed to greet with such enthusiasm and even joy. True, in the first heady weeks of August Russia had set in motion her massive mobilization plans and had shocked the arrogant Germans with an unexpected invasion of East Prussia, the ancient homeland of the Prussians and the site of epic Teutonic-Slavic struggles of the deep past. As the early advances ground down in indecision and confusion, followed with stunning swiftness by defeat, retreat, and military disaster, the realities of Russia's state of war-preparedness revealed themselves to those at home and to the world. The top levels of Russia's military leadership were hopelessly ill-suited for their tasks; strategic reserves of war supplies were utterly inadequate; and military and civil communications lagged decades behind those of her principal foe. Russia could mobilize millions but could not clothe, shoe, arm, and train them or get them to the front. Even with its huge commitments in the West, the German military machine would exact its price for such incompetence. By midfall the shattered Russian hopes of invading Germany turned into the nightmare of vast German advances into Polish territory. As winter approached, the Russians checked the German armies before Warsaw and even sent them reeling back, but the early experience did not bode well for Russia's struggle against Germany.

From the south, rosier news arrived back in Russia. Russian

armies invaded Galicia and entered the Carpathians; against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was just as ramshackle as and even more disunited than Russia, Russia won great victories. By late 1914 the map of eastern Europe was a giant backward S in which German conquests to the north were balanced by Russian conquests to the south. Even farther south, in the front against Turkey in the Caucasus, Russian arms prevailed in an even more decisive fashion.

None of this could conceal the country's vast human losses on the battlefields and the staggering shortages of both military and civilian supplies. Each measure the government took seemed to backfire. Prohibitions against consumable alcohol meant to signify wartime discipline deprived the government of one of its chief sources of income; price ceilings on grain meant to prevent rampant inflation led instead to food shortages. When Russia's already inadequate industrial capacity turned to war production, shortages of all manner of goods and then sharp price increases resulted. At the same time, most workers and salary earners received no wage increases; although workers in some defense related plants earned higher pay, shortages of virtually everything and lengthening lines plus increased working hours signified that even for them the struggle for survival sharpened; in any case, most workers suffered drastic losses in real wages. Meanwhile, only one or two capable ministers still escaped the sinister gaze of Rasputin and the autocratic delusions of Nicholas and Alexandra. Russia's internal scene offered few rays of hope.

Whatever their misgivings about Russia's leadership, conservatives and liberals rallied to the cause; defense of Russia and her victory in alliance with Western Europe were their hopes. Like those in the emigration, many socialists inside Russia had a somewhat different perspective. The entire Social Democratic Duma faction, including the Mensheviks, and the traditionally moderate Trudoviks refused to join their parliamentary colleagues of liberal and conservative persuasion in approving the war budget. The government, however, responded to any anti-war manifestations with massive arrests; existing socialist newspapers, labor unions and workers clubs, and socialist organizations that had operated fairly openly in many cities for a year or two before the beginning of the war all suffered destruction at the hands of the tsarist police. Hundreds of leftists of

all the socialist parties quickly wound up in prison or in Siberian exile. Although war enthusiasm was chiefly notable among wealthy and educated Russians, during the first year or so a restrained patriotism prevailed even in the factories, rendering difficult anti-war agitation there. Furthermore, both among Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries, the intelligentsia cadres, like the rest of educated Russia, occupied a strong defensist stance. This web of circumstances resulted in a temporary weakening and silencing of socialist anti-war forces and a transitory and illusory strengthening of pro-war forces.

Regardless, conditions at the front and in the cities and villages provided potent fuel for anti-war and antigovernment activities. In both Petrograd and Moscow, very soon after the war's beginning Left-leaning SR activists of primarily worker origin began to take steps, at first hesitant and then more bold, against the government and the war. As workers and students gradually responded to harsh wartime deprivations and oppression, revolutionary agitation became more and more acceptable and achievable. By the second half of 1915, the SRs and other revolutionaries in the two chief cities of the empire engaged in a range of activities, including the rebuilding of underground party organizations, summoning of conspiratorial party conferences, regular printing and distribution of leaflets, organizing of strikes and *massovki* (mass meetings), and open opposition to the government-sponsored election of workers' groups in the War-Industries Committees. Briefly stymied at the beginning of the war, the revolutionary movement sprang again to life and would not cease until tsarism had fallen.

The War Comes: "The Wave of Patriotism" and Early Anti-War Activities

Although the internationalist leaders in the emigration formed the ideological and, to a certain extent, the organizational center of the SR anti-war movement, only the party on Russian soil enjoyed the potential of transforming its ideals into tangible realities. Both wings of the émigré PSR approached with trepidation the question of the state of the party inside Russia. Where did the comrades at

home stand? Were they for the war or against it? Were they still for revolution or not? Long months went by as pro-war and anti-war SRs waited almost in agony for news from Russia. When in mid-1915 socialists finally re-established communications severed by the outbreak of hostilities, the news favored the Left. As Chernov told the Zimmerwald Conference in September 1915, "The local committees are internationalist and are publishing anti-war proclamations."¹ Still, in the early months of the war the picture was not so clear: most local party organizations had experienced confusion and, in some cases, outbursts of patriotic fervor. The large Petrograd and Moscow organizations were no exceptions to the rule. In both cities, dissension over the war plagued party organizations already weakened by massive arrests immediately before and after the outbreak of the conflict. The history of the rise of significant anti-war movements among SRs in the two capitals of Petrograd and Moscow is a subject of considerable importance.

PETROGRAD (1914)

By 1914 the Petersburg SR organization already had a long history of radical activism. In the first half of that tumultuous year, the Petersburg SRs were heavily involved in all aspects of the revolutionary movement. They played a significant role in organizing university and high school students, published a popular workers' paper, issued numerous revolutionary proclamations, took part in strike committees, and worked closely with the Bolsheviks and other Left socialists. The coming of the war, of course, signaled hard times for all revolutionary parties. In the days immediately surrounding the declaration of the war, the authorities arrested numerous Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SRs. Police rounded up many members of the SR Petersburg Committee (PC), including L. Moshchin, K. Burevoi, S. Mitkevich, Krylov, and A. Semin, all of whom had strong leftist affiliations.²

In the Spasskii Jail, where unfortunate revolutionaries arrested in July and August 1914 awaited transportation eastward, round-the-clock debates about the war broke out; the impassioned discussions continued even on the long train ride to Siberia. According to later and perhaps misleading testimony of several Bolshevik participants,

the Bolsheviks' position was similar to Lenin's ("Turn the imperialist war into a civil war"). These same Bolshevik memoirists claimed that the SRs, finding it "unethical to kill one's own brothers," recommended that socialists refrain from going into the army, desert the ranks if there, and plunge their bayonets into the earth at the outbreak of military action. Kiselev claimed that the Bolsheviks decisively rejected this "Tolstoyist" or pacifist tactic. Baevskii, an early Soviet historian, also claimed that SRs arrested at the outbreak of the war recommended desertion and passive resistance to show opposition to the war, whereas the Bolsheviks thought that activists should enter the army in order to turn it against the class enemy.³ Bolshevik activists writing in the 1920s may have been loath to admit that during the early months of the war perplexity, dissension, and outright patriotism seized just as many Bolsheviks as Mensheviks and SRs.

In any case, SR activists arrested in the early weeks of the war adamantly opposed Russia's entry into the conflict. Naturally, the removal from the scene of these hardened party leaders weakened the opposition to the war among SRs in Petrograd and elsewhere, precisely the government's intention. The arrests also had the effect of severely disrupting the SR organization in the capital, bringing its operations to a standstill for a month or more. According to the secret police, during August and September most SRs felt that for the time being open demonstrations against the war would be "useless and ill-timed" and that all energy should be devoted to reorganization so that at the end of the war the party "would be in a position to assert itself."⁴

This attitude may have represented a weakening of anti-war resolve, but it also reflected a necessary adaptation to harsh reality. With patriotism's running a strong if short-lived course even among workers, already weakened socialist parties feared placing too great a distance between themselves and mass popular opinion. Additionally, few observers had as yet comprehended the implications for modern warfare of industrial and technological advances. Viewing the war from outmoded perspectives, virtually everyone, including socialists, expected it to be brief. Thus socialists felt impelled to exercise caution lest they be in a disadvantageous position at the war's supposedly imminent end. As the conflict dragged on, social-

ists lost their caution and set about issuing streams of ever more strident anti-war propaganda. However, during the early weeks of the war none of the socialist parties inside Russia staked out consistent anti-war positions.

Within the Petrograd SR organization, disputes over the war quickly escalated into a full-scale split in the party; the surviving six-person PC reflected this division and therefore could not lay down a clear line. One SR labor activist, Sviatitskii, later recalled that the worker-oriented SRs diverged sharply from the party intelligentsia. "I would hardly be mistaken," wrote Sviatitskii, who was himself of the intelligentsia, "if I say that in the workers' SR milieu internationalist and even defeatist views predominated, at a time when intelligentsia circles were almost completely . . . seized by defensist . . . and hurrah-patriotic views."⁵ The class delineation was, however, hardly infallible. Some SR workers were defensist and a considerable portion of the intelligentsia, especially students, were against the war. Furthermore, Sviatitskii's characterization notwithstanding, defensist sentiment within the party's intelligentsia circles in the capital had a restrained character, whereas ardent pro-war feelings were relatively rare.⁶ Overall, as the Bolshevik Shliapnikov recalled, during the war the Petrograd SRs "had a majority of leftists."⁷

By September 1914 various party leaders, including the indefatigable A. F. Kerensky, were staking steps to revitalize the organization. The leftist (anti-war) SRs rallied around the Organizing Commission of the PSR, which attracted the greatest number of worker-SRs and party activists and which displayed the most energy for months to come.⁸ Although he viewed the war differently than did the leftists, Kerensky was able to utilize his status as a member of the Fourth Duma to aid the party cause. In early September, Kerensky agitated in favor of a general SR conference, which should, he thought, work out a position on the war and set in motion regular party work. He also proposed that all populists—SRs, Popular Socialists, and Trudoviks—gather around the consolidated staffs of two legal populist journals, *Zavety* (Precepts) and *Russkoe bogatstvo* (Russian wealth), a plan that the well-informed Okhranka promptly scotched by shutting down both journals.

On 6 September Kerensky presided over a meeting of SR *intelli-*

genty (members of the intelligentsia) at the Imperial Free Economic Society, long a center for populist and liberal intellectuals. This SR group took the title "Informational Bureau at the Free Economic Society"; in reality it was a kernel around which Kerensky and other moderate SRs hoped the underground party organization would revive. At the same time, a number of SRs entered the medical and library commission of the Free Economic Society, which they used for legal party work.⁹ Thus in September and October 1914, two party centers competed for the allegiance of the SR membership in the capital: the staunchly anti-war Organizing Commission, with its largely worker component, and the more moderate intellectual-oriented Informational Bureau.

Still, organizational problems, plus conscious decisions to maintain a low profile, determined that during late summer and early fall party work remained at a low ebb, a circumstance to which radical SR workers and students objected vociferously. Already in August, worker SRs of the Narva District of Petrograd distributed anti-war proclamations at the huge Putilov works and in the district's garrisons; in early September, a meeting of Narva SRs, with numerous workers in attendance, passed a resolution sharply critical of the party leadership's inaction.¹⁰

SR student organizations also came out against the war. On 9 October, the day after four to five hundred gymnasium and university students demonstrated in favor of Emperor Nicholas's call for students to enter the armed forces, the SR and Bolshevik university organizations arranged a mass meeting to protest the "obeisance of students before the Winter Palace, on the very spot where nine years ago our comrades were shot down [a reference to the Bloody Sunday massacre]." That same month a joint SR-Bolshevik organization of gymnasium students began to publish an anti-war newspaper, *Za staroe znamia* (Behind the old banner). Both the joint student organization and its newspaper operated primarily under SR auspices. The paper's chief editors were the SRs B. Iakovlev and G. Zaks, and it received its most substantial support from the SR organization at St. Petersburg University. According to the testimony of the early Soviet historian Dianin, *Za staroe znamia* was not so much a student newspaper as a full-blown revolutionary publication that happened to be issued by students (of principally Left SR orientation).

To provide themselves with a safe locale for meetings, the forty or so radical SR and Bolshevik students joined the Committee of Aid to the Wounded, a civilian war-connected society, from whose premises they engaged in a wide array of activities, including the publication of their paper, until police broke up the circle in March 1915.¹¹

By early September, Kerensky had already broached the subject of a Petrograd conference to work out the party's position on the war. In mid-October 1914 forty-two SRs, including the former Petersburg committee member Moshchin, who returned from Moscow for the event, gathered to discuss the war. The conference passed resolutions that called for the use of terror and other extreme measures against the government.¹² Hence the conferees distanced themselves both from pro-war SRs who called for full support of the government during the war and from the stance of the Petrograd party leaders who during August and September espoused "no demonstrations." This marked a definitive turn of the majority of the capital's SRs against the war. Although there is no evidence of SR-sponsored terrorist acts during fall 1914, the capital's anti-war SRs (in the Organizing Commission) did begin to publish anti-war leaflets on a regular basis, the only revolutionary organization, besides the SD Inter-District Committee (*Mezhraionka*), to do so at this time. During November 1914, a second city-wide conference of upward of fifty party activists took place at the home of the former Second Duma deputy V. V. Evreinov; the SR workers and intelligenty present expressed various views on the war, but most to one degree or another opposed it. The workers noted that in the factories, "The military dust of the early days [of the war] had already settled" and people had begun to "worry about what would come tomorrow."¹³

The Petrograd SRs displayed a high degree of activism in other ways. To print leaflets and newspapers, they set up several printing presses, most of which police confiscated in early 1915.¹⁴ During October 1914 they brought out a workers' paper, *Rabochaia mysl'* (Workers' idea), which the police quickly closed down.¹⁵ The Petrograd SRs also maintained connections with party organizations in provincial cities. Through Moshchin they had contact with the Moscow SRs, who in turn had ties with party groups in Tver, Tula, Samara, and several other towns. Kerensky too played a role; dur-

ing the fall of 1914 he visited Saratov, where he carried on secret negotiations with SRs and other oppositionist intellectuals. The Okhranka noted that when Kerensky forwarded information on SR activities in the capital to Irkutsk, the party organization there began to issue its own anti-war leaflets. In early 1915 Kerensky visited Kiev, Samara, and Moscow with the goal of promoting anti-government work among SRs and other oppositionist groups. Provincial SRs often looked to the Petrograd and Moscow organizations for guidance on important issues such as the war.¹⁶

No evidence links Kerensky with the SR October conference or with the leftist Organizing Commission, but, in view of his agitation for such a conference and his direct participation in Left-oriented SR work the following year, his involvement cannot be ruled out. Regardless, his stance and that of party cadres close to him during the first year of the war is of great interest. As his recent biographer, Richard Abraham, has pointed out, in 1914–1915 Kerensky was by no means as “patriotic” as he later claimed. In a reply to an Imperial Manifesto at the outbreak of the war (which called on all Russians to unify behind tsarism and the war), Kerensky spoke as follows:

Russian citizens! Remember that you have no enemies among the working classes of the belligerent countries. . . . Remember that this frightful war would never have happened if the great ideals of democracy—liberty, equality, and fraternity—had directed the activities of the rulers of Russia and the governments of all countries. . . . Peasants and workers, all who desire the happiness and welfare of Russia, in the [coming] great trials harden your spirits, collect all forces, and when you have defended the country, liberate it.¹⁷

Under his leadership, the Trudovik Duma deputies joined the Social Democrats to abstain from voting for war credits. Kerensky was certainly no defeatist and thought the defense of Russia necessary, but his views, which had a distinct tinge of internationalism, displayed almost none of the “hurrah-patriotism” often associated with liberals and Right socialists of the war era. In fact, various SD and SR organizations reprinted and distributed this and other wartime speeches and writings of Kerensky (and those of the Menshevik Chkheidze) as revolutionary proclamations.¹⁸

Kerensky's early antigovernment statements were no fluke. The Okhranka reported that during his trips around Russia during the fall and winter of the first year of the war (1914–1915) he continued to agitate against the government and its conduct of the war (and, implicitly, against the war itself). In addition, Kerensky urged the revival of a national underground SR organization with city and provincial committees, which would be subordinated to a Petersburg Committee. According to his plan, the party committee, which would consist of intelligentsia SRs, should issue an underground newspaper. In preparation for the construction of the new organizational network, activists should enter the cooperatives and other legal organizations. Kerensky emphasized, however, that most work would have to be carried out illegally since the government would quickly squelch legal activities.

In his overt antigovernment agitation, Kerensky did not focus so much on the war itself but rather on the sharp rises in the cost of living it caused, which, he pointed out, enriched the capitalists and further impoverished the poor. He felt that it would be possible to make deep inroads into the peasantry, among zemstvo employees, and in the armed forces by pointing out that the government was utilizing the widespread patriotic fervor connected with the outbreak of hostilities in order to raise taxes.¹⁹ Thus his critique of the war was indirect but unmistakable.

This position did not constitute the all-out attack on the war that characterized Left socialists; neither, however, was it pro-war. The government evidently disliked the activities of the SRs associated with Kerensky as much as those of the Left SRs. In early January 1915, the Petrograd Okhranka arrested numerous SR activists, confiscated its secret printing presses, and closed down the Free Economic Society and the moderate SR Informational Bureau; thus the government stymied Kerensky's plans to create a moderate intelligentsia-oriented anti-war movement in Petrograd. Meanwhile, the SR student organization continued its radical anti-war work until the heavy arrests of March 1915. The leftist worker-oriented Organizing Commission also succumbed to government attacks during winter or spring of 1915.²⁰ Still, during the first half-year of the world war the Petrograd SRs surpassed the other socialist parties in the scope and liveliness of their endeavors; of special interest was

their publication of a number of anti-war leaflets, an activity that both the socialists and the government found significant.

MOSCOW (1914)

The state of all revolutionary organizations in Moscow as the war broke out was poor: neither Social Democratic nor SR Moscow committees functioned properly, if they even existed.²¹ Nevertheless, SRs, especially those associated with the labor movement, manifested considerable energy immediately before and after the beginning of the war. On the war's eve, M. A. Maksimov, a Moscow SR with close worker ties, attempted to organize anti-war protests. He also formulated a plan to publish an SR trade union paper with the cooperation and advice of representatives of the various trade unions. These plans fell through when police arrested Maksimov and several of his associates on 17 July 1914. Under new leadership, Maksimov's worker circle continued to agitate against the war and was attempting to organize mass anti-war demonstrations when the police arrested the entire membership during early August.²²

At the same time, another SR group led by Shil'nikovskii operated at the Moscow Agricultural Institute; among its members were the "old SRs" Grechaniuk and P. Vishnevskii. During August 1914 police placed the Shil'nikovskii group under surveillance. In order to avoid imminent arrest, in early September Shil'nikovskii escaped to Voronezh on a forged passport, leaving the group to new leaders. In mid-October the former Shil'nikovskii circle, which worked very closely with Social Democrats, called a joint meeting with them at the Agricultural Institute. The SRs and SDs at the meeting decided to publish a proclamation "critical of the government," as a result of which the Okhranka decided to "arrest the group and all main figures . . . before the publication of the proclamation."²³

As in Petrograd, arrests of radical SR activists in Moscow during the period just before and after the declaration of war had a dampening effect on local party activities. On 19 August a group of worker-SRs from the Nosenkov, Guzhon, and other factories held a meeting and passed resolutions on the war that indicate that they were far less radical than the recently arrested Maksimov circle. At the 19 August conference, the "leftists" felt that, in view of the "lib-

erationist nature of the war," no attempt should be made to hinder it. The leftists did, however, espouse the continued underground organization of workers so that at the end of the war the party could make certain demands favorable to workers and peasants, whereas the "rightists" at the meeting, who were in the majority, condemned any underground activities whatsoever for the duration of the war. After bitter debate, the worker SRs passed the rightist resolution, which wished to sacrifice all illegal activities in favor of cultural-educational work.²⁴

Similarly, in mid-September 1914 fifty-seven SR and SD student activists from Moscow University, Shaniavskii University (a free university that attracted many of the radical youth), and the Agricultural Institute gathered in a student cafeteria to discuss the war. Leftists among them submitted a resolution that called for the creation of a joint SR-SD student organization "aimed at the liquidation of the war." Only fifteen students voted for this resolution; the majority supported a moderate resolution offered by the SR F. Pruss and the SD A. Vydrina, which stated that student organizations should refrain from all revolutionary work in favor of such noncontroversial activities as aiding the wounded.²⁵

Despite the decisions of some SR workers and students to abstain from revolutionary activities, the Okhranka continued surveillance of Moscow SRs, with good reason as it turned out.²⁵ Many local SRs, especially in the factories and workers' districts, did not support the government's war efforts. Already in late August, an as yet unidentified group distributed throughout many factories an anti-war proclamation printed by the Kharkov Group of SRs. Although couched in cautious language, this proclamation was quite revolutionary in content; it attacked the government's appeal (also espoused by many Right socialists) for the abandonment of the concept of class struggle and its replacement by a wartime "unification" of Russian society. The Kharkov proclamation also scorned government policies that "shed rivers of blood": "Citizens, enough deception and enough military hurrah. Loving the fatherland, you must show the ruling circles the path [that is, revolution] that alone can lead to full liberation . . . of the worker and peasant movements in all their forms." In mid-September unidentified persons distributed a second SR anti-



Isaac Shteinberg, attorney, SR-Internationalist, Moscow, 1914–17. Later Commissar of Justice in early Soviet government. Courtesy New York Public Library.

war proclamation addressed “To the peasants,” which the police characterized as “unusually radical.”²⁷

During the first months of the war, after police repression against leftist student and worker radicals, other surviving worker and student groups in Moscow took a more moderate path that edged toward defensism and support of the government “for the duration of the war.” Furthermore, in Moscow the SR intelligentsia was more unabashedly patriotic than in Petrograd, although a few Moscow SR intellectuals, such as I. Shteinberg, occupied anti-war stances.²⁸ According to the *Okhranka*, however, the distribution of the two anti-war leaflets and the arrival of Semin and Moshchin from Petrograd galvanized a strain of radicalism that still existed in many SR circles. Having transferred from Petrograd to Moscow in September 1914, Semin and Moshchin immediately took steps to renew revo-

lutionary activity by founding the Moscow Group of SRs, which had ties throughout the local unions, cooperatives, and factories and also worked closely with the Bolsheviks.

Already in September 1914, the Moscow Group issued its first anti-war proclamation. Addressed to "peasants, workers, soldiers, and all honest people" and sounding much like Kerensky's August speech, the leaflet admitted that Russia had little choice but to fight to the end of the war; it also asserted, however, that,

if the people were in control of the government there would be no war. . . . All the burden falls on the workers and peasants, both Russian and German, none of whom wants the war, but who are forced to fight. . . . But the first day of the end of the war is the first day of the revolution. Don't disband and put down arms at the end of the war; rather, eliminate untrustworthy leaders who will be against the people.²⁹

The immediacy of the advice about what to do at the war's end, a topic discussed in some detail in the full text, reveals that the SRs still expected the conflict to be brief. Although they did not yet advocate a revolutionary end to the war, their writings bespoke no interest in the war's aims; rather, they perceived the war as a temporary impediment to revolution, characterized primarily by the hardship it brought the people, a situation for which the government bore the guilt. Once SR activists already disposed against the war realized that it was to last not weeks or months but years, they took the next steps to a more radical and, in many cases, defeatist stance.

On 14 October the Moscow Group printed a second leaflet for "peasants, workers, and all honest people," which pointed out the parallels between the Russo-Japanese War and the present conflict, both of which the tsarist government embarked on against the will of the people: "This war is not our war, the German peasant and worker is starving just as we are, and we are not his enemy. . . . It is time to throw off the yoke of oppression . . . [and to] split up the hydra of autocracy and arbitrary rule. . . . The last day of the war will also be the day of liberation. Prepare yourselves, comrades!" Although Moshchin took the initiative in issuing this proclamation, he received help in its drafting, printing, and distribution from, among others, the Bolshevik I. M. Vlasov. The Moscow Group dis-

tributed large quantities of the leaflet throughout the labor unions. Evidently tipped off, the police raided five Moscow unions and, after finding copies of the leaflet on the premises of the printers' union, shut it down.³⁰

That same month the Moscow Group also published a lengthy theoretical critique of the war. The brochure described the history of the revolutionary movement from the dispersal of the Second Duma in 1907 through the beginning of the war and pointed out that only in the workers' movement, especially in the labor unions, had the revolutionary movement survived the government repression. But since the masses had learned new lessons, "the years of reaction were not only a time of death and decay": the peasantry was reawakening and the industrial proletariat had already begun demonstrating. The current war was "bourgeois in character" and therefore could have no real support from the masses. Since blame for the war fell equally on both sides of the conflict, in the view of the SRs "defensism" was unjustified. "All too easily," they wrote, "does defense conceal attack and conquest." German imperialism was a great danger, as a consequence of which it was not possible "to negate the war now." This situation existed, however, only as long as the war did not take on the character of victorious conquest: "A victory of Russian arms would strengthen zoological nationalism and impose a political moratorium on the liberation movement." For the moment physical defense was necessary, but the Russian people should utilize the opportunity to organize itself for its own liberation. With this goal, asserted the SRs, all socialist parties should strengthen the ties among themselves and extend lines of communication to the peoples of other countries. If a Russian victory became imminent, the revolutionary movement might have to "stop the war."³¹

Thus, on the one hand, the Moscow SRs defined the war as "bourgeois imperialist" and, on the other, characterized the anti-war movement as mass-based, socialist, and international. They viewed defense, construed in a very narrow sense, as an onerous temporary duty valid only as long as Russia was suffering heavy defeats at the front; this idea was quite different from the defensism of the pro-war movement, which called for a Russian victory with war aims. The class nature of the war determined the future lines of struggle,

which were themselves being created by the war. This early SR line on the war opened the door for them to move even further to the Left once they realized Russia would not collapse and that the war would grind on for years.

With the closing of the Moscow printers' union, where they had been printing their proclamations, the SRs were forced to set up their own press. On his return from the mid-October SR conference in Petrograd, Moshchin coordinated this complicated effort. Type was already available from earlier printing endeavors; Semin somehow obtained a roller; and the printer Akelin promised to acquire the press itself.³² The Okhranka decided to interdict these efforts; Moshchin was arrested; and Semin, later unmasked as a provocateur, went even deeper into the Moscow underground, where he survived the entire war era.

With Moshchin's passing from the scene, the mantle of leadership in the Moscow Group passed to G. F. Kuznetsov, who also had wide contacts among Moscow workers. In late October, a Samara tailor named Khabotin arrived with a letter to Kuznetsov from A. F. Belousov, head of the SR Committee in Samara. Belousov informed the Moscow SRs, "Work is reviving among us," and concluded by asking for instructions: "I ask one thing—as soon as possible inform me how you stand on the war. We have a majority against the war. I beg of you to let me know. . . . Your orders are required for our decision".³³

Shortly thereafter another SR from Samara, M. F. Mavrinskii, stopped in Moscow on his way to Petrograd, where he was to seek instructions on the issue of the war. Mavrinskii brought a proclamation recently issued by the Samara SRs; it condemned German militarism and imperialism but at the same time rejected the idea of a Russian victory, which, claimed the Samara SRs, the government would only use to strengthen autocracy. Consequently, the Samara SRs pledged themselves to preparing the masses "for an armed uprising and general strike" either at the end of the war or, under favorable circumstances, even earlier. Thus the Samara SRs staked out a position on the war strikingly similar to that of their comrades in Moscow and Petrograd.³⁴

Belousov also sent a letter that further explained the rationale for his organization's position. He pointed out that, in accordance with

the principles of the Socialist International, all socialists should have condemned the war. In Belousov's opinion, the genuine German threat to democracy and socialism had induced many French, Belgian, Russian, and other socialists to support their countries in the war. But, although Russian socialists preferred an Allied victory over Germany, they were in a different situation than other socialists in that Russia did not have the political freedom of the Western countries; thus they had to reject the concept of a Russian victory, which would only strengthen despotism. "Russian autocracy," continued Belousov, "has until now been the best bulwark of all reactionaries." Russian socialists should therefore try to prevent a German defeat of France and England and should not hinder the Russian government from defending, but only defending, the country. The Samara SRs concluded that all socialists should concentrate all their efforts on the internal struggle with the government so that autocracy could be overthrown. "The loss of a single moment, of a single opportunity would be a crime. A decisive battle is approaching, we want victory, only victory."³⁵ The Samara SRs defined victory not in terms of the defeat of Germany but of tsarism.

A comparison of the positions of Petrograd, Moscow, Samara, and Kharkov SRs suggests that during the first months of the world war a general consensus arose among many SRs. They decided to pursue illegal revolutionary work during the war in order to achieve revolution "on the last day of the war" or, if circumstances prescribed, even earlier. They did not yet occupy a defeatist stance but bitterly opposed a Russian victory, which they saw as a threat to revolution. The SRs agreed that the struggle with the regime should continue on all fronts, with the exclusion only of direct attacks on Russia's war machine. Or, as the Samara SRs expressed it, "Not desiring the defeat of the allies, we cannot weaken that force of resistance which Russia commands."³⁶

The contradiction inherent in this position became increasingly clear to many SRs. With Russia involved in a desperate struggle against superior German might, any agitation, strike, or other demonstration could conceivably weaken Russia's resistance at the front. Not surprisingly, pro-war socialists espoused a doctrine of no action whatsoever during the war. Gradually, SRs who opposed the war followed the logic of their own arguments against it and paid

less and less attention to limiting their actions against tsarism. But for the time being SRs in such anti-war centers as Moscow, Samara, Kharkov, Tula, Tver, Petrograd, Rostov-on-the-Don, and Irkutsk, much like their comrades in the emigration, attempted to negotiate as best they could the perilous straits of Scylla and Charybdis: German victory and Russian victory. If their statements and writings are any indication, the victory they aimed at was that of socialism achieved through revolution.

1915: The Anti-War Movement Deepens

The year 1915 marked the nadir for Russia both at the fronts and at home. During the spring, the still pitifully undersupplied Russian armies bore the brunt of a massive German offensive. Now poor organization, incompetent leadership, and backwardness exacted their full price. Russian armies fled in panic from German artillery barrages. Encircled units surrendered en masse. Soldiers abandoned weapons, which were in desperately short supply. Untrained reserve units ordered to the front picked up rifles from the ground or took them from retreating troops. Artillery shells and even bullets were a rare commodity for Russia's defenders. In the north, German advances swallowed hundreds of kilometers of Polish and Baltic territory. Even worse, to the south German armies that came to the aid of their hapless Austrian allies drove Russian units back until all Russian gains in Galicia were lost. Somehow, the fractured Russian armies reconstituted a front, now abutting on Russian lands. But the spirit of the Russian armed forces never revived from the nightmare of 1915.

At home, the situation was no better. The government failed to solve the internal transportation and production problems. The feat of organizing a war economy, quickly mastered by other belligerents, was beyond the scope of Russia's elephantine bureaucracy. The self-deluded autocracy of Nicholas and Alexandra placed no trust in the Duma, which they rarely summoned. During its worst trial, Russia enjoyed government by Article 87 (the law by which autocracy ruled unchecked when the Duma was prorogued). As the sum-

mer of 1915 waned in catastrophe, Nicholas took direct command of Russia's military, leaving his wife in command at home. The firestorm of opposition (even usually supine ministers vociferously objected) deterred him not at all: it was God's will. The few capable ministers soon received dismissal notices; ministerial musical chairs (with Alexandra and Rasputin's playing the music) became the rule for wartime Russia. Rarely in modern history has a great nation at war had a more lurid charade for a government.

The military debacles, the hardness of life at home, and the spectacle at the top naturally effected public opinion. Liberals and some conservatives around the Duma formed the Progressive Bloc, which espoused a vague plan for a "government of public confidence," which evidently signified a ministry from the Duma. In their view, the autocracy could not conduct the war. Previously supportive moderate socialists now also turned against the government, which they too no longer trusted to effect victory. By spring 1915, workers set in motion a wave of strikes that, if it did not quite reach the scale of 1905 or the first half of 1914, nonetheless frightened the government into precipitate action. In Kostroma and again in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, troops opened fire on unarmed men and women: the algebra of oppression worked for one of the last times. In any case, strikes—fueled by long hours, falling real wages, endless food shortages, and quasi-military regimes in the factories—were now a threatening constant of wartime Russian life.

The patriotic intelligentsia and bourgeoisie still had hopes for warring Russia. During spring and summer 1915, local government leaders formed the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and City Dumas (known by the Russian acronym *zemgor*) in order to organize the production and distribution of uniforms, boots, medical supplies, and ammunition. Bankers and industrialists organized the War-Industries Committees (WICs) to throw the weight of high finance and heavy industry behind the war effort. Many of the *zemgor* and WIC leaders had close ties with the Duma. Sensing an alliance of forces against itself, the ever-suspicious government grudgingly acquiesced. A tragic irony exists in the indisputable fact that these elements of Russian society, against which the autocracy so jealously guarded itself, began to solve Russia's bedeviling production

and supply problems. A few energetic ministers (since dismissed) had doubled the capacity of some of Russia's chief railroad lines. By 1916 the armies were better fed, better clothed, and better armed than anyone could have dreamed possible. Some dared have high hopes for the new fighting season of 1916.

As in the months immediately succeeding the outbreak of the war, Kerensky continued throughout 1915 to play an intriguing, and as yet not fully documented, role in the PSR and in the revolutionary movement as a whole. To recount, much less characterize, his innumerable activities in Petrograd and elsewhere between January and December 1915 is no simple task. As a Duma deputy, as a delegate at various public conferences around the country, and as a participant in numerous conspiratorial intelligentsia gatherings, Kerensky dedicated his efforts to propagating a quite revolutionary program. As opposed to the preceding months, when he often skirted the war issue, his program now involved direct criticism of the government for embroiling Russia in the war and, even more so, for its conduct of the war. In this latter respect, Kerensky issued a series of statements and letters that accused members of the government of virtually treasonous activities favorable to Germany. Whatever his actual estimate of the merit of the charges, he clearly publicized them to destabilize the government, a step from which more ardently pro-war liberals and socialists as yet refrained. The Okhranka reported that during 1915 revolutionary groups distributed copies of Kerensky's speeches and letters very widely throughout Russia and in the armed forces.

His most persistent message throughout the year was that intelligentsia SRs, SDs, and radical liberals should pull together to form a broad oppositionist movement aimed at an overthrow of the tsarist regime, even during the war.³⁷ Although Kerensky's statements do not reveal his deepest feelings about the war—did he wish for a Russian victory? defeat? or was he indifferent?—he cannot have been unaware of the implicit anti-war message he purveyed so widely across the empire. During 1915 Kerensky also became involved in the workers' movement, which was much further to the Left than the intelligentsia circles that were his normal milieu. In addition,

he expended great energies in the task of rebuilding illegal SR organizations and committees all across Russia, virtually all of which turned out to be rock-hard in their opposition to the war.

MOSCOW (1915)

With Kuznetsov at its head, the Moscow Group of SRs continued to publish anti-war leaflets. In March 1915, police arrested the future prominent Left SR M. A. Levin (a student at Shaniavskii University and a member both of the tailors' union and of the SRs' Moscow Group), with copies of the group's latest proclamation in his possession. Entitled "On the war," it chronicled the horrors of the conflict, ridiculed the ostensible cause of the war (the murder of one man), laid the blame instead on all warring countries, and, as in earlier SR leaflets, noted that the burden of the war fell on German workers and peasants just as on their Russian counterparts. The Moscow SRs regretted the inability of socialists to stop the war and exhorted the population:

Don't believe the ancient enemy when they tell us that this is the last war, that after it will ensue eternal peace and prosperity. However the present slaughter ends it will poison the lives of more than one generation after us. . . . As long as those who profit from the war stand in power, nothing protects us from a new war which will again spill the people's blood. . . . No help will come from the moneybags—the capitalists and nobles. . . . Only by our own power . . . can we create our own happiness and ensure it for our children and grandchildren.³⁸

Besides showing precipience about a future war, this interesting document sheds light on the evolution of anti-war thinking among the Moscow SRs. It was the first of their leaflets to omit any mention of the special danger of German militarism; instead it blamed the war on all involved powers, including France and England, the foremost liberal countries of Europe. By referring to capitalists as oppressors on an equal footing with the nobles and the tsar, it came out on the side of political and social revolution: both feudalism (Russia and Germany) and capitalism (France and England) would be overthrown by the impending revolution. Its appeal against the war

had no qualifications, signifying a major step toward what soon came to be known as "defeatism."

By the end of March 1915, the Moscow Group printed and distributed a second similar text. Addressed to "Comrade soldiers!" it displayed a new consciousness about the catastrophic scale and apparent endlessness of the war:

Millions of working people fall in order to nourish with their corpses the insatiable appetite of . . . capitalists. . . . Remember, comrade soldiers, that your happiness rests not in the hands of those against whom you are fighting, but in the hands of those enemies who thrive in warmth and prosperity behind your backs. The peoples' victory is the victory over the internal enemies. . . . You can only profit by turning your arms against those who rule over you. . . . If you return home without achieving land and freedom you will find there only poverty and ruin. And over you will still . . . circle the evil vulture-crows pecking out your eyes and sipping your blood.³⁹

Couched in newfound incendiary terms, it was the Moscow SRs' first outright defeatist leaflet in that it was the first to call for revolution during the war as the only means to stop the war. The authorities cannot have been pleased at the appearance of such literature aimed at the men in uniform and, by summer 1915, Kuznetsov and other Moscow Group activists had fallen victim to the police, after which a new set of leaders took over the SR organization.⁴⁰

Although it was the largest and longest-lived, the Moscow Group was not the only anti-war SR organization in the city. During 1915, the Okhranka noted the existence of an SR circle under N. Gribanov, which operated in connection with the Moscow Group and which issued mimeographed leaflets; the SR baker A. Isaev also led a combined group of SRs and anarchists. More importantly, in late summer 1915, S. S. Kalininskii organized a new SR circle, the Group of Independent SRs, at the Agricultural Institute. The Independent SRs maintained very close ties both with the Moscow Group of SRs and with the Bolsheviks. During early fall 1915, it distributed a proclamation addressed, like the Moscow Group's March leaflet, to the army:

The closing of the trade unions and the workers' press, the exile of SD [Duma] deputies, the shooting of workers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and

Kostromo, . . . are all proof . . . of the traditional punitive-provocative system of this government. . . . Soldiers, you now have power, . . . Demand from the government an accounting. . . . After the struggle with the Germans must follow the struggle with . . . those Russians who . . . betray [the nation] . . . at every step. Soldiers! don't put aside your arms after the battle with the Germans, you must move on Petrograd and purge it of the people's enemies. Down with the government!

The leaflet blamed the dire situation it described not only on the tsarist regime but also on the bourgeois liberals and capitalists associated with the state Duma; taking a bead on liberal capitalism growingly became a hallmark of leftist anti-war literature. The reintroduction of the phrase "after the struggle with the Germans" only slightly qualified the radical nature of this leaflet, which differed substantively from those of 1914 that called for "revolution at the end of the war"; it placed no emphasis on the danger of German militarism and instead identified the regime and the capitalists as the only enemies. Kalininskii, an employee of the Union of Cooperative Societies, a major center of revolutionary activities, arranged for the proclamation to be distributed there.⁴¹

In August 1915, Kalininskii had introduced some of his Bolshevik comrades from the cooperatives to a meeting at the Agricultural Institute, where the Bolsheviks wished to conduct collections for a legal paper they were planning to launch. At the urging of N. N. Sokolov, the current head of the Moscow Group of SRs, Kalininskii joined the editorial board of the Bolshevik paper. The Bolsheviks had agreed to allow the publication of Left SR articles, with the proviso that they not clash with Bolshevik policy.⁴² Presumably, the authorities arrested the Group of Independent SRs around this time since they do not again appear in historical sources.

After the dismissal of the State Duma on 3 September 1915, the Moscow Group issued a proclamation (to the Moscow workers), which was arguably the most radical document to emerge from the wartime SR movement of the city:

The bourgeoisie demands that defense of the country be turned over to it, but our liberals . . . are too cowardly [to seize power]. . . . Unity of action and program among workers is necessary. . . . Half-

spontaneous outbreaks of the workers' movement only weaken the cause. . . . Organize forces! Don't ask for freedom, take it! . . . Begin at once a stubborn, planned struggle for the achievement of our demands, without which there is no salvation for the fatherland. . . . Create at once factory committees, district groups [and] all-city centers.⁴³

Although the SRs avoided the word *soviet*, few workers could have been unaware of what factory, district, and all-city committees and centers signified: this was the formation process of the 1905 soviets. In the revolutionary rhetoric of the war era, the barely disguised call for the election of soviets was a noteworthy addition to the already routine condemnation of tsarism and capitalism.

In response to the recent notable rise in unrest, on 19 September 1915 the Moscow SRs called a two-day conference, attended by SR workers, students, and party professionals, at which Sokolov argued that the time was not ripe for open demonstrations and strikes since the government was seeking pretexts for mass arrests. The difference between this position and the one espoused by the Moscow Group, of which Sokolov was the leader, in its proclamation from just two weeks earlier was striking. Events in Petrograd were the determining factor in this tactical retreat. During the early days of September, massive strikes had broken out, a city-wide strike committee had taken shape, and revolutionaries had issued calls for the election of soviets. But by the third week of the month, the police had utilized the ever-handly expedients of massive raids and arrests to quiet the furor in the capital, thus the Moscow SRs' new caution.

Sokolov suggested to the SR activists that a general SR conference be summoned with the aim of reestablishing the Moscow Committee. He also wanted to strengthen the party's ties with the unions and with the factory workers. Another speaker, V. Kil'chevskii, found Sokolov to be overcautious and recommended instead that the party organize a strike in response to a recent police attack against an anti-war demonstration at Strastnyi Square. G. Boichenko argued that serious attention be devoted to the peasantry. He felt that the SRs could utilize rural cooperatives, where the party was deeply entrenched, to propagandize the peasantry, whose mood, according to Boichenko, was now receptive. A. Bonch-Osmolovskii, who had just

returned from the front, emphasized the need for contacts with the armed forces and noted that much of the officers corps, a majority of whom were now of non-noble descent, was susceptible to revolutionary ideas. An SR student spoke of the liveliness of the student movement. An SR worker from the Dinamo plant urged that the party set up a printing press (a friend already owned a set of print, claimed the speaker). For the first time since the war began, the speakers expressed themselves in a notably upbeat tone.

On its second day, the conference passed a series of resolutions that called for the Moscow SRs to deemphasize strikes and demonstrations in favor of building the party organization, in pursuit of which they should summon Moscow city-wide and regional conferences, which in turn would create city and regional committees. They also decided to set up a new printing press, recommended a more active SR role in labor unions, and established a committee with Sokolov as chair and Kil'chevskii as secretary to organize the upcoming party conferences. Serious debate arose only on the question of whether or not to revive the Moscow Committee; in the hopes of minimizing arrests, Kil'chevskii recommended that the party continue to operate on a federated basis, that is, without a committee. The majority, however, resolved to create a centralized organization with a committee at the head and also rejected Kil'chevskii's resolution in favor of strikes.⁴⁴ Thus, as of fall 1915, the Moscow SRs opted for party building rather than mass demonstrations. The Okhranka responded with extraordinarily heavy arrests (as noted in the émigré SR press), which, in fact, foiled the SR plans to build Moscow city and regional committees.⁴⁵

Simultaneously, the police shut down most of Moscow's remaining labor unions; as a result SRs and SDs had to find new ways to maintain contact with workers. The SRs began to use the Moscow *Birzha truda* (labor market), a sort of employment agency for factory laborers, as a center for propaganda work. The very active SR, anarchist, and SD groups at the Moscow Commercial Institute held well-attended meetings in the cafeteria of the institute, to which they regularly invited workers. Furthermore, the various parties adopted certain cafeterias (*stolovye*) in the workers' districts, which then became centers for meetings, discussions, and distribution of

revolutionary literature. According to the Bolshevik Ter, the cafeterias "at the *Mokhovoi*" and "at the *Devichem*" were "in the hands of the SRs."

During the latter part of 1915 and early 1916, the SRs and Bolsheviks cooperated especially closely. During this period, the Moscow SRs and Bolsheviks formed a bloc to work against the WIC workers' groups (discussed later). Also the SR cafeteria "at the *Mokhovoi*" had such an inexhaustible supply of revolutionary literature that, recalled Ter, "We had to work with them in order to avoid weakening ourselves." Somewhat prematurely, by the last months of 1915 the local SRs and SDs became convinced that revolution was in the offing. Instead, they faced another whole year of seemingly unrewarded revolutionary labor in the incredible conditions of the Moscow underground.⁴⁶

Despite heavy arrests, throughout the first eighteen months of the war the Moscow SRs manifested considerable energy, which placed them at the forefront of the local anti-war movement. Their initial caution about the problem of how to oppose the government and the war without benefiting Germany gradually transmuted into an intractable stance that called for immediate revolution during the war regardless of the outcome for Russia.

PETROGRAD (1915)

In Petrograd, the first half of 1915 marked the nadir of SR fortunes, as well as those of the other socialist parties. The government's policy of persistent raids and arrests had achieved maximum effect, and revolutionaries had had insufficient time to adapt to the heightened repression. Furthermore, the internationalism some socialists initially experienced (on the basis of naive expectations that socialists of other countries would oppose the war) had lapsed into disillusioned patriotism or indifference. The Petrograd intelligent N. Sviatitskii, a prominent labor activist, has frankly recounted his peregrinations from an initial assertion of internationalism, to an ardent defensism in succeeding months, and finally, as the war dragged on, back toward a moderate but distinct internationalism.⁴⁷

In May 1915, one police report claimed, "The SRs satisfy themselves with [the distribution of] old literature or publish hecto-

graphed proclamations." Actually, the SRs repeatedly set up underground printing presses, only to have them confiscated by the authorities. Despite the difficulties, they published numerous anti-war proclamations throughout 1915. During most of the year, the Petrograd SRs operated under the loose guidance of the six-member PC, which had not achieved unanimity about the war issue. During early 1915, the PC issued a proclamation that stated in part: "We consider the present moment especially appropriate for an end to the war, since during the recent period Germany has suffered such severe defeats [*sic*] that her activities have assumed a purely defensive character." Whatever the accuracy of their observations about the war, the authors were seeking to end the conflict; other SRs in the capital took an even more hostile stance toward the war.⁴⁸

Memoirists of all the parties recall the first half of 1915 as the darkest time of the war; by summer, however, prospects for the revolutionaries began to improve. The Okhranka noted that during May and June 1915, in association with the upcoming opening of the Duma, Kerensky and N. Chkheidze, as leaders of their respective Trudovik and Menshevik Duma factions, arranged for their parties to demand higher wages for workers, who were especially vulnerable to the precipitous wartime inflation. Simultaneously, SR and SD activists in Petrograd (with Kerensky's and Chkheidze's help) enjoyed some success in rebuilding their worker collectives; contacts between SRs and SDs were close. The restructured party organizations then used the cost-of-living and pay raise issues quite effectively in their agitation, with the result that during June 1915 workers at the Obukhov and other plants went on strike, the first major episode of proletarian unrest in the capital since early summer 1914. As usual, police moved quickly to break up SR and other socialist collectives.⁴⁹

The writings of N. Sukhanov (according to Postnikov, the only Petrograd socialist to espouse defeatism at this time) played no small role in the intensification of revolutionary anti-war sentiment in the capital and elsewhere. Beginning in 1914, Sukhanov published a series of lengthy brochures that addressed various problems of the day and that eventually focused on the war. Although the legal publication of these booklets—arranged by the leftist SR S. D. Mstislavskii-Maslovskii, who had impeccable military and govern-

ment credentials—prevented the author from discussing, much less advocating, Russia's defeat, their message was sharply internationalist. For example, Sukhanov criticized so-called leftist groups for accepting the war and argued cogently that Russia was fighting not for her own but for her allies' commercial and imperialist interests.⁵⁰ The boldness of Sukhanov's message caused something of a sensation and his arguments received wide acceptance, especially among the intelligentsia youth.

Just at this time, Kerensky, who ever since the beginning of the war had devoted most of his efforts to building an SR organization on the basis of its intelligentsia cadres and coordinating its activities with those of like-minded SD and Left liberal groups, devised a new approach. As of midsummer, he decided to attempt to rebuild the SR organization by unifying the party's leftist worker-oriented elements, in whose affairs he had recently involved himself, with the more moderate but still antigovernment intelligentsia of the three populist groups, the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, and the SRs. In the final analysis, the wartime views of the workers and the intelligentsia diverged too sharply to allow for any unification, but the Okhranka feared that Kerensky's (now largely forgotten) popularity among the workers might aid the plan.

As Abraham, his biographer, has noted, ever since 1905 Kerensky had spoken out for revolutionaries and workers both in public pronouncements and in court, where he defended numerous SRs and SDs; he also played a role in the Lena massacre hearings. Observers such as Zalezhskii, Sukhanov, and the British correspondent E. H. Wilcox document Kerensky's wartime popularity in workers' circles, which was, in the opinion of the Okhranka, based on "his sharp speeches and statements in the . . . State Duma." After the arrest of the Bolshevik Duma deputies, Wilcox claimed, "No one . . . could stir the artisans in the public galleries of the Tauride Palace as Kerensky did, and his word soon became law to the masses of Petrograd. In the industrial quarters on the 'Vyborg side' and in the shipyards and iron works at the mouth of the Neva, 'What did Aleksandr Fedorovich say?' or 'What will Aleksandr Fedorovich say?' were the final standard on all political questions."⁵¹

At Kerensky's initiative, the famous populist unification conference took place on 16 and 17 July 1915 at Kerensky's apartment;

SRs, Trudoviks, and Popular Socialists from the Petrograd area and from Moscow, Kiev, Samara, Saratov, Vologda, Viatka, Krasnoiarsk, Tomsk, Ekaterinburg, and Nizhnii-Novgorod attended. The delegates passed resolutions that, among other points, called for continued struggle with the regime but heavily qualified the means of the struggle (that is, no strikes that would weaken the war effort). The result was that, at least as regards the war, the government got carte blanche. According to the internationalists, this was akin to the Right socialist program all along. Several weeks later, moderate SRs and Mensheviks of the *Prizyv* group triumphantly proclaimed the conference's decisions as congenial to their own pro-war views. Besides passing its widely publicized resolutions, the populist conference also elected a joint Central Bureau of Populist Organizations, which was, however, moribund.⁵²

Although it failed to achieve its ostensible goals, the unification conference, much like the *Prizyv* conference in the emigration, caused a scandal among Left socialists, including most SRs. Several émigré SRs were so dismayed at the whole affair that they contacted Lenin about entry into the Bolshevik party. In an article in the leftist paper *Zhizn'*, Chernov, always willing to undertake unpleasant tasks, defended the participation of SRs in the conference by pointing out that they had attended as the left wing in order to prevent the passing of conservative resolutions. However, Chernov admitted that, having failed to shape the resolutions, the SRs then compounded the error by signing the offending document. This was a mistake, claimed Chernov, since nothing in the resolutions, except the plank on continued underground revolutionary activities, was acceptable to the SRs.⁵³

Although there was more than a grain of truth in the leftist critique of the unification conference's resolutions, hindsight provides a somewhat different line of analysis of the conference's significance. Sviatitskii, who was one of the errant SRs at the gathering, later noted that it had consisted almost entirely of intelligenty, in his words, "cut off from the masses"; thus Kerensky's plan to create a worker-intelligentsia coalition fell through. But, claimed Sviatitskii, the conference had another characteristic. Heavily affected by the continuous string of defeats on the battlefield, even ardently pro-war socialists experienced growing disenchantment

with the regime that they had previously refused to work against or even criticize "for the duration of the war." Thus the conference's resolutions instructed the Trudovik Duma faction to refuse to vote for war credits and otherwise to take positions hostile to the government. The conference also voted to "expand the revolutionary movement," which, by an odd turn of fate, pro-war socialists now deemed necessary for the successful conduct of the war. In other words, Right socialists inside Russia felt that a new government would better pursue the war to a victorious end than the present one. This revival of revolutionism among the pro-war socialists was couched in cautious but distinct terms. The conference espoused a "change in the state structure," "the convocation of a constituent assembly," and the utilization of the Duma, which the conferees recognized as powerless to solve the present crisis, "merely as a body to unite the people's forces until the convocation of the constituent assembly."⁵⁴

By this interpretation, the 1915 populist conference had great revolutionary significance in that it was one of the sources of a new Right socialist movement aimed at overthrowing the government in order to win the war. Just two months later, in the emigration the joint Right SR–Right Menshevik *Prizyv* conference took precisely the same position. Lenin immediately comprehended the importance of this movement, which he dubbed "revolutionary chauvinism"; he considered it one of the revolutionary forces, if not the best one, at work in Russia.³⁵ Although moderate socialism inside Russia found greater support within the intelligentsia than among workers, Right Mensheviks and Right SR activists did play a role in the cooperatives and in the War-Industries Committees workers' group and were by no means bereft of influence in the workers' milieu. The acerbic speeches of Kerensky and Chkheidze in the Duma certainly resonated among workers, even those of radical persuasion, and contributed to the significance of the Right socialist movement.

The populist unification conference and the émigré *Prizyv* movement indisputably marked a new stage in the evolution of Right socialism. Still, the matter is not a simple one. Virtually since the first day of the war, most pro-war socialists had rejected any form of antigovernment work for the duration of the conflict; they thought socialists should work for Russia's victory, only afterward resuming the struggle against the regime. Other right-wing socialists, most

notably Kerensky in Petrograd and Avksentiev in Western Europe, swam against this tide by maintaining that underground socialist work must continue (presumably, some Right Mensheviks must have shared this view). Avksentiev thought that, should the government fall either during the war or after it, socialists could be in a position to play a role only if they maintained underground organizations. Thus before summer 1915 two Right socialist tendencies existed: a predominant passivist one and an activist one. By fall 1915, however, the activists had won the day: almost all Right socialists were working to overthrow the government in order to win the war.

Both at home and abroad most SRs rejected the unification conference, which they nicknamed the "chauvinist conference." Its chief goal, of course, had been to explore channels for unifying all three populist parties. Already two weeks before the conference, the worker-oriented SR organization in the Petrograd Vyborg District expressed violent opposition to any merger of the SRs with other populist groups; they even threatened "to go over to the Social Democrats" if populist unification occurred⁵⁶ (during the war, no SR-to-Bolshevik crossover occurred). The SR delegates at the national conference of zemstvo and city duma activists, which met in Moscow simultaneously with the populist gathering, caucused separately to discuss the populist unification movement; by a large majority they voted to reject any SR union with right-wing populists and passed a resolution that endorsed immediate revolution. Meanwhile, during July and August 1915 Petrograd SRs held a series of meetings, at which the mood was quite radical; some SRs advocated the revival of the soviet of workers' deputies. In other words, the new Right socialist program—overthrow tsarism to win the war—found little support among rank-and-file party members, most of whom had more radical priorities. Furthermore, although worker SRs continued to work closely with Kerensky, they flatly rejected his plan to harness them to an intelligentsia-led populist party.⁵⁷

As summer 1915 came to a close, leftist sentiment among SRs in Petrograd did not abate. In August the Petrograd Okhranka reported, "The SRs do not support a position of national defense under existing conditions, but continue to insist on the internationalist point of view of Victor Chernov and believe that democracy must ei-

ther overthrow the government or force it to make peace." (The Okhranka often called anti-war SRs *chernovtsy* after Chernov or *myslevtsy* after the internationalist SR newspaper.) When the Zimmerwald Manifesto reached the city in early fall, police noticed that the SRs quickly adopted the manifesto's anti-war and antigovernment slogans. Postnikov, who frequented one of the important workers' cooperatives in the capital and attended numerous workers' meetings on the Vyborg side, likewise recalled the popularity of the Zimmerwald resolutions among SR workers. Somewhat later, the Okhranka expressed the opinion that the Zimmerwald Manifesto enjoyed much greater popularity among SRs inside Russia than did the manifesto put out by the Right socialist *Prizyv* group. The secret police concluded that the Right SRs "were not popular in Russia" and that *Prizyv* "not only did not satisfy [the SRs] but antagonized them."⁵⁸

An important aspect of the revolutionary movement during fall 1915 was a notable upturn in the consciousness of the working masses in Russia, the first stirrings of which had already begun during the summer. By mid-1915, the unchecked advances of the Germans, coupled with war-related phenomena such as the sharp rise in the cost of living and the shooting of striking workers in Kostroma and Ivanovo-Voznesensk, created an atmosphere in which, in the words of the Bolshevik activist Kaiurov, "From that time on it became easier to agitate among the workers." One example of the leftward drift took place at the Erikson plant, when, "to the horror of the defensists," the formerly pro-war SR, Vasilii Shashlov, suddenly proclaimed at a factory meeting: "Comrades, did the government ever ask us when it plotted this war? No, they didn't consult us! Is it our fault if only widows and orphans are left?" Several leading worker-SRs (E. Berg, I. Teterkin, M. Zatonskii, and Medvedev) even laid plans to issue a collection of articles with the goal of outlining current SR ideas on the workers' question during the war. To work out a joint program to capitalize on the more favorable conditions, the Petrograd SRs and Bolsheviks held a joint conference during August 1915.⁵⁹ Likewise, the Moscow SRs held their conference in September.

As usual, the government moved quickly to quell revolutionary

activism. On the evening of 30 August 1915, police raided the workers' sickness fund office at the Putilov plant, where they arrested twenty-three SR, Bolshevik, and Menshevik workers, and numerous others at the sickness funds of the Metallicheskie, Nevskii Shipbuilding, and Dinamo plants. These arrests were one of the causes of the strike that virtually paralyzed Petrograd during early September 1915. At a huge meeting at the Putilov plant on 2 September, the Right Menshevik M. Iakovlev and other defensists spoke against the strike. Similarly, at private meetings with workers Kerensky and Chkheidze urged that they not waste their energies on petty strikes but concentrate instead on constructing a force capable of overthrowing the regime; the two Right socialist leaders even traveled around Petrograd factories with this message. Left socialist speakers, who advocated the strike, prevailed and nineteen thousand Putilov workers walked out. That evening Putilov strike leaders summoned representatives from sickness funds and other worker-oriented organizations throughout the capital, including leaders from the Bolsheviks, SRs, and Mensheviks. At the ensuing *massovki* (mass meeting), defensists such as the Menshevik V. Abrasimov (a provocateur) again came out against the strike. A majority, however, approved, and from this point the Putilov strike evolved into a city-wide affair during which eighty-two thousand workers from seventy-two plants struck.

Despite initial unanimity, after a few days the Left socialist leadership of the strike began to split. The Menshevik-Internationalists and the Bolsheviks wished to continue, whereas the SRs and the *Mezhraiontsy* (leftist SDs who looked to Trotsky for leadership) favored ending the strike; when the Putilov workers voted to go back to work on 7 September, the affair was over. Some 140 Putilov workers, including several Bolsheviks and SRs, a Menshevik, and an anarchist, were fired for leading the strike.⁶⁰

The second half of 1915 witnessed not only a rise in worker unrest in the capital and elsewhere but, according to various sources, a growth of SR influence in workers' districts and in many large factories of Petrograd and other industrial centers. The Soviet historian I. P. Leiberov writes, "During the summer and fall of 1915 the SRs noticeably strengthened their influence on . . . the Rus-

sian proletariat. This influence was particularly telling at the large government-owned factories and at certain private factories, for instance in Petrograd at the Baltic Ship Building Plant, the Trubochnyi Plant, and the Obukhov and Metallicheskie Factories." Directly responding to the tendency of Bolshevik memoirists to ignore the SR role in the wartime workers' movement, Postnikov also pointedly notes SR activism and influence in the factories and workers' organizations in the capital and elsewhere. The Bolshevik A. Efimov later recalled that although all three parties had cells at the Staryi Parviainen plant, the SR collective, which included the future SR Central Committee member I. Teterkin, the member of the 1905 Soviet Miasnikov, and S. Ustinov, was especially powerful. The SRs also had great influence at the Novyi Lessner and Siemens-Shukert plants and in the huge railroad yards. By summer 1915 the SRs were conducting widespread agitation in the Vyborg, Nevskii, Vasilevskii, and Kolpino districts of Petrograd. Worker SRs from the Vyborg district organized the Petrograd Group of SRs. By early 1916, the SRs had from thirty to thirty-five factory cells with from five hundred to six hundred members in the capital's large factories. The largest SR collectives were in the Neva and Baltic shipyards and at the Trubochnyi, Obukhov, and Putilov plants.⁶¹

During the war the SRs were also quite active in the labor organizations. A growing body of evidence, including archives recently used by I. P. Leiberov, suggests that during 1915 and 1916 the SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks all played important roles in unions, cooperatives, and sickness funds. SRs or Mensheviks dominated the sickness funds at important Petrograd metallurgical factories such as the Metallicheskie, Russkii Reno, Gvozdil'nyi, Westinghouse, Koppel', and Shlissel'bergskii plants, and at large textile and leather working establishments. Overall, leadership of the Petrograd sickness fund movement belonged to the SRs and Mensheviks, although the Bolsheviks made considerable gains in late 1915.⁶²

Among the important unions functioning legally or illegally during the war were those of the metalworkers, printers, textile workers, bakers, tailors, construction workers, public transportation workers, leather workers, vehicular frame makers, and carpenters. Several of these unions had heavy SR membership and leadership.

The vehicular frame makers (*ekipazhniki*), a skilled metalworkers' union, had several SR leaders. The executive boards of the printers' and metalworkers' unions had members of all three major parties. Left SRs and Bolsheviks led the bakers' union. The SRs had two members on the board of the construction workers' union and broad support from the rank-and-file membership. During the war, the textile workers, formerly SR-oriented, chose primarily Menshevik-Internationalist leadership. Nonproletarian unions, such as pharmacists, clerks, and employees of printing establishments, operated almost entirely under SR or Menshevik influence.⁶³

During November 1915, Right SR and Right Menshevik activists at several large Vyborg District metallurgical plants formed a district wide association of consumer and worker cooperatives. In response, worker activists of Left socialist persuasion (mostly Left SRs and Left Mensheviks, plus two Bolsheviks) created an independent workers' cooperative. The large Petrograd Union of Consumer Societies also operated under the leadership of primarily Left-leaning SRs and Mensheviks.⁶⁴ Overall, the SRs' wartime role in the organized labor movement of the capital was roughly equal to that of the Social Democrats. Right Mensheviks and Right SRs were influential in certain factories, in some of the unions, and in certain cooperatives. The Left SRs and Left Mensheviks formed the two largest and most influential radical contingents within the workers' movement, whereas the Bolsheviks had a lesser role. Since by mid-1915 most Right socialists had joined their leftist comrades in advocating the overthrow of tsarism, the relative degree of influence of the two alignments is often difficult to discern.

The SRs and the Campaign against the War-Industries Committees

During fall 1915, the most crucial issue for socialists, other than the war itself, was the closely related question of whether or not to elect worker representatives to the War-Industries Committees (WICs). Patriotic factory owners and financial leaders instituted the WICs to aid in war production, with an emphasis on heavy industry. The

impetus for this remarkable development was the failure of the tsarist regime to organize war production with the same efficiency as that of other warring countries, especially Germany with its Rathenau Plan. By summer 1915, under the leadership of A. I. Guchkov, who was also a leader of the moderate Octobrist party and former president of the Duma, the WICs conceived the plan of mobilizing workers' support for war production by allowing the factories to elect so-called workers' groups to the WICs (earlier attempts to achieve labor backing through unions and insurance funds had failed). Right socialists supported the concept of the WIC workers' groups and, in fact, numerous Mensheviks and some Right SRs eventually entered the groups. Most émigré SRs rejected the idea of worker participation in the WICs; only the Right SRs of the *Prizyv* group approved. Similarly, most SRs inside Russia opposed the groups, whereas, individual SRs, mostly of the right wing, supported and joined them.

With the government's acquiescence, election campaigns for WIC workers' groups began in Petrograd factories during the month of August 1915. The socialists staked out their various positions, made speeches at factory electoral meetings, and presented resolutions. At first, all Mensheviks supported the workers' groups, although somewhat later the Menshevik-Internationalists turned against them; most SRs and Bolsheviks attacked the whole concept from the outset. The tactical question of how to go about opposing the workers' groups caused endless problems. Bolshevik and Left SR leaders in the emigration held that socialists should take part in the elections in the factories in order to have the opportunity to attend the city-wide electoral conferences, which they could then use for anti-war propaganda before ultimately refusing to elect workers' groups.⁶⁵

Instead of following this plan, Bolshevik activists in Petrograd came out during the factory campaigns for a boycott of the elections. Meanwhile, the SRs and Mensheviks proceeded to participate actively in the campaign, but with different platforms. Most SRs hoped that the factories would elect representatives who would refuse to create workers' groups. The Mensheviks and Right SRs insisted that workers enter the workers' groups not "to make shells" but to organize the revolutionary movement. To complicate matters

further, some Mensheviks and SRs called for participation in the first stage of the elections with the goal of utilizing the resulting electoral conferences for the purpose of summoning a nationwide congress of workers' deputies. Kerensky opposed worker participation in the WICs as "useless."⁶⁶

Naturally, many factory workers found these complicated maneuverings confusing. For example, the Novyi Lessner plant elected a slate of Mensheviks, who therefore favored the workers' groups, but provided them with leftist instructions hostile to the WICs. Similarly ambiguous results occurred in many factories, a circumstance that renders it difficult to judge exactly what workers wanted.⁶⁷ For the most part, factories voted for slates of electors on the basis of the current popularity of this or that party but usually provided the electors, whatever their personal preferences, with instructions opposed to the original purpose of the elections. The results suggest that most Petrograd workers opposed the concept of pro-war WIC workers' groups. Overall, the SRs and Mensheviks, who in the words of one Soviet historian "were able to throw into the factories great numbers of propagandists," did quite well, whereas the Bolsheviks organized a weak campaign and fared poorly. One Bolshevik wrote to a friend outside the city, "Many Mensheviks and narodniks [SRs] were elected: our fellows suffered a fiasco. . . ."⁶⁸ The local Bolsheviks' boycott tactic (now abandoned) had backfired.

Petrograd factories selected roughly 220 electors, who were then mandated to take part in the city-wide electoral conference; if all went well, the conference would then elect the workers' groups. The size of respective party contingents at the 27 September conference is unknown, but the SRs and Mensheviks had significantly larger numbers than the Bolsheviks. Among the SRs who played a prominent role in the election campaign and at the conference were Ia. Shilin (Metallicheskie plant), who was on the conference's presidium, A. Suvorov (Westinghouse), N. Emilianov (Trubochnyi), F. Iakovlev and A. Kachalov (Putilov), A. Ershov (Baltiiskii), G. Komarov (Obukhov), and Voronkov (Arsenal). K. A. Gvozdev, a prominent Right Menshevik, and an evidently obscure Bolshevik, Kudriavtsev, were among the nominees for the chairmanship of the conference. When Gvozdev, an ardent supporter of the workers' groups, won easily, the



Kuzma Gvozdev, defensist Menshevik of worker origin, leader of the War-Industries Committees workers' groups in Petrograd, 1915–17. Courtesy New York Public Library.

right wing felt that the election of a workers' group was assured. When a Bolshevik acquaintance asked Gvozdev whether he was not worried that leftist propaganda might sway many of the electors against the elections, he replied, "Why no, they don't have any support."⁶⁹

Of course, a Menshevik-Right SR block did wish to elect a workers' groups. As one police report stated, "Part of the [SRs] stand for participation [in the WICs] . . . and formed a block with the Social Democratic Mensheviks. . . ." Shalaginova even quotes one alleged

police report as follows: "The aggressive tactics and platform . . . of the Bolshevik-Leninists created a more favorable impression on the vacillating left narodniks than did the undefined liquidators' position, which, with its desire to cooperate with the bourgeois capitalist government . . . violated the principles of the International." This report is bizarre in its wholesale adaptation of the terminology and frames of reference of later Soviet historiography. Other Okhranka reports indicated that from the outset most SRs up to and including Kerensky opposed entry into the workers' groups and had reached agreements with the Bolsheviks on how both parties should act. Postnikov recalled that the worker-SRs elected "were far from the SD-Mensheviks of the Gvozdev type." Consequently, Gvozdev's confidence notwithstanding, the electors voted down the motion to form a workers' group, ninety-five to eighty-one. A recount yielded a similar result.⁷⁰ This should have settled the issue once and for all in a way suitable to the official SR-Bolshevik plan and to the many Petrograd factory workers who had sent leftist instructions to the conference.

The Bolsheviks, however, had inadvertently created a pretext for the WIC to nullify the results and call for a new round of elections. The Bolshevik Petersburg Committee (PC), which was at the time quite radical but inexperienced, decided to ensure that effective Bolshevik speakers were present at the conference to defend their party's point of view. The PC then diverted two mandates from their rightful possessors, the Putilov workers Kudriavtsev and Dikov, and gave them instead to the Bolshevik PC members S. Bagdatiev and V. Zalezhsii. Under Kudriavtsev's name Bagdatiev was an unsuccessful candidate for chairman of the conference and subsequently accepted the position of secretary. Some of the Mensheviks immediately recognized "Kudriavtsev" as Bagdatiev but were willing to ignore the charade as long as they thought their side was winning. After losing the vote, they had a change of heart and promptly informed the authorities. The police then questioned the real Kudriavtsev, who, it so happened, was a Menshevik who objected to the misuse of his mandate. At the urging of the WIC, the government declared the conference invalid and called for new elections.

The second round of voting revealed that, if anything, the mood of workers had become even more militant than before. Under the

name "Strike Committee of Bakers," the SRs issued a proclamation that warned workers against the WICs. The Bolsheviks and the SRs also reaffirmed their agreement to block the workers' groups. On the evening of 20 November 1915, a mass meeting at the Putilov plant passed a resolution that stated, "The gravity . . . and complexity of the tasks placed by history before the working class of Russia demand from it, despite fractional differences, unity of action"; the Putilov workers then voted for the following instructions to their delegates:

1. To arrange by any means whatsoever meetings of all internationalists (Bolsheviks, Mezhraiontsy, and Internationalist Socialist Revolutionaries) at the beginning of the session.
2. To demand the floor at the beginning of the conference regardless of who chairs it in order to make a pronouncement and not to allow anyone else to speak until this pronouncement is made.
3. Having received the floor, to make [the following] declaration: The conference is illegal and therefore it is immaterial how it is constituted. We [Putilov delegates] have come only in order to make an announcement in the name of the organized proletariat of three tendencies: the Bolsheviks, the Mezhraiontsy, and the Internationalist Socialist Revolutionaries.
4. To take part in no voting in order not to give any grounds to maintain that we recognize the conference as legal.

Of the 218 electors selected in the second round of voting, only 153 attended the conference, which took place during November 1915. Many electors either failed to report for certification or, having been certified, simply did not show up (the police arrested five of the electors).

According to plan, at the opening of the conference a group of SRs and Bolsheviks mounted the presidium of the meeting hall and announced loudly that they would disrupt the meeting unless they were allowed to speak "out of turn." Guchkov, chairman of the Central WIC, attempted to shame the leftists into silence but to no avail. Nikolaev, a Bolshevik from the Putilov plant, and Koriakin, an SR from the Novyi Lessner plant, spoke against the workers' groups. In his speech, Koriakin claimed that worker participation in the WICs would be a "blow to all workers' democracy" and that only

an all-Russian workers' congress "could decide on the defense of the country in the interest of democracy."⁷²

After listening to these declarations, most Bolsheviks and Left SRs noisily abandoned the hall, leaving only a few observers from each group. G. Breido, a Right Menshevik (not to be confused with his party comrade M. Broido), declared, "Despite all obstacles, we will carry this matter to a conclusion" and (accurately) accused the leftists of attempting to break up the conference with their "impudent, impertinent behavior," at which point the balance of the Left SRs made a loud exit. "Let them go," cried Breido; "it won't frighten me if another bunch leave. We will carry this through to the end." After one of the remaining Bolshevik observers was forcibly ejected from the hall in the midst of an impassioned impromptu speech, the last few Bolsheviks also departed. All told, eighty-four electors had left the meeting hall.

With a dubious quorum, the rump conference finally proceeded to its business. One of the (supposedly) Right SRs read an announcement in which he demanded that, until the summoning of an all-Russian Congress of Workers, "You should announce that we are against taking part in the defense of Russia. . . . We must counterpose our organizations against those of the bourgeoisie and Black Hundreds. . . ." The Right SR concluded that socialists were entering the WICs "only as representatives of the Petersburg workers, . . . not for the production of shells but for the organization of the people's forces." Other SRs also reluctantly espoused entry, but with equally sharp comments: Voronkov warned that the workers could expect no help from the bourgeoisie in transforming Russian life and that the WICs would be powerless in that regard; Ilakovlev proclaimed that "we do not sympathize with the war . . . and therefore the workers should eliminate it." Only Suvorov edged close to a qualified defensism. Coming from the SRs who favored the creation of WIC workers' groups, these speeches must have been cold comfort for Guchkov. The position taken by these SRs, and many Mensheviks, reflected the new Right socialist campaign against the incompetent tsarist government; as for the SRs, the episode also suggests that by mid-1915 most supposedly right-wing worker-SRs had scant affection for the war.

Now representing only a fraction of Petrograd workers, the dele-

gates elected a Central Committee of Workers' Groups that consisted of three SRs (Emilianov, Komarov, and Iakovlev) and seven Mensheviks (including Abrasimov, Gvozdev, and Breido), and a Regional Workers' Group that consisted entirely of six worker-SRs: Ershov, Ia. Ostapenko, Kachalov, I. Vasiliev, V. Vozhevol'nov (Polevolin?) and Shilin. Considering that a sizable number of leftist SRs had walked out of the conference, the number of SRs chosen is striking and indicates, as other evidence suggests, that Petrograd workers had elected numerous SRs to represent them at the WIC electoral conference. The SR Central Committee Abroad reported that, under threat of expulsion from the PSR, all of the SRs except one had resigned from the WIC; other evidence indicates that Ostapenko, Kachalov, and Shilin, later joined by Anosovskii and Voronkov, remained in the WIC until the February revolution. At several plants where WIC delegates were employed, the workers threatened to roll them out in wheelbarrows if they did not withdraw and several protest work stoppages occurred.⁷³

In Moscow, where the first round of voting took place in November, Guchkov, with the experience of Petrograd under his belt, reached a decision to intervene heavily from the outset. The authorities allowed few factory meetings; as a result anti-war socialists had few opportunities for agitation. Of those who voted, 7,000 rendered their ballots invalid. Despite much officially sponsored propaganda in favor of the workers' groups, sentiment was so strong against them in many metalworking plants that few bothered to vote in the elections: at the Shader factory, only 19 of 1,105 workers voted; at Zhiro, 198 of 3,268; at Dinamo, 74 of 1,500; at Postaschika, 200 of 8,557; at Moscow Metallurgical, 128 of 3,048; and so forth. Overall, only half of Moscow's eligible workers (mostly textile workers tended to vote in the elections) bothered to cast ballots. Although it was not the official leftist tactic, the size of the boycott in Moscow suggests worker hostility to the war or, at the very least, workers' balking at the idea of pro-war WIC workers' groups.

After selection on this inadequate basis, ninety electors gathered at an electoral conference on 10 November 1915. Although the boycott had limited the number of leftists elected, twenty-one Bolshevik and Left SR electors used the conference to "protest the attempt of the bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks to deceive the working

class"; they rejected the title of "elector" since the elections had occurred "in irregular circumstances." As in Petrograd, the rump conference elected a workers' group, but one of doubtful validity and influence. Moscow and Petrograd were not unique: in most of Russia's large industrial cities, the Left SR-Bolshevik bloc either prevented the creation of WIC workers' groups or forced the government to employ devious tactics to create them.⁷⁴ Although some workers' groups in major cities did function, the episode represented a moral victory of sorts of the Left socialists over the government and the wealthy bourgeoisie, who had hoped to harness worker support for the war. The struggle among socialists during the election campaign also suggests that by the second half of 1915 the radicals could exert greater influence over workers than the moderates, some of whom wished the WIC workers' groups to function as the government intended and others of whom wished to use them to harness labor support for their attempt to overthrow tsarism in favor of a government better able to defend the country.

From the outset the PSR both inside Russia and in the emigration opposed them. Only a limited number of SRs remained in the groups; even Kerensky opposed the whole idea. As a result of relatively weak SR support, in most places the WIC workers' groups were heavily Menshevik in orientation. In a 1916 publication, the SR Central Committee Abroad noted that the PSR inside Russia had opposed participation in the WICs, had blocked with the Bolsheviks to defeat their formation, and had expelled SRs who joined them (on this last point, the Central Committee exaggerated since some SRs in Petrograd and other parts of the country remained in the WICs, evidently without retribution from the party).⁷⁵

No sooner had the workers' groups formed than the Left socialists began to attack them. Already in November 1915, the Bolshevik PC issued a proclamation in the name of the eighty-four "internationalist" delegates (Bolsheviks, Mezhraiontsy, and Left SRs), which proclaimed the formation process of the workers' groups "a comedy." The SRs responded with a hectographed letter "To the Bolsheviks":

We, Socialist Revolutionaries, greet you as the first to raise your voices against persons, deliberately violating elementary rules of discipline and comradely ethics [the Right socialists]. Together with you

we will struggle against disorganizing deeds and attempts by the bourgeoisie to decide our internal questions. . . . We consider the meeting of 29 November illegal, and we condemn persons who took part in the voting and thereby sanctioned the meeting . . . and approved the motives for convening it.

Simultaneously, the Petrograd SR organization printed a leaflet that warned workers and socialists against taking part in the WICs. A few weeks later, a general conference of Petrograd SRs passed resolutions, which, among other points, demanded that all SRs in the workers' groups surrender their mandates at once lest they be expelled from the party and absolved the party of responsibility for the actions of "SRs" who participated in them.⁷⁶

The government won a hollow, short-lived victory in establishing a number of WIC workers' groups. To the extent that the groups propagandized the war and supported war production, the Left Mensheviks soon turned against them. Within a year, the workers' groups themselves radicalized and became centers of revolutionary propaganda, a result that stood on its head the original intention of the government and the big industrialists in creating them.

The by no means unsuccessful Left socialist struggle against the workers' groups and the role of the PSR in that struggle are both interesting and revealing. During the second half of 1915, this issue preoccupied socialists and a major part of Russia's proletariat. In fact, the entire revolutionary anti-war movement temporarily channeled itself into the anti-WIC campaign, which, in many provincial cities, extended well into the summer of 1916. The Right (and Left) socialist campaigns to elect (or defeat) the workers' groups took place in the factories with relative openness and thus created rare opportunities to discuss otherwise taboo subjects, such as the war and the way various parties and social groups related to it. Although the first stirrings of a wartime strike movement had begun early in summer 1915, most observers felt that the deepening of workers' unrest and revolutionary sentiment occurred in late summer and fall 1915, coterminously with the WIC campaign. At the very least, the Left socialist agitation on this topic, including that of the SRs, was a factor in the deepening and broadening of the wartime revolutionary movement. The formation of an SR-Bolshevik bloc, which many Menshevik-Internationalists later joined, was also a noteworthy aspect of the campaign.

The Pace Quickens: Late 1915 and the First Half of 1916

With the rise of revolutionary sentiment during fall 1915 and the consequent need for more orderly operations, the Petrograd SRs naturally began to take steps to reestablish a city-wide committee, without which they had operated since some time earlier that year. As in earlier organizational endeavors, Kerensky quickly became involved. His status as a Duma member granted him a degree of parliamentary immunity so that conspiratorial meetings could gather at his apartment. The Okhranka, which kept Kerensky under close scrutiny, reported that in September and October 1915 a series of well-attended SR meetings gathered at his place; worker SRs allegedly went there in the conviction that they could not be arrested. On 17 October, thirty SRs from the various districts and local groups arrived at Kerensky's, only to be warned by the building janitor that "spies" were in the area; a number of them quickly abandoned the premises, suggesting a less than absolute conviction of immunity from arrest. The somewhat smaller meeting continued unhindered and ultimately resolved to set up a commission, to which Kerensky was appointed, and mandated it to work out a declaration on the war and to lay the groundwork for the founding of an SR Petersburg Committee (PC).

During the meeting, Kerensky urged all-out efforts for a revolutionary overthrow of tsarism. He again argued that strikes only weakened revolutionary forces; instead, the SRs should work to strengthen their organizational ties with the masses so that they could seize control of all railroads and communications for a general strike (shades of October 1905) that would force the tsarist regime from power. Such a revolution, claimed Kerensky, would in no way hinder the defense of the country, since the present government was destined to lose the war in any case. He also thought that, in any case, socialists should come out for defense of the country in order to shield the movement from the appearance of "defeatism," which, in his view, was not palatable to the Russian population.

Whatever his earlier views and motives, Kerensky was now playing a double game. When news of the Zimmerwald Conference and the text of its famous anti-war manifesto arrived in Russia, Kerensky openly and repeatedly embraced its internationalist principles, of which his earlier public statements had more than a trace. His

recent biographer Abraham argues that until the February Revolution Zimmerwaldism was Kerensky's position. During fall 1915 and early 1916, he certainly spoke at numerous public functions in an astonishing range of cities in an extraordinarily antigovernment and internationalist spirit. In various speeches, he asserted that the country yearned for and should be granted peace, ridiculed the slogan "War to a victorious end," and called for the formation of a "Red Bloc" to overthrow the government.⁷⁷ From these positions to defeatism was but a short step that many socialists had already taken (indeed, the police reported that, while visiting in Moscow during October 1915, Kerensky had helped draft one of the local SRs' most radical leaflets).

Yet, the concern for defense that Kerensky expressed privately at the secret SR meeting was wholly incompatible with his public internationalism. Quite possibly, he publicly espoused the growingly popular anti-war position to maintain his revolutionary credentials, which he then intended to utilize—not to get Russia out of the war, as he seemed to indicate, but to bring to power a government better able to keep Russia in the war, a goal compatible even with his extremist antigovernment work; or perhaps he was genuinely and profoundly ambivalent. Regardless, his hopes that a revived SR organization in Petrograd would declare itself for the defense of Russia proved illusory.

The plan to recreate a committee was delayed, but on 8 December 1915 some twenty SR leaders met at the quarters of the Trudovik Duma faction to discuss the war and to elect a new Petersburg Committee. Shortly before the conference, Kerensky had circulated a carefully crafted resolution that represented his new Zimmerwaldist stance, which he hoped would appeal to the majority of Petrograd SRs. But the Okhranka later reported, "The SRs of the Petrograd area who occupy a defeatist position were not in agreement with [Kerensky's] declaration because it did not distinguish with sufficient clarity and sharpness its point of view from that of the Plekhanovites and . . . [other defensist] spokesmen. . . ."

Sviatitskii, who attended the conference, claimed to the contrary that Kerensky's resolution was "starkly Zimmerwaldist . . . for which circles of the patriotically inclined populist intelligentsia much abused him." The Kerensky declaration included calls for peace on the basis of no annexations, no contributions, and self-

determination of all nations and ended on a radical note: "Comrades, return to the ranks of the party. Create an organization of the laboring masses. Organize for the single decisive blow. Long live the struggle of the united democratic forces for peace. Long live the revolution. Long live the Constituent Assembly. Long live the Socialist Revolutionary Party." But this "starkly Zimmerwaldist" document struck the party activists and workers at the conference as insipid; as a consequence, after subjecting its planks to stringent criticism, they rejected it. The resolution they substituted was more anti-war in tone than Kerensky's; it denounced the pro-war socialist slogan "Salvation of the fatherland" and proclaimed, "We will insist on peace at the Constituent Assembly and at [other] democratic institutions, and will apply directly to the laboring masses of Germany and Austria, who are struggling with their own socialist-nationalists. . . ." ⁷⁸ The episode suggests that party activists, whom Kerensky was still privately urging toward defensism, were now willing to confront him openly.

One delegate even moved that the SR organization "separate itself from all defensist elements"; after debate, a majority rejected this resolution on the grounds that only an all-Russian party conference could reach a decision to split the party. The Soviet historian Shalaginova asserts, however, "The very fact that the resolution on the need for a split was submitted demonstrates that the conditions for the formation of the future Left SR party were born and developed during the war era." ⁷⁹

Finally, the conference proceeded to its most important task, the election of a new Petersburg Committee of six members. The SR organization in Petrograd, like the Petrograd organizations of all socialist parties, had a special place in the internal Russian party. In lieu of a central committee operating on Russian soil, the Petersburg Committee fulfilled central committee functions. Shalaginova's study of archival sources on the party inside Russia has led her to the conclusion that the resolutions of the December conference spurred the development of anti-war sentiment in SR organizations of other cities: "The Petrograd organization . . . played a leading role in anti-war work among SRs." According to her information, the new SR PC maintained regular contacts with SRs in Moscow, Kharkov, Tver, Rostov-on-the-Don, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Penza, Krasnoiarsk, Irkutsk, and other cities. Indeed, at the December confer-

ence itself, Kerensky had urged the newly elected SR PC to work toward the convocation of an all-Russian party congress and, during his last trip around the country before his health broke, spread the word about the Petrograd SRs' programs (even though they were more radical than his own).⁸⁰ The formation of the Petersburg Committee was, therefore, of far more than local significance.

Late in December, the new SR PC met with the Bolshevik PC to discuss plans for the upcoming Bloody Sunday anniversary (9 January). In the hopes of creating a revolutionary situation, they decided to declare a general strike, or, if that proved unfeasible, at least to organize a massive street demonstration. The police immediately responded with arrests of Bolsheviks, Left Mensheviks, and SRs. According to an Okhranka report, the government carried out "especially heavy mass arrests [of SRs] in Petrograd, Moscow, Tula, Nikolaev, Voronezh, and in several other cities." After surviving the late December onslaught, the SR PC issued a proclamation that called for a strike on 9 January and that sheds light on its objectives:

The tsarist government and the bourgeoisie are doing everything they can . . . to force the working class to renounce . . . the internal revolutionary tasks, and [instead] to expend its strength and blood for the cause of war. . . . These attempts have not succeeded and can't succeed. . . . Workers have nothing in common with the ruling classes. . . . Let the anniversary . . . serve as the day when the wave of revolutionary acts, which will lead to workers' democratic power, begins to grow irresistibly. . . .

Besides a call for international revolution, the leaflet contained a seemingly innocuous phrase that thoroughly alarmed the police: "Let your conscience, your strength, and the means [available] to you guide you in all you desire." In view of the SR-Bolshevik resolve to create, if possible, a general strike with massive street demonstrations, the police correctly interpreted the phrase as granting revolutionary carte blanche to activists in the streets on 9 January; the party empowered them, should the occasion arise, to transform strikes and demonstrations into an armed rising. The police reported, "The SRs fully defined their attitude toward 9 January in a proclamation . . . that called for strikes and demonstrations and [that allowed individual activists] full freedom of action. . . as the situation develops."⁸¹

Various Okhranka reports illustrate the regime's real concern that the SRs and Bolsheviks might actually create an armed rising (at this time, almost all Mensheviks rejected as premature the plan for an uprising). A report from 8 January stated, "In order to weaken the strike movement and prevent an armed rising throughout December we have arrested Bolshevik . . . and SR figures." The Ministry of the Interior also noted the arrest of important Bolshevik and SR activists with the goal of undercutting the planned demonstrations.⁸² Consequently, although some workers marched in the streets, the Bloody Sunday anniversary did not live up to the leftists' expectations.

Under heavy police attack, the SRs displayed considerable organizational resilience by holding a conference in late January, with representation from the SR PC, the Student Committee of SRs (including P. A. Dzen and Zateishchikov), the Initiative Publishing Group (V. Trutovskii, N. Kopytovskii, and others), and the Provincial Initiative Group. This conference passed a set of resolutions that merit extensive quotation:

1. Considering the present European war a struggle of the capitalist bourgeoisie of England, Germany, France, and Russia for markets and world domination, we recognize:
2. that for us, Socialist Revolutionaries, the only acceptable resolutions are those of the Zimmerwald Conference, which should summon socialists of all countries to the struggle for . . . peace.
3. Consequently, . . . we hold that the main task of the day is to organize the working classes for revolution, since only their seizure of power will liquidate the war and all its consequences . . . in the interests of laboring democracy.
4. In view of the obvious bourgeois-capitalist character of this war, we not only reject a class "truce" but emphasize the necessity of intensifying the class struggle. . . .
5. We also consider necessary internationalist efforts toward a unified organization of socialists of all countries in order to strengthen the new International and to accomplish its original tasks.⁸³

Kerensky's chagrin at the December conference's rejection of the anti-war declaration he had labored over must have turned to positive dismay when in the succeeding weeks the SR PC, which he had just helped set up, cooperated with the Bolsheviks to initiate

an unconditional anti-war, antitsarist, and anticapitalist campaign. Shortly after the new year, a severe illness sidelined Kerensky for about six months, but even on his recovery by fall 1916, there is no evidence of his further direct involvement in the affairs of the Petrograd SR organization. For example, although he maintained his wide network of contacts in the capital, including those with SR workers' circles in many factories, he gave no further aid in the matter of reconstructing the SR PC after its destruction during August 1916. (Perhaps his motto was "once burnt, twice shy.") When the party organization did begin to take shape again in late 1916 and early 1917, Kerensky repeatedly clashed with its leftist leadership. A reasonable surmise is that his late 1915 foray into SR organizational work yielded significant results but not of the kind he had expected; thereafter he remained aloof from the underground PSR.

During the second half of 1915 and early 1916, activism in the ranks of the PSR and other socialist parties reflected growing unrest among the mass elements of Russian society. As for workers, their truculence toward the WIC workers' group was only one aspect of the phenomenon. From fall 1915 on, workers at mass meetings more and more often voiced calls to elect soviets of workers' deputies. Many factory meetings convened during the WIC campaign or for other reasons passed resolutions that demanded an end to the war. When in late 1915 moderate socialists in the Moscow WIC workers' group requested that several local unions send representatives into the Unions of Zemstvos and City Dumas (the zemgor organizations, which engaged in war production), the unions flatly refused. In Petrograd Trutovskii and Kopytovskii, members of the SR Publishing Group, set about founding a party newspaper for workers, only to have its first issue confiscated at the printer's.⁸⁴

Their connections throughout Russian society convinced the SRs that the ferment had spread far beyond the urban environment into the villages and garrisons and to the fronts. From the vantage point of their entrenched positions in the zemstvos and rural cooperatives, the SRs noted the powerful influence the hardships of the war worked on the peasants, as a result of which party activists, especially those in the cooperatives, had sharply increased their agitation. Garrison soldiers, especially those located in the central provinces, turned disorderly and defiant; the government had even been

compelled to disband several regiments. To quell the disturbances, the military command instituted a policy of transferring radical soldiers to units at the front. Most disquieting for the government, when military units were dispatched against labor strikes, a commonplace event by this time, they sometimes disobeyed orders and even fired on police instead of on unruly workers.⁸⁵

SR leaders recognized the responsibility this placed on the party, especially in light of the extreme difficulty of constructing and maintaining the stable party organizations that could provide sustained leadership. Anti-war SRs in France and Switzerland noted these problems in their *Biulleten*: "Everywhere there is a sense of organizational and technical inadequacy. Initiative groups take shape here and there independently; workers create small revolutionary groups; the peasant cooperatives have many revolutionaries. . . ." The rise and fall of ephemeral groups occurred even more commonly, claimed the émigré SRs, among soldiers.⁸⁶ Many of these low-level groups sought leadership from the PSR, which could not provide it. Inside Russia, the SRs were saying much the same thing about their organizational inadequacies. Somewhat exaggeratedly, Kerensky told the December 1915 SR conference, "No other socialist party was so disorganized."

Both abroad and at home, the SRs reached similar conclusions about how to solve the seemingly intractable problem: close cooperation, even union, among the various socialist parties so as to pool inadequate personal and technical resources. During February 1916 the Petrograd SR organization issued a proclamation that expanded considerably on this theme:

Comrades! An exceptionally complex task confronts . . . socialists who occupy an internationalist position on the war. . . . Revolutionary laboring democracy of all belligerent and neutral countries must end the war. . . . Immediate concrete tasks must unite us, socialist-revolutionaries of various parties and factions. . . . Party and factional differences must take a back seat. . . . [We must] unite forces . . . on the basis of our common attitude toward the war, as expressed in the Zimmerwald resolutions. . . . Special organs that represent all socialist parties must take shape in each location. These organs must direct the day to day revolutionary activities of combined socialism. We warmly summon comrade internationalists, SRs and Bolshevik and

Menshevik SDs to join together at once to carry out our common tasks on a unified basis.

Once the parties had joined forces, asserted the SRs, the new socialist bloc would have to perfect its anti-war propaganda; promote and wage class warfare, including strikes and demonstrations; and prepare workers, peasants, and soldiers for the "revolutionary overthrow" of the government and the subsequent "seizure of power."⁸⁷

This seemingly utopian prescription for anti-war socialism—unified action under joint party organs—was neither farfetched nor foreign to the recent experience of Russian socialists. During August and again in December 1915, the Petrograd SRs and Bolsheviks held joint meetings to work out tactics for such issues as the late summer strikes in Petrograd, the WIC campaign, and the Bloody Sunday anniversary demonstrations. The city-wide strike committee during early September had consisted of SRs, Mezhraiontsy, Menshevik-Internationalists, and Bolsheviks, and the campaign against the WIC workers had its foundations in the cooperative efforts of the SRs, the Bolsheviks, and the Mezhraiontsy. The Bolshevik activist Kaiurov recalled that in the workers' districts, "All concrete technical measures were worked out in the factories and plants, often together with the Mensheviks and SRs. . . . Each such agreement was considered binding for all workers in the given factory."⁸⁸

SR leaders suggested, however, that socialists create ongoing joint committees to enhance the already existing practice of cooperation, which was still marred by interparty bickering. They also recommended that the practice of creating joint organs be extended to the provincial towns; in point of fact, outside Moscow and Petrograd cooperation among socialists, and even anarchists, had already attained an extraordinary character, up to and including the very joint party organs the SRs now recommended for the capitals and for Russia as a whole (see chapter 4). On this issue, the provinces were the innovators. Since the SRs were the principal proponents of socialist cooperation, their influence was of great significance in defining the nature of the wartime revolutionary movement.

During late winter and spring 1916, strikes at the huge Putilov Works, long an SR bastion, launched a new round of revolutionary activity in Petrograd. In mid-February some Putilov workshops quit

work to protest the recent arrest of Kronshtadt sailors; workers in other workshops, many of whom had long lists of economic and political grievances of their own, followed suit, with the result that on 23 February management locked out the entire Putilov plant, an industrial giant of thirty thousand workers. In response, the SR and Bolshevik PCs proclaimed a general protest strike for the whole city on 1 March 1916; in this case, as for the 9 January demonstrations, the committees of the Menshevik-Internationalists, the Mezhraiontsy, and even the anarchists, refused to participate. In the recollections of one Bolshevik, his party and the SRs promoted the (perhaps adventuristic) plan in the hopes that the strike would transform itself "into an armed uprising." Evidence suggests that, in any event, the strike failed to receive unanimous support even from the SRs and Bolsheviks who sponsored it.⁸⁹ Consequently, despite much advance fanfare around the factories of Petrograd, the 1 March strike did not achieve the desired scale; the culprit was the lack of unity the SRs wished to remedy by the creation of joint organs. The police took revenge with an especially savage round of arrests that still did not quell labor unrest. Later in the month an especially stubborn economic strike broke out at the Vyborg District New Lessner plant; the strike committee had Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SRs and, in the words of the Soviet historian Shelavin, was "noteworthy . . . for its tenacity [and] the wide-scale of its work." The government and the plant administrators, with the help of socialists from the WICs, finally ended the affair by firing more than five hundred plant workers.⁹⁰ The Petersburg strike movement temporarily faltered. For the last time in the history of old Russia, March roared in like a lion and went out like a lamb.

Although the SR committee lay low for a month or two after the failure of the general strike, student SRs maintained a high profile. The Petersburg University Red Cross (a branch of the so-called Political Red Cross, an organization dedicated to aiding political prisoners and whose leadership consisted of SDs and SRs) issued leaflets that were thinly disguised revolutionary tracts calling for financial contributions for prisoners, whose deeds the leaflets praised. The SR student faction, which worked closely with Bolshevik student groups, often distributed party literature in the university hallways.⁹¹ On 4 March 1916, SR and Bolshevik students organized a

university-wide strike to protest the recent arrests of socialist activists; they also distributed a leaflet ("Down with the government!," and so forth) at a large meeting in one of the school corridors. After the meeting, fights broke out between socialist and monarchist students. Police intervened to stop the near-riot and arrested several SR and SD strike leaders, which set off a whole series of disturbances in the following days. In late March the police picked up numerous SR and SD student leaders, a blow that weakened but did not eliminate the demonstrations, which continued until June 1916.⁹²

After two months of relative quiet, May Day 1916 served as the next focal point for agitation. In advance of the proletarian holiday, the SR PC issued a proclamation "To the workers," which asserted that May Day united all workers and socialists behind one slogan: "Freedom and the right to the whole produce of labor." According to the SR leaflet, the previous year's May Day had been the occasion of great sorrow since, at the time (the nadir of the revolutionary movement), defensist slogans had prevailed even among the laboring classes. But sooner or later, claimed the SRs, any class will recognize its own interests and more and more often workers were tending "to enter the . . . path of struggle against the class enemy." The leaflet concluded: "Today we turn to the laborers with the call: in order to bring closer the future socialist order, in the name of international solidarity, in the name of European revolution, come out into the streets on 1 May with the slogan 'Down with the war.' We hope the conscious proletariat, correctly understanding its interests, will not leave our summons unanswered."⁹³

Although the record of the SR PC's activities since its formation in December 1915 placed it on the left wing of Russian socialism, it did not satisfy activists of the PSR in the Petrograd area. On the basis of her examination of police and party archives, Shalaginova makes the observation that during spring 1916 the SRs moved further to the Left. As a result, in late May, on the grounds that the old committee members had pursued the struggle against the war with insufficient energy, the SR Petrograd organization replaced its PC with a new one. The SR PC immediately issued an inaugural proclamation that certainly established its radical credentials:

Only . . . a revolutionary uprising will give democracy the opportunity to shape current events. Laboring people will best fulfill their wishes

not through the murderous struggle among nations but by means of civil war against the bourgeoisie and the land owners. . . . We must create the New International: only world-wide democracy . . . can end the . . . war and dictate the conditions of . . . peace without annexations and contributions. Down with the war! Long live the second Russian Revolution! Long live the new International and, as a member of it, the Russian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries!⁹⁴

This leaflet is one of the very few issued by any of the parties inside Russia to employ the phrase "civil war." Perhaps because of the new volatile tone of propaganda published by the SR PC, which during spring and summer 1916 issued a large number of leaflets, the Okhranka decided by late summer 1916 to destroy the SR organization in the capital. On 14 July 1916 the PC dispatched a letter to the SR delegates to the recently convened Kienthal Conference; the letter noted that the SR PC adhered to the Zimmerwald and Kienthal manifestos, and requested that this be communicated to the International Socialist Bureau in Berne. The SR PC also issued at least four proclamations on the subject of the Kienthal Conference alone, a record that indicates a remarkable degree of energy in the weeks before its demise. The letter to the SR Kienthal delegates and the leaflets about the conference are the last evidence of the committee's activities. In early August massive arrests broke up the PC and all the party's district committees; severe repression continued unabated for months thereafter. The Petrograd Okhranka crowed, "As for the SR party, . . . it does not exist."⁹⁵

Summary

At the outbreak of hostilities in July 1914, the police arrested hundreds of socialist activists in the Petrograd and Moscow areas, including many of the most radical SRs; the large Petrograd and Moscow SR organizations split over the war issue and, in the absence of many recently incarcerated activists of leftist persuasion, failed to take an immediate firm stand against the war. Nevertheless, in both cities party activists and worker-SRs quickly formed groups opposed to the war, whereas intelligentsia circles took a more moderate path. The anti-war movement in the party in both cities quickly

intensified, in terms of both numbers and urgency. After a year or so, the SRs began to lose their initial caution about Russia's ability at least to maintain the front against the Germans. Within the party, the rather fragile line between extreme leftists and moderate internationalists melted away amid Russia's staggering losses at the front, harsh deprivation at home, and overwhelming new awareness of the war's indeterminable length. Shalaginova affirms that during the two years after the outbreak of the war the PSR not only in the two capitals but throughout the empire underwent a strong, steady radicalization process.⁹⁶ Despite constant police harassment, the Moscow and Petrograd SRs, working closely with other anti-war socialists, conducted considerable anti-war and antigovernment agitation.

4



The SRs at the Fronts and in the Provinces

Regardless of how adamantly revolutionary leaders in the emigration and in the large Petrograd and Moscow organizations opposed the war and agitated for the overthrow of tsarism and capitalism, unless their calls elicited responses from the rest of the Russian Empire, long experience had shown that it would all come to nought. When in 1915 news from Russia began to arrive, the SR leadership in Western Europe quickly realized that numerous local party organizations had turned against the war, a process that intensified as time went by. The task for historians today—to ascertain the quantity and quality of revolutionary agitation at the war fronts, in the garrisons, and in the empire's provincial towns and villages during the war years—is as daunting as it is important: the farther from the centers, the scarcer the evidence. This is doubly true of the SRs, who in later decades rarely had an opportunity to publish their memoirs and about whom Soviet historiography has not always been forthcoming. Nevertheless, with some gaps, the record of SR activism in the armed forces and the towns is at least partly retrievable, although the topic of SR agitation in the countryside still poses difficult research problems.

At the fronts, after a year or so of revolutionary quiet, by mid-1915 military authorities began to complain about the dissemination of anti-war propaganda just behind the fronts. By late 1915 and throughout 1916 and early 1917, the commanding generals of all the major fronts repeatedly warned of widespread revolutionary agita-

tion at the fronts themselves. Mutinies, refusals to fight, and other disquieting manifestations soon followed, with companies, regiments, and entire divisions becoming involved. As regards Russia's provincial cities and towns, revolutionary propaganda started soon after the outbreak of the war and, despite the Okhranka's eternal vigilance, seemed to strengthen with each passing month. In the hostile environment of ubiquitous provocateurs and incessant arrests, the socialists, sometimes joined by the anarchists, often formed joint committees to produce and channel anti-war materials to local garrisons and factories. During the war, efforts in the villages did not occupy a primary place in socialist priorities, but the SRs did produce materials for the peasantry and used their positions in the zemstvos and rural cooperatives to maintain contacts with this, the largest and most oppressed segment of the empire's population.

SR Propaganda at the Fronts

As the individuals who directly suffered from the incompetence of their officers and the scandalous shortcomings in supply and training, Russian soldiers quickly lost whatever enthusiasm they had for their onerous, deadly tasks. Only the legendary steadfastness of the Russian soldier accounted for the survival of any will to resist whatsoever after the horrors of 1914 and 1915. Of course, by 1916 the leadership had improved and the shortages had mostly ended. During the winter of 1916, the Germans on the northern front noted with some alarm a new energy and discipline behind the Russian lines. When spring came, General Brusilov launched a series of offensives against the Austrian lines that resulted in the retaking of much of the Galician territory lost the previous summer. However, Russia's last victory of the Great War cost over 500,000 dead, seriously wounded, and captured. Meanwhile, the long-awaited Russian offensive against inferior German numbers on the northern front ground to a rapid halt in the usual bloody miasma of poor organization and failed leadership. For the balance of the war, the soldiers evinced first and foremost a desire for an end to the war, come what may. The situation was grist for the mill of revolutionary propaganda.

Very little evidence exists about wartime revolutionary activity on the southeastern front, where Russia battled Turkey, or in the Black Sea Fleet, despite the latter's long history of revolt; fortunately, the muse of history has been kinder as regards the northern, western, and southern fronts and the Baltic Fleet. Given the realities of life at the fronts, formal revolutionary organizations could hardly exist there, although soldier-activists (thousands of whom the tsarist regime thoughtlessly sought to punish by sending to the battlefields) formed small circles and maintained informal communications networks. Numerous reports from the staffs of the various fronts and fleets, from the Okhranka, and from the Ministries of War and Interior also suggest that, despite the obstacles, beginning in early 1915 soldiers and sailors received considerable quantities of revolutionary anti-war literature; by the second half of 1916 and early 1917 a veritable flood of leaflets reached the armed forces.¹

Still, in the early period of the war, little revolutionary activity took place at or near the fronts. As one soldier memoirist characterized the first few months: "In general there could be no question of work against the war." By September 1915, however, the chief of staff at Dvinsk on the western front complained in a secret report that leaflets were being disseminated at the military hospitals just behind the fronts. Similarly, a June 1916 report from the Sixth Army at the northern front noted the use of the military hospitals and clinics for the distribution of anti-war proclamations.² In mid-1916, army headquarters of the northern front painted the following picture:

Recently in the area of the northern front . . . propaganda of all socialist parties has intensified considerably. . . . [Socialists] are distributing proclamations and pamphlets of criminal content among the soldiers located there. The aim . . . of this agitation is to convince the troops . . . to stop the war and fight the government.

During the last eight months before the February Revolution, military commanders at all three fronts displayed acute awareness of and alarm about the effect anti-war agitation was having on the soldiers. S. Rabinowich, the early historian of the revolutionary movement in the army, notes that left wing SRs, Mezhraiontsy, and Bolsheviks "carried out work in the army."³

Even where the revolutionaries did not manage to construct mili-

tary organizations per se, possibilities existed for carrying out agitation. The so-called zemgor organizations (Unions of Zemstvos and City Dumas), which operated many of the clinics and hospitals mentioned by the general staff as sources of propaganda, maintained huge networks of facilities of all kinds behind each of the fronts. For instance, by mid-1916 the zemgor operation behind the western front included hospitals, clinics, bathhouses, disinfection centers, reading libraries, barbershops, tearooms, cafeterias, officers' messes, construction teams, and factories that employed more than twenty-four thousand individuals. Between October 1915 and June 1917, the zemgor western front ambulatory clinics alone accepted 1.3 million patients. In dire need of labor, the zemgor organizations paid little attention to whom they hired, as a consequence of which innumerable revolutionaries, many of whom could not find regular employment because of their past history and not a few of whom had fled military service, signed up for zemgor employment. To give one example, among the prominent revolutionaries in the zemgor institutions around Minsk were the Bolshevik M. Frunze (under the name Mikhailov), the Left Menshevik B. Pozern (chairman of the Minsk Soviet after the February Revolution), and the poet A. Blok, who aligned himself with the Left SRs. The zemgor apparatus hired thousands of individuals in their various operations all over Russia, including in Petrograd and Moscow, where literally hundreds of socialists, legal and illegal, found wartime employment. Naturally, this network provided a cover for all manner of underground activities, including the propagandizing of the fronts.⁴

By fall 1915, revolutionaries, especially the SRs, were cognizant of their propaganda successes among the troops. Since the beginning of the war, Left SRs in the emigration had emphasized the need for revolutionary work in the armed forces. In September 1915, the activist Bonch-Osmolovskii, who had just returned from the front, spoke to a Moscow SR conference about the growing susceptibility of soldiers and officers to anti-war agitation. On the basis of reports from Russia, the Left SR leader Natanson informed the April 1916 Kienthal Conference that SRs were successfully agitating the armed forces.⁵ Similarly, Tsivin reported to Austrian and German officials, "The SR organization is gaining more and more ground, both behind the front and at the front itself. Its followers number hundreds of

thousands, and even many army officers are members of the party. More and more people are growing weary of the war." Allowing for some exaggeration of numbers, the general tenor of Tsivin's report on the home front was accurate; according to the German attaché Romberg, reports he had received from Keskula, an agent provocateur with close connections to the revolutionary movement inside Russia, corroborated Tsivin's analysis. The sober German concluded that the SRs could be counted on "to help shorten the war considerably. Prospects were exceedingly good in the long run."⁶

Left SRs who addressed a September 1916 Moscow conference of WIC workers' groups strikingly conveyed their sense of the prospects for revolution in the armed forces, in the following statement (summarized by police agents):

Each day of the war more clearly reveals the internal contradictions of the Russian order and . . . swells by tens of thousands the number of the war's opponents. . . . The overfilled jails testify that the Russian people are beginning to understand the war. . . . The success of SR propaganda in the army . . . convinces us that soldiers, forcibly drafted from among the workers, and workers impelled by the punitive military-police state to labor [in war production] are laying the groundwork for revolution. . . . Let government spokesmen conceal the unrest throughout the armed forces, let the military courts devour more and more victims: neither workers nor soldiers are deceived. . . . The longer the war goes on, the worse for the government.⁷

Evidently referring to the Right socialists who had now adopted a revolutionary policy, the SRs also noted certain "naive individuals" who formerly had expected a "bloodless victory" of democracy over tsarism but who now had all abandoned such hopes. Okhranka officials conceded the accuracy of the SRs' estimation of the success of their anti-war propaganda. They also noted that wartime inflation and shortages had sharply increased mass unrest and contributed to the growth of socialist "defeatism" and concluded, "The SR agitators are correct in figuring that this is a suitable moment to plow the fertile soil and to sow revolutionary-socialistic ideas. . . ."

Of equal significance, the Left SRs alluded to differences between themselves and the SDs about the probable nature of the coming revolution. Organizational inadequacies, lack of coordination

among the socialists, and the extreme difficulty of carrying on propaganda forced "the SRs . . . to see the matter differently than the SDs." According to the SRs, "At present a Russian revolution on the example of 1905 is impossible, but revolution based upon the unified soldier and proletarian masses is quite likely." Since the beginning of the war, the SRs had proclaimed their intention of aiming propaganda at both the soldiers and the workers, in the hopes of joining the two; their lack of unity, they thought, had impeded the revolution of 1905-07. Of the socialist parties, on a national scale the SRs did the most thorough job of actually reaching workers and soldiers. When it came, the February Revolution of 1917 took forms already accurately described by the SRs and toward which they had worked.

Less clear is the question of how the various Social Democratic factions acted. Left Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in various parts of the country channeled propaganda to the armed forces; in Petrograd the Mezhrayonka assiduously drafted and distributed leaflets to the local garrisons. Still, overall the SDs seem to have done less than the SRs in this aspect of revolutionary work. Perhaps the answer lies in the realm of theory and program. As Chernov noted at the Zimmerwald Conference, the manifesto jointly agreed upon by the international socialists (most of whom were Social Democrats of various countries) focused entirely on the problem of the urban proletariat, whereas, accused the SR leader, in Russia the primary burden fell on the peasantry. Only a thorough study of the wartime Russian Social Democrats would suffice to elucidate the matter fully, but the wartime writings of the chief Social Democratic leaders indeed suggest a concentration on the urban proletariat and an expectation of an urban revolution on the example of 1905. On the one hand, that the Mensheviks and other leftist SDs such as Trotsky, who had always insisted on the essentially nonrevolutionary nature of the backward Russian peasantry, should focus on the Russian and international proletariat is not surprising. On the other, that Lenin, who by 1905 had reworked Bolshevik theory to include the role of the peasantry in Russia, should have done so during the war is noteworthy. During the war, Lenin (against whom the SRs may well have been polemicizing) often described the existing crisis solely in terms of the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie, regularly spoke of the

coming "dictatorship of the proletariat," and from time to time drew analogies between wartime Russia and the 1905 Revolution; in this same period, he rarely referred to peasant revolutionism, to his own concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or to the task of propagandizing the armed forces, which at the beginning of the war he had advocated as necessary in all warring countries.⁸ Perhaps their Marxist orientation toward the workers led all the SDs, including Lenin, to de-emphasize not just the peasantry, but the soldiers, who were, of course, overwhelmingly from Russia's villages.

Since numerous governmental reports testified that accelerating quantities of proclamations reached several fronts and the Baltic Fleet, the task of accounting for how revolutionaries accomplished this remains. Memoirs and other sources indicate a strikingly unfamiliar phenomenon, in that multiparty organizations (as recommended by the Petrograd SRs in early 1916) conducted most of the anti-war work at or near the fronts. Furthermore, the SRs took the leading role in these activities: they normally either owned the presses that produced the anti-war materials or obtained such materials from the Petrograd organization.

The important northern front was in one sense an exception, in that joint party organizations did not play a role. Although Soviet scholars often attribute the successful propagandizing of the northern front, a phenomenon army headquarters admitted in anguish, more or less exclusively to the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee (PC) and to Latvian Bolsheviks, historical evidence suggests that a wide range of SD and SR organizations supplied materials to the northern front. The SD anti-war literature that reached the soldiers at this front came from the Latvian SDs in Riga (who were Trotskiist rather than Bolshevik) and the Petrograd Menshevik-Internationalists, Mezhraiontsy, and Bolsheviks.⁹

As for the SRs, they carried out widespread anti-war propaganda behind the northern front and eventually constructed an extensive organization for this purpose. Of interest in this regard is rare evidence related to the formation and activities of anti-war circles in one northern province. In February 1916, the Novgorod provincial gendarmerie noted that as of fall 1915 a local SR anti-war group had become involved, in the words of the gendarmerie, "in criminal po-

litical activities." Under orders from the Petrograd organization, M. F. Kolesnikov, a longtime Petrograd party activist, had recently arrived to direct SR anti-war operations in Novgorod. By October 1915, the energetic Kolesnikov, by profession a baker, had conducted a meeting of unknown persons, during which he had distributed leaflets addressed "to the soldiers."¹⁰ Besides several bakers, police identified other early members of the group as Z. N. Znamenskaia, a teacher at a zemstvo school; F. V. Troshin, a peasant; and M. I. Ivanov, a soldier in the local garrison. Another important member of the circle was Zelma Ant, a clerk in the cooperative *Pchelo* (Bee), who introduced them to P. V. Baulin, an SR activist since 1907, through whom they strengthened their ties with the Petrograd SRs.

During late 1915, the activities of the circle intensified. In December Kolesnikov conducted a lottery to raise money for the production of leaflets; according to the police, this event plus the Ant-Baulin contact contributed to a drastic growth in the size and activism of the Novgorod SR Group. Sometime in late December, Ivanov and another soldier, Dimitriev, also established a revolutionary cell in the garrison. By the new year, the Novgorod group had received literature from Petrograd, including the SR PC's leaflet for 9 January (Bloody Sunday), several proclamations addressed to the soldiers, and copies of the Zimmerwald Manifesto. Although available in limited quantities, copies of this literature circulated throughout the garrison and in various radical circles.¹¹

In late January, Ant acquired a Shapirograph printing machine from the cooperative where she worked. With the Shapirograph and the funds collected from the lottery, the SR group began to reproduce proclamations received from Petrograd. In late January, after consulting with Ivanov, Kolesnikov and Ant wrote a proclamation "To the soldiers" and Ant reproduced numerous copies of this and another revolutionary leaflet. With packets of these freshly printed leaflets, Kolesnikov immediately left on a propaganda tour of the garrisons of Novgorod Province and environs. At the same time, the Novgorod group dispatched the student S. N. Orlinskii to Petrograd to arrange regular receipt of literature from the SR PC.

According to police reports, the soldiers' circle in the garrison, which used the rather grandiose title *Voенно-revoliutsionnaia* or-

ganizatsiia (Military-Revolutionary Organization), made use of Ant's Shapirograph to print additional leaflets for the local garrison. On 19 February, P. V. Baulin returned from a trip to Petrograd with copies of an anti-war proclamation to the soldiers and sailors, which originated from the so-called *Severnaia organizatsiia eserov* (Northern Organization of SRs); Ant immediately prepared to reproduce this document in large quantities. Prompted by the growing scale of the SR operations in Novgorod, police then moved against the organizations: during the raids they arrested sixteen persons and confiscated the Shapirograph, stacks of proclamations and other illegal literature, typewriters, printers' ink, quantities of paper, and a file of party correspondence.¹²

The matter is of interest not only because of the unusually close view it provides of the mechanisms by which local SR underground organizations took shape and operated but because of the incipient connections with the Northern Military Organization of SRs. When the authorities broke up the Novgorod organization, it was in the process of becoming one of the outposts of a much larger SR anti-war organization; presumably, the Petrograd organization, the original locale of the Northern Organization, sent Kolesnikov to Novgorod for this very purpose. Later in 1916, the Northern Organization, which had branches in a number of cities and towns behind the northern front, relocated its headquarters to Novgorod, where it operated until the February Revolution.¹³ By all indications, the northern organization was the largest specifically anti-war group operated by the SRs or any other socialist party anywhere in Russia.

Although they approach its activities circumspectly, Soviet scholars occasionally mention the SR Northern Military Organization. In the 1920s, M. Akhun noted its existence in several of his works, and, more recently, Gusev and Shalaginova allude briefly to it. One Soviet document collection provides additional data and even includes a text of one of the Northern Organization's leaflets. As mentioned, with the purpose of agitating the northern front, the Petrograd SR set up the Northern Military Organization in 1915; subsequently, it moved its headquarters to Novgorod, both to be closer to the chief military facilities of the front and to escape the surveillance and provocation that characterized revolutionary life in the capital. From late 1915 through early 1917, authorities noted the activities

of the organization in Novgorod, Petrograd, Pskov, Gatchina, and, in the words of one military intelligence report, "the whole area of the northern front." Tsivin's reports to Austrian and German intelligence indicate that a branch of the Northern Organization operated in Arkhangelsk.¹⁴

Two of the Northern Organization's leaflets from spring and early summer 1916 provide a sense of the rhetoric adopted by the SRs in their agitational literature for the fronts. One leaflet rejected the call for Russia's victory in the war and informed the working masses that their only enemy was the government:

There is only one path . . . revolution. After you overthrow the autocracy, you will create a new peoples' regime of free citizens of free Russia. . . . The proletariat is already making preparations for revolution. . . . When the struggle breaks out, we will be ready, brother soldiers and sailors, to support the working class. We will be ready to overthrow the centuries long slavery of the Russian people and proudly raise the banner of free working Russia. Down with autocracy.¹⁵

The other proclamation bitterly criticized even the priests for attempting to blame Russia's defeats on the Jews and the workers. The liberal bourgeoisie and its press, claimed the SRs, threw up smoke screens about German brutality but failed to mention tsarist inhumanity toward Russian workers, as in recent cases when troops fired on striking workers:

The incompetent tsarist generals, . . . who have often fled in panic from the Germans and the Japanese, bravely win their victories against the proletariat. . . . Under the cover of the roar of war, . . . the military fanfare of the warmongering bourgeois-gentry press, [and] the "patriotic" calls of every sort of "defensist," our black-hundred tsarist government . . . is fastening ever tighter . . . the noose around the necks of the working class. . . . The more the Goremykins & Co. proclaim the "bright future", the darker becomes the present.

According to the SRs, with the cooperation of the liberals and the pro-war socialists, the government was launching a full-scale attack against the working class; the only way out was for "soldiers and sailors to rise up in revolt."¹⁶ These leaflets subjected to condemnation not only the tsarist regime, the landowners, and the capital-

ists but even Right socialists such as Plekhanov and V. Burtsev who supported the war.

The military authorities became aware of the SRs' activities; for instance, in its mid-1916 report on the soldiers' deteriorating mood, the Sixth Army (northern front) identified the Northern Military Organization of the PSR as one of the major sources of offending propaganda. Tsivin described the activities of the Northern Military Organization to his Austro-German connections in expansive terms, showed them originals of some its proclamations, and indicated that it was publishing a small underground newspaper, a claim that as yet lacks corroboration.¹⁷

On the western and southern fronts and in the Baltic Fleet, the aforementioned joint socialist organizations arose to carry out anti-war agitation. Near the western front, shortly after the outbreak of the war, White Russian SRs, Bundists, and Left SDs (of Trotskiist orientation) blocked together to create the *Voenna-revoliutsionnaia organizatsiia* (Military-Revolutionary Union), which maintained its headquarters in Minsk.¹⁸ According to the Soviet historian Savitskii, the SR-SD Union had as its goal "to disseminate revolutionary ideas among the soldiers, directed, for the most part, to the quickest end to the war, no matter what its outcome." The union suffered heavy arrests in early 1916, after which it decided "to refrain from the printing and distribution of revolutionary proclamations"; instead, it would devote itself to building the organization, because, as the group's leader Epshtein asserted, "At the present historical moment, which . . . will end in the defeat of the Russian army and the onset of revolution in Russia, . . . it is necessary to prepare diligently in order to take into our hands the leadership of the masses."¹⁹

Although the Minsk Military-Revolutionary Union generally fit a pattern for anti-war organizations throughout much of the empire, in one respect it differed. According to Savitskii, whose observations receive confirmation from Bolshevik memoirists, the Bolsheviks failed to join the union; furthermore, they had no organizations behind the western front and played no appreciable role in producing anti-war literature for this front.²⁰ Thus other Left SDs and the SRs were primarily responsible for propagandizing the western front.

Anti-war activity occurred in other areas of White Russia. Quite close to the front in Mogilev Province, the SRs maintained two or-

ganizations, both of which issued anti-war literature. One of the Mogilev SRs' leaflets from late spring 1915 was addressed to the "Comrade peasants":

Ten months have passed since the war began. Hundreds of thousands of your brothers [and] sons . . . have been killed on the [battle] fields. . . . The people do not need the war. Why do we need foreign land, when we have our own land, which is, however, taken from the peasant? . . . But the tsar and the wealthy are spiders. . . . They take taxes from you, they take your children, . . . they kill millions of them in the war, but if the peasants ask for the land, they [get] the Cossacks, the lash, and Siberia. . . . The wealthy have seized the land . . . at their head is Tsar Nikolai. . . . All land should belong to the peasants. . . . Down with the war and autocracy! Long live socialism!

At roughly the same time, the Mogilev SRs produced a second proclamation addressed to the soldiers. In early 1915, SRs in Vitebsk came out against the war and channeled masses of subversive literature into the province's numerous military hospitals, clinics, and garrisons.²¹

In the White Russian city of Smolensk, where SRs had long been a predominant force, anti-war activities began in mid-1916; as in Minsk, a joint party committee, which, however, in this case included the Bolsheviks, arose. Early in the war, internationalist SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks all had participated in the local workers' movement and had competed sharply for control of the Smolensk sickness funds and cooperatives. In 1915 socialists formed a new workers' cooperative; during the election of officers, the Left SR P. Novl'ianskii made an especially effective speech, after which the cooperative elected a primarily SR board of administrators. Although most of the local Mensheviks were internationalists, the SRs and the Bolsheviks had the closest relationship. As one Bolshevik later recalled, "The SR underground group in Smolensk was considerably more revolutionary than the Mensheviks, and the Bolsheviks had in general much more contact with them, than with their brother [Menshevik] SDs."²²

Because of its proximity to the western front, by summer 1916 a very large force of reserve and maintenance units had been stationed in Smolensk. Simultaneously, recalled one memoirist, socialists were becoming convinced that they were "on the eve of great

events"; some socialist leaders felt that Smolensk, because of its crucial location, would be an excellent center for anti-war activities. During August and September 1916, a group of several SRs, Bolsheviks, and a Bundist created the *Voennno-revoliutsionnaia organizatsiia* (Military-Revolutionary Organization). Sobolev, one of the Bolshevik organizers of the group, wrote in his memoirs that it had the goal of agitating soldiers of the Smolensk garrisons in order to draw them into the revolutionary movement and through them to forge connections with the fronts; thereafter they hoped to use these connections to prevent the regime from using the troops to suppress future urban uprisings.²³ A second Bolshevik memoirist, Astrov, recalled that, although disagreements among the various parties did arise, the disputes "were settled in a positive manner." Astrov claimed that, under the influence of proclamations "published by the Petrograd SRs," the Smolensk Military-Revolutionary Organization arrived at a defeatist stance on the war.

As tensions mounted during the months before February 1917, the joint socialist group decided that, at the first sign of the outbreak of revolution, it would foment uprisings in the military garrisons and among the workers, after which it would seize local military and civil power. "We did not doubt," continued Astrov, "that the revolution was approaching. We had detailed plans about what to do. We would establish ties with [Petrograd], seize the city telephone and telegraph stations, capture the regional military headquarters, the commandant of the police, and the train station." Unfortunately for the socialists, an agent provocateur betrayed the whole operation, with the result that all the leaders, having been arrested on 6 January 1917, sat out the onset of the February Revolution in jail.²⁴

The organizations that agitated the western front were in the main of joint socialist origin, although SRs in Mogilev and Vitebsk provinces acted independently. The most important of the anti-war groups, the Minsk Military-Revolutionary Union, consisted of Left SRs and various types of Left SDs. For some reason, no Bolsheviks joined the group; nor had they any equivalent organizations nearby. In the White Russian region, only in Smolensk did the Bolsheviks take part in organized anti-war activities; even there, however, the SRs had the greatest influence.

A similar picture of the southern front emerges. The SRs had a

very active and, according to an SD memoirist, sizable organization among the workers of Chernigov, a city strategically located behind the front. Chernigov also had Bolshevik, Menshevik-Internationalist, and other smaller socialist groups. Sometime in late 1914 or very early 1915, the SR organization formed a bloc with the non-Bolshevik Left SDs and began to publish anti-war proclamations; the joint SR-SD group called itself, appropriately, *Ob"edinennaia gruppа SR i SD* (the United Group of SRs and SDs). In February 1915, just six months after the outbreak of the war, the group issued the following proclamation to the soldiers:

With the lash they herded you here, tore you away from your native fields, from your wives and children, in order to ship you after two or three weeks to the front as a new reserve of human flesh for the German cannons. With the rod they want to instill in you a feeling of obligation and patriotism. . . . Soldiers, . . . they have ridiculed us enough, they have maimed Russia enough. We do not want to be cannon fodder! We do not want the Russian government's war! Hail the friendship of all peoples! Land and freedom to the Russian people! Long live free Russia! Long live the revolution!²⁵

By late 1915, the Chernigov Bolsheviks, having recently made contacts with soldiers in the local garrison, naturally wanted to supply them with anti-war literature. Having no printing press, they decided to apply to the SRs, who owned the press used by the United Group of SRs and SDs. At this point, the Chernigov Bolsheviks joined the group, which now took the grander title *Iuzhnaia voennaia organizatsiia* (Southern Military Organization). The Southern Organization's ties gradually expanded not only throughout the garrisons but to the nearby southern and southwestern fronts as well. For several months, it functioned very smoothly and published a number of proclamations. Just then, the Bolshevik Central Committee representative R. Zemliachka arrived in Chernigov from Moscow and pointed out, perhaps overzealously, that the Central Committee disapproved of joint socialist blocks. For several months the Chernigov Bolsheviks resisted this point of view but finally succumbed to Zemliachka's arguments and "expelled" the SRs from the Southern Military Organization. One Bolshevik memoirist later wryly admitted that this entirely deprived the local Bolsheviks of

printing capacity, since the SRs took their printing press with them when they were "excluded" from the bloc. In alliance with the other Left SDs, the Chernigov SRs continued to publish anti-war literature until the outbreak of the February Revolution.²⁶

At least in part because of the role the Kronshtadt sailors played in 1917, events in the Baltic Fleet command great interest. During the 1905–1907 revolution, SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks had all created extensive organizations in Kronshtadt. The repressive aftermath of the first Russian revolution destroyed all SD organizations and even their circles in Kronshtadt, whereas the embattled SR circles managed to survive. Police reports indicate that between 1910 and 1913 the SRs constructed an organization with ties throughout the Baltic Fleet, including Kronshtadt, Revel, and Helsinki; this organization maintained ties with nearby party groups, such as the Petrograd and Izhevsk SRs, and the SR Central Committee Abroad in Geneva. On at least two occasions, in 1910 and again in 1913, the SR Baltic Fleet organization, which had its headquarters in Kronshtadt, attempted to organize general fleet uprisings, which were, however, stymied by provocation. During 1912–1914, Bolshevik circles in the Baltic Fleet enjoyed a modest revival but, according to police reports, did not rival those of the SRs.²⁷ Russia's entry into the war set off a repression in the fleet that, as elsewhere, swept away most revolutionary organizations.

Unlike the soldiers, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet did not face the hazards associated with combat. The Russian fleet had never recovered from the disaster at Tsushima during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War; even by 1914 the fleet was so weak and outmoded that it dared not challenge the powerful German ships on the open seas. Still, the defensive duty, characterized by endless tedious and seemingly purposeless training, hardly contributed to morale. The SRs, who before the war had displayed greater tenacity and enjoyed greater success among the sailors, were also responsible for the first stirrings of renewed revolutionary activity in Kronshtadt after the war began. A police report from April 1915 noted that a sailor of the First Baltic Fleet Command, Stepan Lysenkov, had recently received two visitors from Petrograd, one a civilian, the other a soldier. Although the reporting agent linked the pair to no particular party, he claimed that they had delivered proclamations to Lysenkov

and promised to return soon. A second police report noted that the proclamations the Petrograd revolutionaries had brought were from the SRs and the SDs and called for "the fleet and the armed forces to end the war by means of an armed rising." Since copies of these incendiary documents quickly spread throughout the Baltic Fleet, the police raised the alarming possibility that Kronshtadt might be on the verge of an uprising like those of 1905–1907 and nervously drew attention to increased mass unrest in nearby Petrograd, which they attributed to sharp rises in the cost of living.²⁸

In September 1915, the police arrested a small revolutionary circle on the cruiser *Admiral Makarov* and blamed the growingly successful agitation of such groups on the arrival of revolutionary literature in Kronshtadt. That same month, an agent provocateur reported that, although he often met socialist sailors who opposed the war and capitalism, their agitation was still quite unmethodical. During October, reports for the first time specified party connections. Anticipating arrest, the sailor Lysenkov had fled to Petrograd, where, before moving to Moscow, he had stayed with SRs in the Nevskii District. A certain S. G. Pelikhov, who had deserted the fleet and who now functioned under the pseudonym "Il'ia Kotel'nikov," had taken Lysenkov's place. After providing him with a forged passport, the Petrograd SRs had sent Pelikhov-Kotel'nikov to Kronshtadt as liaison between the Petrograd organization and the Kronshtadt circles. Among his Kronshtadt contacts were the SRs Mitrofan Shugaev, Vasilii Skortsev, Gavrilov, and Shurov.

On his arrival in Kronshtadt, Pelikhov described to local socialists the tense situation in Petrograd and assured them that additional SR and SD proclamations were on their way and, further, that the Petrograd SRs, including workers at the Nevskii Metallicheskie plant, where Pelikhov was employed, were prepared to help in any way they could. Pelikhov also claimed that everyone should be prepared for an all-European revolution, which he foresaw at the end of the war. On 22 October 1915 a revolt broke out on the battleship *Gangut*, which resulted in the arrest of ninety-five sailors, many possessing SR literature.²⁹ Sometime in October or November 1915, under stimulus from the Petrograd SRs, various revolutionary circles combined into the *Voennaia-revoliutsionnaia Organizatsiia* (Military-Revolutionary Organization). For the balance of the



S. G. Pelikhov, anti-war SR, contact between underground Kronshtadt circles and Petrograd revolutionary organizations. Reprinted from *Geroi oktiabria* (Leningrad, 1967), vol. 2, p. 227.

year, this Kronshtadt organization, which consisted of SRs, SDs, and anarchists, received help and literature from the Petrograd SR organization.

By winter 1916, however, police reports noted an increase in Social Democratic propaganda in the fleet but thought that, as yet, it "had not yet reached a planned level." At this point, police agents monitoring Kronshtadt evidently became confused about the nature of the revolutionary organization there. Sometime in early 1916, the Kronshtadt Military-Revolutionary Organization sought and achieved ties with the Bolshevik PC. Published police reports, the only source for these matters, do not reveal whether the Kronshtadt revolutionaries had broken or lost their ties with the Petrograd SRs

or were simply augmenting old ties with new ones. In early 1916, Pelikhov and Lysenkov, the latter of whom had returned after hiding for a time in Moscow, now acted as liaison between the Kronshtadt organization and the Bolshevik PC, leading the police to conclude that the Kronshtadt organization was "Bolshevik." (The inaccuracy of this impression is suggested by the fact that even in early 1917 Pelikhov was a Left SR; his work during 1915 and 1916 therefore had nothing specifically Bolshevik about it.) Already in late February, however, the Bolshevik PC, claiming that the "danger of arrest" was too high, refused to send representatives to Kronshtadt; the Bolshevik concern was real since during late February and early March the authorities systematically destroyed the Petrograd Bolshevik organization. Contacts between Kronshtadt revolutionaries and the Petrograd Bolsheviks gradually weakened and, by summer, had broken off completely.³⁰ The Bolshevik Baltic Fleet sailor P. Dybenko recalled about this period, "Our misfortune was that we were poorly connected with the Petrograd organizations and did not know whether they supported us."³¹ As a police report from August 1916 described the situation: "In the city of Kronshtadt, there exists a powerful military organization, in which soldiers and sailors work together—SDs, SRs, and anarchists—[and] which considers itself non-partisan." The Okhranka concluded that, although the Bolshevik committee had rendered considerable help to the Kronshtadt revolutionaries, the ties were strictly informational and the Kronshtadt organization did not submit to Bolshevik directives.³²

Thus, after the repression of the party organizations in August 1914, many SD, SR, and anarchist circles continued to eke out an existence in Kronshtadt but depended entirely on nearby Petrograd for printed materials. By spring and summer 1915, the circles became more active and established contact with the SR Petrograd organization, which supplied SR and SD literature, both of which were welcome in Kronshtadt. During fall 1915, the circles banded together to establish an interparty organization, very similar to those in Smolensk, Chernigov, Minsk, and other places. By winter, at a time when ties with the Petrograd SRs may have been interrupted, this organization made contact with the Bolshevik PC, a situation that temporarily misled police agents to suppose that the Kronshtadt organization was Bolshevik. Among the SRs associated with

the interparty organization were N. Izmailov (whom Lenin appointed commissar of the Baltic Fleet after the October Revolution), A. Baranov, B. Donskoi (who perished in the July 1918 assassination of General Eichhorn, military governor of the Ukraine), and Ia. Popov, all of whom were prominent Left SRs in Kronshtadt during 1917. According to the Bolshevik Egorov, the interparty collective survived until the February Revolution because it operated deep in the underground and was never penetrated by police agents.

Whatever happened later, the SRs had taken the initiative in stimulating the birth and growth of the Kronshtadt Military-Revolutionary Organization. Furthermore, sometime during 1916 the SRs built their own military organization in Kronshtadt, which operated under the direction of the SR Northern Military Organization and which also survived until the February Revolution.³³

Materials about revolutionary activity at or near the fronts and in the fleets reveal certain characteristics. For the most part, joint revolutionary centers that consisted of various SD factions, SRs, and, in some areas, anarchists, produced anti-war literature and distributed it to soldiers and sailors on active duty. The Okhranka, the military commands, and the Ministry of the Interior repeatedly noted the joint nature of these activities and insisted (to anyone who would listen) that both SR and SD literature reached the soldiers and sailors in great quantities. The evidence suggests that, of the various parties and factions involved, the SRs played the greatest role in the formation and functioning of the joint anti-war organizations near the fronts.³⁴ In addition, they carried out independent agitation on a wider scale than the other parties.

SR Activities in the Provincial Cities

Workers and other dwellers in provincial cities faced much the same problems as the inhabitants of the capitals: shortages of all manner of necessary items, rapid price rises and low wages, and harsh discipline and long hours in the factories. Although shortly after the outbreak of the war the government exempted workers in war production from military service, the draft fell quite heavily on the balance of the proletariat. In general, already poor living conditions in many

industrial cities and towns further worsened as hundreds of thousands of new workers arrived from the villages to take up work in rapidly expanding war-related industries. Additional confusion and hardship accompanied the government's policy of transferring hundreds of plants, with their work forces, from northwestern regions under threat from German advances to cities to the east and the south such as Moscow, Saratov, and Samara.

The wartime record of SR urban organizations is significant both in terms of party history and for the light it sheds on the mood of the empire's working class. Additionally, the worker-oriented urban committees of the SRs (and of the SDs) devoted considerable energy to contacting soldiers in the local garrisons and supplying them with subversive literature. Although evidence about SR activities in provincial cities is often episodic, it leaves no doubt that numerous of their organizations across the empire reacted to the various crises of the war era much like those already discussed in the emigration, the capitals, and the cities just behind the fronts: they turned against the war and the government. True, at least at first defensism held sway in some important organizations, such as those of Saratov, Astrakhan, Voronezh, Ekaterinburg, and Krasnoiarsk. Moreover, important intelligentsia elements in local committees almost everywhere lined up behind Russia's war effort. However, the SR organizations in Irkutsk, Kiev, Chernigov, Rostov-on-the-Don, Kharkov, and Samara, like those in Moscow and Petrograd, began publishing anti-war proclamations during the first weeks or months of the war. In the course of 1915, SR organizations in Ekaterinoslav, Sormovo (Nizhnii-Novgorod), Tula, and Baku also came out against the war and issued revolutionary leaflets.³⁵ By 1916, SR organizations from one end of the empire to the other were struggling against Russia's involvement in the war and calling for immediate revolution. This portrait of SR activity, much of it carried out in conjunction with other socialist and anarchist groups, alters one's perceptions of the wartime revolutionary movement, which therefore looms larger as a significant factor in the overthrow of the tsarist regime.

A survey of the empire between July 1914 and February 1917 reveals no particular pattern as regards the geography of SR anti-war proclivities, except to indicate that most party activists in most lo-

cations turned against the war. The evidence is clearer, however, for some cities and towns than for others. Several locations for which evidence is relatively complete—the cities of Kharkov and Tula and the armaments plants in Orel Province and in Nikolaev—will serve to establish a profile of the scope and tone of the PSR's wartime activities in provincial Russia.

After Moscow and Petrograd, the Ukrainian city of Kharkov stands out as a major center of SR opposition to the war. Two SR groups, one of students and the other of workers, operated in Kharkov and worked together smoothly. Most of the workers were employed in railroad-connected concerns, including the wagon construction plant and the railroad repair shops and yards, which constituted the city's chief industry. The original mainstay of the SR student organization was the Agricultural Institute. After heavy arrests there, by early 1916 an even stronger SR organization arose at the Medical Institute and among the teachers of the Agricultural High School. The SRs, Bolsheviks, and Mensheviks all maintained large groups at the university. Throughout the war years, the socialist student circles repeatedly helped reorganize workers' circles after the especially frequent arrests in that milieu.³⁶

The Kharkov SRs began issuing anti-war literature immediately after the declaration of war and continued to do so until February 1917. In August 1914 one of the local SRs' revolutionary leaflets even helped galvanize temporarily dormant anti-war sentiment in Moscow. The scale of the Kharkov SRs' efforts during the first difficult months of the war is suggested by an incident in which a student arrested in November 1914 had in his possession copies of three separate recently published local SR leaflets. In the eyes of both the government and the socialists, repeated success in publishing leaflets was a sign of organizational vitality, a circumstance that doubtlessly contributed to the heavy arrests of SRs in early 1915.

During fall 1915, the SRs and Bolsheviks, as elsewhere, formed a bloc against the election of a WIC workers' group. Well apprised of the militance of local workers and party factions, the government forbade all factory-level campaign meetings. Elections took place as scheduled, and the electoral conference then chose as chairman a Menshevik, who was, however, immediately presented with a leftist resolution that denounced the WICs. At first he claimed to have

"lost" the resolution and then, although it had been typed, pretended he could not decipher it. A Right SR sent by the Central WIC in Petrograd spoke in favor of the elections but to no avail. Ultimately, Left SRs and Bolsheviks raised such a ruckus on the floor that the whole conference dispersed and the delegates marched, singing the "Marseillaise," out into the streets, where, to their dismay, they immediately ran into mounted gendarmes stationed near the conference hall. The Left bloc worked so effectively that no workers' group ever came into existence in Kharkov.³⁷

The SR leader V. Chernevskii recalled that by mid-1916, repeated mass arrests had destroyed the city-wide SR, Menshevik, and Bolshevik organizations. Provocateurs plagued all the party organizations, so that throughout 1916 party groups rose and fell in rapid succession. During this difficult time, student circles kept the movement alive; hard-core SD and SR groups survived among the medical students, who in mid-1916 contributed the considerable sum of six hundred rubles for the purpose of rebuilding the SD and SR organizations.

Wishing to break up the student circles, during October 1916 the government drafted many students into the armed forces and dispatched them to the Tsaritsyn Military School; the SRs and SDs responded by publishing jointly a proclamation that called for a general protest strike. Despite the continued repression, by midfall 1916 student revolutionaries agitated openly outside the schools; they no longer bothered to refer to themselves innocuously as "Marxists" and "narodniks," but daringly as "SRs" and "SDs." After creating a revolutionary student council, medical students agitated for a general strike and an end to the war. On 8 February 1917, the Kharkov SRs issued a proclamation that again called for a general strike and an end to the war. During the third week of February, immediately before the revolution, the police arrested all student leaders in Kharkov.³⁸

In Kharkov workers' circles, a similar situation prevailed. Although by mid-1916, the Okhranka had neutralized city-wide party organizations, individual SR, Bolshevik, and Menshevik groups, often with the aid of student circles, continued to operate in the factories and workshops. During summer 1916, under the leadership of the SR Chernevskii and the Bolshevik Kotlov the Kharkov railroad

and engine production workers set in motion a strike movement to protest conditions in the factories. As the strike intensified, a joint party organization arose to coordinate the movement. In August, the strike expanded drastically, with the result that the police retaliated by arresting and shipping to the front roughly one hundred worker-activists. In late 1916, the SR and Bolshevik leaders of the strike committee decided to establish ties with railroad workers in nearby cities such as Poltava and Nikolaev, a task Chernevskii assumed. SR and SD activists then held an underground meeting in Poltava and resolved to summon a conference of all southern railroad workers in early March with the goal of initiating "an all-Russian revolution." Perhaps their plan was overambitious but, in any case, the February Revolution in Petrograd intervened with the same result.³⁹

As shown by the formation of the interparty strike committees and student organizations, relations between the SRs and SDs in Kharkov were, as in many other areas, amicable. The close relationship between the local SRs and Bolsheviks is suggested by their joint issuing of proclamations for 9 January 1917 (Bloody Sunday).⁴⁰ The Kharkov SRs are also of special interest in that one of their principal leaders, V. M. Kachinskii, joined the three-province South-Russia Committee, which coordinated SR activities against the war in Kharkov, Voronezh, and Kiev and which will be discussed later. Early and persistent radicalism among wartime Kharkov SRs is commensurate with their behavior later when, immediately after the fall of the old regime, they proclaimed themselves the "Left SRs-Internationalists," the very first in Russia to do so.

In the central industrial region around Moscow, the metalworking town of Tula, whose industrial specialty made it very important for war production, experienced a lively revolutionary movement. In Tula revolutionaries of various parties cooperated closely. For instance, when the war broke out, the SRs and SDs from the shell and firearms plants, both of obvious military significance, held a joint meeting in a wooded area outside town to discuss what to do about the conflict. What decision they reached at that point is not known, but the local SRs began anti-war agitation sometime during the summer of 1914. In June 1915, the governor of Tula Province wrote a report of a recent strike in which he informed the minister of the interior that, although the workers had put forward only eco-

conomic demands, the strike leaders, who were members of leftist parties, "were organized in a surprisingly friendly, orderly way and showed a great deal of experience in conducting strikes." During the mid-1915 elections to the local sickness fund council, the workers elected three Mensheviks, three Bolsheviks, and three SRs (P. Aleksandrov, K. Khokhlov, and D. V. Tiurikov), a careful balance that suggests that local activists and workers settled issues on an interparty basis.⁴¹

The SR organization in Tula operated under the leadership of P. Aleksandrov, M. Kuznetsov, and the two Antonov brothers. Aleksandrov not only held important positions in the SR organization and in the sickness fund but also chaired the Tula metalworkers' union. From the outset, the largely worker-oriented Tula SRs opposed the war; during summer 1914, they obtained a printing press from Moscow and immediately began to print numerous anti-war proclamations. A Soviet historian of the 1920s noted that one of the SR leaflets (addressed to "Toilers of the fields and factories!") began, "For twelve torturous months of the war," and concluded, "Hail land and freedom!."⁴²

Relations between the SRs and the Bolsheviks were especially close. One memoirist recalled that during late 1916 a group of SRs and Bolsheviks met at the SR Antonov's apartment to work out details of a planned strike, which the Mensheviks declined to join. In early February 1917, the strike at several Tula industries broke out as planned; SRs, Bolsheviks, and anarchists participated and each group took the task of agitating the factory workshops where it was strongest. The Bolshevik Puzakov later recalled, "We [Bolsheviks] got along . . . better with the SRs and anarchists than with the Mensheviks; . . . they were more revolutionary than the Mensheviks . . . [and] in no way supported the war." According to Bolshevik memoirists, the SRs and the Bolsheviks twice printed joint proclamations. In each case, all copies of the defeatist leaflets had at the top both the SD slogan "Proletarians of the world unite" and the SR slogan "In struggle will you attain your rights." A controversy about which slogan should go first was resolved by a compromise that entailed printing half the leaflets with the SR slogan first and half with the SD slogan first. Each party then distributed leaflets with its own slogan in the uppermost position; thus the Tula socialists solved the

important questions of revolutionary life. The Bolshevik Krutikov noted that printing proclamations together with the SRs was especially desirable for his party since only the SRs had a printing press.⁴³

In Orel Province to the south of Moscow on the borderlands of the Ukraine, the Briansk munitions plant witnessed a wartime strike remarkable for its stubbornness. SR, Bolshevik, Menshevik, and anarchist circles (with the SRs in the leading position) had a long history of activism at the Briansk plant, a major supplier of war-related materials. As elsewhere, revolutionaries utilized the plant's sickness funds as centers for their illegal activities. The famous Briansk strike began on 8 May 1916, after a spontaneous strike in March of that year failed to obtain the pay raises that were its principal goal. Precipitated by a series of meetings throughout the plant's workshops, the May strike was in no way spontaneous. The Menshevik M. Ul'ianov, the SR S. Goncharov, and the nonparty activist I. Serganov filled the role of tribunes at factory meetings and street demonstrations (the Briansk Bolsheviks had no talented speakers). Of this group, the SR Goncharov, in the words of a memoirist "an old fighter for workers' freedom," was the most influential. The strike leaders initially decided to ban large demonstrations and to skirt the war issue in order to deprive the government of a pretext for mass arrests, which, they feared, would result in the destruction of the active revolutionary cells at the plant.

By 18 May, the strike had not won its goals, prompting Goncharov to urge an end to the strike to prevent repression and breakup of the factory cells. Against Goncharov's advice, the workers voted to continue the strike, with the result that the government began rounding up strike sympathizers. At a follow-up meeting on 20 May, Goncharov, now incensed at the arrests he had predicted, spoke out strongly for continuing the strike. Furthermore, the SR and Left Menshevik dominated strike committee decided to send an anti-war telegram to the SD faction in the State Duma. Despite its economic origins, the Briansk strike had now become a major political anti-war strike; economic issues soon revealed political ones.

On 21 May 1916, police began arresting strike leaders, including Goncharov and several other SRs; several SDs; and two nonparty activists. The government sentenced some strike instigators to Si-

beria, sent others directly to the front, and, in the process, destroyed the plant's network of socialist cells. Furthermore, the police eventually arrested over three thousand workers and mobilized them into the army. Finally, by the end of the first week of June brutal repression had broken the strike.⁴⁴ Bolshevik memoirists indicate that the SRs and Left Mensheviks provided most of the initiative and leadership during the Briansk strike, although rank-and-file Bolsheviks enthusiastically supported it and suffered the consequences.

Far to the south, the Don basin port of Nikolaev had Bolshevik, Menshevik, and SR groups that, according to Kirianov, since early in the war "carried on active work." By early 1915, they had come together to form "an organization mixed in party composition"; leaders of the joint committee included the Bolshevik A. Skorokhodov, the SR Nikitin, and the Left Menshevik D. Leikant. The late 1915 campaign for a WIC workers' group provided the Left socialist committee with a popular issue, after which its membership grew rapidly. According to Kirianov, the joint socialist group in Nikolaev carried out agitation of "a rather powerfully defeatist tendency." During the last months of the old regime, the SRs also had an active independent organization.⁴⁵

The most important event in wartime Nikolaev was the strike at the sprawling Naval plant, the chief supplier for the Black Sea Fleet. Although the Naval workers originally quit work to demand higher wages, the strike subsequently took on political overtones. A factory inspector's report from late February 1916, when the strike was already in its second month, claimed that class interests stood higher among the workers than patriotism and that representatives of "extreme Left parties" had terrorized patriotic workers into silence; the factory inspector also claimed that initially one-third of the workers were hostile to the strike, one-third indifferent, and one-third "defeatists," the motto of the last segment being "The worse [for the Russian government], the better." The workers elected a strike committee that consisted, among others, of the SR Nikitin, the Bolshevik A. Skorokhodov, and the nonparty leftist Makarov, all three of whom also belonged to Nikolaev's joint revolutionary committee, which prompted the factory inspectorate to bemoan the fact that workers chose "such people" as their leaders. The strike committee maintained its headquarters in the local sickness fund office.

The Naval factory management, the factory inspectorate, and Vice-Admiral Muraviev all identified the strike as political. In a January 1916 report, Muraviev wrote (with notable paranoia), "Whether or not this political strike [can be blamed] on the leftist parties or whether Germany is operating here . . . hardly matters, such is the coincidence of their interests."

As noted by the authorities, at least at first the workers did not support the strike unanimously. When strikers sent representatives to the shell workshops, which were antistrike, the workers there threatened the prostrike spokespeople with hammers. Moderate leaders at the plant requested arbitration by the local War-Industries Committee but to no avail. Gradually, all workshops shut down (shell production could not take place without production from the other workshops). In late January, the government attempted to appeal to the workers by pointing out that the Russian fleet was in dire need of the supplies manufactured at the Naval plant; it was the failure of this tactic that led factory inspectors to remark that the workers "placed class interests above patriotism." The authorities then resorted to a series of mass arrests that sent some workers directly to the front, some to civil court, and some to summary courts martial, which could, should the authorities wish it, mete out death sentences. With absolutely no effect, the arrests accelerated: at the end of January, 377, and by mid-February, 565. Finally, on 24 February 1916, the authorities mobilized the entire work force of sixty-five hundred workers into the army; during March the management began hiring an entire new work force.

As the Soviet historian Shatsillo remarks, "In the midst of the war, one of the largest military production plants [in the nation] struck for two months!"⁴⁶ One might add that the workers preferred arrest and fighting at the front to working under existing conditions at the Naval plant. Although the workers first struck on economic grounds, their incredible tenacity in the face of appeals to their patriotism and their tendency to elect Left SRs and Left SDs as leaders suggest politics at work, as claimed by the authorities. Like the Briansk strike, it was a remarkable episode, deeply revealing of the proletariat's waxing indifference, indeed hostility, toward the war and the government. In Nikolaev, as elsewhere, socialists of leftist persuasion won the ears of most of the workers.

In all four locations—Kharkov, Tula, Briansk, and Nikolaev—the SRs, who in each case already had long involvement in the local revolutionary movement, were from the outset against the war and involved themselves deeply in antigovernmental activities. The activities included the publication of proclamations, the calling of demonstrations, and the leadership of strikes. Worker activists were the chief element engaged in revolutionary activities, but in Kharkov student activists also played an important role. Although the SRs acted independently, they also willingly allied with other parties, especially the Bolsheviks; the joining together of various factions on the basis of a common antigovernment program obviously strengthened the impact of whatever work they performed. In some places, the SRs provided leadership to the local revolutionary movements. Especially noteworthy in this respect was the ability of the SRs in several places to obtain and maintain printing presses, when the SDs had none. This profile of SR activities in several places sets the pattern for many of Russia's cities and towns.

A useful approach for examining SR activities throughout the rest of the Russian Empire will be to proceed from the north to the south, and from the west to the east. Naturally, the *northern region* was dominated by Petrograd, but SR organizations in other northern towns—Kronshtadt, Novgorod, Pskov, Arkhangelsk, and Gatchina—also joined the anti-war movement. Other than the bare fact that the SR Northern Military Organization operated in all three towns, information on Pskov, Arkhangelsk, and Gatchina is lacking; descriptions of anti-war groups in Kronshtadt and Novgorod appeared earlier in this chapter. By a stroke of good fortune, a Soviet historian who wrote in the 1930s provides interesting details of revolutionary life in the industrial town of Kolpino, just outside Petrograd. After the 1905 Revolution, the local SR organization, which had recruited a number of shop foremen at the huge Izhorskii munitions plant, alone survived the repression of the Stolypin era. In 1912, in protest of the Lena massacre, the SRs led the first major post-1905 demonstrations. During the immediate pre-war years, the Bolsheviks (whose circle arose in 1913), Mensheviks, anarchists, and the SRs, who had a sizable following in assembly workshops, all had factory cells in the Izhorskii plant. After the war broke out, the SR leaders Zimin and P. Demskii arranged a joint meeting with the

Bolshevik circle, which had no contacts outside Kolpino and which met rarely; the SRs hoped to coopt the smaller group, but the Bolsheviks resisted the overtures. Beletskii, an SR university student, who acted as liaison between Petrograd and Kolpino and who was also very close to the Bolsheviks, first brought copies of the Zimmerwald Manifesto to the Kolpino socialists, who immediately reproduced it for distribution throughout the local enterprises. During fall 1915, the SR Stepkin chaired the local WIC workers' group electoral conference, at which the SRs, the Bolsheviks, and the Mezhraiontsy cooperated in selecting delegates opposed to the workers' group. Although the SRs and the Bolsheviks continued to work together closely before the February Revolution, the Bolsheviks resisted several SR attempts to bring about an SR-Bolshevik merger.⁴⁷

The heavily industrialized *central region*, with Moscow at its center, contained a number of important cities, including Tula, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and Nizhnii-Novgorod, and several smaller factory towns, such as Tver, Riazan, Kostroma, and Shuia. Tula has been discussed. The textile centers of Ivanovo, a traditional Bolshevik bastion, and Shuia, since 1906 an SR stronghold, were not centers of anti-war work for either party; patriotic defensism may have prevailed among local cadres there, as for a time it did among the SDs and SRs in several Volga cities. Only very fragmentary information about the SRs in Kostroma and Tver is available. A Soviet historian notes, without details, that the Kostroma SRs split over the issue of the war; how influential either the anti-war or pro-war side in the split became or what either accomplished is impossible to judge. As regards Tver, the secret police reported that the former Petersburg activist Moshchin, who had just moved to Moscow, where he headed the Moscow Group of SRs, visited Tver in October 1914 and met with numerous SR activists from Petrograd whom the government had exiled there. The Okhranka also listed Tver as a place where the local organization had regular contact with the Petrograd SRs. A Soviet historian reports that during the war era the local SRs maintained a center in the cooperative association and issued revolutionary leaflets and a newspaper, *Tverskii listok* (Tver gazette).⁴⁸ These circumstances imply the existence of anti-war activities in Tver.

Located to the southeast of Moscow in the direction of the Urals, Nizhnii-Novgorod witnessed a lively wartime revolutionary move-

ment, especially in the suburb of Sormovo, where most of Nizhnii's factories were located and where most of the town's proletariat lived. Prominent Left SR leaders in Sormovo included M. Blagin and Gratskii. SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks were all involved in the Sormovo Political Red Cross (a nation-wide charitable organization that provided aid to political prisoners and had definite revolutionary overtones). Members of all three parties carried out collections for the Red Cross, which provided numerous opportunities for anti-government propaganda. The SR labor leader Blagin was especially active in the Political Red Cross. One Bolshevik memoirist claimed of the Nizhnii SRs, "Sometimes they blocked with us, sometimes with the Mensheviks, whichever was more profitable to them." The SRs and the Bolsheviks took a common view of most issues; for instance, the Bolshevik S. Kuznetsov recalled that, when a strike broke out on 1 May 1916, "We carried it out together with the SRs."⁴⁹

Shliapnikov, one of the most important Bolshevik leaders in Russia during the war, recalled that the Nizhnii SRs adopted the slogan "Down with the war" and espoused armed revolt. More recently, the Soviet historian Shalaginova has reported that the Nizhnii SRs published anti-war proclamations throughout 1915, 1916, and early 1917, one of which, to give an example of their tone, inveighed against "the descendants of the vampires—the tsarist government with its gentry landowners and capitalists."⁵⁰

In the *Volga region*, the upper Volga city of Kazan experienced a typical wartime revolutionary movement. During 1915, anti-war cells formed in the large local garrisons (Kazan was the headquarters of the multiprovince Kazan Military District). In early 1916, SR and SD workers and students created a Coalitional Committee to coordinate activities among their groups. The Coalitional Committee produced and distributed anti-war leaflets in the schools and factories and passed them to the revolutionary cells in the garrisons, with which it had contact. The committee had a role in growing unrest in the garrisons and provided direct leadership of a burgeoning strike movement during late 1916 and early 1917. N. Armitage, who has studied the revolutionary movement in Kazan, writes, "The SRs appear to have been the leading element" in the Kazan Coalitional Committee.⁵¹

The important cities on the southern Volga had a mixed record in terms of anti-war activities. Soviet histories usually claim that the traditionally powerful SR organizations in the cities of Samara, Saratov, and Astrakhan initially came out in favor of the war. As regards Saratov, evidence suggests that both the SDs and the SRs at first failed to take a stand against the war. The Saratov Left Menshevik, V. Antonov-Saratovskii, who later became a Bolshevik, recalled that at the outbreak of the war only he, "the worker SD Anan'ev, and the SR A. Minin" openly opposed the war. In fact, claimed Antonov-Saratovskii, most of the local socialists were "outright defensists." Other memoirists claimed that Antonov-Saratovskii himself was at first a defensist. In other words, internationalism was rare in Saratov. As elsewhere, the SRs eventually split into two groups. One group consisted of students and workers and was revolutionary; the other, which comprised the powerful SR intelligentsia (in Antonov-Saratovskii's acerbic phrase "Philistine dust"), took a defensist position. The leftist group had two circles, one of workers and the second of students, led respectively by Dekatovoi and Meierov.⁵²

That Saratov did not become a center for revolutionary work during the war is undeniable. For instance, as far as evidence reveals, neither the SDs nor the SRs printed anti-war proclamations locally, an unusual circumstance for such a large city. Eventually, anti-war socialists, including the Left SRs and the Bolsheviks, formed a coherent policy. During fall 1915, a Left bloc of those two factions agitated so effectively during the local WIC campaign that the government had to resort to falsified election results in order to create a WIC workers' group. Occasional hints of other activities emerge from the sources: in mid-1916 the émigré SR paper, *Na chuzhbine*, reported the arrest and trial of several Saratov SRs (Trubitsyn, Petrov, and Gladkov) for possession of illegal literature.⁵³ The quite moderate stance of the huge SR organization in Saratov during 1917 suggests, however, that the Left SRs did not predominate there during the war.

Although some Soviet histories have described the Samara SRs as pro-war, already in early fall 1914 the Samara SRs themselves reported that they "had a majority against the war." On several occasions, the head of the local SR organization, A. Belousov, sent em-

issaries to Moscow and Petrograd to ascertain whether other SR committees were also anti-war and to seek instructions. The Samara organization began printing anti-war literature in 1914 and continued to do so in the succeeding years. During summer 1915, the SRs, the Bolsheviks, and the Mensheviks held a joint conference to work out a mutually acceptable position on the war, a task that they evidently failed to fulfill. As in other places, the SRs and the Bolsheviks blocked together against the election of a WIC workers' group, whereas the Mensheviks took the opposite tack. At some factories, workers refused to elect even preliminary delegates and, in one case, announced, "We consider it inappropriate to work with the bourgeoisie in the War-Industries Committees." The Granat plant sent delegates to the electoral conference but gave them anti-war and anti-WIC instructions. At the huge Trubochnyi plant, where the SRs exerted growing influence, SR and Bolshevik agitators spoke against and several Mensheviks spoke in favor of worker participation in the WICs. At the urging of the leftists, Trubochnyi workers selected several delegates and provided them with instructions to go to the electoral conference, read a protest, and leave.

The Samara SRs initially took a rather cautious stance that called for revolution on the last day of the war "or earlier if conditions are favorable" (see chapter 3). Eventually, however, they underwent the oft-noted radicalization process, as suggested by one of their leaflets from 1916, which ended with the defeatist slogan, "Down with the robbers' war!"⁵⁴

No information has emerged on the wartime revolutionaries in Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan, the latter of which Soviet historians list as a place where defensism prevailed among the SRs. The Left SRs were very active in both locations during 1917, suggesting at least the possibility of anti-war activities before the February Revolution.

In summary, although some Volga cities witnessed revolutionary agitation, the Volga provinces did not stand at the head of SR-sponsored resistance to the war; nor were other parties especially active there. During fall 1914, the Samara SRs informed the Moscow organization of an upcoming conference of Volga region party organizations. If it took place, perhaps party representatives advocated a moderate or pro-war stance. Soviet historians claim that the SR organizations along the Volga were defensist, an assertion at least par-

tially confirmed by the weakness of anti-war sentiment in cities like Saratov and Astrakhan. Still, further research (possibly in archives) about the revolutionary movement in the Volga cities may yield some surprises. During late 1916, Tsivin showed the German military intelligence copies of an illegal SR anti-war newspaper, *Klich* (The call), which he claimed was appearing in the Volga region and which impressed the Germans as authentic.⁵⁵

The *region of the Ukraine* witnessed a very lively revolutionary movement. (As noted previously, the SRs and other socialists in Chernigov were quite active.) Although no information exists about whether the SR Volga conference scheduled for fall 1914 ever occurred, in December 1914 a conference of important Ukrainian SR organizations did take place. In December 1914 the organizational committee for the SR *Iuzhno-russkaia Konferentsiia* (South-Russia Conference) issued a declaration that explained the goal of the conference. The gathering ultimately set up the SR *Iuzhno-Russkii Komitet* (South-Russia Committee), which was, in Radkey's words, a "nest of leftists" and which included the Left SR activists M. Kogan-Bernshtein, V. Kachinskii, and V. Chaikin from Voronezh, Kharkov, and Kiev, respectively. With its leadership centered in Voronezh, the South-Russia Committee carried on its activities, including the publication of an anti-war newspaper, *Zavety zhizni* (Precepts of life). Like the SR Northern Military Organization, the South-Russia Committee receives fairly frequent mention in Soviet histories, but with few details. The scope of its work was evidently broad since, according to the *Okhranka*, it maintained regular contacts with numerous SR organizations, including those in distant Siberia.

Of the cities associated with the South-Russia Committee, Kharkov has already been discussed. Incomplete information about Voronezh, the South-Russia Committee's headquarters, indicates a quite well-coordinated SR organization there. M. Kogan-Bernshtein (member of the South-Russia Committee, head of the local SR organization, and, in 1917, chairperson of the Voronezh Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet) organized the publication of the newspaper *Zavety zhizni* (Precepts of life), an accomplishment that required a sizable organization of educated cadres. During the war, several worker-oriented institutions operated in Voronezh, including the

union of office clerks, several sickness funds, and the cooperative *Samopomoshch'* (Self-help), the latter two comprising more than nine thousand members. Several SR and SD members of the office clerks' union who were also active in the cooperative exerted their influence to found a so-called Committee to Aid War Victims, which, as in other places, quickly became a cover for revolutionary activity. This was even more the case for the local Peoples' University, in which, according to an SD memoirist, advanced workers and party activists gathered into two groups, the technical commission and the cooperative commission. The technical commission issued the newspaper *Zavety zhizni*; originally the SRs and SDs worked together on the paper, but gradually the chief editors, who were SRs, eased out the SDs and the paper became the organ of the Left SR South-Russia Committee.⁵⁶

Although considerable gaps exist in the record of the wartime SRs in Kiev (the third city represented on the South-Russia Committee), evidence does indicate that the organization there was sizable and, according to Shalaginova, produced a stream of anti-war literature beginning in 1914 and continuing until the February Revolution. The Bolshevik activist M. Maiorov claimed that most of the surviving labor unions, workers' clubs, and cooperatives, including the workers' cooperative *Zhizn'* (Life), fell under the sway of SR and Menshevik defensists. From these centers, the Right socialists waged a successful campaign to elect a WIC workers' group, which operated under the leadership of the SR printer N. Nezlobin (later chairman of the Kiev Workers' Soviet) and the Right Menshevik Semechkin. During 1916 left-wing socialists waged a struggle in selected workers' groups such as the tailors' union, where they eventually replaced the pro-war leadership. As far as evidence reveals, however, most of the legal labor organizations remained under Right socialist control. Some student circles consisted of Bolsheviks and Left SRs. Anti-war groups such as the Left SRs and Bolsheviks must have maintained underground party committees with circles in the factories, in legal organizations, and among students. The repeated publication of revolutionary leaflets by the SRs and their membership in the staunchly anti-war South-Russia Committee indicate a sizable left-wing organization with printing presses. During the early part of 1917, the Kiev SRs carried on evidently unsuccessful

negotiations with the Bolsheviks about cooperation between the two parties to prepare for potential disturbances.⁵⁷ The elliptical data suggest an interesting story about wartime Kiev, the details of which doubtlessly rest in Soviet archives.

The *Don basin industrial region*, which, like the Urals, had mining industries and chemical and metalworking plants widely dispersed throughout the countryside and in several important cities and towns, witnessed a very active and relatively well-documented anti-war movement. Active socialist organizations in nearby cities such as Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Odessa clearly aided in stirring revolutionary sentiment. Revolutionary activities in Nikolaev, including the strike at the Naval plant, have already been described. In the town of Mariupol, the SRs had a strong organization when the war broke out; as throughout the Don region, the local Mensheviks were staunchly internationalist. After July 1914, the SRs, the Left Mensheviks, and the Bolsheviks created a joint committee with the title *Sotsialisticheskaia gruppа* (Socialist Group). In May 1916, the joint committee, which adopted a defeatist stance and published anti-war proclamations, helped organize a strike, in retaliation for which in early June 1916 the police arrested the group's entire membership. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Taganrog SRs, Bolsheviks, and Mensheviks (the last had the largest following) formed a joint committee. This committee, which included the prominent Left SR N. Kulik, who was delegated from Lugansk for this purpose, led a strike during May 1916. Late in 1916, a joint party group, including SDs, SRs, and anarchists, was active at the Russko-Baltiiskii plant, the largest in the city.⁵⁸

Of the medium-sized Don cities, Lugansk had the most lively revolutionary movement, in which Left Menshevik, Bolshevik, and Left SR groups participated. The SR organization was led by a group of worker activists, including Kulik, Latyshev, A. Shtanko, and Vershinin. At the outbreak of the war, a metalworkers' union operated in Lugansk under the leadership of the SDs I. Ryzhov and P. Shevtsov and the Left SR Shtanko. Eventually, the police closed the union, after which SR, Menshevik, and Bolshevik activists created an illegal union at the huge Gartman Locomotive factory. The illegal union enjoyed considerable influence among Gartman and other Lugansk workers; it led a struggle against the election of a

WIC workers' group, agitated against the war, and printed and distributed numerous anti-war leaflets.

News of the September 1915 Zimmerwald Conference enlivened the local revolutionary circles; when actual copies of the Zimmerwald Manifesto, which the Petrograd SRs had reprinted, arrived in Lugansk, the SR-SD leadership of the union reproduced and distributed the manifesto throughout the Gartman plant and even hung copies on the plant gates and along the nearby streets. In late January 1916, Left SDs and SRs again passed out copies of the manifesto in and around the factory. Shortly thereafter, SR and Bolshevik provocateurs in the illegal union betrayed the entire leadership; after their arrest the Left Menshevik T. Rudenko rose to head the surviving group. All three parties remained active in Lugansk and, according to one memoirist, "acted to a considerable degree jointly."⁵⁹

Ekaterinoslav, the largest of the industrial cities in the Don basin, experienced a significant revolutionary movement during the war. Police reported the presence of Bolshevik, SR, and Menshevik groups. "All organized underground work here," claimed the police, "is concentrated around the workers' sickness funds, primarily at the Briansk and Truboprokatnyi plants." Kirianov claims that Bolshevik forces "were small" and experienced "well-known" problems. A Bolshevik memoirist, S. Gopner, comments perplexingly that when the Ekaterinoslav Bolsheviks called a city-wide conference in 1916, they elected as chairman a certain Zakhar'ev, "who vacillated between the Bolsheviks and the SRs".⁶⁰

The Ekaterinoslav SRs were better organized. Shalaginova reports that they published numerous proclamations throughout 1915 and 1916. Several memoirists and the historian Kirianov claim that the SRs and the Mensheviks dominated the Ekaterinoslav sickness funds, which, according to the police, were centers for revolutionary work. When the election campaign directed at the WIC workers' group began in early 1916, the SRs, who locally had good relations with the Mensheviks, instead formed a bloc with the Bolsheviks; the Left alliance succeeded in entirely preventing the formation of a WIC workers' group in Ekaterinoslav. Later in the year, SR agitators utilized a meeting at the Donetsk-Iurevskii metallurgical factory just outside Ekaterinoslav to read selections from illegal party literature and to distribute large quantities of anti-war proclamations

printed by the Kiev SRs. From the Donetsko-Iurevskii plant, this literature worked its way throughout factories and mines in the Ekaterinoslav area, creating a sensation among the workers. Kirianov has written that SRs of "defeatist" tendency in Ekaterinoslav had a "considerable mass following among the workers."⁶¹ Evidence suggests that, although the Mensheviks were also influential, the SRs were the chief factor in the revolutionary movement in Ekaterinoslav; as in Kiev and Kharkov, they published heavily and were deeply involved in the local workers' movement.

In the mines and in the metal and chemical plants that dotted the countryside of the Don basin, all three parties had a following, took part in strikes, and distributed illegal literature from the nearby towns. According to Kirianov, the Bolsheviks lost ground during the war years, whereas by early 1917 the Mensheviks tended to dominate the metalworking plants and the SRs the mines and chemical plants. In the mining area near Taganrog and Sulin, the worker-activists I. Shvedov and Kh. Chernokozov, who before the war had worked to popularize workers' sickness funds in the Don basin region, were among the most important SR leaders.⁶²

In the *far southern region* of the empire, along the Black Sea coast and in the Crimea and the Caucasus, the scant information available is consonant with the general picture of the empire's revolutionary movement and the SR role in it. During early 1915, an SR activist in Sevastopol wrote a letter (intercepted by military censors) to a friend at the front that may suggest the attitude of SRs in the south: "Enough fighting, there are already an endless number of orphans and cripples. . . . In May we will begin to punish our highest officials . . . we will smash the land owners. [You should] desert the front and head for the interior of Russia; we will start first with the officials." The SRs in nearby Rostov-on-the-Don began publishing anti-war literature immediately after the outbreak of the war. SRs in the small town of Rostova-Nachichevansk, the site of important railroad yards, repeatedly published anti-war leaflets, including those for the third anniversary of the Lena massacre in April 1915, for 1 May 1915, and for the anniversary of the arrest of the five Bolshevik Duma deputies in September 1915. The Odessa SRs published anti-war proclamations on 1 May 1916 and on other occasions. In both Odessa and Kherson joint party committees that cut

across SD, SR, and anarchist lines coordinated revolutionary agitation. On 14 February 1917 the joint committee in Odessa issued leaflets under the signatures of the SRs and SDs.⁶³

Regarding Stavropol, the police reported, "Immediately after the beginning of the war the quantity of illegal literature, proclamations and brochures, calling for the laboring masses to fight against the war and autocracy increased in [the city] and in the villages of the province. . . . In January 1915, many anti-war and anti-government proclamations were distributed throughout the city of Stavropol." A second report claimed, "In April 1915 [the police] carried out searches of persons suspected of revolutionary activities in Stavropol and surrounding villages . . . [and] found large quantities of revolutionary literature and proclamations summoning the laboring masses to carry out the struggle against the imperialistic war and autocracy." Although these published police reports fail to specify party designations, other evidence suggests that anti-war SRs and Mensheviks were the main forces active in the area.⁶⁴

Information on the Caucasus, although incomplete, is still of interest. A mid-1916 conference of SR organizations in the Caucasus adopted a program that espoused the necessity of "struggling for peace by reestablishing the international solidarity of the working class." In Baku, the single most important city of the Caucasus, the SR organization survived the era of repression with considerable success. As elsewhere, the party intelligentsia was defensist, but workers predominated in the local organization, as a consequence of which in early 1915 the Baku SRs turned firmly against the war and began to issue anti-war literature. As in so many other places, the SRs and Bolsheviks allied to oppose the election of WIC workers' groups. One Baku SR leaflet from late August 1916 ended with the slogans "Down with the bloodthirsty autocracy! Down with the fratricidal war! Hail the all-peoples' revolutionary uprising! Hail the Soviet of Workers' Deputies!" The only wartime political strike in Baku arose during August 1916 to protest the arrest of SR activists accused of revolutionary agitation. Late in 1916, the police inflicted heavy arrests on the SR organization in Baku, seizing printing presses and other equipment used in illegal activities.⁶⁵ Overall, a strong anti-war movement that consisted primarily of SRs and

Left Mensheviks characterized the extreme southern regions of the empire.

As described previously, the *White Russian region*, perhaps because of its proximity to the front, witnessed widespread SR anti-governmental agitation and propaganda, including in the cities of Minsk and Smolensk and in the provinces of Mogilev and Vitebsk. In the White Russian town of Podolsk beginning in October 1915 workers at the big Singer plant participated in a series of strikes that continued until shortly before the February Revolution. The strike leadership consisted of SDs, nonparty workers, and SRs; a similar alignment of forces led the local February uprising and formed the leadership in the Podolsk soviet.⁶⁶

The *Urals region* had a number of important cities—Ufa, Ekaterinburg, Perm, Zlatoust, and Orenburg—but its mines and factories were widely spread throughout the countryside, a circumstance that provided a rather unusual character to the revolutionary movement. Quite early in the century, the still partially ruralized factory and mine workers formed armed brotherhoods, whereas elsewhere armed brotherhoods had consisted more or less exclusively of peasants. The Urals brotherhoods, moreover, consisted of SRs, anarchists, and Bolsheviks, with SRs as the predominant element, and displayed unusual tenacity in surviving at least until 1909. Furthermore, during the entire 1907–1914 era SR organizations throughout the Urals maintained an extraordinarily high level of activism. Such militancy suggests the likelihood that the Urals SRs would respond strongly against the war. Indeed, a Soviet historian has claimed that remarkably bad wartime conditions in the Urals led to the development of “one of the most powerful anti-war revolutionary movements in the country” among both workers and peasants.⁶⁷ Other evidence at least partially supports this conclusion, but historical sources have provided mysteriously little data about which revolutionaries became involved in and led the movement.

A July 1916 report from the Department of Mines in the Ufa area confirmed that poor living conditions had “created fertile ground for agitation by leftist elements, which they have not failed to take advantage of”; workers who had arrived from the south had taught the locals “how to strike.” A May 1916 report from the Ekaterinburg

Okhranka similarly noted that bad conditions "had created revolt in workers' circles, which disloyal persons can utilize to attain their ends."⁶⁸ The lack of party designations in these materials is odd; perhaps tendentious editing of published police and government reports has obscured the party orientation of "one of the most powerful anti-war revolutionary movements in the country."

The Bolshevik activist A. Kuchkin and several Soviet histories of the Urals indicate that the local Bolsheviks did not take an activist stance about the war and even joined the Mensheviks in entering the WIC workers' groups in several Urals cities. Since the Bolsheviks evidently did not lead the reported Urals anti-war movement and the Mensheviks, who in the Urals did not have the reputation for radicalness of their party cohorts in the south, were unlikely to have done so, perhaps the SRs were the driving force. A hypothesis that the Urals SRs bore the chief responsibility for the anti-war propaganda the authorities and Soviet histories have noted fits the known evidence. Urals SRs had a long history of radical activism among workers and peasants, and, shortly after February 1917, very large Left SR organizations arose in Ufa and Ekaterinburg, exactly the places the police most often cited as centers of revolutionary work during the war. At the very least, by analogies with other areas of the empire, SRs in the Urals must have taken part in whatever anti-war activities occurred, but final conclusions about this matter await further evidence. For whatever light it sheds on this historical problem, during 1915 and 1916 a joint committee of SRs, Bolsheviks, and Left Mensheviks carried out revolutionary anti-war work in the southern Urals town of Orenburg.⁶⁹

Since the tsarist regime had exiled innumerable seasoned revolutionaries to the villages, towns, and cities of the vast *region of the Siberian subcontinent*, the revolutionary movement there had a quite radical and sophisticated tone. Khaziakhmetov, a Soviet scholar of the revolutionary movement in Siberia, describes the situation during the war as follows: "The evidence speaks of cooperation among the representatives of the two largest political parties, of the creative union of proletarian and revolutionary petty bourgeois democracy in the struggle against autocracy under the conditions of exile." This opaque statement signifies that Siberian SRs and SDs worked together closely. They did so, claims Khaziakhme-

tov, in all sorts of legal and illegal endeavors: in workers' sickness funds, in unions and cooperatives, in the publication of newspapers, and in the organization of meetings.⁷⁰

The Narymsk District, where Tomsk is located, was one of the principal areas to which the government sent political exiles. Tomsk was both a railroad center and, during the war, an important garrison town. Nevertheless, the first two years of the war witnessed little revolutionary activity there. During summer 1916, local authorities sent a number of socialist exiles to work as farmhands in the fields of the Narymsk District. Fifty-six of these individuals, including the Bolsheviks I. N. Smirnov and N. N. Iakovlev, and the SR S. D. Kudriavtsev, suddenly received notification of their mobilization into one of the Tomsk units scheduled to go to the front; they at once decided to utilize their misfortune to organize an anti-war circle among the seventy thousand troops garrisoned at Tomsk. Before leaving Narym at the end of the summer, they informally set up the so-called *Voenno-sotsialisticheskii soiuz* (Military-Socialist Union). Of all the anti-war organizations in Russia of a similar nature, this particular one has received the most attention in Soviet historiography; perhaps this is because it achieved a measure of success in agitating units in Siberia, some of which eventually went to the fronts and became involved in the uprisings endemic among front-line troops during the last months of the old regime.⁷¹

Memoirs and other sources show that on 18 November 1916 a secret conference of Tomsk SRs and SDs officially created the Military-Socialist Union, entry into which was open to all revolutionaries opposed to the war, including anarchists. The union set itself the task "of agitating among the soldiers against the war and against autocracy and to organize them . . . for the struggle." The union's leaders established two headquarters, one in Narym and a second more important one in Tomsk itself. In late 1916 the Bolshevik leader Iakovlev informed Krupskaya (Lenin's wife) that the union's cooperative endeavors "proceeded smoothly."⁷²

The texts of two of the Tomsk Union's proclamations indicate their high quality, reflecting the skill of "old" revolutionaries in Siberian exile. They carried the headings "War on war! Distribute among your comrades! Conceal from authorities!" One of the proclamations, intended for a unit designated for the front, had the ad-

dress "To those on the march" and advised "Carry this pamphlet to your positions." The leaflets analyzed the imperialist nature of the war, attacked the tsar and the capitalists, and appealed to workers, peasants, and soldiers. Both proclamations concluded with the slogans "Down with the war, autocracy, the tsar, the capitalists! Hail the revolution, peoples of the world, the democratic republic!" In addition, one had the slogan "Land and power to the people."⁷³ By early 1917, the Tomsk branch of the union, which held its meetings at a local workers' cooperative, had established contact with garrisons in Krasnoiarsk, Irkutsk, and Achinsk and began making plans for an armed rising of the entire Irkutsk Military District. Provocateurs revealed to the Tomsk police the names of several of the group's leaders, including the SR Kudriavtsev and the Bolsheviks Iakovlev and Kosarev, who only escaped arrest because of the outbreak of the February Revolution.⁷⁴

Shortly after the beginning of the war, the Irkutsk SRs, SDs, and anarchists created the *Soiuz sibirskikh rabochikh* (Union of Siberian Workers). By early 1915 the union had roughly twenty-five members, many of whom had arranged work in the city's factories, a practice at which local police cast a blind eye ("looking through their fingers") since these concerns produced defense materials. (As in other places, the Irkutsk Union of Cities operated local war-related production and services; numerous socialists of various parties and tendencies worked there.) The Union of Siberian Workers' growing membership was, however, defeatist; like anti-war socialists elsewhere, they began writing, printing, and distributing anti-war literature. Their efforts included the publication of several brief-lived newspapers, the issues of which reached workers not only in Irkutsk but in Krasnoiarsk and other places. Already in 1915, the police began arresting members of the union and eventually brought to trial over one hundred of its activists. The Irkutsk union survived until the February Revolution, although with a much lower level of activities than during 1915.

Besides participating in the Union of Siberian Workers, the Irkutsk SRs maintained their own committee, which, under the guidance of Sartakov and an especially sizable group of SR exiles, displayed considerable energy in organizing the publication of anti-war materials. The memoirist Lipkin analyzed the relative status of the

parties as follows: "In Irkutsk, the gendarmes showed little interest in the SDs [but] kept a closer watch on the anarchists and SRs, who were more active." The police arrested the anarchists on 22 October 1914 and one group of SRs in January 1915. Meanwhile, a group of moderate SRs, including A. Gots, M. Krol', and V. Arkhangel'skii, began issuing *Sibir'* (Siberia), a newspaper aimed at the intelligentsia. Although its message was hardly revolutionary, its reporting on the war had a growingly critical edge (a regularly appearing column on the war under the byline "G. Sh." was the product of the joint pens of the SRs E. M. Timofeev, Krakovetskii, and several other prisoners at Alexander Central, a nearby hard labor institution). Somewhat later, *Sibir'* served as a forum for Gots' "Siberian Zimmerwaldism," which was moderately anti-war. On 26 May 1915, the police rounded up a second larger SR group that was publishing two anti-war newspapers, *Narodnaia Sibir'* (Peoples' Siberia), which aimed at a mass readership of peasants, workers, and soldiers, and the even more radical *Otgosloski zhizni* (Echoes of life). According to Khaziakhmetov, before their destruction, the SR newspapers were sent to several distribution points, from which they were circulated regularly to nineteen Siberian cities and towns and to Petrograd, Moscow, Kharkov, and Nizhnii-Novgorod.⁷⁵

Shalaginova states that among the SRs in wartime Krasnoiarsk "defensism predominated." If so, this situation did not last long. During early 1915, sixty revolutionaries arrested in various places at the outbreak of the war arrived in Krasnoiarsk. The new exiles included V. Burtsev, now on the extreme right wing of the SRs, and a larger contingent of radicals, including the Left SRs G. Smolianskii and I. Maiorov, future deputy commissar of agriculture in the Soviet government. Even before the arrival of new faces, local SR cadres counted left-wing anti-war activists of stature, including N. V. Mazurin, Ada Lebedeva, and, a little later, V. M. Karamasheva, who came to Krasnoiarsk to promote the entry of revolutionaries into the armed forces for agitational purposes, an idea current among radical socialists during 1915 and 1916. The Left Menshevik A. Tsvetkov-Prosveshchenskii later recalled that the arrival of the Zimmerwald Manifesto in Krasnoiarsk during late 1915 sparked a lively debate, in which only a few SRs and Mensheviks supported the war; most SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks "formed a united front against the

war." His recollections are buttressed by police reports from spring 1916, which stated, "Among the Krasnoiarsk SRs there exists a strong tendency toward union with the local SDs on the basis of 'defeatism.'"

During 1915, the Krasnoiarsk SRs and Bolsheviks formed a joint military organization, modeled on the example of the Irkutsk Union of Siberian Workers. Among the SRs involved were Sartakov (a former member of the Irkutsk union) and, by mid-1916, the soon to be famous Sergei Lazo. The arrival in early spring of the exiled Bolshevik Duma deputy A. Badaev, who stopped in Krasnoiarsk for a time on his way eastward, caused a sensation. Badaev addressed a large gathering of local workers and revolutionaries sponsored by the SR-SD City Collective of Unified Socialists, an organization founded by the SR Poslavskii. Thereafter, the enthused SDs formed special "Badaev groups," dedicated to disseminating defeatist ideas. During April 1916, the police noted "the defeatist propaganda of the province's numerous politically unreliable elements . . . who are engaged in writing and printing revolutionary proclamations in a strictly defeatist spirit." According to the same report, the publications, which originated from both the SRs and the SDs, threatened the loyalty of the two thousand workers at the Krasnoiarsk Trans-Siberian Railroad workshops, many of whom already had experience in the 1905 Krasnoiarsk Republic.

During the summer of 1916, local socialists staged a debate on the war before a large gathering; the Left SR Lebedeva and the Bolshevik Vatkin spoke for the anti-war position; afterward the gathering voted heavily for an anti-war resolution. Meanwhile, the Left SR officer Sergei Lazo, the future commander of the Far Eastern Front during the civil war and today a folk hero in the USSR, arrived in Krasnoiarsk, where he fell under the radical influence of Lebedeva, whom he eventually married, and Mazurin. He also joined the Krasnoiarsk *Voenno-revoliutsionnaia organizatsiia* (Military-Revolutionary Organization), in which, according to one Soviet history, he played a prominent role by carefully explaining to the soldiers that the war profited the capitalists and that the people themselves must begin the struggle to end the war. (During the February revolution, Lazo led his regiment over to the side of the revolutionaries, thus ensuring the success of the local uprising.)

Soviet histories give a prominent place to the wartime revolution-



Sergei Lazo, officer and anti-war SR leader in Krasnoiarsk, 1914–17. Later commander of the far-eastern front during the Civil War. Reprinted from *Sergei Lazo: Vospominaniia i Dokumenty* (Moscow, 1985), inside front cover.

ary movement in Siberia and speak especially highly of the work of the Tomsk Military-Revolutionary Union and the Irkutsk Union of Siberian Workers. Lashkov notes that proclamations from these two organizations helped consolidate revolutionary sentiment among workers in Novonikolaevsk, and Batalov writes of their “enormous role” in the spread of anti-war propaganda in Siberian garrisons, from which many units eventually went to the war fronts.⁷⁶ In co-operation with other revolutionaries and on their own, the SRs in Siberia carried out widespread anti-war agitation.

Thus the anti-war tendencies of SRs in the capitals, in the cities

behind the fronts, and in the profile locations described at the beginning of this section were hardly isolated cases. As Shalaginova has written about the SRs in industrial centers across the empire, "The influence of the defensists fell rapidly as the influence of the internationalists intensified; in opposition to the defensists, [the internationalists] attempted to create and strengthen illegal organizations for the struggle against the war and the production of illegal proclamations." Similarly, the multivolume *Istoriia SSSR* (History of the USSR) states, "In the PSR the left internationalist wing, reflecting the interests of part of the workers and the radical intelligentsia, . . . was [quite] clearly represented. . . . The leader of the Left SRs, M. A. Natanson, and a number of his adherents even came out for the defeat of tsarism during the war."⁷⁷ One might add to these evaluations that the SRs tended to bloc together with other anti-war revolutionaries, even to the point of creating joint committees in numerous locations.

Of special note was the relative success of the SRs in many locations in producing anti-war leaflets. Both the revolutionaries and the Okhranka held the printing and distribution of illegal literature to be evidence of organizational efficiency and perspicacity, a view adhered to by Soviet historians (who therefore often discount the efforts of other parties, while extolling those of the Bolsheviks). The leaflets preserve for posterity the positions of this or that revolutionary group but also provide a basis for judging the success of respective groups in disseminating their subversive messages. Quite often during the war years, the SRs had printing presses or other reproduction equipment (Shapirographs, mimeographs, and so on) when the SDs, and especially the Bolsheviks, with whom the SRs most often allied, did not; such episodes occurred in Tula, Moscow, Irkutsk, Kharkov, Chernigov, and other places. This meant at the very least that the SRs commanded considerable financial resources and were skilled in the conspiratorial techniques of operating the equipment and concealing it from the ever-watchful eyes of the secret police.

Furthermore, SR materials from Petrograd played a role in local revolutionary movements in places near and far such as Kronshtadt, Smolensk, and Lugansk; similarly, police reports note that SR materials from Irkutsk reached not only numerous Siberian locations but European Russian ones as well. Since the Petrograd and Moscow organizations, as well as the Northern Military Organization, the

South-Russia Committee, and the Irkutsk organization, all maintained contacts with SR groups in numerous cities, towns, and provinces, a reasonable assumption is that SR printed materials traveled along these networks. During the war, the PSR as a national entity displayed organizational skills not surpassed (in truth, not equaled) by the other socialist parties.

The SRs and the Villages

The burdens of the war fell most heavily on the Russian Empire's huge peasantry. They provided the foot soldiers and suffered the bulk of the casualties. Since, however, a severe excess of labor prevailed in Russian agriculture, the eventual drafting into the military of nearly 40 percent of working age peasants did not damage the grain crops. Harvests were quite good, but the government pegged grain prices so low that the peasants hoarded grain rather than sell it for insufficient recompense. (Transport problems and the government's focus on supplying the fronts further contributed to the famous wartime grain shortages in the towns.) Among other things, grain hoarding indicated the peasants' lack of identification with the cause of Russia at war. Supporting this observation were the so-called *baby bunty* (women's riots) in many villages at the outbreak of the war; peasant women knew that their husbands and sons would leave, all too often never to return or to return maimed and lame. Soon enough the news of terrible conditions in the military and devastating losses began to arrive in the villages. Certainly, rural Russia was susceptible to anti-war and antigovernment agitation.

Because of the great difficulty associated with agitation in the villages, especially in a military situation, the SRs did not focus major direct attention on the peasants during the war; nor had they in the years just preceding the conflict. Unquestionably, however, they were the only major Russian revolutionary party regularly to raise the issue of the peasants' plight, to predict peasant revolutionism, and to aim at least some propaganda in the direction of the villages.

The SR newspapers published in Paris and Geneva between July 1914 and February 1917 at one and the same time reflected both the party's interest in the peasantry and the tertiary priority it gave to peasant questions. Editorials and articles discussed the war itself,



N. Rakitnikov, SR leader in Saratov, 1914–17. Contributor to SR-Internationlist émigré newspapers. Courtesy New York Public Library.

the way socialists should relate to it, and worker-related problems much more often and in more detail than peasant matters. Nevertheless, the peasant-oriented articles that did appear are of great interest. From a very early period of the war, SR leaders, most notably Chernov and Rakitnikov, set out to establish that those who thought the peasants were loyal to tsarism were vastly mistaken. A constant theme of SR writing on peasant questions was that the peasantry suffered worst of all during the war. The peasants, they concluded, shouldered the burden of defending the country out of a sense of duty, but completely without the “hurrah-patriotism” of the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie, and the gentry.⁷⁸

Especially telling about the peasants' day-to-day lives were the articles Rakitnikov (under the pseudonym "N. Maksimov") wrote about Saratov. From the place where the SRs had traditionally enjoyed the greatest organizational success in the villages, Rakitnikov reported the hardships wrought upon the peasantry by the mass drafting of young men, the requisitioning of horses, and the seizure of grain and other foodstuffs for the military; furthermore, all this came just at harvest time of 1914. The peasants wryly commented: "See how sly the Germans are; they declared war just when one day feeds the whole year" (the late summer harvest provides food for the entire year). In his articles, Rakitnikov predicted that the accumulated grievances were inexorably swinging the peasants to the side of revolution and concluded by declaring, "Old bureaucratic Rus' is at an end!"⁷⁹

Chernov's analyses were more theoretical in nature. Already during fall 1914, Chernov polemicized against orthodox Marxists such as Plekhanov, P. Maslov, and Iordanskii for overemphasizing capitalist industrialization. In failing to take into account the socialist implications of the Russian peasants' collectivist mentality, some Marxists, claimed Chernov, relied too exclusively on the proletariat, a phenomenon he called "industrial socialism." This complex of attitudes led these Marxists, continued the SR theoretician, to an overevaluation of the benefits of capitalism and, ultimately, to legalism, the prime example of which was German revisionism. Chernov proposed a broader revolutionary vision that included both the workers and the peasants; on this basis he could predict a socialist revolution for Russia in the near future. During the war, Chernov vigorously defended his theory of worker and peasant revolution, which he had first formulated during the 1890s (and which almost certainly influenced Lenin's ideas of the revolutionary role of the peasantry in Russia). For instance, Chernov widely publicized his refusal to sign the Zimmerwald Manifesto, which he voted for and otherwise approved of, because it failed to acknowledge the extent to which in Russia the war burden fell on the peasantry.⁸⁰ An obvious concomitant was that the document provided no basis for the peasants' role in the coming revolution, a serious shortcoming in terms of the application of Zimmerwaldism to Russia.

Although between 1910 and 1914, the party's rural organizations

underwent a revival (after their post-1907 destruction), there is little evidence about them once the war began. Presumably, the government destroyed these organizations during late summer 1914. Still, the SRs' presence in rural cooperatives and zemstvos provided them with natural centers for peasant agitation. After the war began, Chernov and other party leaders repeatedly urged that party members join these and other social organizations so as to utilize them for revolutionary purposes. During fall 1915, a spokesperson at an SR conference in Moscow recommended increased SR agitation in the cooperatives since the peasants were growing receptive to calls for revolution. An almost classic case of the SR-peasant nexus arose in Novgorod, when an SR circle enlisted an employee of the local cooperative, a zemstvo teacher, and several local peasants, a conjunction of circumstances not likely to have been unique. During an August 1915 conference of zemstvo and city дума activists in Moscow, the SRs caucused separately and endorsed a call for immediate revolution; this boldness of zemstvo SRs in Moscow suggests the likelihood of antigovernment activities back home. In early 1916 the Petrograd SRs reported the rise of numerous circles in rural cooperatives that looked to the PSR for leadership. Russia's numerous agricultural schools and institutes, which by the time of the war had many students from peasant families, also provided focal points for peasant-oriented work; active anti-war SR organizations existed, for example, at the Moscow Agricultural Institute and at the Kharkov Agricultural Institute and High School.⁸¹

The SRs circulated significant quantities of leaflets that addressed the peasants directly or that discussed peasant problems within a broader context. In Mogilev, the provincial committee issued anti-war literature directly to the peasants. One such leaflet from 1915 detailed what the peasants had suffered since the outbreak of the war and concluded: "All land should belong to the peasants. The land should be used by those who work it with their own hands. A clique of magnates and gentry have seized the land. At their head is the greatest landlord—tsar Nicholas and his family. You must obtain land and freedom! Down with the war! Down with autocracy! Long live socialism!"⁸² Already in late summer 1914 similarly worded leaflets to the peasantry circulated in and around Moscow. Thus the SRs intermingled references to age-old peasant grievances with descriptions of the additional wartime burdens.

The SRs also often addressed leaflets conjointly to two or more social groups (peasants and workers, soldiers and peasants, all honest citizens, and so forth) and pointed out their common plight. One such leaflet from Moscow in fall 1914 asserted, "All [the war's] burden falls on workers and peasants." A leaflet from the Tula SRs had the address "Toilers of the fields and factories." Another from Niznii-Novgorod spoke of the tsarist government with its gentry landowners and capitalists as "progeny of the vampires." A leaflet from the Chernigov SRs aimed at the soldiers described their fate: "With the lash they herded you, tore you away from your native fields to ship you to the front. . . . We do not want to be cannon fodder! We do not want the war! Land and freedom for the Russian People."⁸³ The SRs were well aware that the peasantry were the backbone of the armed forces; consequently, as a matter of course virtually all SR military-oriented agitation focused special attention on peasant questions. This signified an indirect but potent SR influence on Russia's peasantry during the war.

Thus almost all SR revolutionary literature was more or less equally suited to workers, soldiers, and peasants. This was not accidental. SR writings show that they were aware of the close links among these groups and of the consequent necessity of agitating all of them. (Marxist literature focused much more exclusively on the urban population.) Police reports from Novgorod and Stavropol provinces indicate that revolutionary literature did reach the villages. The overall SR effort among the peasantry was probably greater than the sparse sources on this topic reveal and certainly surpassed the work of the other parties. Because of the wartime conditions, however, the SRs devoted less direct attention to the peasants than to workers and soldiers. Enormous SR activism and success in the villages up through 1907 and again in 1917 suggest, at the very least, that the PSR, far better than other socialist groups, succeeded in keeping its revolutionary message before the eyes of the peasantry during the war.

The Social Bases and Priorities of the Wartime PSR

M. Hildermeier and M. Perrie have already done ground-breaking work on the social makeup of the PSR; the studies of C. Rice,

O. Radkey, and M. Melancon augment and generally support their findings. By all accounts, the period of greatest enrollment into the PSR (and into other socialist parties) was the years from 1905 to 1907. In one sample of one thousand pre-1917 SRs, very nearly 75 percent joined in those three years alone; another 13.5 percent joined in the year before or the year after 1905–1907, for very nearly 90 percent of the PSR's pre-1917 membership. The war years themselves, except for a month or two just preceding February 1917, witnessed statistically insignificant gains in party membership. Indeed, only roughly 4 percent of SRs entered the party between 1908 and 1915.⁸⁴ Thus by 1907 the social structure of the PSR had taken shape and did not change substantially during the following decade. Information on the 1917–1918 recruitments could alter the picture drastically but is irrelevant to the PSR during the war.

Several scholars have pointed out that the largest social grouping in the PSR were the industrial workers and artisans; evidence suggests that urban workers comprised roughly the same proportion of the SRs' as of the SDs' membership. Perrie reports that approximately 50 percent of SRs were worker-artisan in occupation. The next largest group was the intelligentsia (broadly defined as clerical and professional personnel, plus students) at 25 percent; the peasants made up somewhat less than 20 percent. SR cadres were therefore about 67 percent worker-peasant. Although soldiers and sailors did not constitute a social class (most were of the peasantry), many persons in the armed forces also entered the PSR.⁸⁵

That wartime SR writings and propaganda focused on the workers more than on the peasants is no cause for surprise, since a preponderance of party cadres were of urbanized worker-intelligentsia origin (75 percent). Few rural party organizations functioned between July 1914 and February 1917, a circumstance that lessened the utilization of SR peasant and peasant-oriented activists, who were in any case not the largest component in the party. Even between 1900 and 1907, when the PSR's interest in the peasantry was in its apogee, the party issued fewer leaflets, booklets, and newspapers for the peasants than for the workers; of course, it also published large quantities of materials aimed at the soldiers, many of whom were peasants.

Between 1908 and 1914 and again during the war period, simi-

lar priorities prevailed. The SRs addressed the largest quantity of printed materials to workers, a somewhat smaller quantity to soldiers, and the least to peasants. Still, material aimed at soldiers was quite peasant-oriented and, to a lesser degree, so was literature for workers. Although the PSR proved during the 1902–1907 and 1917–1918 periods that it had an enormous interest in peasant work, at other times it fell back on priorities that represented the actual social makeup of the party cadres. The SRs had party kernels in the rural cooperatives and zemstvos, party leaders reasonably accurately described the state of mind of the peasants, and the SRs did more than anyone else among the peasants, but neither before the war nor during it was the peasantry the party's largest social component or its major priority. (Of the sample of 1,000 SRs discussed, 293 reported involvement in terror, 235 in peasant-oriented work, 211 in soldier agitation, and 179 in work among the proletariat; after 1907 the terror program died out, with what reassignment of personnel is not known. So many SRs were employed in factories that they probably needed no special assignment to the proletariat. In any case, less than one-fourth recall peasant-oriented assignments.)

Evidence about the SRs in Siberian exile and hard labor at the time of the February Revolution generally supports this picture of the PSR's social makeup. Soviet research on the social origins of Siberian political exiles yields the following results: between 1908 and 1910, 49 percent were workers, a percentage that by 1915–1916 had increased to 58 percent; in 1908–1910, peasants constituted 12 percent but shrank to 2.8 percent by 1911–1914 and increased slightly to 4.4 percent by 1915–1916; the intelligentsia increased from 21.6 percent in 1908–1910 to 27 percent by 1915–1916. These figures say nothing directly about party composition but would generally reflect the composition of the SD and SR parties, whose members wound up in Siberia. As of 1908, the peasants incarcerated would have been members of the PSR, the chief party to engage in peasant organizing and propaganda. The steep drop-off thereafter would reflect the drastic cutback in the SRs' peasant work after 1907. The mild climb during the early war period would have represented the increased arrest of peasant soldiers and sailors.

Figures about prisoners at hard labor (*katorga*) corroborate the

other findings. Among those prisoners at katorga who reported party membership, SRs formed the absolute majority. At hard labor during 1908–1910, persons of worker origin were 60 percent; peasant origin, 14.7 percent; and intelligentsia, 8 percent. Similarly, of two limited samples of SRs at exile and at hard labor who were freed by the February Revolution, thirteen were workers, six were peasants, three were soldiers or sailors, and three were intelligentsia.⁸⁶ Overall, the figures on social origins for persons in the Siberian penal system coordinate well with the available figures on SR social composition (which were quite similar to those of the two SD parties). With some variations, most data bearing on the social makeup of the PSR both before and during the war suggest that the party had roughly 50 percent workers, with the balance apportioned among the other classes.

Summary

As in the emigration and in the capitals, SRs throughout the empire either opposed the war from the outset or soon turned against it. To pursue the anti-war cause, they often allied themselves with other like-minded revolutionaries and even sponsored and entered joint committees. Joint-party committees with SR participation, it should be reiterated, formed in many places, including Kronshtadt, Smolensk, Minsk, Chernigov, Mariupol, Lugansk, Taganrog, Odessa, Nikolaev, Kazan, Orenburg, Irkutsk, and Tomsk. The SRs' efforts among the soldiers and sailors surpassed those of the other parties. In the industrial towns and cities, their role was roughly equal to that of the anti-war SDs (Bolsheviks and Left Mensheviks); in many areas their closest allies were the Bolsheviks, although SR–Left Menshevik blocs prevailed in some important regions. In a manner consonant with both their social composition and the practical realities of wartime Russia, the SRs devoted greater efforts to the soldiers and the workers than to the peasants, although they did more in the villages than anyone else.

5

The Other Revolutionaries: Left and Right Mensheviks, Mezhraiontsy, Bolsheviks, and Anarchists

During the war the activities of the various socialist parties and factions were so closely intertwined that the history of one can hardly be understood without reference to the history of the others. This chapter will focus on the socialist parties other than the SRs, namely, the Bolsheviks, the nonaligned Social Democrats (in Petrograd the Mezhraionka), the Left and Right Mensheviks, and the anarchists (who of course were not socialists). Cooperation between Right Mensheviks and Right SRs is already a familiar theme: during much of 1917 the bloc of these two groups dominated both the soviets and the Provisional Government. With some permutations, the same two groups constituted the defensist (pro-war) socialist alliance before the February Revolution. Since the Left socialist bloc still languishes in relative obscurity, the various leftist factions will receive especially close attention.¹ The goal, of course, is not to provide an exhaustive account of the wartime record of any of these groups but rather to outline their positions and sketch their activities, especially as they relate to the SRs who worked so closely with them.

The Menshevik-Internationalists

Although after the February Revolution a close relationship arose between the Left SRs and the Menshevik-Internationalists, during

the war the two groups were not always in perfect agreement. The Left Mensheviks sometimes displayed caution on various issues that set them slightly apart from the other three major factions of the Left bloc. Before the outbreak of the war, Menshevism had already split into two broad tendencies, roughly described as "liquidators" (*likvidatory*) and "party Mensheviks" (*partiitsy*). The former group wished to put a decisive end to underground activities in the workers' movement by means of "liquidating" secret party cells and committees. They believed that illegal activities compromised the socialists and were in any case unnecessary since a broad legal democratic workers' party was the prime desideratum. The *partiitsy*, led by such party stalwarts as Dan, Axelrod, and Martov, shared some of the sensitivities of their moderate comrades on the question of expanding the Social Democratic party into a broad workers' movement but, in the repressive conditions of tsarist Russia, rejected the possibility of proceeding on a completely legal basis. They felt that the maintenance of an underground party organization in conjunction with the broader movement was the only path capable of advancing the cause of workers' democracy. Although the party Mensheviks maintained close contact with the Menshevik liquidators, they could not bring themselves to relinquish revolution as did their more conservative comrades. (Between 1908 and 1914, virtually identical considerations split the PSR into its right and left wings.)

After the beginning of the war, the liquidators and the *partiitsy*, with some significant permutations, became, respectively, the Menshevik Defensists and Internationalists. From the outset, Martov and other Menshevik-Internationalist leaders opposed the war and, during fall 1914, even won the praise of Lenin for their anti-war statements. Differences quickly developed, however, between the Left Mensheviks (another term for Menshevik-Internationalist) on the one hand and the Bolsheviks and SRs on the other about the all-important question of how to go about resisting the war. The Left Mensheviks put forward the slogan "Peace at all costs" (*Mir vo chto by ne bylo*), which, as Martov, the chief Left Menshevik leader, was at pains to point out, did not constitute "defeatism" (the call for all socialists to work toward the defeat of their own governments in the war).² Although some SRs and Bolsheviks were outright defensists

(pro-war), and other members of the two parties took positions no different from that espoused by the Left Mensheviks, certain of the Bolshevik and Left SR leaders (Lenin, Natanson, and even Chernov) rejected "peace at all costs" as pacifistic and insisted on utilizing more revolutionary slogans. The differences on the war soon translated themselves into other areas of disagreement. Although they entered the Zimmerwald movement and even joined its left wing, the Left Mensheviks never entirely gave up hope in the Second International, just as they never gave up hope in the Menshevik-Defensists; thus Left Menshevik proclamations omitted slogans that called for the "New" or "Third" International, whereas SR and Bolshevik literature normally included this call.³

Moreover, all Menshevik organizations inside Russia initially took a different stand on the workers' groups of the WICs than did most Bolsheviks and SRs. Some Menshevik-Defensists approved worker participation in the WICs for the purpose of furthering the war effort. The Left Mensheviks also backed participation in the WIC workers' group, not, however, for purposes of defense, but for organization of the workers for revolutionary goals.⁴ By the time of the election campaigns, many Right Mensheviks and Right SRs had come over to a more revolutionary stance and adopted the same slogan ("Entry into the workers' groups not for the production of shells, but for the organization of workers") that the Left Mensheviks used. Meanwhile, in the emigration Martov criticized the concept of the WIC workers' groups and issued a reprimand to Left Menshevik organizations inside Russia for supporting them. He found Left Menshevik anti-war statements commendable but thought that they should have simply rejected the WIC workers' groups.⁵

Once a number of workers' groups, albeit elected by highly dubious methods, began to function, the government used them for the propaganda purposes that were their chief design, that is, to demonstrate that workers were behind the government in the war effort. To prevent the government from achieving this goal, by early 1916 the Left Menshevik Initiative Group (IG) in Petrograd had adopted a policy of open agitation against the workers' groups.⁶ Left Mensheviks elsewhere soon followed suit. In some southern towns such as Lugansk and Nikolaev where election campaigns were still taking place in 1916, Left Mensheviks joined the Left bloc of Bolsheviks

and SRs against the formation of the groups.⁷ In March 1916, the Petrograd IG published a proclamation critical of the workers' groups and simultaneously issued an ultimatum to the Samara Menshevik legal paper *Nash golos* (Our voice); if the Right Menshevik paper did not change its stance on the workers' groups and on the war itself, the Left Mensheviks threatened to withdraw support from and boycott *Nash golos*. At about this time, the Okhranka began to classify the Menshevik-Internationalists as "openly defeatist." In a lengthy evaluation of the Social Democratic movement as of summer 1916, the Okhranka noted that in January 1916 the IG had published the "Declaration of the Petrograd Organization of the SD-Mensheviks," which expressed "a defeatist point of view . . . [by calling] for a struggle against autocracy and for socialism."⁸

The Menshevik-Internationalists had always opposed the war, but the tone of their anti-war and other agitation definitely indicated a further turn to the Left after the new year. The relative moderation of Left Menshevism inside Russia before 1916 in part reflected organizational inadequacies. One of the chief founders of the Petrograd IG, O. Ermanskii, claimed that it began operating sometime in 1915; that would indicate that it had a late start in building its cells and committees. On his arrival in Petrograd in late 1914, Ermanskii found Menshevik anti-war efforts "in poor condition."⁹ The principal Menshevik organization in the capital was the Organizational Committee, which had originally been the center of the Menshevik partiitsy and which looked to Martov, Dan, and Axelrod for leadership. But the Organizational Committee experienced dissension over the war and ultimately took a very moderate stance.

The defensist proclivities of the Organizational Committee during the first six months of the war should not, however, be exaggerated. In late 1914, the committee issued a proclamation ending with the slogan "Long live peace!" Furthermore, a late 1914 conference of the Menshevik Organizational Committee and other Menshevik groups of the Petrograd area published a résumé of its resolutions that contained the slogans "Down with militarism! Down with war! Long live peace!" none of which can possibly be construed as wholehearted support for the war.¹⁰ Despite this early outburst of internationalism, as time passed the Organizational Committee tended to become more supportive of the war, a factor that led Ermanskii

and other Left Mensheviks to strike out on their own to form the IG. Naturally, this development, which deprived the Organizational Committee of all its leftist forces, pushed it even further to the Right.

The Left Menshevik IG eventually built an organization that consisted of some four hundred to five hundred workers and published numerous anti-war proclamations, which, as noted, by 1916 earned it the Okhranka's epithet "defeatist."¹¹ That same year, the Petrograd Bolsheviks listed the IG as one of the groups, along with the Mezhraionka and SR-Internationalists, with which they cooperated closely.¹² Nevertheless, Menshevik-Internationalist caution continued to manifest itself in several ways. Although the IG joined in the September 1915 strikes and even sided with the Bolsheviks (against the SRs and Mezhraionka) in favor of prolonging the demonstrations, the Left Mensheviks on several other occasions refused to involve themselves in strikes and demonstrations, whereas the SRs and Bolsheviks consistently supported such actions. Regardless, the IG was an organization closely tied to the Petrograd workers' movement; it had numerous factory cells and a deep involvement in the cooperatives and labor unions.¹³ When the February Revolution came, several garrison units elected Menshevik-Internationalists into the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet, thus suggesting that the IG had involved itself in the important work of propagandizing the Petrograd garrisons. The Left Mensheviks contributed heavily to raising revolutionary consciousness in the capital during the war.

All across Russia Menshevik-Internationalists played a similar role. During 1915 and 1916, a self-named "Group of Marxists" at Moscow University issued a series of leaflets that expressed a position similar to that of the Left Mensheviks. Along with SRs and nonaligned SDs, the Menshevik-Internationalists were among the principal participants in anti-war agitation on the western and southern fronts. Mensheviks in the south of the empire, including the Don basin industrial region, were especially prone to internationalism.¹⁴ One Soviet historian has remarked about Mensheviks of the Caucasus that some of them wanted Russia's defeat in the war, whereas the balance supported the slogan "Neither victory, nor defeat," a typical Menshevik-Internationalist formulation.¹⁵ Al-

though in many parts of the empire the Left Mensheviks carried out effective revolutionary work against the war, certain characteristics of the Social Democratic movement render it difficult to judge the full extent of their efforts. In many areas, Social Democratic party organizations were not split into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions, let alone into Left and Right Menshevik groups. Perhaps only in Petrograd did the Left Mensheviks create an entirely separate organizational structure. Nevertheless, the Menshevik-Internationalists became an important (and in many places leading) force in numerous unified Social Democratic organizations.

Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, many Soviet histories have maintained that Mensheviks as a group favored the war.¹⁶ Even Menshevik émigrés have made this claim. The Right Menshevik Anan'in, for example, wrote in his memoirs, "Almost to a man, with various nuances, the Mensheviks inside Russia supported the patriotic point of view, although less decisively than Plekhanov and Aleksinskii in the emigration."¹⁷ This is a very inaccurate assessment of tendencies within the Menshevik movement. As Western historians of the Menshevik movement have noted, the number of internationalist Mensheviks both at home and in the emigration was quite large. Furthermore, many left-wing Mensheviks inside Russia had the characteristics of defeatism (unalloyed opposition to the war and the government). Their influence in spreading revolutionary anti-war sentiment requires recognition and further investigation.¹⁸

The Mezhraionka: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

The history of the Petrograd Interdistrict Committee (*Mezhraionnyi Komitet* or *Mezhraionka*) of the RSDRP is of no less interest and significance than that of the Menshevik-Internationalist IG. The Mezhraionka arose in Petrograd, when a group of Left Mensheviks, nonaligned SDs, and maverick Bolsheviks, all of whom rejected the factionalism that plagued the Social Democratic movement, established their own group (later committee) several years before the war. Forming a new faction may not be the best cure for the disease of factionalism but, in any case, this group of experienced activists

dedicated itself to uniting the various leftist tendencies in the party. The most prominent leader of the Petrograd Mezhraionka was I. Iurenev.¹⁹ Although the group took its ideological cues from a wide range of leftist Social Democratic leaders ranging from Lenin to Martov, it looked most of all to L. Trotsky. The Mezhraionka constructed an organization that consisted of several district committees, factory cells having between 150 and 200 worker-activist members, several propaganda circles, and a quite active group among Petrograd students.²⁰ As their organizational accomplishments testify, the persons who entered the Mezhraionka were of a very high calibre.

From the outset, the positions of the Mezhraionka on the war, the International, and revolution were all impeccably leftist, as was its position on the WIC workers' groups. During the first year of World War I, of the various Social Democratic groups in Petrograd, the Mezhraionka enjoyed the greatest success in publishing anti-war proclamations.²¹ Among other things, the *Mezhraiontsy* (members of the Mezhraionka) devoted considerable efforts to the task of propagandizing the soldiers of the very large Petrograd garrison and at the fronts. Already by late 1914 the Mezhraionka had established a special military organization, which, concedes Iurenev, was not large but had widespread ties with the soldiers in the area of the capital. Iurenev recalled that his group conducted "rather great agitational and organizational work" in the 175th Reserve Regiment in Krasnoe Selo and brought six companies under its influence. He also claimed that Mezhraionka leaflets addressed to soldiers worked their way to the various fronts, to the Baltic Fleet, and to garrisons deep inside Russia, a quite plausible observation partially supported by reports from military intelligence.²² This focus of the Mezhraionka is worthy of note since the other Social Democratic organizations, including the Bolsheviks, did less in this regard.

The police reported that the Mezhraiontsy played a quite active role during fall 1915 in the campaign against the WIC workers' groups but showed few signs of life during the first half of 1916.²³ The series of massive arrests that began in December 1915 and continued until January 1916 inflicted severe damage on the Mezhraionka (as on the other parties). By fall 1916, however, the Mezhraionka had recovered and, until the February Revolution,

manifested remarkable skill in printing and distributing revolutionary proclamations at a time when other Petrograd socialist parties often proved unable to perform this crucial task.

Although the Petrograd Mezhraionka maintained ties with a number of Social Democratic organizations in other cities, few, if any, of them directly subordinated themselves to the Mezhraionka.²⁴ Regardless, the Mezhraiontsy enjoyed considerable influence within the Social Democratic movement. On an empire-wide basis, most Social Democratic organizations had not broken into Menshevik and Bolshevik factions. In much of Siberia, the whole of the Urals, many areas in the south, and almost all medium-size and small towns, Social Democratic organizations consisted of individuals who called themselves Mensheviks or Bolsheviks but who had not found the factional differences sufficiently important to merit breaking up the unified local organizations. This, of course, was the precise organizational arrangement espoused by the Petrograd Mezhraionka and by Trotsky in the emigration. Additionally, in areas where Social Democratic organizations had split, many SD activists considered themselves nonaligned, that is, neither Bolshevik nor Menshevik. Such nonaligned SDs often identified closely with Trotsky's position and that of the Petrograd Mezhraionka and, in some places, referred to themselves as Mezhraiontsy. On an all-Russian scale, the Mezhraionka's conception of party organization (unity of all leftist SD elements) was quite popular in the Social Democratic movement, a circumstance that demonstrates the inadequacy of concepts of the Social Democratic movement that work in terms of Bolshevik versus Menshevik antinomies. Like the Left Mensheviks, the nonaligned SDs regularly occupied radical positions and worked avidly against the government during the war.

The Bolsheviks

In many areas of the empire, after the outbreak of the war the SRs and Bolsheviks worked together especially closely.²⁵ This factor and the tendency of Soviet historians to focus heavily on the role of the Bolsheviks (sometimes to the virtual exclusion of other parties) during the pre-February war era necessitate an especially close

look at the Leninists. Any account of the Bolshevik organization inside Russia must begin with the important Petersburg Committee. When the tsarist regime carried out its onslaught against socialist activists immediately after the outbreak of the war, it rounded up numerous Bolsheviks, who during the last year or so had reached a position of great influence among the capital's proletariat. An Okh-ranka report from late summer noted, "The activities of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolsheviks have halted completely."²⁶ Although arising in part from arrests, the problems for the Petrograd Bolsheviks had a second cause. One Bolshevik memoirist recalled that after issuing an anti-war proclamation on the war's eve the Petersburg Committee "lapsed into silence for several months."²⁷ The Bolshevik A. Arskii, who was in Petrograd at the time, has provided insights into the exact origins of this "silence." Arskii described a meeting of Petrograd Bolsheviks summoned to discuss the war issue. Ten to fifteen persons attended, including N. Sokolov, V. Krestinskii, A. Shliapnikov, M. Goldenberg, and I. Steklov. "The impression that emerged from this meeting," recalled Arskii, "was extremely heavy. These persons, on whom local party members had long relied for leadership, had no strong outlook on events." Sokolov, Goldenberg, and several others, recalled Arskii, "went over into the camp of the social-patriots. They said that the anti-war position was not popular and that to go against the people's mood in this way would subject the party to the risk of full ideological isolation." Even the Bolsheviks who opposed the war, claimed Arskii, "had no well worked out view; defeatism was little felt at the time."²⁸

When in August the first Bolshevik anti-war proclamation appeared, it was issued by a collective of young Bolshevik activists specifically to protest the Bolshevik committee's failure to condemn the war.²⁹ For the balance of 1914, the committee remained in an indecisive, disorganized state, a common enough situation for socialist parties at the time. Late in 1914, the police noted the "accidental and self-appointed nature of the Petersburg Committee." The same report also claimed that the party's district committees were not functioning, a situation that restricted activities to factory cells and to groups in the unions and other labor organizations (during the first weeks after the war began all the socialists experienced similar travails).³⁰

The five-person Bolshevik Duma contingent, which, according to Soviet histories, at this troubled time formed the ideological center of the party, also succumbed to confusion on the crucial war issue. The Bolshevik Duma deputies joined the Menshevik faction to sign a Social Democratic resolution that pledged the proletariat to defend Russian culture against attack, a statement that provided a potential basis for defensism. Nevertheless, both SD factions, together with the Trudoviks, abstained from voting for war credits. L. Kamenev, the only central committee member in Petrograd when the war began, spoke out strongly against Lenin's famous manifesto, which called for "defeat of one's government." In his critique, Kamenev cited the party constitution, which forbade the publication of documents with the central committee's signature without the actual participation of the central committee. In early November the Petrograd Bolsheviks convened a conference to discuss Lenin's defeatism and Kamenev's charges. Police raided the gathering and arrested Kamenev, all five Bolshevik Duma deputies, and a number of other party members; the government charged the whole group with opposition to the war, whereas most of those arrested had not adopted such a position. At Kamenev's trial, he again stated his opposition to Lenin's stand on the war and referred to an agreement on the war issue he had reached with the Right Menshevik Iordanskii. Kamenev's testimony provoked Lenin's ire and caused a scandal in the party, whose aftereffects were still evident in 1917 when some party members objected to Kamenev's candidacy to the central committee. (The gravamen of the case against Kamenev was not his defensism but rather his testimony at the trial, especially his admission that he had reached an agreement on the war with Iordanskii.)³¹

During the first half of 1915, matters hardly improved for the Bolshevik organization, whose fortunes in Petrograd reached such a low ebb that party historians have sometimes claimed that during that year the party's Moscow Committee assumed the mantle of leadership for the nation-wide party. Sometime during summer 1915, in all probability at the party's 14 July conference at Oranienbaum (just outside Petrograd), the Bolsheviks recreated their committee.³² In August the Bolsheviks held a joint conference with the Petrograd SRs; here the two parties worked out tactics for a rapidly reviving revolutionary movement and reached agreements on the upcoming

WIC workers' group elections. At the end of the month, the Bolshevik organization again suffered heavy arrests, which did not, however, put the committee out of commission. Shortly thereafter the committee, manned by radical young activists such as Zalezhskii and Bagdatiev, diverted two mandates from electors in the WIC workers' groups elections, thus inadvertently providing the government with a pretext for calling a new round of elections. From mid-summer 1915 until early 1916, the Petrograd Bolshevik organization displayed considerable energy but suffered from the lack of experienced leaders.³³

On the evening of 31 December 1915, just after the Bolshevik and SR Petersburg committees held a joint conference to make plans for the upcoming 9 January anniversary, the Okhranka, hoping to prevent the demonstration, arrested virtually the entire Bolshevik committee, numerous SRs, and other Left socialists.³⁴ A new Bolshevik committee quickly arose, only to fall victim to yet another round of arrests in association with the late February Putilov strike.³⁵ Until October 1916, the Petrograd Bolsheviks had no committee. Arrests had cut so deeply into district and factory level Bolshevik committees and cells as to preclude organized party life for many months, a fate that befell the SRs in August 1916. The government cited the failure of the Bolsheviks to revive their organization as one of the factors in the relatively peaceful May Day 1916 holiday.³⁶ In October 1916, Petrograd Bolsheviks established an impressive organization with several district committees, two or three presses, and a Petersburg Committee, all of which the Okhranka (guided deftly by three provocateurs on the committee) again decimated with massive arrests in December. When a new committee took shape after the first of the new year, it was, according to memoir accounts, not in condition to lead the local party organization (much less to lead the masses in a revolutionary struggle).³⁷

As in all the parties, the Bolsheviks' Petersburg Committee stood as a symbol of the party; before the establishment of the Bureau of the Central Committee, it was also the titular head of the party inside Russia. Despite evidence to the contrary, many Soviet studies give the impression that throughout the war era, in the words of one scholar, "The Petersburg Committee never ceased its activities."³⁸ The Left Menshevik Dvinov, a harsh critic of the Bolsheviks, later

wrote of the Bolshevik committee, "It was a fiction serving the provocateurs as material for reports and as a justification for receiving their salaries, and the Okhranka as a dramatization of their activities and [as an excuse] for uninterrupted arrests."³⁹ The truth lies somewhere between these two versions. When it functioned, the Bolshevik committee performed diligent revolutionary anti-war work; for example, it published anti-war proclamations, played a prominent role in the anti-WIC workers' group campaign, and helped lead numerous strikes.

Especially during the first year or so of the war, organizational and ideological malaise afflicted the whole Bolshevik party organization inside Russia, an entirely typical state of affairs in the wartime socialist movement. Arrests on a massive scale, disruption of internal communications, and loss of contact with the émigré party leadership rendered party life and work difficult for Bolsheviks and for all revolutionaries. Lenin's call for "defeat of one's own government" further complicated the party's position. Already during the 1920s the Soviet historian Baevskii wrote that one of the main arguments used by the numerous Bolshevik comrades who opposed the defeatist slogan was "the absolute impossibility of agitating in this spirit."⁴⁰ The historical record indicates that none of the anti-war socialists used overtly defeatist slogans in the literature they distributed inside Russia.

In his famous history of the revolution, Trotsky admitted the inutility of "defeatist slogans" but claimed, "The number of Bolshevik patriots was insignificant."⁴¹ This is inaccurate. Even in the Petrograd organization, influential leaders backed the war. Throughout the Urals Bolsheviks were prone to defensism; in Ufa the Bolshevik leader V. P. Artsybushev not only failed to oppose the war but joined the local WIC workers' group. The Bolshevik activist A. Kuchkin recalled, "The Bolsheviks in the Ufa area had no clear Leninist line on the war. There was a certain lack of focus." Kuchkin also recalled that some Bolsheviks came out for "defense of the fatherland" and entered the WIC workers' groups. "No one [among the Bolsheviks] had a consistent anti-war line; some were instinctively against the war, but only vaguely." Several Soviet histories of the Urals confirm the local Bolsheviks' general lack of wartime activism and their entry into various local WIC workers' groups. Moreover, almost ev-

everywhere in the region Bolsheviks operated in undifferentiated SD organizations, historically dominated by Mensheviks of quite moderate persuasion, who were also the strongest force in the region's unions and sickness funds.⁴²

According to one recent Soviet history, Siberian Bolsheviks, who at the time also coexisted with Mensheviks in joint Social Democratic organizations, "failed to take a stand against the predominant 'Menshevik' pro-war sentiment." M. Tomskii, who was located in exile in Iakutiia, backed the war.⁴³ In Saratov, only two or three SDs and SRs opposed the war until September 1915 or thereabouts.⁴⁴ The important Moscow party leadership also vacillated on the issue of the war. Ermanskii, who later founded the Left Menshevik IG in Petrograd, reported in his memoirs that when he arrived in Moscow from Siberia during fall 1914, he found no trace of Social Democratic anti-war work.⁴⁵ Organizational inadequacies were only one factor in the absence of Bolshevik activity in Moscow. Moscow Bolsheviks such as P. M. Maliantovich and the "rock-hard" I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov viewed "this war as a war of liberation against German militarism," and Skvortsov signed a proclamation with this formula. A spirit of disorientation and apathy toward the war so afflicted both Moscow and Petrograd Bolsheviks that in late 1915 leading intelligentsia activists of the two cities, including Skvortsov, V. I. Iakhontov, V. P. Miliutin, P. B. Smidovich, N. D. Sokolov, and Romanov (a provocateur), held a joint conference in Moscow with a group of Right Mensheviks and their associates (A. M. Nikitin, S. M. Zaretskaia, L. N. Radchenko, P. P. Maslov, M. Gorky, S. N. Prokopovich, and E. Kuskova). Although the Bolshevik-Menshevik conference did not reach agreement on all issues, it did vote to work toward unification of the various SD factions and, most significantly, to allow the Menshevik Duma deputies, who had defensist proclivities, to speak for the Social Democratic party as a whole. Bolshevik defensism in Moscow was not restricted to intellectuals. During August 1915 a general conference of Moscow Bolsheviks met to discuss the setting up of a legal party newspaper; the delegates, who included not only Iakhontov, Skvortsov, Smidovich, and Miliutin but also Bolshevik representatives from unions, cooperatives, and factory cells, decisively rejected two separate anti-war resolutions offered, respectively, by Latsis and Goncharov.⁴⁶

Defensism was considerably less common among Bolsheviks than among Mensheviks, but assertions that Bolsheviks unanimously opposed and resisted the war do not stand up to examination; during the first year or more of the world conflict, Bolshevik activists inside Russia failed to distinguish themselves in their anti-war fervor. As the war progressed along its terrible and bloody path, Bolshevik activists and organizations turned more firmly against it; the same was true of the other socialist parties. As often noted by memoirists and confirmed by Okhranka reports, by mid-1915 growing mass dissatisfaction with the war and its consequences stirred up the dormant revolutionary anti-war resolve of many socialists. Regardless, the phenomenon of Bolshevik "patriotism" was significant in terms of both numbers and personalities involved (Tomskii, Kamenev, Miliutin, Smidovich, Skvortsov-Stepanov, Gol'denberg, Sokolov, Iakhontov, and Artsybushev inside Russia and numerous Bolsheviks in Western Europe, including half the Bolshevik Committee Abroad).

Organizational problems beset Bolsheviks in many areas of the empire, including Moscow. Having set themselves the task of creating a stable committee, the Moscow Bolsheviks on several occasions enlisted aid from Petrograd (as had the Moscow SRs). The innumerable wartime Moscow Committees were notoriously short-lived, a phenomenon that spurred the early Soviet historian (and memoirist) Menitskii to comment, "comrades who arrived in Moscow during 1915-1916 found no organization whatsoever and concluded that during the war years no party work was being carried out in Moscow."⁴⁷ Albeit on a small scale, some Bolshevik activity did occur. M. Latsis, a well-known Bolshevik activist stationed in Moscow for part of the war, recalled that for about six months during spring 1915 the Bolshevik *Severnaia grupp*a (Northern Group) operated an illegal printing press, which printed several anti-war proclamations for distribution in Moscow, Kharkov, and Ivanovo-Voznesensk. When police confiscated this press, "no more were set up," recalled Latsis.⁴⁸ The Soviet historian Erde wrote about one committee created in early 1916, "Like its predecessors [it] had a brief life."⁴⁹ The Moscow Bolsheviks did not solve their organizational problems before the February Revolution.

The situation at the fronts was quite similar. Despite the presence of a rather large number of party workers, wrote the Bolshevik mem-

oirist Knorin, "A unified Bolshevik party organization, even any sort of structured revolutionary organization at all, did not exist on the western front or in White Russia. There were only traces of an organization and informational ties among the more prominent party workers with one another and with the capitals."⁵⁰ A second Bolshevik memoirist from White Russia, Agurskii, supports Knorin's contention that not even rudimentary Bolshevik organizations existed near the western front. Agurskii did note that the Bolsheviks A. Rakov and S. Nakhimson were stationed at the northern front and thus implied, hopefully, that they might have initiated party activities there.⁵¹ Rakov, however, could have contributed nothing to the cause of Bolshevik activities, since at the time he was a Left SR, who entered the Bolshevik party only in mid-1917.⁵² A recent party history similarly asserts that before the February Revolution Sergei Lazo conducted Bolshevik work at the front.⁵³ But Lazo was neither at the front nor a Bolshevik; as a young officer stationed in Siberia he joined the SR party during 1916; as a Left SR he became commander of the Far Eastern Front of the Civil War and joined the Communist party only after July 1918.⁵⁴ SRs, Mensheviks, non-aligned SDs, and anarchists who contributed greatly to the cause of revolution, many of whom later joined the Communist party, must receive recognition for their efforts, but they cannot win retroactive status as "old Bolsheviks."

In the latter part of 1916, several Bolsheviks participated in a revolutionary circle that arose in the Twelfth Army at the northern front. Among the members were the Bolsheviks A. Vasil'ev and D. Grazkin, the nonparty radical R. Sivers, and the SR-Maximalist Khaustov.⁵⁵ Grazkin's memoirs shed interesting light on the circle. He recalled that a "very small circle" formed when he accidentally ran across Vasil'ev and Sivers. Grazkin's remark—"One must assume that along with this [circle] there existed and functioned other groups of Bolsheviks in the Twelfth Army"—implies that he did not know of any other such circles. Grazkin also recalled that before the February Revolution the circle had "no ties with Petrograd and hardly any with Riga."⁵⁶ Although after the February Revolution the Vasil'ev-Grazkin circle evolved into an important Bolshevik organization responsible for issuing the radical *Okopnaia pravda* (Truth in the trenches), it hardly represented evidence of strong Bolshevik efforts at the northern front before the revolution.

Soviet histories also often list the Bolshevik A. Pireiko, who volunteered into the Russian Army, as an activist who carried out party work at the fronts. His memoirs fail to mention any such activity; moreover, he recalled, "What the Bolsheviks with Lenin at their head said and did at that time did not reach the army, [although] some news of Plekhanov did arrive."⁵⁷ The prominent Bolshevik V. Zalezhskii confirmed the lack of directives from the party leadership after the war began. No one, claimed Zalezhskii, knew what to do: protest the war or sign up? Each party member was allowed full freedom to do what he wanted, a situation, he recalled, that resulted in confusion. "Organized revolutionary work in the army during the war hardly existed. . . ."⁵⁸ Although for a time the Petrograd Bolshevik organization helped revolutionary circles in the Baltic Fleet, evidence of systematic Bolshevik work at the fronts is indeed lacking.⁵⁹

No matter occupied revolutionary activists' time, energy, and resources more than writing, printing, and distributing of agitational literature, especially leaflets. In repressive times, when open agitation at large rallies (*massovki*) became impractical, the parties relied more and more heavily on the production of proclamations. Each faction took considerable care that the wording of its proclamations was politically correct, not only so that the leaflets precisely represented the group's current position on a given question but so as to draw, they hoped, the appropriate response from the workers, soldiers, or peasants who read the proclamations. Furthermore, they knew that comrade-competitors of the other socialist factions checked the contents of each leaflet closely (and sometimes recalled them even decades later). Nothing elicited more pride from activists than the printing and widespread distribution of politically acute and well-printed revolutionary leaflets; nothing caused more jealousy than when a rival faction accomplished this; and nothing prompted more ridicule than when an effort fell flat. The government too took the production of revolutionary proclamations very seriously and moved quickly to locate and seize illegal presses and arrest all involved.

Consequently, Soviet historiography pays close attention to the question of revolutionary leaflets and concentrates on the Bolshevik tracts; some historians specialize in the analysis of the party's proclamations. Among other tasks, Soviet studies undertake to locate,

count, and analyze the content of Bolshevik anti-war leaflets. Beginning in the 1930s, Soviet histories have made a series of claims about the number of wartime proclamation texts the Bolsheviks accounted for in various locations and in Russia as a whole, with estimates for the latter ranging from roughly three hundred all the way to over six hundred. Some of the recent larger estimates include local totals roughly as follows: 160 in Petrograd, 70 in Moscow, 70 in the Ukraine, and 87 in Riga, Latvia. Thus three cities alone—Petrograd, Moscow, and Riga—and the Ukraine account for a sizable majority of the empire-wide total. The question arises, Do various historical sources, especially memoirs of Bolsheviks active in these and other locations, justify the large and ever expanding counts (after all, intensive research could be ferreting out previously undiscovered documents)?

Although the evidence on this matter is too large and complicated to be presented here, it does suggest retroactive inflation of proclamation counts. Primary historical sources about specific locations, including memoirs and document collections published in the 1920s, tend to give quite modest totals. Some more recent Soviet studies have made large claims for the Petrograd and Moscow committees throughout the war period, overlooking the fact that these two institutions often did not exist and often did not possess the capacity to print leaflets when they did exist. Certain methodological problems also arise. Ascribing to the Bolsheviks texts published in Riga by Latvian Social Democrats, who were at the time Trotskyist in alignment, is highly questionable. In many parts of Russia, the Bolsheviks coexisted with Mensheviks and Trotskyists in joint SD organizations; some studies evidently count leaflets issued by joint anti-war SD organizations as Bolshevik. Considering the large number of Left Mensheviks and nonaligned Left SDs in such organizations, this too raises questions.

An examination of the situation in Kharkov, a major anti-war center for all the socialists, also elicits doubts. A Soviet document collection asserts that, of the seventy leaflets the Bolsheviks allegedly issued in the Ukraine during the war, thirteen were from Kharkov, an evidently plausible total; according to this volume, during the second half of 1914 the Kharkov Bolsheviks issued four proclamations. A Bolshevik memoirist recalled, however, that his organization was destroyed at war's outbreak, began to regroup in March

1915, and printed its first anti-war proclamation only in August 1915. He specified that from August 1915 through January 1916 the Kharkov Bolsheviks issued five or six proclamations. Several memoirists have testified that, because of extraordinarily heavy and continuous arrests, during most of 1916 both the SD and SR organizations did not exist (much less issue leaflets); late in the year a joint SD-SR student group did manage to issue a few proclamations. Just before the February Revolution, the Kharkov Bolsheviks, lacking a printing press, published a leaflet jointly with the SRs because the latter had a press.⁶⁰ Thus even the modest count for Kharkov rests on shaky ground.

An objective analysis of Bolshevik wartime output of proclamations might conclude that Bolshevik organizations, when they existed and when they had presses or other reproduction equipment, issued anti-war leaflets second to none in their scorn for the government, in the acuteness of their analysis, and in the immediacy of their appeals for revolution. The totals for specifically Bolshevik organizations were, however, less than those suggested by many recent Soviet studies.

Available primary sources suggest several hypotheses about the Bolshevik party in Russia during the war. First, at the beginning of the war many Bolsheviks took a defensist stance. Second, because of heavy arrests and lack of a clear vision of what to do, Bolshevik organizations in many cities accomplished little during the first year or so of the war. Third, thereafter Bolshevik organizations in Petrograd and other cities played an active role in the anti-war revolutionary movement. Fourth, in the cities this role did not exceed that of the other anti-war socialists and at the fronts was less than that of the other socialists. Naturally, Soviet studies have provided a much more expansive picture of the wartime Bolsheviks. Only intensive scrutiny of existing materials, especially those in the archives, will ultimately establish the actual extent and the actual limits of Bolshevik activism between July 1914 and February 1917.

The Menshevik-Defensists

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the émigré Menshevik leader G. Plekhanov came out in support of Russia's war effort and held

that for the duration of the war socialists should carry out no illegal activities or do anything that would hinder Russia's defense. The rationale for his position was that, since even the German Social Democrats had failed to offer resistance to the German war effort, all Russians, even socialists, had no choice but to defend Russia and its culture from German militarism. After the war, of course, matters would be different, but for the moment love of country outweighed devotion to socialism.

Support for this extreme position was not solid among other émigré Right Mensheviks such as N. Potresov and P. Maslov, both of whom thought the existing government damaged Russia's defense, which they supported.⁶¹ It was even less popular inside Russia, where Menshevik leaders in the Duma, including N. Chkheidze, joined with the Bolshevik Duma deputies and the Trudoviks to abstain from voting for war credits and issued a declaration that effectively disassociated them from any wartime *carte blanche* to the government. Nonetheless, the Menshevik Duma deputies failed to put themselves on a collision course with the government. For instance, the declaration, which originated from the entire SD Duma delegation, including the Bolsheviks, contained a sentence with a somewhat defensist ring: "The proletariat . . . will at all times defend the cultural wealth of the nation against any attack from whatever quarter."⁶²

After this rather qualified anti-war demarche, the Menshevik Duma faction quickly occupied a moderate stance, which straddled the fence between defensism and internationalism. Likewise, during fall 1914 the Menshevik Organizational Committee in Petrograd issued proclamations calling for an end to the war, but without the calls for revolution that would have constituted an outright internationalist position. Thereafter, it migrated closer to defensism, as a consequence of which the anti-war Mensheviks such as Ermanskii eventually withdrew to form the Menshevik-Internationalist Initiative Group (IG).⁶³ (The Petrograd SR activist Sviatitskii described how he and other SR intelligenty similarly migrated from a modest internationalism at the time of the war's outbreak toward defensism as Russia suffered costly defeats.)

By mid-1915, however, virtually all moderate Mensheviks (and SRs) had abandoned their previous wartime support of the government (Plekhanov) or passive resistance (Chkheidze) in favor of a

more activist stance against the government. A further degree of Menshevik unity prevailed when the Right Mensheviks joined the Menshevik-Internationalists inside Russia to support the election of WIC workers' groups. Lending support to these endeavors were the Siberian Zimmerwaldists, as they came to be called, such as I. Tsereteli and F. Dan. From Siberian exile, these Menshevik leaders declared their internationalism by asserting that the war was imperialist in nature, as a result of which neither socialists nor the proletariat should support it or the government in waging it. (Under the leadership of A. Gots, a group of Right SR exiles, who occupied a very similar position to that of the Menshevik Zimmerwaldists, worked closely with Tsereteli and Dan.)

Since their reasons for adopting the various evidently similar positions were widely divergent, the unity among the moderate Mensheviks was illusory; in fact, they were not at one about the war itself. Plekhanov headed a tiny group of émigré Mensheviks (in the joint Right Menshevik-Right SR *Prizyv* group) who still adamantly insisted on the right of Russia to defend itself, while now suggesting that socialists (and the proletariat) should oppose the government by lining up behind the moderate opposition inside Russia. Their goal was to strengthen the defense effort by democratizing the government to the extent of creating a liberal republic in Russia. Other moderate Menshevik leaders such as P. Axelrod in the emigration and Chkheidze inside Russia were far more open than Plekhanov about opposing the existing government, while either maintaining the bare necessity of defense (Chkheidze) or emphasizing the necessity for peace (Axelrod). In that they neither outright abjured defense nor urged it, the Siberian Zimmerwaldists (Tsereteli and Dan) were perhaps closest to Axelrod on these issues.⁶⁴

As regards the WIC workers' groups, all the Mensheviks inside Russia from far Right to far Left insisted that they supported entry not to wage war or defeat Germany but to organize the workers. This position fit well with the Right Mensheviks' new opposition to the government; the workers should begin organizing themselves to aid the bourgeoisie in the coming revolution and to defend workers' economic and political interests under a new liberal regime. Although the Left Mensheviks eventually pulled out of the WIC workers' groups, the rest of the Mensheviks remained in them; although

some Right SRs also took part, the government believed that the Mensheviks were the dominant force in the WIC workers' groups.⁶⁵

Inside Russia, the Right Mensheviks' organizational strength and their support from workers are difficult to judge. During the first year of the war, when leftist socialists endured an enforced near-silence, the moderate socialists had the field more or less to themselves either in supporting the government or in insisting on the right to defense. As the war dragged on and its attendant hardships accumulated and intensified, the relatively simple anti-war and antigovernment slogans of left-wing socialists became more and more popular among the workers and soldiers. The moderate Mensheviks and their Right SR allies did not have as clear a message. Some wanted defense, whereas others considered themselves Zimmerwaldist internationalists; some leveled devastating criticisms against the government, whereas others, in their concern not to hinder Russia's defense, were quite cautious; and some drew much closer than others to open calls for revolution, even during the war. That workers and soldiers gradually heeded Left socialists more than Right socialists is hardly surprising.

The Right Mensheviks were heavily involved in various aspects of the wartime labor movement, including the labor unions, cooperatives, and sickness funds. Furthermore, many of Russia's factories had sizable Menshevik groups, some under the leadership of moderate Menshevik worker-leaders. By late 1915, however, the chief realm of moderate Menshevik activism were the WIC workers' groups. Whatever the government's intention in allowing their creation and whatever the Right Mensheviks' motivation in joining and leading them, the workers' groups gradually became less and less involved in ameliorating worker versus management/government strife (and thereby aiding the war effort) and more and more involved in promoting strikes and antitsarist agitation.⁶⁶

Since the Right Mensheviks offered leadership to the less revolutionarily inclined elements among the proletariat, their turn toward activist antigovernment and anti-war positions, even if those positions had qualifications, made them, in a sense, almost as significant a revolutionary force as the Left socialists. During the second year of the war, all socialists reached an implicit agreement that the tsarist regime had to go; what would happen thereafter was an

open question. As commentators on the Mensheviks have pointed out, after the February Revolution, in which the Right Mensheviks played a cautious but distinct role, they quickly reached a consensus in favor of revolutionary defensism (defend revolutionary Russia against a hostile Germany); their alliance with the Right SRs on this basis became the leading element in Russian politics during most of 1917.

The Anarchists

Numerous anarchist groups opposed and agitated against the war. In many areas anarchists joined with SRs and SDs to disseminate anti-war propaganda, as happened in Tomsk, Kronshtadt, and Irkutsk. In other locales, such as Tula and Briansk-Ekaterinoslav, anarchists co-operated with SRs and Bolsheviks in carrying out strikes and other anti-war demonstrations. Evidence also exists that anarchists distributed anti-war literature at the fronts. Memoirists recall that during 1915 and 1916 the Moscow anarchists were active participants in the very hazardous underground of that city. For instance, in early 1917 Moscow anarchists helped the Bolsheviks by printing copies of a proclamation for 9 January. During fall 1916, the Ministry of the Interior noted the existence of active anarchist groups in several districts of Petrograd (the Vyborg, Narva, and Moskovskii districts). They were attempting to found additional groups and in some districts anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists were forming joint groups. The anarchists were enjoying special success in recruiting deserters from the armed forces. Anarchist groups, noted the government, were making plans for expropriations and terrorist acts. Since local leaders of the SDs and SRs did not approve of these plans, the anarchists maintained ties with anarchist groups in Moscow, Tula, Briansk (Orel Province), Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Baku. Interior Ministry officials concluded that the anarchists were a "grave danger to public order" since their actions were aimed at "pushing the masses to active demonstrations."⁶⁷ Although the fragmentary evidence available on anarchists during the war does not allow for a sustained analysis of their movement, it does suggest that their ef-

forts may have been considerable. Access to police archives would be useful in completing the story of anarchist anti-war efforts.

Summary and Commentary

When considered in light of the data on their activities in other chapters, the information on the various parties and factions presented here carries certain suggestions relevant to the whole problem of the revolutionary movement in the years before the overthrow of the tsarist regime. There was a constellation of leftist organizations, each with constituencies among the masses, all working together for the overthrow of the regime and for the establishment of quite radical goals such as ending the war, creating soviets, and ushering in the epoch of socialism. Furthermore, even moderate socialists ultimately contributed heavily to antitsarist propaganda. Although the effects of revolutionary agitation are hardly susceptible to precise measurement, socialists issued a flood of it in Russia during the war. Since after thirty months of war, during which anti-war revolutionary agitation steadily intensified, a revolution did occur in Russia, a *prima facie* case exists that revolutionaries helped create it.

Soviet histories assert the existence of massive agitation and its efficacy but normally attribute it to the Bolsheviks. Soviet scholars are unlikely to be proved correct about the Bolshevik role in agitating the fronts and garrisons; if archival evidence existed to demonstrate this realm of Bolshevik activism, Soviet historians would have produced it by now. In any case, Left Mensheviks, nonaligned SDs, and, most of all, Socialist Revolutionaries had a major hand in propagandizing the armed forces. As for the workers' movement, by mid-1915 in some key areas Bolsheviks played a very active role in the struggle against the war and against the tsarist regime. Even in these locations, however, the Bolsheviks did not act alone in their revolutionary endeavors. On an all-Russian scale, the crucial element in the effort to turn Russia's proletariat and soldiers against the war and the regime was the Left bloc, rather than any single party.

6

The Last Months of the Old Regime

By fall 1916, the Russian troops' will to resist on the battlefield was dying a final death; desertions grew alarmingly. At immense cost, the armies of Brusilov had won victories against waning Austrian resistance, but this could not alter the devastating disadvantage of Russia to Germany on the northern front. The bleakness of the military situation was more than matched by the chaos inside Russia. The government entered its final orgy of incompetence. Increasingly tenacious strikes flared in the capitals and across the empire; soldiers sent against the workers often balked. Although grain was available, endless transportation snarls led to shortages in the cities and widespread fear of famine. Even the most conservative elements of Russian society grew restive, one sign of which was the late 1916 murder of Rasputin by Prince Iusupov and other persons close to the court. Rumors of a coup, perhaps originating at the court or in the Duma, were heard everywhere.

For revolutionaries, the last few months of the tsarist regime were simultaneously a time of the most extreme frustration at the success of the Okhranka in disrupting their party organizations and of eager anticipation of a revolution that everyone sensed was approaching, but whose date and occasion no one dared predict. In Petrograd, the various socialist organizations suffered a series of damaging attacks from the secret police. The exhilaration of the early 1916 strikes and demonstrations, eagerly promoted by some revolutionaries, faded rapidly after the late February suppression of socialists, including an attack on the Bolshevik organization so severe

that until fall 1916 it ceased to exist as an organized entity. Meanwhile, the SR Petersburg Committee continued its operations throughout the spring and much of the summer and issued numerous proclamations of defeatist tone; consequently, in early August it suffered the same fate as the Bolshevik committee. The Menshevik-Internationalist group and the Mezhrainka survived but also experienced episodic raids and arrests.

Nevertheless, the revolutionary movement in the capital did not expire during the second half of 1916. As the last year of the old regime waned, many cities across the empire such as Kharkov, Smolensk, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolaev, Krasnoiarsk, and Baku experienced an intensification of revolutionary agitation. Likewise, in the capitals of Moscow and Petrograd, even as district and city party committees languished, factory cells of the various parties increased in size, number, and activism. Furthermore, toward the end of 1916 and in early 1917, despite the government's most intensive efforts to prevent such a development, the party committees themselves, at both the district and city levels, showed signs of reviving. During the last months of tsarism, the bonds of imperial society, already weakened by a record of unresolved socioeconomic problems and decades of mass unrest, began to snap under the final strains of an unsuccessful and incredibly costly war, deprivation, and the seemingly endless Russian winter; during these tense months, Russia's fate hung in the balance.

The Petrograd SRs in the Gathering Storm

Beginning on the night of 31 July 1916 and continuing several days thereafter, massive police raids destroyed the SR Petersburg Committee, all district committees, and other groups associated with the SR organization. The damage inflicted was quite similar to that experienced by the Bolshevik organization after the raids of late February, with similar long-term results. An Okhranka report from October 1916 concluded that

after the July 31 liquidation of the [SR] Petrograd committee, . . . [their organization] is still in a state of full disarray, despite unsuccessful attempts of new leaders to reestablish it. Recently, . . . [these leaders]

have attempted to create ties with old narodniks and through their intermediary to seek out "*intelligently*" for the reestablishment of party activities.

The SR activist Sviatitskii confirmed this picture in his memoirs, when he observed that during fall and early winter 1916 no Petersburg Committee, no district committees, and no "initiative groups" existed at all; the authorities had swept everything away.

Meanwhile, at the delegation of Chernov and Natanson in Switzerland, the SR activist Aleksandrovich arrived in Petrograd sometime during the late summer. His hazardous passage from Scandinavia forced him to abandon along the way all party literature, letters, and other materials he had carried with him. Fortunately, Aleksandrovich had memorized the addresses of several party members in Petrograd; when he arrived at the door of one of them, his disheveled appearance and his "defeatism" thoroughly alarmed this individual, who happened not to be a radical on the war issue. The moderate SR referred Aleksandrovich to the now staunchly internationalist Sviatitskii, who gave him a place to stay during the weeks after his arrival. Aleksandrovich immediately began making contacts with SR workers, especially in the Moskovskii District, where he soon headed the district organization. The Petrograd SR intelligentsia, who did not cotton to Aleksandrovich, nicknamed him *chernovik* (rough copy), a wicked pun on the rough-hewn Aleksandrovich's status as a representative of the urbane Chernov. The aforementioned police report probably referred in part to Aleksandrovich when it mentioned "new leaders" who were attempting to reconstruct the party organization.

The testimony of Tsivin to his German superiors suggests that sometime during the fall Aleksandrovich left Russia for Norway, where he was supposed to meet with party leaders, consult them about the organization inside Russia, and return. At this time, Chernov was laying plans to travel from Italy, where he had recently resided, to Norway in order to launch an ambitious anti-war newspaper and, presumably, be closer to Russia. These plans fell through when Chernov and other anti-war leaders could find no way to get to Norway (the British were already hindering the travel of internationalists). In any case, by December Aleksandrovich had returned to Petrograd, where he intensified his efforts to construct a party organization in the capital.¹

In mid- or late December, Sviatitskii and Aleksandrovich decided that the time was ripe to recreate an SR Petersburg Committee (PC). Because of the high level of provocation among worker SRs, they deemed impossible a city-wide conference, the normal mode of choosing a city committee; thus they decided instead to act on a conspiratorial basis. Aleksandrovich, who had ties throughout the workers' movement, and Sviatitskii, who had both worker and intelligentsia contacts, hoped to identify seven to ten SRs who commanded sufficient authority among the party masses to assume the functions of a committee.

As it turned out, this was easier said than done. SR factory cells were operating and in fact thriving, but contact with them was dangerous because of the ubiquitous provocateurs. Sviatitskii recalled that tension was so high in the factories that workers' cells exerted an almost irresistible pressure on party leaders to provide organizational and ideological guidance. Thus Sviatitskii and Aleksandrovich confronted the unenviable task of creating a committee to provide the required leadership but without exposing themselves and the new organization to the disaster of mass arrest. They decided to settle in advance on appropriate slogans for the new committee they hoped to organize. They agreed on the suitability of the slogans "Down with the war," "Immediate peace without contributions and annexations," "Constituent Assembly," and "Revolutionary overthrow of the tsarist regime" but disagreed about "Defeat of one's own government," which would have alienated the basically patriotic SR intelligentsia. Sviatitskii insisted on the necessity of relying on SR intelligenty, whereas Aleksandrovich wanted to create a committee basically made up of workers. At this point, Sviatitskii successfully argued that the remarkable number of provocateurs in the proletarian milieu signified that a worker PC could never function; this situation necessitated compromises in the selection of slogans in order to attract the intelligentsia.

Sviatitskii worked up a list of respected intelligentsia activists who, he thought, would agree to enter the committee on the basis of the preselected internationalist slogans. The group included N. Sukhanov, A. A. Nikitskii, A. Gizetti, Somov, Kerensky, N. S. Rusanov, N. Briullova-Shakol'skoi, B. Flekkel', Mark Braginskii, and S. Mstislavskii, all of whom were supposedly internationalist to one degree or another. Objections to his journalistic contributions to

the government paper *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik* (Government news) quickly eliminated the candidacy of Mstislavskii, the most internationalist of the whole group on the list. In late December, Flekkel' and Aleksandrovich arranged a meeting of the prospective committee members. The meeting took place at Somov's apartment, with everyone in attendance except Braginskii, Rusanov, and Briullova. When contacted, Braginskii deprecated the whole concept of an intelligentsia PC. "They are not socialists," he exclaimed, "at best they are all petty bourgeois. They are all chauvinists. At the first real business, your whole group will fly away." Gizetti attended the meeting but also refused to join the committee, which he considered premature. Sukhanov and Nikitskii respectfully declined on the grounds that they no longer considered themselves SRs (both were in the process of converting to Menshevik-Internationalism).

As Aleksandrovich had suspected, plans to form a Petersburg Committee of the individuals mentioned proved unrealizable. "I told you so," he responded. "It's already long past time to send all the intelligentsia riff-raff to the devil. We'll get by with workers." Aleksandrovich and a group of worker acquaintances then formed an unofficial committee that, during the remaining weeks of the old regime, fulfilled some of the functions of a city committee.² The sharp differences in outlook between the SR intelligentsia and worker activists did not augur well for the possibility of permanently reunifying the PSR.

By all accounts, the weeks of late 1916 and early 1917 tested the patience and fortitude of others besides the SRs. The Okhranka gleefully noted the demoralization of the moderates; when in mid-December the government summarily prorogued the Russian parliament, the Progressive Duma Bloc (the Octobrists, the Constitutional Democrats, and other centrist groups and individuals who wished to reform the government) accepted this insult with hardly a whimper. Especially damaging to the cause of those who hoped to bring about a restricted transformation of the government was the complete unwillingness of P. Miliukov, the leader of the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), to entertain any but purely parliamentary solutions to Russia's problems. Rather than accept such a passive approach, the left wing of the Progressists under the leadership of A. Konovalov decided to forge an alliance with the workers by

contacting moderate socialist leaders in the capital, in Moscow, and in several other important industrial cities. As opposed to the Kadets, the Konovalov group was willing to consider illegal activities; according to the memoirs of A. Blok, who knew many of the public figures involved, they hoped to form a government that consisted of representatives from the WICs, the zemgor union, certain oppositionist Duma factions, various other social organizations, and the State Council. The December negotiations did not bear fruit in the formation of the hoped-for Left bloc, but in late January 1917, Konovalov and Guchkov (the head of the War-Industries Committees) tried once again when they called a meeting of representatives of several of the liberal parties, of the Right Mensheviks and Right SRs (including Chkheidze and Kerensky), and of the WIC workers' groups. This too was a blind alley since Miliukov again balked at anything extralegal and the government, which now feared the right wing of socialism as much as the left wing, arrested most of the WIC workers' group delegates.³

The Right socialists, who had ties with the liberals and Progressists through the Duma and who, by virtue of their membership in the socialist parties, had contacts with the mass movement, occupied a potentially pivotal position at this time. When the mildly internationalist SR Postnikov, whose natural milieu was the moderate socialist and liberal intelligentsia, later commented on the attempts of Sviatitskii and Aleksandrovich to create an underground SR organization, he suggested that they failed to understand that the center of SR (and socialist) work had shifted to legal endeavors: to the publication of various journals and newspapers, to the WIC workers' groups, to the Duma, and so forth. Postnikov expressed the Right socialist "liquidator" credo when he commented, "The day-to-day work of all Russian socialist parties more and more attained a European character," as a concomitant of which, in his view, underground work was fruitless. (Even decades later, many moderate socialists gainsaid the validity and efficacy of the wartime underground socialist movement inside Russia; some even denied that it had existed.)

In truth, the testimony of Postnikov, Zenzinov, and others indicates that in the twin capitals of Petrograd and Moscow and in many other cities, a sizable moderate SR (and SD) public lived and

worked in an entirely legal fashion; they found employment on the boards of newspapers and journals, in cooperatives, and zemgor organizations. Their views covered a fairly broad spectrum from outright support of the war and support of the government for the war's duration, to quite stringent criticism of the government for its failures and of the war itself. As the war progressed, most of them hoped for revolution in association with the Duma; they wanted to mobilize workers to become involved in the political process. Thus they had lauded the WIC workers' groups, since they hoped that these would serve to organize the proletariat and focus its demands so that the liberals, with worker support, would force reforms or, if necessary, overthrow tsarism.⁴ Sources on wartime Russian socialism suggest two different socialist worlds, not defined by party labels or even by support or opposition to the war (although that too was a major dividing line) but by attitudes toward how socialists should achieve their goals: through a mass-based uprising led by revolutionaries or through a mass-supported revolution organized and led by Duma elements. In the end, each alignment played an important role in the overthrow of tsarism.

Meanwhile, the revolutionaries became preoccupied with the upcoming Bloody Sunday (9 January) anniversary, a day they always commemorated with strikes and demonstrations. A year earlier, in 1916, the regime had become quite concerned about the threat of massive demonstrations and had wreaked havoc on several of the socialist parties through wholesale arrests of activists. When the subject of what to do for 9 January 1917 arose at a meeting of SR party leaders, Sviatitskii pointed out, "Lately demonstrations of the Petrograd proletariat have become more and more lively. They did not restrict themselves any longer to strikes. Having left the factories, workers were singing revolutionary songs and carrying red banners." But, complained Sviatitskii, they lacked organization and appropriate slogans; moreover, preferring to remain in the relative safety of the workers' districts, they never even attempted to reach the Nevskii Prospekt in the center of the city, whose approaches the police always blocked with barriers. Consequently, Sviatitskii recommended that revolutionary cells in the factories act to introduce a maximum degree of organization into the 9 January demonstrations so that massive numbers of workers carrying banners with

revolutionary political slogans would suddenly and irresistably converge on the Nevskii.

Aleksandrovich and his worker comrades objected to Sviatitskii's ideas as adventuristic; they pointed out that his plan would expose the backs of the workers to the whips of the Cossacks. "When we have arms and bombs, then we'll . . . go to the Nevskii." Sviatitskii countered by accusing the old worker activist of "outdated SR doctrine"; in his view, the masses would arm themselves in the process of the demonstrations, evidently a reference to the probability of cooperation with soldiers, whose revolt the SRs had been forecasting for over a year. Aleksandrovich and his companions from the factories insisted that workers' demonstrations were still haphazard, as a consequence of which they considered the call for an armed rising premature. They agreed with Sviatitskii, however, that the SRs should issue a proclamation that called for a strike on 9 January (the lack of a printing press prevented them from doing so).⁵

The attitude of various socialist leaders about the event is of interest. As mentioned, SR leaders came out for a strike and expressed the intention of issuing a leaflet. The Bolsheviks, the Mezhraionka, the Menshevik-Internationalists, and the anarchists all backed the strike, and the three SD committees all printed leaflets, although the police confiscated the entire run of the Bolshevik proclamations when it arrested their PC in late December. On this occasion, even the formerly cautious Central WIC Workers' Group not only advised workers to leave work on 9 January but espoused a general strike as well. (Hasegawa expresses the opinion that, with the blessings of Konovalov and Guchkov, the WIC workers' groups lined up behind the strike movement in order to regain their waning influence among the increasingly radical worker masses.) As opposed to a year earlier, when the SRs and the Bolsheviks were the principal sponsors of demonstrations, all the major leftist groups now joined in. This socialist-anarchist unanimity just a few weeks before the fall of the old regime reflected a new awareness (shared by the growingly desperate liberals and centrists in the Duma) of the increased likelihood of revolution. In retrospect, however, Aleksandrovich was probably correct about the mood of the Petrograd workers in early January. Although 140,000 workers struck and marched in demonstrations on 9 January 1917 (some sources claimed 200,000 or even 300,000),

the disturbances did not attain a revolutionary scale.⁶ Among other factors, the SR-Bolshevik failure to distribute leaflets probably contributed to the torpid mood of the marchers on 9 January 1917; had a greater number of leaflets from a broader range of parties reached the masses that day, the political slogans in them might well have injected a greater degree of enthusiasm into the crowds.

The relatively restrained attitude of Aleksandrovich about the prospects for an uprising on 9 January was shared by other top-level Left socialists in Petrograd. In his memoirs, Shliapnikov claimed that by late 1916 the Bolsheviks were aware that they were in the midst of a revolutionary situation but did not presume to plan or predict the actual events. Neither the Bolshevik Bureau of the Central Committee nor the Bolshevik PC wished to push matters in early 1917. Activists such as Aleksandrovich, Shliapnikov, and the Mezhraionets Iurenev, showed greater restraint on several occasions during the winter crises than some of their comrades of the Right socialist intelligentsia, who were intent on impelling the liberals toward revolution. Long experience and bitter memory of past costly defeats created a caution among the hardened worker-leaders not conducive to adventurism. The socialist activists hoped for revolution and in order to achieve it urged strikes and demonstrations with radical political slogans but feared like the plague premature outbursts that might expose workers to Cossack violence and that might subject activists to mass roundups by the police.⁷

Although no further major events occurred during January, for the balance of the month and continuing into February strike activity in Petrograd factories reached a sustained high level. According to information adduced by Hasegawa and the Soviet historian Leiberov, between 1 January and 22 February 268 strikes involving over 320,000 workers took place in the capital. Political and economic strikes merged into a single phenomenon, with many types of plants, including normally quiet textile mills, involved. An especially lengthy strike with political slogans occurred at several textile concerns in the Vyborg District, a matter of interest since the women workers at some of these establishments were the first to abandon the workplace on 23 February, the first day of the fateful February disturbances.⁸

Sviatitskii recalled this as a time of intense activity in SR factory cells. Attempts to create an SR committee also continued. For this purpose, a whole series of so-called initiative groups arose, but agent provocateurs betrayed each one in succession. An early January 1917 report from Minister of the Interior Protopopov stated, "The SR Party is in a relatively disorganized state. . . . The intelligence organs have crushed each of their attempts to recreate a strong organization." According to Sviatitskii, by January concern about the repeated success of provocateurs in blocking the reestablishment of a PC led the SRs to set up a special investigatory commission to eliminate police agents from the party ranks. A number of honest individuals—including a woman SR guilty of nothing more than gossip and a certain young activist—fell under the dark cloud of suspicion. Unfortunately for the SRs, the commission failed to identify the villain of the piece, S. Ia. Surin, a young Aivaz worker and an SR activist with connections throughout the region whom Sviatitskii and Aleksandrovich considered indispensable to the task of recreating an organization.⁹ The police spy Surin doubtlessly caused many of the failures of January and February 1917.

During the month of January, the revolutionaries began to look ahead to a new event on the horizon (the dynamic of the revolutionary movement was such that, after each failure, hope soon reawakened in association with yet another upcoming holiday, celebration, or political occasion with its promise of strikes, demonstrations, uprisings, and, miracle of miracles, even revolution). After a lengthy enforced recess, the Duma was due to reconvene on 14 February 1917. Many disaffected moderates wanted the Duma to exert pressure on the tsarist government to issue a constitution; others hoped that the Duma would overthrow tsarism entirely. Thus, weeks in advance, some liberals (Konovalov, Guchkov, and several leftist Kadets) and the Right socialists focused their attention on the scheduled 14 February 1917 Duma opening; because of the unwonted attention, this event began to take on a significance out of all proportion to reality, especially considering the recent ineffectuality of the Duma. Thus the Left socialists too were forced to become involved, although with very different motivations.

Ever since mid-1915, right-wing socialists, including Right SRs,

Right Mensheviks, Bundists (Jewish SDs), Popular Socialists, and Trudoviks, all of whom had a defensist position on the war, had espoused a policy of revolution for the sake of creating a government better able to defend the country. The Right socialist parties, most of which were represented in the State Duma, had close contact with liberals and other forces in Russian society who, as noted, also showed increasing susceptibility to the idea of overthrowing the tsar with, however, the quite different purpose of winning the war. Membership in the Duma was therefore the nexus of those who adhered to the position of overthrowing the tsar in order to run the war more effectively (whether for defense or victory).

To encourage the moderate elements of society to make their move toward the formation of a Duma-centered parliamentary government, which they hoped would then pursue a rational war policy, the Right socialists in the WIC workers' groups in Petrograd and elsewhere began to agitate for workers to carry out a strike in conjunction with the opening of the Duma on 14 February; they also wanted the striking Petrograd workers to demonstrate at the Tauride Palace, where the Duma met, in the hopes that this show of worker support would impel the timid parliamentarians to seize power. The activist Konovalov group clearly favored this move, which also received tacit support from the Right SRs and Right Mensheviks in the Duma.¹⁰

As mentioned, the Petrograd WIC workers' group had already shown an alarming turn toward the side of revolution. The prominent Bundist Rafes recalled that by the end of 1916 upward of five hundred workers from the factories, cooperatives, and unions regularly gathered to hear the debates and anti-war agitation at the meeting hall of the WIC workers' group. In a report about the 9 January demonstrations, the Okhranka had noted the leftward drift even of the Central WIC Workers' Group, which had openly "conducted agitation for a general strike, whereas [earlier] it had attempted to hinder strikes."¹¹ As a result, in late January police rounded up large numbers of workers' group representatives, who remained in jail until the February Revolution. The government's open attack on the workers' groups, whose formation it had earlier sponsored, created a situation in which WIC workers' group leaders still at large, the

Mensheviks Gvozdev and Abrasimov and the SRs Ostapenko and Anosovskii, whose defensist position on the war had not been popular, could now accurately portray the workers' groups as victims of government repression; consequently, their agitation in favor of a 14 February strike enjoyed some success among workers. Even now, however, the WIC workers' groups insisted that the proletariat's primary task was not to end the war at once (potentially creating great hardship because of the Germans' advantageous position) but to cooperate with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the autocracy, for which purpose workers in the factories should form strike committees.¹²

This significant development did not, however, please the Left socialists; they also wanted to overthrow the tsarist regime, but not in favor of a Duina-based government that would, they felt, prolong and attempt to win the war. To their dismay, however, they found it difficult to find an alternative to the proposed 14 February strike and Tauride Palace demonstrations. The Bundist Rafes recalled that the various SD factions—the Left Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks, and the Mezhraionka—faltered and shifted plans several times, so that contradictory instructions kept coming down into the factories. Finally, the Bolsheviks devised a plan that called for an advance counterstrike with revolutionary slogans; thus they issued a printed appeal for workers to strike on 10 February instead of 14 February. After 10 February (which was poorly chosen since it was already a holiday) came and went with few workers' showing an interest in the Bolshevik plan, the Bolsheviks urged a fallback date of 13 February for the strike. In order to undercut the Right socialist plan, the Mezhraionka issued a leaflet that urged workers not to strike on 14 February and not to heed those who called for a march on the Tauride Palace (in its anxiety to deflect the workers from acting at the behest of the Right socialists, the Mezhraionka leaflet even questioned the preparedness of the proletariat for a revolutionary struggle, a caution that was tactical rather than expressive of the Mezhraiontsy's general outlook, which was quite radical). As on 10 February, most workers ignored the Bolshevik call to strike on 13 February.¹³ All of this was occurring against the backdrop of interesting developments within the socialist movement that merit detailed examination.

With rumors of a coup of some sort rife in the capital and with a socialist consensus that the existing regime should be toppled, from late January, all socialists were concentrating on the problem of the Duma. Consequently, in early February representatives from the entire range of Petrograd socialist groups held a conference at the apartment of the Right Menshevik L. Galperin to discuss the upcoming event; this was an extraordinary affair, unprecedented during the war. For the Right, the Mensheviks Chkheidze, M. Skobelev, and Galperin attended, as did the SRs Zenzinov and Kerensky, the latter of whom also represented the Trudoviks; for the Left, the nonaligned SD N. D. Sokolov, the Left SR Aleksandrovich, and the Bolshevik Shliapnikov took part. Speaking for the Left, Shliapnikov criticized the Right socialist plan of having workers demonstrate at the Duma; he considered it deceptive of the workers, who, he believed, wanted to end the war. Instead, the Bolshevik leader called for political strikes, street demonstrations, and an immediate open struggle against the tsar, which, he hoped, would bring the soldiers into the fray on the side of the revolution. Chkheidze and Kerensky strenuously objected and demanded to know how the Left planned to conduct itself in the days leading up to 14 February. Shliapnikov and Aleksandrovich replied that they would attempt to dissuade workers from any Tauride Palace demonstrations and try to organize separate demonstrations in their stead. At this point, the infuriated Kerensky became quite abusive; as a result harsh words were exchanged and Aleksandrovich and Shliapnikov abruptly abandoned the meeting.¹⁴

Of course, Kerensky and the Bolshevik Shliapnikov found little in common; the personality clash between the SR comrades Kerensky and Aleksandrovich was even more acute. Sometime after Aleksandrovich's arrival in the capital, Kerensky queried Sviatitskii, with whom Aleksandrovich was staying, about the underground activist, "What is he, a spy or something?"¹⁵ (Kerensky's remark referred to Aleksandrovich's defeatism, an outlook on the war that Right socialists viewed as provocation, rather than as a genuine and increasingly widespread socialist preference.) Furthermore, by early February 1917, the Right socialists were deeply committed to channeling revolutionary turmoil into acceptable boundaries (that is, in the direction of a Duma-based government). Thus the all-socialist confer-

ence had been exquisitely poised for the Right-Left clash that occurred. In point of fact, both sides threw down their gauntlets on this occasion: to determine the nature of the coming revolution, the Right and Left socialists would duel for the allegiance of the masses. For the Right socialists, success would be defined as the effective application of pressure (of workers as guided by Right socialists) on the moderates in the Duma to create a parliamentary government; for Left socialists a successful outcome would be a revolutionary uprising having no connection with the Duma.¹⁶

During the last few days before 14 February, the Right and Left socialists barraged the factories with agitation to strike or not to strike, to go or not to go to the Duma; the Left Mensheviks, who already in January had issued a proclamation that warned workers to ignore advice to go to the Duma, now drafted a new leaflet that advised workers not to strike on 14 February, only to cancel it at the last minute in favor of yet a new idea. The Right SR Ia. Ostapenko and the Right Menshevik Abrasimov (a provocateur) from the WIC workers' group toured factories with their prostrike message. On the morning itself a widely distributed unsigned proclamation (attributed by the Left socialists to the workers' group) urged workers to leave the factories and go to the Tauride Palace. As the morning shift at the huge Putilov Works ended on the fourteenth, two agitators stationed at the gates appealed to the exiting workers to march to the Duma: "Down with autocracy," they shouted. "As the emperor does not know how to govern the country and is betraying it, the people should take power in their own hands . . . [and] since the people do not want the war, it is necessary to end it." If this report is accurate, this line of agitation involved demagoguery, since the socialists who proposed the Duma demonstration wished to overthrow the existing government, rather than bring an immediate end to the war. As at the Putilov Works, two "unidentified individuals" had spoken in favor of the Right socialist plan at a 9 February "flying meeting" (so-called because it met and dispersed quickly so as to avoid arrest) at the Vyborg District Aivaz plant. Left socialists believed that the WIC workers' group, which had the facilities and motivation, bore the responsibility for all propaganda of this tendency.¹⁷

After the Bolshevik debacles of 10 and 13 February, all the Left

socialists belatedly signed on to what was originally a Menshevik-Internationalist plan to capitalize on the workers' enthusiasm for striking on the fourteenth by urging them to leave work that day *without* going to the Duma; in pursuit of this idea, the Left Mensheviks cancelled their proclamation against the 14 February strike and distributed instead a hectographed resolution in favor of it, under certain conditions. The Petrograd SRs issued no leaflets, but the SRs in nearby Iuriev, in Moscow, and in several other locations published proclamations that condemned the idea of having workers go as supplicants to the Duma, which they portrayed as powerless and reactionary. After the counterstrikes they had proposed for 10 and 13 February fell through, the Bolsheviks also belatedly signed on to the Left socialist 14 February plan. Unity among several socialist groups brought the usual relatively good results. Over eighty thousand workers struck on 14 February, a very respectable turnout; as opposed to 9 January, sizable numbers marched on the Nevskii Prospekt, but only a few hundred attempted to approach the nearby Duma, where they were quickly dispersed by the extraordinary security around the Tauride Palace. The failure of workers to demonstrate at the Duma of course negated the original Right socialist intent of the strike. The secret police attributed the collapse of the Right socialist plan both to Left socialist agitation and to the WIC workers' group's general unpopularity. The seriousness of Right socialist intentions in this affair is demonstrated by Zenzinov's recollections that on 10 and 14 February he and a group of his associates, including N. Sokolov, B. Flekkel', V. Chernolusskii, and S. Znamenskii, set up a special communications center at the offices of one of the journals, where they arranged to receive reports of demonstrations and transmit them by phone to Kerensky at the Duma.¹⁸

For the first but not the last time in February 1917, Right and Left socialists presented for the approval of the masses two distinct versions of revolution: one mass-based and radical-led, the other mass-supported and liberal-led. In this first contest, the Left had the victory. Perhaps this was not surprising; the many tens of thousands of workers who left work and demonstrated on 9 January and 14 February 1917 (roughly 140,000 and 84,000, respectively) still represented only the most radicalized portion (roughly one-fifth to

one-quarter) of the capital's proletarian work force. These were individuals and groups who were most embittered, who were most prone to express their feelings in a public way, and, one may surmise, who over the years had often responded to radical socialist agitation. What the rest of the capital's proletariat would do if they decided to leave work was still an open question.

Surviving descriptions of the 14 February street demonstrations, the last before the revolution, are revealing about the mood of the workers and students who participated and about the interaction between the masses and the Left socialists: this was, after all, the dress rehearsal for the revolutionary spectacle that began just nine days later. On the morning of 14 February, Petrograd students held a meeting at the Polytechnical Institute, during which Right and Left socialists argued the merits of their respective programs for the day, after which the students voted to demonstrate at Kazan Square, instead of at the Duma. Some of the massive columns of workers that attempted to penetrate into the center of the city ran into formations of mounted gendarmes with drawn sabers. Police agents on the Nevskii reported that among the main organizers of the street demonstrations were SR and SD students, including the Bolshevik Taranova. According to the agents, the most important figure on the Nevskii was the SR I. K. ("Gavril") Akulov, who had been delegated to lead the demonstrations by P. P. Rumiantsev, the head of the Petrogradskii District SR organization. Shliapnikov characterized the demonstrators as enthusiastic but hampered by police attacks. Sviatitskii wrote a somewhat different description:

The demonstration on the 14th was not a success. I went to the Vyborg Side [a large workers' district] especially to observe what was happening. Most of the factories struck and in the morning some marchers carried red flags. But, in general, the working masses were dispirited and inert. . . . At least the demonstration at the Duma fell through.¹⁹

The strikes and marches had not fit the Right socialist plan nor, however, had they turned into the revolutionary uprising consistently espoused by the Left socialists (by this time, the Bolsheviks, Mezhrailontsy, and SRs routinely called for direct revolutionary

mass action, whereas the Left Mensheviks, who also urged revolution, still emphasized the Constituent Assembly in their hopes to see the rise of a radical bourgeois government).²⁰

The completely undecisive nature of 14 February, which the Right socialists had hoped would be the occasion of an overthrow of tsarism by the moderates, left them in an unpleasant quandary. Shliapnikov recalled that several days after the 14 February debacle, when they met accidentally at the entrance to N. D. Sokolov's building, Kerensky loudly berated him for "disrupting" the demonstrations at the Duma. On 14 February, the irate Kerensky also hectored the Duma deputies by accusing them of cowardice: "Your speeches on the necessity for calm at all costs are . . . just an excuse to avoid the real fight, just a pretext to stay safely in your armchairs. . . . If you [ignore] warning voices, you will encounter the harsh facts."²¹ Having failed to form a dependable Left bloc with the moderates in the Duma and to pressure the same groups into action by channeling the workers toward the Duma, the Right socialists were experiencing the same feeling of complete loss of control over events that the liberals had confronted at the end of 1916. At the same time, the Left socialists had no conviction that they could control the mass elements of society, whom they nonetheless edged toward a struggle and who were showing every sign of a last restiveness.

In the immediate aftermath of 14 February, the atmosphere in Petrograd achieved incandescence. Shortfalls in grain shipments to the cities, including the capital, caused severe rationing and sparked perhaps exaggerated rumors of worse shortages to come. At the huge Izhorskii munitions plant in Kolpino, a suburb of Petrograd, a series of strikes, accompanied by a clash with the Cossacks (who nevertheless left the impression that they were sympathetic to the workers), culminated on 16 February in a lockout, which threw the entire work force of the plant into the streets in an ugly mood. A few days later, the even larger Putilov plant witnessed strikes and a lockout. Although data about party involvement in the January-February strike movement are extremely scarce (surprisingly so in view of the importance of these events), SR and SD workers' circles, and in all likelihood the upper-level organizations as well, certainly would have played a role. When Sviatitskii, an SR labor activist since before World War I, cautiously mentioned in his memoirs that Janu-

ary—February 1917 was a time of intense activity in SR workers' circles, he was certainly referring in part to the strikes that characterized Petrograd proletarian life at this time.²²

Whatever the case as regards the strikes, the underground parties were up to their necks in revolutionary plans and activities. On 21 February, just two days before the revolutionary disturbances began, the police reported, "Because of the grain shortages, there exists a powerful ferment among the workers: disorders can be expected at any moment. . . . Taking this mood into account, SD centers [a term that covered the Left Menshevik IG, the Bolshevik PC, and the Mezhraionka] are planning to utilize the first suitable chance to initiate, under their control, a widespread movement with revolutionary slogans." The Mezhraionka instructed its members to agitate verbally in the factories with calls for the formation of nonparty factory committees of politically conscious workers, who would then lead future demonstrations and serve as the basis for district and city-wide elected committees, a line that edged very close to an appeal for the election of soviets.²³

During the third week of February, the Petrograd Initiative Group of SRs issued a proclamation that called for the reestablishment of the local organization and the convening of an all-Russian SR congress, an idea that implied an expectation of imminent revolution. The SR leaflet also appealed for anti-war demonstrations, a continued struggle against autocracy, the democratization of Russia, socialization of the land, and the eight-hour workday and contained the following rhetoric: "Can it be that you do not feel that the whole of enormous Russia has come alert, sensing the storm? Can it be that you have not heard that the news has already begun to flow?" This and other evidence about the revolutionary organizations during the weeks preceding the February Revolution give the distinct impression that the socialists had a keen awareness of the special nature of the situation by early 1917 and keyed their agitation accordingly and that this in turn became a factor in the development of revolutionary expectations among the masses. Indeed, on the eve of the February Revolution an Okhranka agent wrote, "The underground revolutionary parties are preparing a revolution. . . ."²⁴

By mid-February, every sort of revolutionary activity intensified; at all levels, the various parties strengthened links with one another.

The Bolshevik Sonia Tarakanova, one of the leaders on the Nevskii on 14 February, helped create a joint SR-SD city-wide student committee, which a few days later played a prominent role in the February Revolution. Through the intermediary of the daughter of the State Duma deputy Dziubinskii, Tarakanova obtained a supply of hand grenades from the armed forces. Having first offered the grenades to the Bolshevik Bureau of the Central Committee, which declined to accept them because it had no storage facilities, Tarakanova gave them to an SR group that was in the process of creating an armed brotherhood of Petrograd workers.²⁵

Of equal importance, despite the verbal altercations that had marred the early February joint socialist meeting, leaders of the various parties reached a decision to reconvene an even broader version of the Right-Left socialist conference; this resulted in the creation of the so-called All-Socialist Informational Bureau, which consisted of every major socialist faction in Petrograd and (as will be shown in chapter 7) met repeatedly throughout the February crisis. Sviatitskii characterized the group as follows:

There arose in Petrograd an "informational bureau" consisting of representatives of all the revolutionary-socialist groups. It met several times with the purpose of exchanging information and coordinating actions. . . . Among the members there was no awareness of the exceptional importance of the present moment. None of them imagined the nearness of the revolutionary outburst.²⁶

Sviatitskii's view that the informational bureau was unaware of the gravity of the situation is illogical (and probably had more to do with the early 1930s publication date of his article than with his actual opinion). Previous to the crises of February 1917, no such ongoing intersocialist body had existed; the socialists decided to meet together regularly "to exchange information and coordinate actions" precisely because of their awareness of the extraordinary situation. Shliapnikov's recollections confirm that "the obvious rapid growth of revolutionary sentiment" persuaded the socialists to form the bureau "in order to coordinate actions"; their specific goal, he claimed, was "to prevent the movement [that had arisen by early 1917] from dissipating itself."²⁷

During the tumult of the third week of February, revolutionary

leaders and activists began to make plans for the upcoming 23 February International Womens' Day, an event—although no one as yet knew it—that would be crucial in Russia's history. As on previous occasions, socialist committees, factory cells, and various labor organizations made plans. On 21 February, advance word circulated that on the morning of the celebration the Mezhraionka would distribute a leaflet. Moreover, the workers' cooperative association, which had Left Menshevik and SR leadership, issued a special edition of its paper *Trud* to commemorate the occasion. Activists spread the word that an open meeting of students and workers would take place immediately after the demonstrations at 4:00 P.M. at the Psycho-Neurological Institute. Several of the socialist committees also publicized a general meeting of workers scheduled later in the evening at the premises of the cultural commission of the cooperative association. These meetings are of special interest since they seem to have had the purpose of transforming the International Women's Day celebration into something of broader significance (for further discussion of the origins of the International Women's Day strikes and demonstrations, see chapter 7).²⁸

By 22 February, the eve of the holiday, new and fateful developments further heightened the already unbearable tension in Petrograd. In protest against rising costs and grain shortages, beginning on 17 February Putilov employees had gradually shut down various plant workshops, so that by 21 February the entire munitions complex had reached a state of paralysis. In retaliation, exactly one year after the February 1916 lockout at the Putilov Works that had had such alarming aftereffects, the plant's managers called a new lockout. When workers arrived on the morning of 22 February, they found the gates locked; according to common practice, Putilov workers immediately headed for neighboring plants to persuade them to call a protest strike. Zenzinov recalled that a group of SR workers from Putilov came to inform Kerensky about the seriousness of the Putilov lockout, which put thirty thousand workers out on the streets. Zenzinov later noted the prescience of the workers in warning Kerensky, "This could signify the beginning of a great revolutionary movement." These were not empty phrases; walkouts at Putilov had precipitated the near-total strike in September 1915, as well as the ugly disturbances in February 1916. Zenzinov attributed

the SR worker-activists' acute analysis to their closeness to the revolutionary masses, whose patience was finally snapping.²⁹ In the language of metaphor, the top-heavy, decayed structure of old Russia was cracking and crumbling at the foundations: those located at the bottom sensed the rumblings.

Although the Petrograd SRs did not succeed in reconstructing their city-wide organization before the fall of the old regime, the memoirs of Sviatitskii, Shliapnikov, Zenzinov, and Iurenev all indicate the existence of Aleksandrovich's SR workers' committee, which assumed a leadership role accepted by the heads of the other parties and by all local SR elements except the defensist intelligentsia.³⁰ By early 1917, several district party organizations were reviving after their July 1916 destruction. On his return to Petrograd, Aleksandrovich took charge of the Moskovskii District SR organization. Police reports from mid-February note that P. P. Rumiantsev headed the SR organization in the Petrogradskii District. Iurenev, the Mezhraionka leader who was very close to Aleksandrovich, reported that just before the February Revolution the SRs carried out strong agitation in the Nevskii and Moskovskii districts and somewhat less systematic agitation in the Vasileostrovskii District; this disparity may indicate the relative state of those district organizations.³¹ SR party organizations of some kind therefore existed in the Moskovskii, Nevskii, and Petrogradskii districts and probably in the Vasileostrovskii District, where the SRs and SDs held a joint conference on 26 February.

In two other important districts, Narva and Vyborg, the SRs had sizable networks of factory cells and well-known activists. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Vyborg SRs formed an "SR Initiative Group" that helped revive the city-wide organization, and police reports show that during 1915 the Vyborg District SRs were still well organized.³² Among the Vyborg District's numerous SR activists of stature were Surin, an Aivaz metalworker with ties throughout the city (and a police agent); Voronkov, leader of the SRs at the Arsenal plant, labor union and health fund official, member of a WIC workers' group, and member of the Petrograd Soviet from February until October 1917; I. Teterkin, SR leader at Staryi Parviainen and future PSR Central Committee member; S. Ustinov, also of the Staryi Parviainen plant and one of the chief spokesmen for its

workers during 1917; Koriakin, Novyi Lessner activist and one of the leaders of the campaign against the WIC workers' groups; and I. Mil'chik, a prominent Erikson activist. On the evening of 23 February, the SRs and SDs of the Vyborg District held a joint conference, which suggests the existence of an SR district organization.

A similar situation existed in the Narva District, where for fifteen years the SRs had maintained a powerful presence at the Putilov, Treugol'nik, Skorokhod, and other factories. As in the Vyborg District, the Narva SRs had numerous activists of stature, including V. M. Levin, a Putilov worker who later in 1917 chaired the presidium of the Petrograd Factory Committees.³³ SR influence extended beyond factory cells; the SRs Boris and Olga Flekkel' and A. Gizetti had founded and led several workers' educational societies in the district, and during the war Olga Flekkel' continued to operate a workers' school that by all accounts was a center for both education and underground SR and SD activities. When Sviatitskii and Aleksandrovich decided to revive the SR PC, they contacted the Flekkel's and Gizetti because of their wide contacts in the Narva District.

At the time of the February Revolution, the SRs had a healthy network of factory cells throughout the city, a circumstance to which Sviatitskii deftly alludes. Supporting this are Leiberov's evidence about the growth of SR cells in many large plants in the capital during 1915–1916 and Kh. M. Astrakhan's argument that SR and Menshevik, rather than Bolshevik, cells dominated the metallurgical plants of the Vyborg District during February 1917. SR cells in the Petrogradskii, Vasileostrovskii, and Nevskii districts were as numerous, large, and active as those of the SDs, and various sources indicate that in the important Narva and Moskovskii districts and in the outlying Kolpino District, SR cells predominated.³⁴

The several Social Democratic factions also had numerous factory cells and organizations of varying strength. Of the SD groups, the Left Mensheviks probably had the largest network of cells; they were also very influential in several underground labor unions and in the Left-oriented cooperative movement. The Left Menshevik Initiative Group itself issued leaflets but otherwise left a shadowy impression.³⁵ The Mezhraionka had a small but very well-knit organization that displayed exceptional activism during the entire

revolutionary crisis. It maintained three or four district committees, several circles of propagandists, and a student organization and included roughly two hundred worker-activists, many of whom were quite influential, in a number of factory cells, which, according to late 1916 police reports, were gaining ground on the Bolsheviki in many factories.³⁶

On paper, the Petrograd Bolsheviki had a good organization, but it did not function well during the weeks preceding the February crisis. To avoid arrest, the Bureau of the Central Committee distanced itself from the party's operations; numerous Bolshevik and Soviet commentators have noted its inability to act effectively before and during the February crisis. Three days after the beginning of mass unrest, the police arrested the Petersburg Committee, ending its rather weak involvement in the mass movement. As for the districts, evidence exists only about the Vyborg Committee, which, recalled Kaiurov (one of its members), was not equal to its assigned task of replacing the Petersburg Committee. During the February days, claimed Kaiurov, no instructions whatsoever circulated to Bolshevik cells.³⁷ Presumably, the Bolsheviki, like the SRs, had several loose-knit district organizations. During early 1917 the crux of the matter, however, was in the Petrograd factories, where, for whatever reason, the Bolsheviki had a somewhat weaker network of cells than one might expect. All of this was the context of Shliapnikov's comment that during February 1917 the Petrograd Bolsheviki were in no position to lead the masses.³⁸

Whatever the size and efficiency of each party's organization in the capital, in toto they represented a considerable force with cells and experienced activists in virtually every plant in the area, factors that would be of great importance once revolutionary disturbances began.

Moscow and the Rest of the Empire

Although Petrograd was the first link in the chain of early 1917 events, the remaining regions of the empire would be the final arbiter of the impending revolution's success or failure. Revolutionary anti-war movements existed in numerous cities and towns, includ-

ing near the fronts; socialists and anarchists took part in antigovernment agitation. A reasonable conclusion is that this agitation was an element in laying the groundwork for revolution in Russia. Information on these activities during the last few months of the old regime suggests processes at work very similar to those in the capital.

In Moscow, as in Petrograd, the year 1916 was characterized by the disruption of party organizations; they failed even to organize strikes for May Day. By fall, however, the situation began to change. All the revolutionaries had been restricting their activities to the workers' cooperatives and cafeterias, which served as centers for meetings and distribution of literature. In November, SR and SD students began to organize weekly debates at the Commercial Institute cafeteria, with more and more workers attending. For the first time, party activists began to make contact with soldiers in the local garrison and to supply them with anti-war literature. (Tsivin reported to the Germans that by late 1916 one of the largest SR military organizations in the country had its center in Moscow; confirmation from other sources about such a large-scale operation is, however, entirely lacking.) During the fall, relations among the anarchists, SRs, and Bolsheviks became even closer than they had been in the past.³⁹

By late 1916, the SR workers' cafeterias "na Mokhovoi" and "na Devichem" had become veritable founts of illegal literature. The SRs had several workers' circles and a "central organization" (the intrepid Moscow Group of SRs), which gradually strengthened and which had the invaluable capacity to reproduce leaflets. In late December, the Moscow Group of SRs issued a proclamation that stated, "It is time for us to understand that we will escape from starvation only by overthrowing the autocratic government and ending the war. Down with the war! Down with autocracy! Long live the Russian Revolution." The Bolshevik Shevkov recalled that by October 1916 the SRs and anarchists were distributing their leaflets on the trolleys "practically by hand."⁴⁰

As in Petrograd, during January and February 1917 a leftist coalition (in Moscow of SRs, Bolsheviks, and anarchists) engaged in a struggle against the Mensheviks and the WIC workers' group over the issue of whether or not workers should demonstrate at the

Duma. (This debate of course symbolized the real issues: the nature of the future revolutionary government and the course it should follow about the war.) The leftist coalition widely utilized the slogan "Down with the war." According to Ter, by the end of January 1917 the SR organization, which had kept a rather low profile in order to prevent arrests, moved to a much more activist stance. One of the Moscow group's leaders disappeared for a few days and then reappeared with a large crate containing a very sophisticated printing press, the envy of the other parties. During early February, under the name Moscow Initiative Group of SRs (a designation that denoted imminent plans to establish a committee), the Moscow SRs issued a proclamation, in language quite reminiscent of the leaflet the Petrograd Initiative Group of SRs put out a few days later, that proclaimed:

They tried to bury us but nevertheless we are still alive. . . . You, old fighters who had begun to doubt the victory of revolution, and you, young green warriors, haven't you felt how the whole of enormous Russia has come alert? Surely you have heard that the news is spreading. . . . The endless world war that destroys the sacred, inalienable human right to life, forced us to declare war on war. Our path regarding the war is that of K. Liebknecht and F. Adler.⁴¹

The Initiative Group also recommended that all forces in Russia that adhered to the Third International coordinate their activities in order to pursue a policy of "unconditional internal revolutionary struggle." For 14 February, the Moscow SRs issued a leaflet that stated:

We should turn not to "society" [*obshchestvennost'*], not to the Duma, but to the people . . . who should organize themselves, should select their own deputies, should obtain their own rights to a free life by means of revolutionary struggle. Elect revolutionary organizations, disseminate revolutionary propaganda throughout the proletariat, the peasantry, and the armed forces! Down with the war! Long live the democratic republic! Long live revolutionary socialism.⁴²

Bolshevik Ter claimed that during the last two weeks of the tsarist regime, the Moscow SDs and SRs worked together almost as one: "There were people very close to us in the SR organization. . . . It was important to us," recalled Ter, "that the SRs approve of our line of agitation." When news of the revolution came on 27 February, the

Bolsheviks, who did not have a press, and the SRs issued a joint leaflet that greeted the long-awaited event and called for the immediate election of workers' soviets. The SRs also issued a separate proclamation that called for everyone "to stop work and immediately elect representatives to the Soviet of workers' deputies, which, together with other social organizations, should take governmental power into its hands in Moscow. . . . Long live the armed nation! Down with autocracy! Down with the war! Long live revolution!"⁴³

During the last few months of tsarism, joint SR-SD student groups in Kharkov aided in the reconstruction of party circles, agitated more openly than since before the war, and elected a revolutionary student council, with the result that the still vigilant police arrested the entire student leadership shortly after the new year. By this time, however, a joint SR-SD underground workers' committee had contacted railroad workers in several cities and was in the process of laying plans for a general railroad strike on the example of October 1905. The unified SD-SR organization in Smolensk also made plans to seize local transport and communications centers at the first sign of revolt but instead suffered arrest during February. Evidence from other areas suggests a similar level and tone of activities among revolutionaries. Already in August 1916, the Baku SR organization issued a proclamation with the slogans "Down with the bloody autocracy! Down with the fratricidal war! Long live the peoples' revolutionary uprising! Long live the Soviet of workers' deputies!" (Socialists deemed calls for the soviet appropriate only in times of imminent revolution.) Police raids on the Baku SR organization in late December 1916 led to the arrest of forty-three individuals, seizure of an illegal passport office, and confiscation of quantities of revolutionary literature.

In late 1916, the Nizhnii SRs published a proclamation that urged "the destruction of the existing political order by means of a general political strike and a general armed uprising." For Bloody Sunday (9 January 1917) the Kharkov and the Nizhnii SRs issued leaflets with calls for the overthrow of the autocracy; the Kharkov SRs published their proclamation jointly with the Bolsheviks. For 14 February, the Iuriev SRs in the far north and the joint SR-SD committee in Odessa in the south issued leaflets that urged the masses to elect their own organizations in defiance of the Duma. During the final days of the old regime joint socialist proclamations appeared in thir-

teen locations. During January 1917, Ekaterinoslav SRs, Bolsheviks, Ukrainian SDs, and anarchists pooled their resources to purchase arms for the decisive struggle they foresaw. According to Shalagina, during the final weeks before the revolution the SR Northern Organization (Novgorod) and the Southern Organization (Chernigov), as well as other SR military groups in Kronshtadt, Vladivostok, Pskov, and elsewhere, "carried out wide-scale work among soldiers and sailors."⁴⁴

The Government and the Revolutionaries before February 1917

Six weeks before the beginning of the final February crisis, Lenin told a Swiss audience, "We . . . [may not] live to see the decisive battles of the coming revolution." Often taken as a demonstration that the socialists inside Russia had no awareness of the impending revolution, this remark, made by Lenin when he was out of touch with the Bolsheviks at home, does not correspond with socialist activities inside Russia at the time. The government entertained no doubt that revolutionaries had made progress in agitating soldiers and workers. In late 1916, the military censors intercepted a plan written in June 1916 by one P. Sharov (a soldier of unknown party) that outlined in remarkable detail the rationale, slogans, organization, goal, and probable results of an uprising of the entire Russian army. On examining this document, the General Staff decided to prevent the army from becoming "a tool of the revolution" by conducting an investigation of revolutionary activity in the army. A preliminary report suggested, "Revolutionary elements are setting about and possibly have already organized their forces [in the military] for an armed rising. . . ." Now quite alarmed, at the end of 1916 the General Staff ordered a much wider investigation, the results of which so shocked the generals that they now envisioned themselves sitting at the head of an utterly revolutionalized army. In response, the staff initiated a campaign throughout the armed forces against revolutionary ideas; the plan consisted of having senior officers "talk to" junior officers, junior officers to NCOs, and so forth, down the chain of command. Finally, realizing the futility of such mea-

asures, in mid-February 1917, just two weeks before the collapse of tsarism, the General Staff made a decision to rid the armed forces of all revolutionary elements.⁴⁵ Probably unrealizable in the best of circumstances, this plan came far too late to undo the effects of a disastrous wartime government policy: as a punitive measure, it had drafted tens of thousands of radicals (especially SRs) into the armed forces and had deliberately dispatched the worst of them (the leaders and the most outspoken activists) to the front.

Front commanders had given the government ample warning of the soldiers' mood. In mid-October 1916, General Brusilov of the southwestern front reported to the commander-in-chief about disorders in the Seventh Siberian Infantry Division and warned that suppression of this and other disorders was proving most difficult. Brusilov warned that he fully expected that revolutionary agitators would enjoy even greater success in the future. The late December uprisings of the Fifth and Fourteenth Siberian Rifle Divisions and the Seventeenth Siberian Rifle Regiment quickly revealed the accuracy of the general's prediction about the volatile situation at his front. The Seventeenth Rifle Regiment refused to fight and voted instead for the slogan "Down with the war!" The high proportion of Siberian units involved in the disorders indicates that the multi-party Tomsk Military Union, Krasnoiarsk Military-Revolutionary Organization, and Irkutsk Union of Siberian Workers enjoyed success in propagandizing soldiers from that part of the empire. Long before 1916 the generals of the northern and western fronts had complained of widespread revolutionary agitation (see chapter 4). By early 1917, General Ruzskii felt compelled to describe his armies of the important northern front as "pitiful nests of propaganda."⁴⁶ The Bolshevik Fedotov, who was stationed at this front, recalled, "Numerous SR and SD proclamations appeared. Even speeches of State Duma deputies Chkheidze and Kerensky [both highly critical of the government] were distributed. The mood was such that it became necessary to end the war no matter what." The Left SR Robert Eide-man, a field-grade front officer, wrote in his memoirs:

From late 1916 through early 1917, a solid protest against continuation of the war occurred. Soldiers put into motion every type of protest, beginning with written proclamations, and ending with the revolt of whole regiments. Agitation for an end to the war and the

overthrow of tsarism was carried out in the broadest manner . . . on all army fronts.⁴⁷

The consensus of military and socialist observers—not to mention the evidence of subversive activities at or near the fronts—suggests that socialist propaganda played a direct role in the revolution in the armed forces.

The garrison troops in various cities also displayed a tendency toward disobedience and disloyalty; soldiers began to refuse to obey orders to fire on workers' demonstrations. One such incident occurred during the early 1916 disorders in Petrograd; by summer of the same year, SRs in the emigration noted additional episodes in various parts of the country. During fall 1916, when soldiers received orders to fire on workers striking the Nobel plant in Petrograd, they fired on the police instead, for which eight of them received long sentences at hard labor (*katorga*). In October, soldiers of the 181st Infantry Regiment, whose garrison was located near the Novyi Lessner and Russkii Reno plants and whom Left SRs and Bolsheviks from those plants had heavily propagandized, joined workers' demonstrations in the Vyborg District.⁴⁸

On 10 February a police agent overheard soldiers sent to quell an anticipated demonstration at the Putilov Works tell a group of workers in the street that they were planning to fire on the police instead of at the workers: "Our commanders have given us two hundred shells each to put down the strikes. This time it won't work! When we get orders to shoot, we are going to turn our weapons on the pharaohs [an epithet for the police] and shoot them instead." The soldiers proudly recounted that their unit was the same one involved in the incident at the Nobel plant a few months earlier. One of the workers suggested that the soldiers organize themselves, drawing the sharp retort: "Don't worry about that, we have already long been organized and ready to take care of them. You'll see what will happen." Shklovskii, an instructor in a reserve armored battalion, recalled that, during the last two weeks before the February Revolution, when members of his unit encountered police on the streets they chanted derisively, "Pharaohs! Pharaohs!"⁴⁹ Whatever the cause, the situation in the garrisons was dire indeed.

As early as June 1915, both the government and the revolutionaries began to note a rising tide of workers' unrest. Late summer and

fall 1915 were characterized by incessant strikes in many parts of the country, the most serious of which was the near-general strike in Petrograd. The autumn WIC election campaign placed the capital's proletariat in a state of incipient revolt. In January 1916, the Petrograd SRs urged that the various left-wing socialists join forces in order to take advantage of the obviously enhanced opportunities for revolution. During the late spring of that year, police agents reported that SD activists of the capital's Moskovskii District were expressing the opinion that one of the many local strikes would soon turn into a general armed rising. By fall 1916, economic and political strikes followed one on another in bewildering succession in the large factories of the capital. The Left Menshevik Dvinov only slightly overstated the case when he later commented, "During 1916 the workers never came off strike."⁵⁰ The October 1916 strikes were especially bitter; by 19 October 75,400 workers at sixty-three factories were on strike and, after a brief respite, on 27 October 79,100 workers at seventy-seven plants struck, a state of affairs that reduced the chief of the Petrograd Provincial Gendarmes to a state bordering on hysteria:

The exceptional seriousness of the historical moment. . . , the incalculably catastrophic hardships, the potentially rebellious demonstrations that threaten the vital underpinnings of the state, [and] the embitterment of the lower elements of the population, all demand . . . immediate and exhaustive measures to eliminate the disorders and to disperse the atmosphere of social dissatisfaction.⁵¹

The situation was hardly better elsewhere; cities such as Kharkov, Smolensk, and Chernigov witnessed widespread worker unrest, and a series of giant industrial plants in the Urals struck. Burdzhakov and Koenker point out that by late 1916 the accumulated hardships of the war years created a very serious strike movement in Moscow. In terms quite reminiscent of those used by the authorities in Petrograd, the Moscow Okhranka reported in mid-February:

The state of extreme agitation of the working mass[es] and in social circles, the aggravation of the bread shortage in Moscow, and the activities of revolutionary circles could create, under a new onslaught of strikes and demonstrations, a much more serious threat to official order and to public security.

Governors and officials in Kazan, Saratov, and Tula also wrote similarly panicky reports about their provinces. The Central WIC Workers' Group noted that in Petrograd rumors spread that a general uprising had seized Moscow, that even the Moscow police had gone on strike, and that the armed forces there had refused to fire on demonstrators; similar rumors spread about Petrograd, in Moscow; and in Kharkov rumors about Moscow and Petrograd, and vice versa, were widespread. The Central Workers' Group claimed that the worsening of the workers' economic position and the weakening of their civil rights, both caused by the war, lay at the roots of the strike movement. The police, the government, military officials, and quasi-governmental bodies such as the WIC workers' groups began to resort to language that reflected ever more poignantly their sense of the danger of the situation, which they began to compare to that of 1905. One police report even asserted that the mood of society was more hostile to the government than in 1905.⁵²

The government insisted that revolutionaries had involved themselves in the calamitous situation. Officials noted that by fall 1916 the WIC workers' groups, originally set up to promote the war effort, had become agitational forums "for representatives of all underground revolutionary parties without exception."⁵³ In September 1916, the SRs had used a Moscow conference of WIC workers' groups to agitate against the war and the regime and had openly predicted an imminent revolution of workers and soldiers. Rifes and other memoirists describe a similar use of the Petrograd WIC workers' groups as forums for agitation. Furthermore, the Right socialist-oriented WIC workers' groups themselves now openly agitated for a general strike. The radicalization of the WIC workers' groups alarmed the government since these carefully constructed bodies had originally consisted of and represented that portion of the empire's working class least alienated from the government and most favorable to the war effort. The greater threat came, of course, from the left-wing socialists. In Petrograd in November 1916, police reported a recent alarming growth "in the revolutionary underground . . . by means of an influx of new members and the return from exile and from military service of old party members." The Okhranka emphasized that the radical wings of the SRs and Mensheviks were far and away the more active and popular in those two parties; for example, in late 1916 the secret police stated, "Since

most of the SRs have gone over to the defeatist camp, those who accept the war have shrunk in numbers . . . , are cut off from the masses, and have no practical significance or influence. . . ."⁵⁴

Furthermore, noted the police grimly, various SR and SD collectives began to coordinate their activities. During October, a group of Right SRs and Right Mensheviks, including Kerensky, Chkheidze, and N. D. Sokolov, held a series of meetings to form a "Left bloc"; even the Bolsheviks, who earlier were most predisposed to separatism, had "decided to reach out to the Mezhraiontsy . . . and do not even rule out the possibility of a bloc with the narodniks [SRs]." During November 1916, SR, Menshevik, and Bolshevik worker-activists of the Petrograd area held a meeting in the city's Vyborg District to discuss joint plans; a month later (December 1916), the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee reported to the party leadership abroad that it worked together with the Left SRs, the Left Mensheviks, and the Mezhraiontsy. In the factories themselves, joint work was the rule; at the Diuflon plant, the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and SRs held interfactional meetings at the sickness fund office to discuss current affairs and reach agreements about cooperative endeavors. Among the students in the capital, the Mensheviks and the SRs issued the newspaper *Zhivaia sila* (Living force) and also helped publish several union and cooperative newspapers; Menshevik, Bolshevik, and SR students cooperated so closely in various endeavors that the police characterized their work as "nonfactional." In late 1916, the police expressed the opinion that as yet strikes and demonstrations had had a rather disorganized character, but "in view of the acute situation in the country and the heightened mood of the masses, things could take a turn for the worse, especially because of the unification [tendency] . . . of defeatist SDs and SRs. . . ." Secret police agents noted "a cumulative demand to end the war" and reported hearing people express the opinion "We are on eve of great events as in 1905." A high-level government report on proletarian unrest dating from January 1917 recorded growing agitation for a general strike and summed up the situation in Russia as follows: "The general move to the Left of the population has aided the growth of the revolutionary organizations and the success of their propaganda."⁵⁵

The language of revolutionary leaflets printed in the last months of the old regime fully shared the special apocalyptic quality of con-

temporaneous government reports. Although from the earliest period of the war socialist leaflets had espoused revolution, from about mid-1916 on such literature not only called for revolution but assumed its imminence. Shalaginova, who has closely examined SR archival materials, specifies that by fall 1916 SR proclamations had as a premise that revolution was near.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, during January and February 1917, revolutionary literature went even further by asserting that revolutionary tremors had in fact begun: "Have you not felt that all of Russia has gone on the alert!" In early 1917 the Bolshevik Vyborg District Committee appealed to workers to restrain themselves temporarily in order to "gather forces and energies for the great events now approaching."⁵⁷ Earlier revolutionary literature did not display this rhetorical immediacy. (During 1914 and 1915, socialist groups often restrained workers from open demonstrations in favor of organization building; now they urged discipline in the early stages of revolution.)

The unpublished memoirs of the anarcho-syndicalist G. Maksimov are illuminating about the Russia of 1916. Assigned early that year to the Third Reserve Regiment outside the capital, Maksimov took part in evening "meetings," where the soldiers read newspapers, discussed events, cracked jokes about "Grishka, Nikolashka, and Sashka" (insulting diminutives for Rasputin and the royal couple), and admitted a likely German victory. Calling those who wanted peace "cowards," some soldiers wanted to defend "fatherland" and "tsar," to which others cracked, "What tsar? Grishka and Nikolashka?" After a time, radical views became popular; Maksimov read Sukhanov's brochures to the "meetings." In the Petrograd chemical unit where Maksimov served after September 1916, the soldiers organized a discussion club, where on a nightly basis the educated soldiers debated the war and the worker-peasant soldiers said "they wanted peace" but were frightened of defeatism, so that Maksimov explained to them the logic of "revolutionary defeatism." After October, Maksimov worked regular hours in the Main Chemical Committee and devoted his evenings to the revolutionary student movement, which, although radical, remained "within the walls" of the schools, whereas, recalled Maksimov, revolutionary activity within the workers' milieu transgressed such limits. Beginning in late 1916, Maksimov worked at the Langenzippen plant,

where the murderous work pace and deplorable conditions led workers to "italianize" (slow down). Maksimov took anarcho-syndicalist brochures to work. At first, fearing transfer to the front, the workers avoided organized actions; by Christmas, however, workers showed solidarity, spoke of a factory-wide strike, and gathered during work hours to discuss the necessity for making ties with other plants, thus setting the stage for the February upheavals at one plant.⁵⁸ Maksimov's story is a microcosm of imperial Russian society's fateful, final radicalization.

In his official report for January 1917, Minister of the Interior Protopopov, whom many of his contemporaries felt to be in advanced stages of lunacy, wrote, "Russia is in the preparatory phase for a rising of unified revolutionary organizations."⁵⁹ On the basis of this perception, the tsarist minister ordered round upon round of arrests throughout the empire that extended even into the ranks of the previously exempt moderate socialists and that continued unabated literally until the last full day of the tsarist regime. The repression failed to prevent the much feared uprising but altered it to some degree by robbing the revolutionary movement of further contingents of radical and moderate socialist activists. At first glance, the historical record gives the misleading impression that the February Revolution, long propagandized and promoted by the revolutionaries, developed almost independently of them.

That the defensist movement within the PSR was in full retreat by late 1916 is indisputable. As noted by Sviatitskii, from the outset of the military conflict an intelligentsia versus worker-peasant-soldier split on the war issue developed within the PSR; in the last months before the February Revolution, the Okhranka confirmed the existence of this alignment and noted the pro-war SRs' increasing lack of influence ("no practical significance or influence whatsoever anywhere"); the police dismissed them with contempt as intelligently cut off from the masses and preoccupied with literary pursuits. According to the police, SR students were also overwhelmingly anti-war and defensist sentiment survived only among some Menshevik students.⁶⁰ In Petrograd and elsewhere, a few Right SRs remained active in the WIC workers' groups, but on the whole the Right Mensheviks dominated these institutions. Even SRs who almost certainly at heart favored Russia's war efforts, such as A. Gots

in Siberia and Kerensky in the capital, described themselves as Zimmerwaldists. By late 1916 very few SRs in the emigration or inside Russia would publicly support the war.

As regards the left wing of the party, in early January 1917 the Ministry of the Interior reported, "Thanks to the careful attention of the intelligence organs, in most cases their attempts [to restore their organizations] have been cut off at the root." Still, the Socialist Revolutionaries had developed a new concept of revolution and a new set of tactics that hardly depended on the existence of well-defined committees of any single party. Already during fall 1914 the Moscow SRs advised, "The time of barricades had passed," and noted that the soldiers, who possessed arms, were necessary to defeat the government. Again during early fall 1916 SR agitators differentiated themselves from SDs in that they [the SRs] held, "A Russian revolution on the example of 1905 is impossible, but revolution based upon the unified soldier and proletarian masses is quite likely." To provide leadership of this soldier-proletarian uprising, the Petrograd SRs espoused that "comrade internationalists, SRs and Bolshevik and Menshevik SDs join together at once to carry out our common tasks on a unified basis." They identified the revolutionary tasks as "promoting class warfare" and "preparing workers, peasants, and soldiers . . . for the revolutionary overthrow of the government . . . and the seizure of power." (In this connection, Sharov's plan for a military insurrection mentioned previously advocated "the unification of all revolutionary forces" and offered "Land and Freedom" as one of the uprising's appropriate slogans.) In recent years SR pronouncements had suggested that they did not view the proletariat as the sole fulcrum on which the revolution would turn; rather, workers and soldiers would be the joint keys to the overthrow of autocracy. Thus, the SRs took the broadest possible approach in propagandizing workers, soldiers, and peasants and in urging the unified action of the socialist parties as well. (The Left Mensheviks and the Mezhrayontsy also agitated widely among the soldiers; as regards the Bolsheviks, Shliapnikov recalled, "We hardly succeeded in carrying out work among the workers [and] devoted only small efforts to the army."⁶¹ No one could decree the date or exact circumstances of the revolution, but the SRs' understanding of the dynamics of revolution in Russia in 1916–1917 turned out to

be accurate. The SRs prepared themselves for a revolution, which, when it came, worked itself out in ways they had already described and toward which they had urged the mass elements of society.

Summary

During the second half of 1916 and the early weeks of 1917, the repressive apparatus of the government never for a moment relaxed. In Petrograd, in Moscow, and throughout the provincial cities, they arrested SRs, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and anarchists and their committees, whether independent or joint. (Whatever the faults of Russia's military and civil leadership, the police experienced no failure of will.) Under direct and sustained police attack, the SRs were unable to maintain their organization in Petrograd. Nevertheless, their workers' circles expanded and, in the final two months before the fall of the old regime, operated under the leadership of an informal workers' committee organized by Aleksandrovich. As the head of the Petrograd SRs by appointment of the SR Committee Abroad, Aleksandrovich participated in the attempts to set up a Petersburg Committee and in the joint socialist deliberations preceding the February uprising. On a national scale, the SRs, acting independently and jointly with other leftist groups, carried out revolutionary agitation at the fronts and in numerous cities; although it is difficult to reach final conclusions, their role in the last weeks evidently exceeded that of other parties.

While carrying out incessant repressive actions, the government showed increasing awareness of the deteriorating mood of the masses and the role of revolutionaries, including the SRs, in the revolutionizing process. Similarly, SR agitation and that of other socialists now posited the imminence of revolution as a given, rather than as a distant or uncertain possibility. The agitation and propaganda work carried out by the SRs, especially when considered in light of its cumulative effect and in conjunction with that of the other revolutionary parties, constituted a significant factor in the development of a revolutionary situation in Petrograd and many other locations during January and February 1917.

7

The SRs and Other Socialists during the February Revolution

Virtually everyone in Russia sensed the special nature of the country's situation by January–February 1917. The famed memoirist N. Sukhanov recalled how on 21 February in a department of the Ministry of Agriculture where he worked he overheard two women typists chatting: "If you ask me," said one of them, "it's the beginning of a revolution!" In distant Kazan, an acquaintance remarked to the Right Menshevik G. Denike, "Well, we are headed toward a revolution," to which Denike replied, "Yes . . . and I feel it will be an enormous misfortune"; Denike later insisted, "It is not true that no one expected revolution in Russia. By the end of 1916 it was a widespread expectation." The only mystery concerned where and under what circumstances decisive mass unrest would begin; after all, no one could decree the downfall of tsarism. In the last decade, however, the always-difficult deep winter had taken on a threatening symbolism: the 9 January Bloody Sunday anniversary inaugurated the season with strikes and demonstrations. Just a year before, in 1916, the entire months of January and February had witnessed unremitting labor turmoil in the capital and elsewhere. Following an entire year of burgeoning strikes and other signs of disaffection, early 1917 appeared grim indeed to anyone who cared to observe. Furthermore, exaggerated rumors of grain shortages raised the fear of famine; on top of everything else that had befallen Russia's laboring people, to starve in the cold was an intolerable prospect. For thirty months of war, socialist propaganda had told workers, sol-

diers, and peasants that their enemy was not on the battlefield but at home, among those who grew fat on war profits as the people bled and hungered. The events in Petrograd between 23 and 27 February suggest that many had heeded the message.

The SRs and the other socialist parties, acting separately and in concert in three overlapping networks of alliances (all-socialist, Left socialist, and Right socialist), became directly involved in the onset and carrying out of the February Revolution; not surprisingly, the party organizations played the same role in the revolutionary movement during the February crisis as they had before it. Of course, the workers, soldiers, and students of the capital made the revolution through repeated mass actions in the streets so powerful that the police and Cossacks could not (and the military units would not) prevail against them.¹ Still, the dynamic of the situation was complicated. The mass elements of society found their chief motivation for revolution in factors such as war-related economic and personal hardships and accumulated anger at age-old government repression. Once, however, their patience began to break, the masses invariably looked to the socialists for on the spot guidance on all matters that pertained to the overthrow of the old regime and the construction of the new one. This was hardly a random occurrence; after all, for decades the socialists had showered the population with propaganda. The intense interaction between the mass elements of Petrograd's population and socialist leaders and activists in the factories, streets, and barracks during February 1917 is a phenomenon deeply revealing of the processes at work in Russian society, processes best understood within the context of the revolutionary movement, including the SRs and the other revolutionary groups, since the beginning of the war.

In the pages of this chapter, the socialist blocs often supplant the SRs at center stage; nevertheless, this *is* the history of the SRs in the February Revolution. For many months they had insisted on the necessity for coordinated endeavors among the parties, and just such joint endeavors characterized, indeed helped bring about and shape, the successful revolution. Thus even as specifically SR actions obscured themselves in the joint fray, the SR program for a Russian revolution received its ultimate vindication.

The Outlook of the Socialists

As tsarism's final crisis took shape and hardened in Russia's frozen winter, the mentality of the various oppositionist parties—what they wanted and how and when they expected to achieve it—became the capital question. In general, by definition, the Left socialists wished to turn strikes, whether planned or spontaneous, into wider demonstrations and, if the opportunity arose, into an armed uprising and revolution. As noted, only the Left Mensheviks sometimes hesitated because of a special concern about the nature of the post-revolutionary regime; during the February crises, however, the Left Menshevik Initiative Group underwent a radicalization process that brought its members nearer to their Bolshevik, Mezhraionka, and SR brethren on the Left. By mid-February, the Moscow and Petrograd SRs were focused so intently on an uprising that they notified the population of the two cities to make preparations since revolutionary tremors had already begun. On various occasions during the final two months of the old regime, the Moscow SRs told the people to carry out "unconditional internal revolutionary struggle [in order to] overthrow the autocratic government and end the war"; people should "organize themselves, . . . [and] obtain their rights . . . by revolutionary struggle." Moscow and Iuriev SRs told people to "elect revolutionary organizations"; and Nizhnii SRs called for "a general political strike and a general armed uprising." Thus the SRs not only expected revolution but urged it in concrete terms: In Petrograd, Moscow, Nizhnii, Kharkov, Odessa, and elsewhere they published proclamations that called for the immediate revolutionary overthrow of the government as the only way to escape hunger, thus tying their agitation to the grain shortages.²

During early 1917, not only the SRs but the Mezhraiontsy, the Left Mensheviks, and the Bolsheviks, all of whom made up the Left socialist alliance, had repeatedly displayed revolutionary intentions, namely, during the planning for the 9 January Bloody Sunday anniversary and for the 14 February Duma opening; even the cautious Left Mensheviks advised the workers to organize themselves for the approaching struggle.³

Right socialists too had long since entered the lists against the

tsarist regime. In the Duma, Chkheidze and Kerensky excoriated the regime in such terms that their speeches were used as revolutionary texts; on the floor of the Duma the firebrand Kerensky called for the overthrow of the "tyrants." In the worker milieu, Right SRs and Mensheviks from the WIC groups took a similarly intransigent anti-tsarist stance.⁴ The Right and Left socialists were still separated by their outlook on the war and on the nature of the posttsarist regime, but in terms of immediate tactics they achieved an identity of goals.

Perfectly aware of the revolutionaries' intentions, the government never relaxed its vigilance in observing every revolutionary demarche, nor, clear up through 26 February, did it fail to incarcerate every Right and Left socialist it could lay its hands on. Much as historians do retrospectively until this very day, the government puzzled in advance about what would actually spark the final revolutionary outburst. Reports from Petrograd, Moscow, and numerous other locations revealed all too clearly that bread shortages, whether real or perceived, acted as an extreme irritant on the worker masses. The government also realized that disturbances over bread were not somehow exempt from socialist intervention. As noted in chapter 6, on 21 February the secret police reported that the underground organizations were planning to utilize the turbulent mood over food shortages "to initiate, under their control, a widespread movement with revolutionary slogans." In a somewhat different vein, the Okhranka predicted: "The underground revolutionary parties are preparing revolution, but a revolution, if it takes place, will be spontaneous, quite likely a hunger riot." Regardless, the government reiterated its conviction that, as one report warned, "revolutionary propaganda" had brought Russia "to the eve of revolution"; Petrograd was "more than close to an armed uprising, the goal of which is the conclusion of immediate peace"; and "Leftist revolutionary circles are absolutely convinced that the revolution will begin very soon."⁵

If by early 1917 food shortages, general revolutionary agitation, and the likelihood of an uprising had become rather confusedly intermixed in the minds of government observers, these same observers also showed concern, indeed alarm, about specific events: 9 January, 14 February, and, fatefully, the upcoming International

Women's Day. The authorities feared that the socialists would attempt to use each of these to spark wider disturbances. Thus the police made heavy arrests in advance of 9 January and again before the Duma opening; in neither case did the strikes and demonstrations turn into an uprising. That left the 23 February International Women's Day celebration.

In the days preceding 23 February, government agents reported in detail about the various plans for this occasion. The SRs and Left Mensheviks issued a special edition of the cooperative paper *Trud* to commemorate the celebration; according to the memoirs of the Left Menshevik Ermanskii, one of the editors of *Trud*, the entire special International Women's Day issue was "informed by a bold militant spirit." The Left Mensheviks and SRs also scheduled and publicized open meetings at 4:00 P.M. at the Psycho-Neurological Institute and later at the premises of the cooperative commission. Furthermore, the Mezhraionka issued a leaflet that urged workers to celebrate the 23 February holiday and also noted the imperialist nature of the war, condemned the tsarist regime *and* the capitalists (a hallmark of the Left socialist movement), and contained the slogans "The day of reckoning is drawing near," "Long live peace!," "Down with the war," and, interestingly, "Long live the Provisional Revolutionary Government!" With its leftist slogans and its appeal for a Provisional Revolutionary Government, this leaflet gave every appearance of wishing to expand International Women's Day into a broader revolutionary event. The Left Menshevik Ermanskii also specifies, "On the day itself illegal proclamations were distributed in the factories by the Initiative Group and other party organizations." (Just before International Women's Day, police agents noted that the Left Mensheviks had drawn closer to the radical Mezhraiontsy and were planning to issue a proclamation on 23 February.) Additionally, for several days before 23 February, the Mezhraionka scheduled meetings at various locales in the workers' districts and recommended the election of factory, district, and all-city committees, a line of agitation usually associated with a general strike.⁶ During the days just before and during the actual revolutionary crisis, the SR worker committee under Aleksandrovich worked especially closely with the Mezhraionka so that, in lieu of additional

evidence, one may infer that its views were similar to those of the Left SDs, an interpretation that draws support from the general tendency of concurrent SR agitation.⁷

For some reason, however, Bolshevik leaders in the Bureau of the Central Committee and the PC decided that 23 February was not an appropriate date for a general strike or revolutionary demonstrations; they held that May Day was more propitious for an uprising and keyed their oral agitation accordingly. Kaiurov recalled that even the radical and usually headstrong Vyborg Committee, perhaps reluctantly, came out against strikes that day.⁸ Meanwhile, the Right socialists, evidently quite deflated after the defeat of their hopes for 14 February, remained silent about International Women's Day (during the first two days of widening disturbances that succeeded the event, they attempted to restrain rather than encourage mass demonstrations, which they feared would develop beyond their control). A certain irony exists in the quite unintentional block of Right socialists and Bolsheviks that arose at the onset of the crisis that brought about the downfall of tsarism.

No unanimity exists among scholars about the events before 23 February. In a recent article about certain aspects of the February Revolution, I argue that the Mezhraionka, the Left Mensheviks, and the SRs agitated for strikes and demonstrations on International Women's Day in the hope of sparking an uprising. In this interpretation, the issue of *Trud* that appeared before the event, the proclamations distributed by several party groups, and the mass meetings called for the evening of the holiday all had this goal. About this issue, Hasegawa and Longley have taken a very different tack by suggesting that none of the revolutionaries had serious intentions about 23 February. Hasegawa notes the radical slogans in the Mezhraionka leaflet but concludes that its purpose was purely educational; Longley points out that the leaflet in question, despite its radical slogans, does not even mention a strike or demonstration for 23 February. Some decades ago, Katkov expressed the opinion that the Mezhraiontsy were quite serious about the radical slogans in their 23 February leaflet but wondered how one committee alone could have produced such vast results. Ferro takes a much more expansive view than any of the foregoing by outright asserting multi-

party sponsorship of the 23 February disturbances: "The parties and the trade unions were trying to organize a demonstration for 23 February. . . . For the occasion an organizing committee had been put together under the aegis of the Mezhraionka. Were they going to organize a strike or a parade? . . . Only the Bolsheviks were somewhat reluctant."⁹

Support can be marshaled for either interpretation, but the weight of evidence lies with the Ferro version. Although it is true that the Mezhraionka 23 February text published (and edited?) by Shliapnikov in the early 1920s does not have calls for a strike or demonstration, on 24 February police agents reported arresting women in possession of this leaflet the day before and quoted its text as having the slogans "Down with the war" and "Don't go to work on 23 February"; this accords well with the Mezhraionka's verbal agitation at exactly this time for factory, district, and city committees, a tactic directly tied to the idea of a general strike and that otherwise makes no sense.¹⁰ The worker-SR Markov recalled that from the time of the Izhorskii munitions plant strike on 10 February the rumor "Great demonstrations are necessary for 23 February Women's Day" circulated widely among workers. (Indeed, Iurenev recalls that already during late 1916 his group had begun preparations for Women's Day.) Some time shortly after the 14 February demonstration, the Bolsheviks issued the following statement: "Let each day in the history of the workers' movement become a call to demonstrate. [Let] the trial of the workers' deputies, the Lena massacre, the first of May, the July shootings, the October days, January 9, and the like serve as a summons to mass action." In other words, any attention drawn to a workers' event should automatically carry revolutionary implications. Kaiurov recollected the matter as follows:

We could feel the storm coming, but no one could determine how it would be manifested. The highly charged mood of the masses forced the district committee to decide to stop agitating, cease direct appeals for strikes and the like, and focus attention primarily on the maintenance of discipline and restraint during the upcoming demonstrations . . . [on] International Women's Day.

As Kaiurov's words reveal, *that* strikes and demonstrations would occur on 23 February was a given. Indeed, women's groups such as

those associated with the Mezhraionka and the Bolshevik Vyborg organization had long since determined to celebrate their day with street demonstrations. Immediately before and on Women's Day itself, contingents of Mezhraionka leaders and activists, including A. Itkina, I. Kroshinskii, B. Ratner, and A. Slutskii, addressed worker and student meetings, as did leaders of the other parties. As mentioned earlier, many of the women textile workers who struck and who went out into the streets on the morning of 23 February (with calls for bread and, later, with political slogans) had taken part in tenacious political strikes in the preceding weeks. Another member of the Bolshevik Vyborg organization, Sveshnikov, later indicated that despite party directives against them his group did agitate for strikes and demonstrations. After noting the appearance of the special issue of *Trud* and proclamations on 23 February, Ermanskii cautions, "Of course, one may not, in a given case, assert that what follows is necessarily a result of what preceded"; clearly, however, this unwonted resort to purely logical precepts only serves to underscore his firm belief that socialist preparation had resulted in the strikes and demonstrations of 23 February.¹¹

Of varying degrees of interest are the testimony and commentary of other witnesses and historians. Several months later, the former military governor of Petrograd, S. S. Khabalov, testified under interrogation that, in his opinion, the demonstrations "had been inspired by the revolutionaries." While carefully weighing spontaneous and organized elements of the outbreak of the February Revolution, the historian Leiberov claims that the decision to strike and demonstrate on 23 and 24 February were taken "not spontaneously, but at the initiative of worker-activists of the various revolutionary-party tendencies." When his factory reached a strike decision on 23 February, the Bolshevik activist Kaiurov recalled, "Neither the [district Bolshevik committee], nor the cadre worker representatives were surprised; it was clear that the idea of demonstrations had long since ripened among the workers." Finally, Shliapnikov recalls "the agitation of our party collectives in favor of a demonstration on 'Women's Day,'" a matter of interest since the Bolshevik leadership to which he belonged opposed demonstrations that day.¹² The implication from a broad range of sources is that all the left-wing socialists, excepting a handful of Bolshevik leaders, prepared for and took

part in the disturbances of 23 February, the first day of the last crisis of tsarism.

Regardless, the revolutionary dynamic was such that, as suggested by the Bolshevik statement, any celebration of a workers' event resonated of revolution. The intense activities of leftist SDs and SRs before International Women's Day, including the issue of leaflets with calls for a revolution and a Provisional Revolutionary Government, must be interpreted in this light. When the police noted that bread riots might break out at any moment but that underground organizations (that were preparing a revolution) were ready to utilize such riots to initiate an uprising, they only partially described the final revolutionary outburst. Two currents—unrest over food shortages (that were the subject of revolutionary agitation and that were expressed not by riots but by purposeful strikes and street demonstrations) and celebration of International Women's Day (a purely socialist event preceded by considerable agitation)—suddenly ran together into a revolutionary stream so powerful that the authorities could find no means to stop it. Thus the Russian revolution, by no means entirely spontaneously, commenced.

Socialist Leaders and Blocs

The question of what the top-level leaders of the various socialist groups in Petrograd did (as opposed to their general views, which have already been discussed) during the February crisis (23–27 February) that led to the fall of the old regime is of interest for several reasons. Tsarism's abrupt demise thrust the left- and right-wing socialist leaders into the forefront of a vast historical drama that unfolded act by act over the following year. With an early advantage to the moderates, all of them formed the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet, the *de facto* national center of Russia's revolutionary forces. Within two months some of them, namely the Right SRs and Right Mensheviks, also began to take over the leadership of the Provisional Government. By fall, the radicals among them, most notably the Bolsheviks but also the Mezhrailontsy (who merged with the Bolsheviks), the Left SRs, and, to a lesser degree, the Left Mensheviks, had become the predominant force in the soviets and, in October,

formed the first Soviet government. More directly to the point, from start to finish, the leaders of the various Petrograd socialist parties and factions, operating independently and in concert, had a distinct, indeed determining, role in the development and working out of the February crisis.

The testimony of revolutionary activists indicates that the chaos in the streets of the capital during the February days severely hindered direct, reliable communications between party leaders on the one hand and activists in the factories, garrisons, and streets on the other. Still, the problem should not be exaggerated. Even after the 25 February breakdown of public transportation, a trip by foot from the Vyborg District, to the Petrograd side, to the Vasileostrovskii District, and then to the center of the city and beyond, and back again, all in the course of a few hours, was quite feasible; in such extraordinary times, a walk through the city could impart much information. These are not hypothetical speculations; the memoirs of Kaiurov, Shliapnikov, Markov, Iurennev, Ermanskii, Zenzinov, and others reveal that during the crisis days all of these individuals visited neighboring districts, communicated with activists of both their own and other parties, and passed on and received information, decisions, and directives; on occasion, telephone calls also played a role.

Between 23 and 27 February, SR and SD district-level party organizations held meetings, both separately and jointly. These intermediate organizations sought and received guidance and sometimes orders from higher up in the party hierarchies and transmitted directives to the lower-level cells and groups; this was the whole point of the district-level meetings (discussed later). Questions arise then about how party leaders reached decisions, what they decided, and what modes they used for translating their decisions into practical measures.

Already by fall 1916, two socialist blocs had taken distinct form: the Right socialists, with Kerensky and Chkheidze at their head, had begun to meet together during October, and the Left socialists, who had cooperated closely ever since the anti-WIC campaign, further solidified their alliance during November and December, one aspect of which was the joint planning commission for International Women's Day. Early in February, the leadership of all the socialist

parties (Left and Right) had taken the unusual step of meeting together to discuss plans for the opening of the Duma. As noted in chapter 6, just before 23 February, at the initiative of the Right Menshevik N. S. Chkheidze, a call went out to reconvene the all-socialist gathering. With the approval of the Right Mensheviks, the Right SRs, the Trudoviks, and the Popular Socialists in the Duma, Chkheidze suggested to the Bolsheviks through N. D. Sokolov, to the SRs through Aleksandrovich, and to the Mezhraionka through V. Leont'eva, that the joint socialist conference meet again to discuss the possibility of coordinating actions. In view of the poor results of the first meeting, general socialist support for the renewed meetings reflected acute awareness of the severity of the crisis. As Shliapnikov described the matter, "The growth of the revolutionary movement in Peter [Petrograd], in the presence of several party and group organizations, demanded unity of action from those organizations."¹³ The Bolshevik Bureau of the Central Committee agreed to attend on condition that the conference consist only of those genuinely opposed to the war. Since by this time even Kerensky described himself as a "Zimmerwaldist," the Bolshevik condition posed no obstacle to the attendance of every socialist group in the capital.

The first all-socialist meeting (or the second, if one includes the early February meeting) gathered at M. Gorky's house and included Chkheidze and Skobelev of the Right Mensheviks; Kerensky, Zenzinov, and A. Peshekhonov of the Right SRs, Trudoviks, and Popular Socialists; Gorky and Sokolov from the nonfactional SDs; Shliapnikov and V. Pozhello from the Bolshevik Bureau and PC, respectively; A. Grinevich, Ermanskii, and E. Sokolovskii from the Left Menshevik IG; G. Erlich from the Bund; Aleksandrovich from the SR-Internationalists; and Iurenev from the Mezhraionka.¹⁴

At the outset, Chkheidze and Kerensky "gave assurances" of their internationalism; Kerensky even came out in favor of the position of the Zimmerwald Left, surely an exaggeration since this was the position of Lenin, Natanson, and the extreme left wing of European socialism. According to the memoirs of Ermanskii and Iurenev, the atmosphere of distrust among the various right- and left-wing leaders was such that they did not readily divulge their views to one another. Consequently, a rather desultory conversation revolved

around the question of the mood of various elements of society, especially the working class. Ermanskii later recalled that although everyone spoke of the mood of the workers, "No one said anything which would lead one to expect the imminent onset of revolution." Iurenev recollected that the representatives of the underground (leftist) organizations "did not find a common language with the representatives of 'society'" (a snide reference to the Right socialists from the Duma). No general agreement about what to do could be reached, so that the conference, in Iurenev's phrase, had a merely "informational character"; thus the socialist conference had not succeeded in creating a coordinating body, a new failure that led the Left socialists to an important independent action.¹⁵

Despite its failure to live up to expectations in terms of coordinating activities, the "All-Socialist Informational Bureau," as it came to be called, met several times at various locations during the February crisis. The Left Menshevik N. Sukhanov, who attended all the meetings after the first one, comments briefly on the meetings of 24 and 25 February but reveals little about what the socialist leaders said there.¹⁶

The All-Socialist Informational Bureau was not, however, the only such group that came into being in association with the February crisis. According to Iurenev, who provides the most information on this matter, when the broader conference failed to fulfill its promise as a "coordinating" body, the Left socialists decided to initiate a smaller exclusively leftist information bureau. This group consisted of Iurenev of the Mezhraionka, Aleksandrovich of the SRs, Sokolovskii of the Left Mensheviks, and Pozhhello of the Bolsheviks. (In this regard, Iurenev points out that Aleksandrovich had the authorization of the Foreign Delegation of the SR Central Committee to represent the whole party in Russia and the Petrograd organization in particular.) The Left Socialist Bureau met for the first time late on 23 February.¹⁷ It represented precisely the Left socialist bloc that operated during the war not only in Petrograd but, with various configurations, throughout the empire. This alignment of groups (sometimes with, sometimes without the Left Mensheviks) had opposed the Right socialists over the election of the WIC workers' groups and, more recently, during the recent struggle over 14 February.

The February Days

23 FEBRUARY

Despite the attention many socialists had devoted to International Women's Day during the week preceding the holiday, the women from the Neva Thread Mill and the No. 1 Great Sampsienov Mill could hardly have realized that they were taking the first steps in the overthrow of the regime when, during the morning of 23 February, they summoned male workers from the Nobel, Arsenal, and Erikson plants into the streets by pelting the windows of the factories with stones or by actually entering the workplace, as happened at Aivaz. Police reports from 23 February do, however, record the arrest of women workers that day for shouting at the police: "You don't have long to enjoy yourselves, you'll soon be hanging by your heads."¹⁸ Representing bravado as much as prescience, this nevertheless fits the pattern of a generalized awareness of the gravity of the situation by early 1917.

In the course of the day, many workers of Vyborg District plants marched, singing revolutionary songs, to the less radical factories (the Arsenal, Rozenkrants, and Patronnyi plants) to call them out on strike (*sniat' s raboty*). Augmented by the new arrivals, the columns of strikers then streamed to surrounding areas to call out more workers, after which they finally headed for the center of the city. Although this was a socialist women's holiday, concern over the bread shortage underlay the demonstrations on the morning and afternoon of 23 February. The cry that first filled the winter air of graceful Petersburg that day was "*Dai khleba*" (Give us bread).¹⁹

Several worker-activists have left accounts of how the factories first reached strike decisions. Kaiurov recalled a mass meeting at Erikson, at which Bolshevik, SR, and Menshevik worker-activists presided. An SR worker from the same plant, I. Mil'chik, described how inexperienced workers approached all party activists with questions about what to do and exerted pressure on them to provide leadership. Subsequently, ten or twelve party activists, including the SR Mil'chik, the Mezhraionets A. Volodin, the Bolshevik Kaiurov, and several Menshevik-Internationalists, held a meeting at the plant's health fund office during which, at the urging of rank-and-file workers, they decided to strike. The strictly local impulse to strike

is of interest; Burdzhakov has noted that no Bolshevik party directives came down to factory cells that day, as was natural since the Bolshevik leadership opposed the demonstrations. Although the Mezhraionka, the Left Mensheviks, and the SRs evidently supported the 23 February strike, what directions, if any, they sent to factory cells are not known. Kaiurov recalled, "The idea of demonstrations had already seized the workers, but no one as yet realized to what it would lead."²⁰

Whatever the case as regards directives, party agitation did have an effect in bringing "the idea of demonstrations" to workers on 23 February. Through the workers' cooperatives and the cooperative paper *Trud*, the Left SRs and Left Mensheviks had urged workers to celebrate the occasion. Police reports from 23 February described the arrest of workers in possession of the Mezhraionka leaflet with the slogans "Down with the war" and "Don't go to work on 23 February"; members of several groups handed out leaflets. Although calls for bread predominated on 23 February, many workers already shouted slogans such as "Down with the war" and "Down with autocracy." The political slogans indicated Left socialist attempts to escalate the strikes, which socialists had encouraged in the first place, into demonstrations of a more profound significance. As Leiberov describes the matter (with some jargon), "From the very beginning of the movement [on 23 February] the leading cadre part of the revolutionary proletariat introduced the political slogans: 'Down with the war!' and 'Down with the tsar!'"²¹

Once the women textile workers struck and brought out several large metallurgical plants, further initiative for spreading the strikes on 23 February came from plants having strong records of revolutionary activism and strong networks of revolutionary cells. Plants such as Novyi Lessner and Erikson, both instrumental in bringing out additional factories of the Vyborg and other workers' districts, had strong SR, Bolshevik, Menshevik, and, in some cases, Mezhraionka groups. Erikson workers, for instance, had the distinction of luring Arsenal workers to walk out for the first time since 1905. Fortunately, I. Markov has left a full description of the February Revolution from the perspective of an Arsenal worker; as one of very few written by worker SRs, Markov's memoirs are especially valuable. According to him, a mass meeting on the morning of 23 Feb-

ruary at the Arsenal voted to carry out a demonstration later in the day, the nature of which Markov does not specify. The workday then commenced as normal. Sometime after midday, strikers from other factories, primarily from the Erikson and Baranovskii plants, showed up in the street outside, calling for the Arsenal workers to quit work. Since rumors had already spread that the Aivaz and Nobel factories had struck, the mood in the plant was tense. After some persuasion, the entire Arsenal work force left the plant with the exception of fifteen or so "strikebreakers."²² As at the Erikson plant, young workers asked advice of older ones who had taken part in the 1905 Revolution. Some of the workers requested that Markov lead them in singing the "Marseillaise" and other revolutionary songs, since they did not know the words. Out on the streets, striking workers shouted to one another, "Comrades, we are going to the Nevskii Prospekt."

Someone suggested going first to the nearby Feniks, Rozenkrants, and Metallicheskie plants in order to induce the workers there to leave work. A group of party activists from Arsenal, including Markov, led the way. At the Feniks plant, a crowd of workers comprising roughly half the work force were already in the street singing revolutionary songs. The Arsenal and Feniks strikers merged before marching to Rozenkrants, where work was still in full progress. The strikers shouted, "Comrades, quit work!," after which some Rozenkrants workers came out. When the now quite large column of workers reached the yard of the Metallicheskie plant, they found a mass meeting in progress. An SR worker-activist, Shalin (Shilin?), one of the leaders at the plant, was giving a speech, characterized by Markov as "brilliant," urging the workers, "*Bastovat*" (Strike).²³

The process described in detail by Markov regarding the Arsenal and other nearby Vyborg factories occurred throughout large areas of the city. The Soviet author Astrakhan, utilizing various unpublished workers' memoirs in Soviet archives, has shown how workers from Vyborg plants proceeded to other factories, many of them in other workers' districts, including the Promet, Orudiinyi; and Patronnyi plants; a number of factories in the Okhta District, and several establishments on the Petrograd side. In the Vasileostrovskii District, police dispersed the strike emissaries before they succeeded in bringing out the Trubochnyi and Simens-Gal'ske workers.

In general, on 23 February Vasileostrovskii workers failed to strike in great numbers. Regardless, large columns of workers eventually headed toward the center of the city. Markov wrote that party activists marched at the head of the columns so that if the police or Cossacks were to attack, the experienced people could maintain order and prevent panic. Among those at the head of Markov's column were the Left SD Burtsev and the SRs Kisliakov, Potapov, Voronkov, and Markov.²⁴ When the column reached Arsenal Street, they encountered huge meetings of striking workers from other factories. Cossacks were openly fraternizing with workers, one of the key elements in the developing revolutionary situation.

Workers formed a "live" tribune by lifting several leaders high in the air so that they could be heard. Among those speaking at this point were I. Teterkin, a well-known SR from Staryi Parviainen, Voronkov from Arsenal, and the SDs Burtsev, Fedorov, and Egorov. The call was "To the Nevskii!" Police in the neighborhood tried to goad the Cossacks into attacking the columns, but to no avail. The columns were organized according to factories, with individual factory leaders at the head of each column. A little farther on yet another meeting was held, at which an SR from Erikson called for the police and the Cossacks to join the workers. A second SR from the Metallicheskie plant, a friend of Shalin's, again urged the workers to the Nevskii Prospekt.²⁵

The workers' columns, with the SR Voronkov, the SD Burtsev, and other leaders at their head, finally reached the Nevskii; they marched down the broad avenue singing the "Varshavianka" ("My dear Warsaw") and shouting for bread. The failure of the Cossacks to fulfill their assigned role evidently caught the regime off guard, with the result that workers reached the center of the city relatively unobstructed. Nevertheless, demonstrations on the Nevskii were still small and brief. Markov wrote that after marching down the Nevskii Prospekt, he hurried to the Moskovskii District Westinghouse plant, where he had formerly worked, to urge the workers there to strike. Afterward, he went to the Cultural Commission of the Cooperative Societies at 38 Zhukovskaia Street near the center of the city. Markov described the events of the day to disbelieving cooperative officials, including the SRs Mstislavskii and Evreinova and the Menshevik Kheisin. Just then the Bolshevik Popov from the

Vasileostrovskii District and the SR Vasil'ev from the Moskovskii District dropped into the office together and enthusiastically confirmed Markov's story, thus convincing everyone of the significance of the days' happenings. Markov informed the cooperative leaders that activists from the Vyborg District would not be attending the previously scheduled meeting at the cooperative offices (for the evening of International Women's Day) since Vyborg District SD and SR leaders had called a general meeting (*plenarnoe sobranie*). Finally, Markov returned home to the Vyborg side. His landlord, a fellow SR, told him, "all the comrades are reporting in to the party, and the SDs are doing the same."²⁶

The demonstrations of 23 February were not enough in themselves to shake the regime or, for that matter, to assure revolutionaries that the revolution had begun. The strike was not yet general and few marchers reached the center of the city. Nevertheless, the spirit was markedly different than in the recent past, such as on 9 January and 14 February, when large numbers had struck, but without enthusiasm.²⁷ The fraternization between formerly antipathetic Cossacks and workers was an ominous portent for the future of the regime. Once the Cossacks had gone over, the defense of the regime would fall on the police and, with momentous consequences, the army.

The first metallurgical plants to strike on 23 February and many of the plants that struck most persistently thereafter had active SR, Menshevik, and Bolshevik circles. Factory activists of all the parties reached joint strike decisions; the demonstrations and columns in the streets had similar Left-bloc guidance. Evidence pertaining to the strike willingness of various factories vis-à-vis individual party strengths in those factories suggests interesting patterns. The Right Menshevik Zhukov had great authority among the workers at the Feniks plant, with the result that, as one would expect, this plant was difficult to bring out, although a portion of the workers could be lured into the streets. The Arsenal, where the Right SR Voronkov's word was law, had to be "brought out" on the first day but thereafter became a self-motivated striking plant; Voronkov even harangued the crowds in the streets. Rozenkrants, a well-known "Bolshevik" plant, was notoriously hard to bring out on strike; Markov called it a "cemetery" (*mertvoe kladbishche*). Factories such as Erikson, Novyi Lessner, Liudvig Nobel, Baranovskii, and Aivaz,

which were enthusiastic participants in the strike movement in late February, had long records of activism in previous years *and* collectives of all the parties. This last configuration was the truly explosive one, not the existence of any single party organization.²⁸

After the exhilarating events of the day, the Left Socialist Bureau of the Bolsheviks, Left SRs, Left Mensheviks, and Mezhraiontsy held its first meeting; its main topic was the selection of so-called fighting slogans, that is, slogans to be used in verbal or printed agitation. The Left Mensheviks wanted to emphasize appeals for a Constituent Assembly. The Bolshevik Pozhhello suggested appealing for the election of a soviet of workers' deputies on the example of 1905. Iurenev stated that in principal the Mezhraionka stood for the formation of a soviet but considered an open call for its election premature. At other meetings the SRs similarly warned about the problem of protecting the soviet if it were elected in an untimely manner.²⁹ Although Iurenev does not specify the slogans agreed upon, the SR-Mezhraionka leaflets issued before 27 February urged the continuation of strikes and demonstrations, advocated the union of workers and soldiers in the struggle, called for revolution, but did not mention the election of soviets. A reasonable inference is that the Left socialist meeting agreed on this set of priorities.

24 FEBRUARY


On 24 February, the Mezhraionka issued a proclamation addressed to workers and soldiers that advised them, "Not in going to the Duma will hunger be eliminated. Only revolution will lead us out of the dead end of war and destruction. Prepare yourselves! . . . Organize yourselves, comrades! The day of reckoning with the ancient enemy is approaching." The text also called for support of the locked-out Putilov workers; for workers to urge the soldiers to join the movement to create a democratic republic; for the summoning of a Constituent Assembly; and for the creation of a Provisional Revolutionary Government. Its call for the formation of a revolutionary government and its continued use of heightened rhetoric ("The day of reckoning . . . is approaching") suggest both a definite awareness of and a desire to capitalize on the general revolutionary situation.

This document's request for workers to bring soldiers over to the

revolution requires special note: any hope for an uprising depended on support from the soldiers, whom otherwise the regime would utilize against the workers. From the bottom of the revolutionary hierarchy, the SR activist Markov, who marched in street demonstrations that day, recalled that on 24 February worker-activists made their first verbal appeals to the soldiers. Zenzinov, who spent the entire day wandering the tumultuous streets of the city, describes how the chains of soldiers, under strict orders not to allow passersby to move from one section of the city to another, often succumbed to persuasion, glanced around to ensure that no officers were near, and waved on by those who approached them.³⁰ Since the Left Socialist Informational Bureau had its first meeting on the previous evening, the Mezhraionka's leaflet reflected the outlook of the Left bloc, and, as mentioned, perhaps its most striking aspect was its call for the propagandizing of the garrison soldiers. One may infer that the tactic was working.

The strikes and demonstrations of 24 February were similar to those of the day before, except more than twice as large. If over 80,000 workers struck on 23 February, roughly 200,000 struck on 24 February. If relatively few workers reached the Nevskii on the day before, many marched there on 24 February. Workers from a number of factories acted to sustain and spread the strikes on this occasion. The friendly attitude of the Cossacks, an unexpected development, made an immediate impression on workers, with the result that their newfound aggressive mood was not crushed, but encouraged. The parties played a role here as well. The Mezhraionka's leaflet called for continuation of the strikes and for "revolution," the position of the Left socialist bloc. Factory-level activists of the various parties urged workers out into the streets.

Markov's description of his adventures on 24 February captures the exhilaration, as well as the frustration, of the second day of revolutionary disorders. When Markov boarded a trolley car at 5:30 A.M. on the twenty-fourth, the car was filled with workers loudly discussing the strikes the day before. On finding out that one group of them was from the Geisler plant, Markov sent word through them to an SR leader there, an old friend, "*Bastovat*" (Strike). He also advised his fellow riders, wherever they worked, to come out on strike as well. When Markov arrived at the Arsenal, he found a group



Demonstration in front of the Petrograd Arsenal Plant, probably on 27 February. The various banners include one with the slogan "Zemila i Volia" (Land and Freedom). Reprinted from *Oktiabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie* (Leningrad, 1967), vol. 1, p. 73.

of party activists standing outside the plant, including the SRs Voronkov and Ivanov, a few Mensheviks, and the Bolsheviks Burtsev and Denisov. Voronkov described to the activists how at a meeting of the WIC workers' group the evening before the police had arrived and accused the session of being a "soviet of workers' deputies." Only the absence of contingents of workers from some districts, notably from the Vyborg side (most Vyborg activists were attending a joint SR-SD meeting), had convinced the police that this was a normal workers' group meeting, rather than a workers' soviet, thereby preventing arrests. Having visited the Petrogradskii District the evening before, the SR Ivanov reported that workers there were *ochen' dovol'ny* (very satisfied) with the Cossacks; on the Petrograd side, he claimed, the workers' mood was high.³¹

After a discussion of the previous day's strikebreakers, the activists decided to send an interparty delegation around to the various workshops to ensure that all workers walked out. At 6:40 Markov,

Samodurov (both SRs), and the Bolshevik Denisov began to make the rounds of the workshops. As it turned out, their tour was not needed. Over the objections of the foreman, the elder at one workshop, the SR Petrov, left to go find out for himself what was going on and quickly returned with the news that the other workshops were already going out on strike. On the way out of the huge plant, members of various workshops joined together. Out in the street, word soon circulated that Arsenal and Kornilov workers had brought out even the inert Rozenkrants in force. As on the day before, the slogan was "To the Nevskii!" The Patronnyi and Promet plants came out singing revolutionary songs.³² The revolutionary demonstrations of 24 February were in full swing.

Many of the workers' columns headed straight for the center of the city. Sizable groups of activists, however, ventured purposefully to the still-quiet Vasileostrovskii District. A passage from an article by Leiberov reveals how this occurred: "On 24 February Petrograd Bolsheviks and worker activists of petty bourgeois anti-war party groups [SRs, Left Mensheviks, Mezhraiontsy] succeeded in raising demonstrations among the proletariat of Vasileevskii-Ostrov."³³

Starting at 9:00 A.M. large groups of striking workers broke through police cordons set up to contain the revolutionary contagion and headed to the island's plants. Some of the Vasileevskii-Ostrov factories were in the process of coming out on their own. At a mass meeting in the Simens-Gal'ske plant, SR, Bolshevik, and Mezhraionka orators called for strikes and the overthrow of tsarism, after which the entire plant work force walked out on strike, joining at once the columns from the Vyborg and Petrograd sides. Similarly, joint SR, Bolshevik, and Left Menshevik agitation succeeded in persuading Simens-Shukkert workers to abandon the workplace. Columns of workers now some three thousand strong then headed for the Baltic shipbuilding and Gvozdil'nyi plants, where ten thousand workers were called out by external agitation. By the end of the day, some twenty-four thousand Vasileostrovskii workers joined the strike movement.³⁴

Memoirists, seconded by Soviet historians who utilize unpublished memoirs and police reports, noted the widespread use of political slogans on 24 February. The parties used various methods to introduce political slogans. Revolutionary leaflets (for example,

those the Mezhraionka issued before 23 February and again on 24 February) contained such slogans. Police reported that activists spoke at factory meetings on anti-war and antiregime themes. A certain Petr Tikhonov exhorted the outlying New Village subdistrict Shchetinin plant to go out on strike in imitation of Vyborg District workers: "We comrades should also quit work today to show solidarity with the other comrades and in order to obtain bread." Tikhonov then shouted the slogans "Down with the government, down with the monarchy, down with the war" and urged workers to arm themselves with whatever weapons available—nuts, bolts, or stones—because "only in this way will we get bread for ourselves."³⁵ Thus he intertwined economic and political issues (bread and the war). Such speeches, several of which police agents recorded at various locales, were a prime factor in the developing revolutionary situation.

On 24 February, heightened militancy and tenacity among the striking masses accompanied and probably resulted from the widespread use of radical slogans. Markov has described how, as the columns of Vyborg workers, augmented by those from the Petrograd side and the Vasileostrovskii District, headed for the Nevskii, mounted gendarmes and Cossacks blocked their way; enraged workers knocked the chief of police from his horse and killed him. "Thus began the revolution," was Markov's laconic remark years later. The gendarmes then attacked the columns repeatedly but could not stop them. One brutal onslaught occurred at the Shpalernoi Bridge, causing the crowds to run out on the ice to avoid being crushed. A mounted gendarme charged Markov, dealing him a painful blow on the back with a whip. As the columns reformed on the other side, Voronkov, who witnessed the attack on Markov, expressed amazement at seeing him still alive.³⁶

After reaching the Nevskii in great numbers, columns of workers shifted restlessly from the Znamenskaia Square, to the Kazan Cathedral, then to the Aleksandrovskii Garden, and back again in order to avoid arrest and attack. Some demonstrators carried red flags with the slogans "Democratic republic" and "Government responsible to the people." Markov led his column singing the revolutionary song, "Bravely, comrades, on your feet." Most of the workers Markov saw that day were from the Vyborg and Nevskii districts.

It was at this point, emphasized Markov, that workers for the *first* time began to propagandize soldiers in the streets. A huge demonstration formed at the Kazan Cathedral, at which workers, both men and women, and members of the intelligentsia spoke. Police began to circle the square. After the arrival of fresh unsubverted Cossacks, the crowds of 24 February melted away.³⁷

Utilizing unpublished memoirs in Soviet archives, Leiberov has reconstructed the events of 24 February from a different perspective but in a way that completely confirms Markov's portrait. Leiberov claims that between 11:00 A.M. and 12 noon the first workers' columns reached the Nevskii; most of the demonstrators were workers, but students also took part. No less than thirteen large columns of workers paraded on the Nevskii, totaling some thirty-six thousand persons. Six of the columns were disorganized, whereas seven were highly organized. The organized columns consisted of experienced proletarians (metalworkers, textileworkers, men, women, and youths) led by worker-activists. Leiberov specifies, as Markov averred, that the leaders were Left Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, SRs, and Mezhraiontsy. Organized marching lasted for two or three hours. Six mass meetings took place, at the Znamenskaia Square, the Kazan Cathedral, and other places. Representatives of all the parties addressed the meetings. Police agents lurked around the meetings, taking pictures of the speakers and strike leaders, an activity the crowds still perceived as a threat. At one point, they tossed two police photographers down onto the frozen Ekaterinskii Canal.³⁸ The high degree of coincidence between Markov's eyewitness account and Leiberov's historical reconstruction from a wide range of sources suggests that, as they claim, Left socialist activists led the strikes and demonstrations on 24 February.

25 FEBRUARY

As far as existing evidence reveals, no proclamations appeared on 25 February. This was, however, the first day of the general strike *and* a day when observers noticed a growing unruliness among soldiers. Encouraged by the size and stubbornness of the crowds on 23 and 24 February and wishing to counteract the military governor General Khabalov's proclamation to return to work, leftist groups

now acted to perpetuate the general strike. The Mezhraionka and the Bolshevik leadership came out for a three-day general strike. During the day of the twenty-fifth, a conference of SR activists voted to support prolonged strikes and demonstrations, and the anarchists laid plans for terrorist attacks on police and government institutions, including the bombing of the Okhranka headquarters.

Characteristic of the day are reports from Iurenev that his group delegated agitators to the centers of the city, where I. Krushinskii and B. Livshits gave especially fiery speeches at Znamenskaia Square and the Kazan Cathedral; Zenzinov stood quite close to the Left Menshevik A. Grinevich as he addressed a huge gathering at the Kazan Cathedral. P. Lur'e reports that the Cossacks and the soldiers openly ignored urgings from the police to fire on the demonstrators; he heard one orator call for workers to arm themselves at the Arsenal, another tell them to go to the Duma, and a third to elect the soviet. Massive student meetings took place at the Psycho-Neurological Institute and other schools, and fifteen to twenty thousand students joined the demonstrations. When mounted police veered threateningly toward one crowd, the Cossacks fired a volley that killed their chief; the crowds then threw bottles and grenades at the police and forcibly freed arrested demonstrators.³⁹ Several memoirists recall blood on the snow that day.

Although the studies of Burdzhilov, Wildman, Hasegawa, and Leiberov fully investigate many aspects of the demonstrations of 25 February, a day that witnessed a profound deepening of the revolutionary movement, several matters require further emphasis. For one thing, joint Left socialist leadership continued to foster revolutionary action in the factories and in the streets. The Bolshevik Kondrat'ev described a meeting in his Vyborg plant, the Novyi Parvainen, on the twenty-fifth:

Orators—Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, SRs. The call—go to the Nevskii. . . . One orator ended [his speech] with the revolutionary poem: "out of the way, outmoded world, from top to bottom overtaken. Young Russia is on the march." The atmosphere was incandescent. . . . A unified passion, to live or die in the struggle.

Likewise, an organized group of SR-Internationalist, Bolshevik, and Left Menshevik leaders summoned a meeting of more than four

thousand Aivaz workers; orators told the workers to be prepared to strike until March or until railroads, small plants, and workshops joined the existing general strike. After the meeting, Aivaz workers, having a long way to go from the suburban Lesnoi subdistrict, headed in small groups for the city's center.⁴⁰

At the huge Obukhovskii plant in the Nevskii District, a meeting of Menshevik-Internationalists, Bolsheviks, and Left SRs, the last of whom "enjoyed wide influence among Obukhov workers," reached a decision late on the evening of 24 February to urge plant workers to strike the next morning, a plan to which even Right SRs and Right Mensheviks in the plants raised no objections. During the morning of 25 February, an initiative group of Left SRs and Bolsheviks, with assistance from a group of young workers, made the rounds of workshops, with the result that by 9:00 A.M. the plant's operations ground to a halt. Thousands of workers gathered near the exit, where they listened to socialist orators who urged them to head for the center of the city. Ten thousand Obukhovtsy marched, merging with masses of strikers from the Atlas, Izhorskii, Farforovyi, and Aleksandrovskii plants. Having struck at noon, over ten thousand workers at the suburban Okhtinskii plant listened as strike representatives announced to the plant managers that they were striking because of "bread shortages." A joint strike committee of Left SRs, anarchists, Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Internationalists, and nonpartisan activists decided to organize worker brigades in shifts to maintain the especially sensitive kerosene production process; the rest of the workers joined the demonstrations with the slogan "Bread, freedom, and peace."⁴¹

Most of the Moskovskii District plants, where since 1905 the SRs wielded considerable influence, joined the strike movement on 25 February. At the Narva District Putilov Works, with its thirty thousand employees the largest enterprise in the capital, a workers' committee of Left SRs, Bolsheviks, anarchists, and Left Mensheviks took shape on 25 February and, in the words of the Soviet historian Leiberov, "became an inter-party revolutionary executive organ." The joint strike committee decided to organize an armed detachment, establish revolutionary order in the streets, and disarm the police of the Narva District. The giant Vasileostrovskii District Trubochnyi plant, with its twenty thousand workers, also unexpectedly

joined the demonstrations. Authorities had thought that the sizable Right Menshevik and Right SR organizations there would, as on the previous days, restrain the factory's employees. Instead, the relatively small Mezhraionka, Menshevik-Internationalist, Bolshevik, and Left SR collectives successfully agitated for a strike, with the result that by 1:00 P.M. the entire shift of ten thousand workers left the plant.⁴²

During the February crisis, special centers for coordinating activities were developing in the various workers' districts. Already on 21 February, the police received reports that the sickness fund office at the Diuflon plant was playing the role of "revolutionary headquarters" for the entire Petrograd side. By the twenty-fifth, these revolutionary centers were appearing everywhere: in the Vyborg District, the office of the workers' cooperative association provided this service; in the Narva District, the Putilov cooperative *Trudovoi put'* (Labor's path); in the Vasileostrovskii District, the cooperatives *Ob'edinenie* (Union) and *Vpered* (Forward); in the New Village sub-district, the cooperative *Edinenie* (Unity). In the factories themselves, sickness fund offices usually filled this role. At these sites, Leiberov has reported, "Brief meetings took place as well as conferences of representatives of the various parties, including Bolsheviks, Mezhraiontsy, Left SRs, and Menshevik-Internationalists, who exchanged party and revolutionary information, worked out routes for workers' columns, and reached agreement on actions with neighboring enterprises."

Just a few days after the February Revolution, the Moscow newspaper *Russkoe slovo* (Russian word) published a review of the recent events in the capital that stated: "On 25 February, the movement took on a more organized character. Organized groups of workers participated." Among others, the paper named the metallist, textile worker, and printers' unions as playing a role. In addition, then, to the cooperatives and sickness funds, which were legally operating entities, the underground unions evidently activated. Regardless, illegal interparty strike committees, which, in the words of Leiberov, "during the war alone were recognized by the Petrograd proletariat," utilized the "revolutionary headquarters" described previously to give the movement the "organized character" numerous observers noted.⁴³

The twenty-fifth also witnessed a very different but equally significant development. Until then, moderate SRs and Mensheviks in the factories had related equivocally or even with hostility to the mass demonstrations; on 23 and 24 February, they had attempted to restrain workers from striking. On 23 February the Right Menshevik Zhukov, head of the influential Menshevik organization at the Feniks plant, spoke out at a factory meeting against wartime strikes and accused those calling for them of "adventurism." Zhukov effectively prevented a strike at Feniks until columns of workers arrived at the gates of the factory, after which roughly half the Feniks workers walked out. Menshevik defensists at the Nobel plant also had some success in restraining workers by telling them, "It was necessary to wait and not to go out in the streets." Right SRs and Mensheviks restrained the Trubochnyi workers for two days.⁴⁴

Shortly after the failure of its 14 February plans, the Central WIC Workers' Group members still at large (the SRs Ostapenko and Anosovskii) issued a restraining appeal just as strikes broke out at the Putilov plant that remained in effect when the 23 February disturbances began: "Comrades, . . . return to work at once. The working class, in awareness of its responsibility during the current moment, should not weaken its forces. . . . The interests of the working class summons you to your workplace." On the evening of the twenty-third moderate SR and Menshevik leaders of the Petrograd Union of Consumer Societies called a meeting of primarily moderate activists from the cooperatives, sickness funds, and WIC workers' groups. The conference, which took place at the sickness fund office of the Semenov Machinery plant on the Petrograd side, reached a decision that, in view of the mood of the masses, it was necessary to urge workers to go to the State Duma with the slogan "Bread and peace."⁴⁵ On 23 and 24 February, the moderates in the factories opposed the strikes; however, if they could not deter the workers from striking, they wished to channel them, as in mid-February, toward the Duma.

The moderate socialist intelligentsia, which took its cues from the heads of the socialist Duma factions, adopted the same cautious position as the moderate worker-leaders in the factories, cooperatives, and WIC workers' groups. While walking down the street on the evening of 23 February, the SR intelligent Postnikov met the SR

labor activist Evreinova, who had just come from the cooperative offices, where she had learned of the day's events from Markov and other activists who dropped in there. She enthusiastically described to him how factory workers' circles had taken the initiative that day. Postnikov, who was no rightist, nevertheless responded to Evreinova's news with reserve and expressed the view that the workers' movement was weak, whereas other classes (that is the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia) were better informed politically and could provide more stubborn leadership against the tsar. His attitude toward the developing revolution was therefore quite similar to that of the Right SRs Zenzinov and Kerensky, who at this time expressed equally negative views about a workers' revolution.⁴⁶

The divergence between the leftist activists of the various parties and the moderate intelligentsia leaders already had a lengthy history going back to the 1908-1912 "liquidator" versus "partiitsy" debates. Ever since mid-1915, however, a community of views had arisen between the two sides about the necessity of overthrowing the tsarist regime; however, as already noted, their war goals and their views about the posttsarist government were not identical. By February, with tensions increasing day by day and prospects for an actual uprising becoming brighter by the moment, the differences between the Right and Left socialists had, for a time, again outweighed the agreements. The 14 February contretemps had perfectly illustrated the dichotomy. For a time after the opening of the Duma, the two socialist camps worked at cross-purposes, a situation that continued even after they began meeting together in the All-Socialist Bureau during the early phase of the actual revolutionary disturbances. Early opposition to the demonstrations by the Menshevik and SR intelligenty and their moderate counterparts in the factories must be seen in this light; they wanted a revolution, but a controlled and limited one. As the Right Menshevik M. Skobelev described the Right socialist position, "Holding that the immediate successors to the autocratic regime were the bourgeois elements of the country, we expended all energies in order to force the propertied classes to take power into their own hands." Sukhanov also notes that the defensist elements, especially the Right Mensheviks, "wished to solve the political problem in favor of bourgeois power" (but, he adds with perhaps some exaggeration, they had "no serious

influence whatsoever among the masses").⁴⁷ When they failed to hinder the movement in the streets, the moderate SR-Menshevik bloc had to move to a more active stance or risk seeing a revolution led solely by Left socialists intent on ending the war.

Leiberov has noted that even on 24 February the Right socialists in the Duma still took the position that the workers' demonstrations were incapable of overthrowing the regime. Police reports suggest an exquisite ambivalence in the Right socialist outlook; one astute police agent described how the Right Mensheviks and Trudoviks in the Duma wavered between on the one hand urging the government to attack the worker demonstrations and on the other "marching at the head of the . . . [workers'] movement." By late 24 February, however, "on their own initiative," moderates in the cooperatives, WIC workers' groups, and health funds began to come over to the revolution; by the twenty-fifth, the moderate socialist leaders also returned to an activist stance.⁴⁸ The tendency of the entire Petrograd work force to join the strikes, which until then had had the backing only of the Left socialists, underlay this Right socialist shift to the Left, which on 25 February recreated a certain fragile unity in the socialist camp.

The change of heart of moderate socialists led them to summon two meetings on the twenty-fifth. The Petrograd Union of Consumer Societies called a city-wide conference of cooperative officials, mostly moderate Mensheviks and SRs. The more than fifty moderate worker leaders who attended listened to reports from the various districts and resolved to create a soviet of workers' deputies on the example of 1905. This was the first open espousal of elections to the soviet (Sukhanov recalled that at the joint socialist meetings of 23 and 24 February Skobelev had already raised this issue); however, Left SR and Mezhrainka spokespeople at the cooperative conference warned against the premature formation of a soviet. The Right Mensheviks later complained that this warning delayed for a day or two serious steps to convene the Petrograd Soviet.⁴⁹ Later in the day, two leaders of the Central WIC Workers' Group, the SRs I. Ostapenko and E. Anosovskii, both of whom had close ties with the Right socialists in the Duma, summoned a meeting of all workers' group representatives still at large after the extensive arrests in early February.

The pretext for calling the meeting was the "food crisis," but its actual purpose was to develop a strategy to increase the Right socialists' involvement in what had become a near-revolutionary situation. Among other plans, it resolved to send Ostapenko and Anosovskii to that evening's Petrograd city дума session, also scheduled to discuss the food crisis. As at a previous workers' group meeting on 23 February, police promptly arrived and this time were not deterred from carrying out arrests, including of Ostapenko and Anosovskii. One of the moderate worker leaders shouted as he was led away by police, "One more effort and victory is ours! Don't give up!" thus revealing the militance of even the moderate socialists by this time. The city дума session that evening, attended by numerous workers and students, heard ringing speeches from Skobelev, Kerensky, the cooperative leader I. Volkov, the Kadet A. Shingarev, and others from various social groups; it gave a symbolic christening to the Right socialist return to the revolutionary fold by closing with resolutions that demanded a change of government and free speech and association.⁵⁰

In order to prevent Left socialist domination of the movement in the streets, moderates took a distinctly more radical position than a day or so earlier. The attempt to channel the workers toward the State Duma having failed, the moderate socialists decided to take the bull by the horns by coming out foursquare behind the strike and by calling for the soviet. As regards both matters, the strike and the soviet, the somewhat belated Right socialist initiative met with success: the normally passive portion of the workers (the 200,000 or 300,000 who rarely struck but who were now coming out into the streets) tended to accept leadership from the moderates, who, two days later, stole the march in summoning the soviet.

Late that evening, the Okhranka, under the direct orders of Minister of the Interior Protopopov, responded to the burgeoning revolutionary movement by arresting 136 activists of the various parties, including five members of the Bolshevik PC.⁵¹ This was Protopopov's swan song: the arrests in no way hindered the transformation of the uprising into a revolution. The reestablished identity of immediate goals—overthrow the tsar and elect soviets—within the socialist movement, temporary as it was, signified an oppositionist block that included the Left and Right socialists and, through the

latter's auspices, all shades of liberals. Crystalline in its fragility, this bloc was nonetheless lethal enough to overturn the existing regime. Right and Left SRs, Right and Left SDs, as well as Kadets and Octobrists, not to mention some conservative elements, wished to see the regime fall; a similar coalition (sans the right-wing element) had proved its potency in October 1905. By 25 February, everyone, except the regime's bureaucrats, some military officers, and the police, had abandoned the attempt to restrain the workers' movement. The Left socialists wanted the workers, plus the soldiers, to establish a revolutionary socialist government; the Right socialists, liberals and others wished, in alliance with the workers, to kick aside the decrepit tsarist regime in favor of a new government under moderate leadership.

26 FEBRUARY

On 26 February, the Mezhraionka and the SRs, acting jointly, issued two proclamations in large quantities, one addressed to workers and the other to soldiers; both leaflets appealed to the workers and soldiers to ignore the government's appeals to end the disorders and, instead, urged continuation of the general strike. The leaflet "To the soldiers" advised the soldiers to imitate the example of the Cossacks in refraining from attacking demonstrators. Both leaflets also suggested that workers and soldiers join in attacking the old regime.⁵² The appearance of these two leaflets, printed and distributed in large quantities by two influential leftist socialist groups on the eve of the downfall of the old regime, is of significance. The leaflets also reflected the positions agreed on by a majority of the Left socialist bureau: the documents did not as yet call for the soviets but urged revolution in every other respect, including a special appeal to the soldiers. (The questions of the soviet and the soldiers had a vital relationship: until the soldiers came over no soviet could be convened.)

At this point, the Left socialist bloc remained in a mode of restraining the masses on the matter of soviet elections. By no later than 24 February, workers in the various districts had begun to discuss the prospect of forming soviets; as mentioned, on 25 February a conference of moderate cooperative activists called for a soviet and

some orators on the Nevskii Prospekt did the same; and by 24 and 25 February some factories began to elect soviet deputies. But the SR-Mezhraionka leaflets did not mention the soviets, and the SR delegates to the 25 February cooperative conference warned against the immediate creation of a soviet of workers' deputies as "dangerous since it would be hard to defend."⁵³ A reasonable conclusion is that, as the Right socialists later complained, the Left socialists prevented the formation of the soviet on 25 and 26 February.

To a considerable extent, the workers' movement of 26 February followed the well-established pattern of earlier days. One police report from that day indicates exactly how the already noted district revolutionary headquarters operated. At noon, fifty persons gathered at the cooperative "Unity" in the New Village subdistrict of the Petrograd side. They reached a decision to take measures to ensure that on the next morning (27 February) all workshops of the plants in the subdistrict went out on strike, after which they should head for an agreed-on place on the Nevskii Prospekt; after meeting at 10:00 A.M. on the Nevskii, they would take part in various planned demonstrations.⁵⁴

The fateful difference between this and earlier days was that on this day, on orders, the soldiers opened fire on the crowds, killing and wounding many demonstrators (on the twenty-fifth only police units had fired on demonstrators and casualties had been light). Late that afternoon and evening, some of the very troops of the Pavlovskii Guards Regiment who had participated in the massacre rebelled against their officers (some reports claimed that many soldiers were also incensed because several units had received orders to don police uniforms and augment the police in the streets). The government had expended its final credit among the soldier masses; instead of quelling the demonstrations, the bloody tragedy in the streets led to a massive soldiers' revolt, which, along with the workers' strike movement, augmented by significant support from radical students and liberal elements of society, completed the alignment of social forces necessary to overthrow tsarism.

Although histories have explored many aspects of the soldiers' revolt in very great detail, several points require further elucidation, especially as regards the SRs. Clear evidence about socialist activities within the Petrograd garrison on 26 and 27 February is scarce,

but logic suggests that the SRs and other Left socialists would hardly have failed to encourage and direct the Petrograd soldiers' uprising when it came. The government had punished thousands of revolutionaries, especially SRs, by sending them into the army; many radicals were therefore located at the front and in the garrisons, including in Petrograd. Additionally, by mid-1915 the SRs and Bolsheviks had promoted a policy of sending activists into the military for revolutionary purposes. Elections to soldiers' committees and to the soviets beginning on 27 February revealed large numbers of SR and SD activists in the units of the Petrograd garrison. The presence of sizable cadres of socialists of all the leftist parties, the SRs foremost among them, in all branches of Russia's military was a major (and as yet largely unexamined) factor in the soldiers' revolt.

Long ago Sukhanov, the prime eyewitness reporter of the revolution, stated unequivocally, "One thing is certain: there were great numbers of politically conscious and party elements in all the units of the Petersburg garrison . . . [who] not only were capable of taking up the movement, becoming its center, and lending it the inspiration of some political generalization, but their doing so was inevitable." More recently, the Soviet historian Leiberov has utilized archival sources to draw attention to the role of a "group of junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, [associated] with the SR party" in the revolt of the Petrograd garrison. Leiberov claims that soldiers of the Volynskii, Litovskii, and Preobrazhenskii regiments and the Sixth Sapper Battalion were under SR and, to a lesser extent, Menshevik and Bolshevik influence exerted through underground organizations in the units themselves.⁵⁵ Iurenev reported that much of the 172nd Reserve Regiment near Petrograd was under Mezhraionka influence, and the Bolshevik Tarasov-Rodionov, an officer in a unit stationed at Oranienbaum just outside Petrograd, has described how, when news came of disturbances in Petrograd, soldiers of his and other nearby units overthrew their officers and turned instead for leadership to officers and NCOs who were SR and SD party members, after which the units marched on Petrograd to join the revolution. (In a similar important episode from a distant part of the empire, Lieutenant Sergei Lazo, an SR-Internationalist, led his entire regiment fully armed into the service of the newly formed revolutionary government in Krasnoiarsk and thereby as-

sured the success of the revolution there.) About the Petrograd garrison during February, the Soviet historian K. F. Shatsillo also notes the "significant influence among the soldier masses [of various revolutionaries and] especially of the SRs."⁵⁶

The units of the Petrograd garrison experienced not only subversion from within but agitation from without. During the war years, the Left SRs, Left Mensheviks, and Mezhraiontsy had channeled numerous proclamations toward the men in gray uniforms. The police reported that even before the final round of revolutionary disorders soldiers and workers had begun to talk and at times act together. Additionally, SR and Bolshevik workers in the Vyborg District had directly propagandized and subverted units in the nearby garrisons. Markov recalled that on 24 February workers began to appeal openly for soldiers to join the revolution. By 25 February contact between worker-activists and soldiers in the streets was quite widespread. A particularly strong bond developed between workers and soldiers who had worked in factories before military service. During the course of the street demonstrations on 25 February, Markov met and sought to influence soldier-proletarians from Moscow, Briansk, and Ekaterinoslav. The dialogue between soldiers and workers gradually overcame the long-established barrier of distrust between the two groups. As noted by the SR provocateur "Kochegar" in a report he turned in on 25 February, this process posed a grave potential threat to the regime:

Among the military units sent to quell the disorders, a tendency to play around with the demonstrators has been observed, and some units relate to [the strikers] protectively . . . [and] have encouraged the crowds by calling to them to "press on harder." If this is allowed to continue and if control [of the military units] passes to the leaders of the revolutionary underground, then the disturbances will assume the widest character.⁵⁷

Despite Kochegar's warning, the regime was powerless to alter the process by which activists both within and outside the units influenced soldiers to join workers and students in the uprising. The Mezhraionka's leaflets for 23 and 24 February mentioned the necessity for soldiers to come over to the revolution. On the twenty-fifth the Mezhraionka sent student agitators to soldiers' barracks. Ob-

servers recalled seeing the Mezhraionets Iurenev and the Left SR Aleksandrovich urge group after group of soldiers at the huge demonstrations near Kazan Cathedral that day to join the revolution. A young Socialist activist, S. Afinogenov-Stepnoi, witnessed the demonstrations in downtown Petrograd each day of the crisis; in his recollections published in 1918, Afinogenov recalled that during the afternoon of 25 February socialist activists—possibly Iurenev and Aleksandrovich—spoke to the soldier throngs at the Kazan Cathedral in the following vein: "Comrade soldier! If you are satisfied in your souls to fire on your brothers only because they have come out [into the streets] to get bread, then shoot, comrades, obey the orders of your commanders who look upon you as slaves. . . . But, comrades, you are no longer slaves!" During the course of the day, the SRs initiated a program they called "the union of the soldiers with the people" (*soiuz soldat s narodom*).⁵⁸

The first evidence that the leftist agitation was having an effect concerns the late evening of 25 February. The next day the police spy "Krest'ianinov" reported that a number of sailors of the Second Baltic Fleet Command (a unit stationed in Petrograd) held a secret meeting in the cellars of the unit's barracks. At this meeting they reached a decision that at 6:00 A.M., 27 February, they would seize weapons and shells from the armory room, occupy all entries, arrest the commanders, arm members of the unit, and, on the basis of the circumstances, proceed to further action. These individuals were almost certainly members of an underground cell of the type reported by Leiberov.⁵⁹ This report filed on 26 February contains signs that as early as 25 February someone had already formulated plans for the garrison uprising on 27 February; if further evidence were to confirm this, it would be of extreme importance as regards the carrying out of the revolution.

On 26 (and 27) February, the actual days of the soldiers' uprising, the Mezhraionka and the SRs addressed joint leaflets with explicitly revolutionary calls to the soldiers. Bolshevik leaders and agitators, who were also concerned about the soldiers, carried out verbal agitation similar to that of the SRs and Mezhraionka. Naturally, the party activists did not always know what to say to soldiers. Late on the twenty-sixth, the Left Menshevik Ermanskii ran into one group of officerless soldiers from the rebellious Pavlovskii Regi-

ment, but his "attempts to influence them, to create any sort of general goals and tasks, had no results. It grew dark. Little by little . . . they disappeared back to the barracks." Similarly, Kaiurov went that evening to one barracks, where he found soldiers intermingling with workers. Thinking to bring a military unit under direct revolutionary control, he shouted the magic word *Stroi!* (Fall in!) and, wonder of wonders, they stepped into ranks. Unfortunately, Kaiurov knew no other commands and after several embarrassing moments a peach-faced ensign marched the unit off to some unnamed task, after which Kaiurov restricted his activities to workers.⁶⁰ Anecdotal evidence suggests that the soldiers did not respond well to direct commands from worker-oriented activists but had to be approached as equals and in terms meaningful to their own predicament.

Police reports indicate that the party hierarchies took steps to channel propaganda directly to the soldiers. On the morning of 26 February, the SR agent provocateur "Matveev" attended and reported in detail on a meeting of the Vasileostrovskii District Left SR, Mezhraionka, and Bolshevik organizations with some twenty-eight activists present. The group agreed on a common program that called for a continuation of the strikes and demonstration, the collection of arms, and the disarmament of city police through surprise attacks. Leiberov characterizes this program as a "list of preparatory measures for an armed uprising." Before the meeting dispersed, party representatives handed out packets of the SR-Mezhraionka leaflet "To the soldiers" for distribution to troops in the streets.⁶¹ Iurenev and Aleksandrovich, who were responsible for the drafting and printing of these leaflets, had forwarded them to their district organizations, which in turn handed them down further for distribution.

Several educational establishments, most notably the Psycho-Neurological and Polytechnical institutes, served as centers for feeding, housing, and organizing mutinous soldiers and sailors from Petrograd and areas outside the city. Tarasov-Rodionov, a Bolshevik officer in a unit from nearby Oranienbaum, recalled how his and other units found quartering and food at the Psycho-Neurological Institute. According to Tarasov's recollection, young revolutionaries acted as coordinators at these centers; these were members of the joint SR-SD student organization that arose in the capital just before

the February crisis. The precise impact of this contact between soldiers and radical students is difficult to measure, but it is worthwhile noting that the student organization, which mobilized a sizable proportion of the capital's students through mass meetings from the twenty-fifth on, occupied an extreme leftist position (agitating for soviet power) before, during, and immediately after the February Revolution.⁶²

Socialist agitation of another sort also played a role among the soldiers during the February days. Whereas the Left socialists wanted soldiers to join the crowds in the streets and help form a radical revolutionary government, the Right socialists had other intentions. For several days before 27 February, Kadets and moderate SRs and Mensheviks in the Duma carried out intensive "anti-monarchical, republican" agitation in the barracks near the Tauride Palace.⁶³ As will be shown, this agitation continued on 27 February as well.

On the evening of 26 February, the leaders of the Petrograd socialist movement gathered at Kerensky's apartment for what, unbeknown to them, was their last prerevolutionary convocation; in attendance were all those mentioned at the first meeting, with the exception of Shliapnikov and Pozhhello (the latter was sitting in jail and the former was for some reason incommunicado), but with the additions of N. Sukhanov from the Left Mensheviks and M. Berzin and S. F. Znamenskii of the Trudoviks. The Right SR Zenzinov later recalled with annoyance the behavior at this meeting of Iurenev and Aleksandrovich, both of whom, he confided, "worked closely with the Bolsheviks." "At every inconvenient opportunity," according to Zenzinov, "Aleksandrovich . . . emphasized his Zimmerwaldism, internationalism, and defeatism." In general, the representatives of the illegal organization, recalled the Right SR, acted as though they were the only true socialists in the company of "a bunch of liberals" and counterposed themselves to the *obshchestvennye* (social) organizations such as the Duma, in which many of the Right socialists present held seats.⁶⁴

In Iurenev's terse description, the last meeting was "rather stormy. We discussed the question of the workers' strikes and demonstrations since the 23rd, the shootings in the streets, and the prospects for the future." Iurenev promised to provide a detailed description of the meeting at some future time, a commitment, to our misfortune, he never made good. Nevertheless, several accounts exist. Ac-

cording to Kerensky's recollections, Iurenev argued that the reaction was gaining strength, the unrest in the barracks was subsiding, and the revolutionaries had no choice but to wait for a better day. Zenzinov seconds Kerensky's version and quotes Iurenev: "No, there won't be any revolution." The Left socialists such as Iurenev and Aleksandrovich, claims Zenzinov, took a "wait and see" attitude toward the movement in the streets. Consequently, the Right socialists concluded that the leftists had underestimated the significance of the events. Another bone of contention between the two sides was the Left socialist slogan "Down with the war!" which the Right socialists feared would alienated the liberals and which Aleksandrovich and Iurenev refused to abandon in their mass agitation. A 5 March 1917 article in the newspaper *Den'* reported that at this meeting the Left SRs and Mezhrayontsy argued against the formation of a soviet since it "had insufficient support," an observation that both confirms the tenor of Zenzinov's and Kerensky's recollections and provides hints as to what was going on.⁶⁵

The alleged Left socialist caution had its origins in intersocialist competition. The Right Mensheviks, Right SRs, Bundists, Trudoviks, and Popular Socialists, all with Duma representation, habitually worked out programs jointly (they had, for example, attempted to channel the workers toward the Tauride Palace on 14 February). On the morning of 27 February, this same group gathered at the Duma and took fateful, and in this case successful, steps to ensure that workers and soldiers would go to the Tauride Palace (discussed later). A pattern becomes clear: on 14 February, again between 23 and 25 February, and finally on 27 February, the Right socialists exerted all their energies to have the masses go to the Duma.⁶⁶

The leftists at the 26 February meeting argued against the summoning of a soviet (which in principle they advocated) to counter the Right socialists' intentions to take steps the next day to call the soviet to meet at the Duma. The Left socialists, who, as on 14 February, did not want anything to happen at the Duma, used the tactic of downplaying the mass movement and support for the soviet. (Why else would they insist, just as the first units were rebelling, the news of which traveled like wildfire and was known to all at this meeting, that the soldiers' unrest was subsiding?) As mentioned, Zenzinov felt that Iurenev's and Aleksandrovich's arguments conveyed the impression that they underestimated the seriousness of the situation.⁶⁷

However, between 25 and 27 February, as heads of their respective parties, they took a series of actions that clearly demonstrate that, far from lagging behind the events, they were step by step urging the masses toward revolution. (The very next morning, they issued a proclamation utterly at odds with what they had told the Right socialists.) The divergence on the question of summoning the soviet disclosed the acute tension that still existed between the Right and Left socialists as each side maneuvered to assume control of the mass movement. In earnest, they now reengaged in the duel about the nature of the revolution.

The phenomenon of the All-Socialist Informational Bureau, which held meetings right through the February crisis and encompassed the whole socialist leadership in Petrograd, is as intriguing as it is important. The police were aware of the meetings and intended to raid the 26 February meeting and arrest the participants but, harried by the deepening disorders, failed to implement the plan.⁶⁸

Sometime after the tumultuous all-socialist meeting, the leftists held their meeting. Unfortunately, no detailed information is available about this session. The leftists must have discussed what to do in light of possible Right socialist attempts to take control of the mass movement. Iurenev notes only that the Bolshevik Pozhello and the Left Menshevik Sokolovskii failed to attend. Pozhello failed to go to the final meeting because the Bolshevik PC had been arrested (likewise, Shliapnikov recalled that he failed to attend the last all-socialist conference earlier on the evening of 26 February because no one had informed him of it).⁶⁹ As for the Left Mensheviks, by the evening of 27 February they had rejoined the SRs and the Mezhraiontsy in various activities. In view of its brief life and the failure of the Bolsheviks and Left Mensheviks to attend its crucial February 26 meeting, the Left socialist bureau does not, at first consideration, appear to be very important. The Left bloc members, however, acted jointly to publish virtually all the proclamations that appeared between 23 and 27 February, led the workers of numerous factories to strike and demonstrate, and agitated widely in the streets and barracks. Furthermore, early on the morning of 27 February, a key day in Russia's history, the Mezhraionka issued in the name of the leftist SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks, who comprised the membership of the leftist bureau, an important proclamation that represented the decisions of the group's last meeting.

27 FEBRUARY

After the events of 26 February, the last full day of tsarism, Shurkanov, trusted Bolshevik party comrade, former PC member, current Vyborg Committee member, and, last but not least, police agent under the pseudonym "Limonin," turned in to his superiors in the Ministry of the Interior a fascinating report that portrayed the role of the party activists in what he had no doubt was an impending revolution. The police agent pointed out that workers were going to their factories the next morning (27 February) with the sole aim of organizing their demonstrations so that they could go out into the streets in an orderly fashion; they intended to "achieve full success." The factories, claimed Shurkanov, had become revolutionary information centers where "experienced orators electrify the crowds, coordinate the actions of individual factories, and provide the demonstrations with overall agreement and organization." The movement had originally broken out without preparation over the food crisis, but by the evening of 24 February, "when revolutionary circles put forward the slogans 'down with the war' and 'down with the government,'" activists had taken charge of planning the demonstrations. Since the soldiers were for the most part tolerating and even encouraging the demonstrators, the masses were becoming convinced "The authorities were powerless to put down the movement . . . [which] would not die out, but would . . . move on to a final victory in overthrowing the government." Shurkanov therefore advised the government to close down the factories for "two or three days" so as to hinder their use by the activists for revolutionary purposes.⁷⁰ Like the warning of the SR police spy "Kochegar" about the soldiers, Shurkanov-Limonin's advice was pertinent but in vain.

Remarkably, the Shurkanov document precisely delineated the process by which Left socialist activists used the factories as forums for bringing their messages to the broadest mass of workers, described how the activists organized demonstrations, and accurately prognosticated the events of 27 February, namely, the soldiers' uprising and the formation of the soviet. If a police spy understood these last points, then the socialists on whom he was spying and about whom he was reporting must also have had this awareness.

Still, the morning of 27 February witnessed a certain hiatus in the intensity of the workers' movement. Virtually the entire work force

of the capital struck, but the downtown streets were empty and the government showed some signs of organizing a counterattack.⁷¹ The slaughter in the streets the day before may have frightened people. Or was this the calm before the storm? In any case, the massive soldiers' uprising quickly rendered moot the question of the workers' mood.

Early on the morning of 27 February 1917, the last day of the old regime (although this was as yet certain to no one), the Mezhrainka distributed a leaflet in the name of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SRs. It addressed the workers and noted "we have been fired upon," a reference to the shootings in the streets on 26 February. The proclamation congratulated the Cossacks for attacking the mounted police and praised the Pavlovskii Regiment, which, after firing on the demonstrators, had mutinied. The proclamation again advised that everyone ignore the government's call to return to work, recommended a continuation of the general strike, and suggested that workers cut off electricity into the city. The purpose of the leaflet was to encourage workers who might be dismayed by the casualties the day before to continue the demonstrations. Since the soldiers as a whole had not yet revolted, the leaflet's drafters still observed silence about the soviet but edged closer by advocating the election of "factory and district committees."⁷²

Although this leaflet had as its general purpose to further, under adverse circumstances, the cause of the revolution that the Left socialists had been promoting ever since 23 February, it also contained an admonition that sheds light on the Left socialist bureau:


We Bolsheviks, Menshevik SDs, and SRs summon the proletariat of Petersburg and all Russia to organization and feverish mobilization of our forces. Comrades! In the factories organize illegal strike committees. Link one district to another. Organize collections for the illegal press and for arms. Prepare yourselves, comrades. The hour of decisive struggle is nearing.⁷³

The leaflet (whose text originated shortly after its writers had told the Right socialists that the disturbances were over!) is thus best understood not only as an attempt to turn the general strike into an uprising but as a representation of the plans of the SRs, the Left Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks, and the Mezhraintsy who comprised the Left socialist bloc. The Left Socialist Information Bureau's 26

February evening session, attended by the SRs and the Mezhraiontsy (the latter of which had a Left Menshevik-Bolshevik constituency), reached agreement on the line to be taken and the slogans to be used. The leaflet had no party signature: consequently, anyone reading it would perceive it as coming from a joint collective of the parties mentioned in the text, as its issuers clearly intended.

More or less simultaneously with the distribution of the Left socialist leaflet, a group of Right socialists, including Kerensky, Chkheidze, Skobelev, Sokolov, and Zenzinov (the same group that had argued so fiercely with the Left socialists at the joint meeting the evening before) gathered at the Tauride Palace to carry out a concrete program of actions that built on and expanded the initiative begun by the moderate socialist worker-leaders two day earlier. Kerensky arranged a room for their deliberations; the Right socialists who met throughout the twenty-seventh at the Duma were the kernel around which the Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet formed later in the day. Between 9:00 A.M. and noon, Right SR and Right Menshevik delegates from this group agitated with great effect in the Tauride and Kirochnyi barracks, urging the soldiers to go to the nearby Tauride Palace, where the Duma was located (and where later in the day the new Petrograd Soviet, under Right socialist auspices, actually took shape). By 27 February, all socialists urged the soldiers onto revolutionary pathways, but in this case the Right won an enormous victory in starting a movement of soldiers to the Tauride Palace, home of the Duma. Commentators agree that by this time the revolutionary initiative had gone to the soldiers; when they began reporting en masse to the Tauride Palace, workers, who also were the subjects of intense Right socialist agitation, followed suit. The Right socialists had taken a big step in the direction of containing the revolution within certain limits.⁷⁴

After early successful agitation among the soldiers, during the afternoon the Right socialists turned to the problem of the workers, who normally responded more willingly to the Left socialists. By early in the afternoon, several Right Menshevik and Right SR WIC workers' group members, who had been arrested several weeks earlier, were freed when the crowds attacked the jails; they immediately headed for the Duma to make common cause with their socialist allies there. By 2:00 P.M. the enlarged Right socialist group had issued a proclamation to workers to elect soviet deputies and



Street demonstration on the Nevskii Prospekt, Petrograd, during the February Revolution, with banner calling for a democratic republic, constitutional assembly, and land and freedom. Reprinted from *Oktiabr'skoe voozruzhennoe vosstanie* (Leningrad, 1967), vol. 1, p. 71.

send them to the Tauride Palace; they issued this proclamation under the signature of the self-designated Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Several Right socialists then made tours of selected large factories to urge them to follow the advice in the proclamation; one of them, Gvozdev, even used an open car belonging to one of the wealthy Duma members, a certain baron, to make the rounds of factories. The Bolshevik Aleksandrov recalled that at 3:00 P.M. someone from the Menshevik Duma faction telephoned the Putilov cooperative *Trudovoi put'* with instructions to elect soviet deputies and send them to the Tauride Palace.⁷⁵ These highly pointed actions opened up the last round in the fateful struggle between Right and Left socialists over the nature of the February Revolution.

In the first (14 February) round in this duel, the Left socialist bloc prevailed by influencing the workers, who had struck largely at

Right socialist urging, to stay away from the Tauride Palace. When demonstrations began on 23 February, Right socialists evinced suspicion and reserve toward the mass movement and again raised the slogan of having workers petition the Duma instead of engaging in street demonstrations. But by late 24 and early 25 February, to head off Left socialist domination of the movement, moderate socialists came out for the strikes and, even earlier than the Left socialists, for the soviet; a sort of standoff ensued, in which moderate socialist support helped extend the strikes to include the entire working population but Left socialist warnings delayed the summoning of the soviet. By the morning of the twenty-seventh, the moderates clearly intended to steal the march on the radicals in sponsoring the creation of the Petrograd Soviet.

Ever since 1905, however, there had been two versions of what the soviet should be: leftists wanted it to function as a government based directly on the mass elements of Russian society, whereas moderates visualized it as a coordinating body for the affairs of workers and other social groups, an arrangement that would leave the actual government in the hands of the liberals centered in the Duma. The Right socialists wished to prevent the creation of a mass-oriented government of soviets under Left socialist leadership, which, they correctly feared, would move to end Russia's involvement in the war.⁷⁶ This is the significance of their early formation of the Provisional Executive Committee and their calls for soldiers and workers to gather at the Tauride Palace and send their soviet deputies there as well.

The next two leaflets to appear on 27 February were the mysterious "RSDRP" and "Finland Station" documents. Regarding the RSDRP leaflet, the Japanese historian Wada plausibly suggests the likelihood that the Mezhraionka was responsible. Judging from its contents, the leaflet appeared around 2:00 P.M.; the Mezhraionka probably printed it in association with Bolshevik and Left Menshevik activists, thus explaining its generic signature (all of these groups used RSDRP, the Russian initials of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party).⁷⁷

The leaflet addressed the workers and informed them, "The army is with you"; thus it postdated the rising of the Petrograd garrisons during the morning and early afternoon. It called for continuation of

the general strike, fraternization between workers and soldiers, and election of strike committees in the factories. The leaflet also advised the factory-level committees to send representatives to the soviet of workers' deputies and is therefore the first Left socialist document to call openly for the soviet. According to the leaflet, the soviet would serve as the leadership of the revolutionary movement and would create the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The text concluded by pointing out, "For victory we need organization, we need a directing center of the movement," a seemingly simple statement of unexpectedly great import.⁷⁸ By referring to all three aspects of the February Revolution, the workers' uprising, the soldiers' revolt, and the soviet, the RSDRP proclamation marked a new step of the revolutionary process. The call for the soviet was now appropriate because the entire work force and the soldiers had joined the revolution.

A couple of hours later, the famous "Finland Station" proclamation appeared. According to one source, it was dropped by airplane around the centers of the city, marking it as a very early example of airborne propaganda. Almost certainly correctly, Wada attributes this leaflet to a combination of Left SDs and/or Left SRs. Iurenev mentions the joint printing of a document that fits the general description of the Finland Station leaflet. The complete lack of a party signature suggests a broad group of authors, including both SDs and SRs (Iurenev indicates that anarchists took part as well). In any case, this leaflet, which came out about 4:00 P.M., was a follow-up to the RSDRP proclamation. Addressed to workers and soldiers, it again urged them to elect the soviet and then *named* the "directing center of the movement" called for in the earlier proclamation by stating: "Let the Soviet of deputies be created under the protection of the troops. . . . Let the Finland Station be the center, where the revolutionary headquarters will gather."⁷⁹ The leftist party leadership had settled the question, or so it thought, of where the soviet that represented the workers and soldiers would gather.

None of the proclamations the Left socialists issued on 27 February referred in any way to the Duma, the Tauride Palace, the Provisional Executive Committee, or, remarkably, the Petrograd Soviet that was gathering at the Tauride Palace. The first of their leaflets to mention the soviet, the midafternoon RSDRP proclamation, called for workers and soldiers to elect representatives to the soviet and

proclaimed the need for a "revolutionary center," that is, a place for the soviet to gather (from the outset they rejected the Tauride Palace as a site for the new government). Later in the afternoon, a broad coalition of leftists issued the Finland Station leaflet that promoted this Vyborg/side railway station as the locale for the soviet. Three additional Left socialist leaflets that appeared during the evening—two Left bloc documents and the Bolshevik Manifesto—ignored the already-existing Tauride Palace Petrograd Soviet; two of them did not even use the word *soviet*. The successful convocation of the Petrograd Soviet at the Tauride Palace, with all it portended, so dismayed leaders of the Left socialist parties that they forebore even to hint that anything was occurring there; they attempted to name an alternative center, but with no success. By evening, they seem to have been tempted to bypass the soviet entirely in their desire to create a government directly based on the mass elements of society; thus the failure of two of the three leaflets from the evening of 27 February to use the term *soviet*.

The most noteworthy theme of all the leftist documents of the twenty-seventh was that the revolutionary government, whatever its name, must rest squarely on the workers and soldiers. As one SR-Mezhraionka-Left Menshevik leaflet put its case regarding the Provisional Revolutionary Government: "It must be created by the representatives of the proletariat and the army. . . . Immediately undertake elections to the soviet. . . . Tomorrow the Provisional Government will finally be formed." Often attributed exclusively to the Bolsheviks, this was the position of the whole left wing of socialism. Socialist Revolutionary, Mezhraionka, Bolshevik, and, to a lesser extent, Left Menshevik activists and leaders wished to see the creation of a revolutionary soviet government that would represent the workers and soldiers and that would meet under the protection of the revolutionized armed forces. The history of Left socialist leaflets on 27 February demonstrates this very clearly.

Later in the evening, the Mezhraionka and the SRs in one case and the SRs, the Mezhraionka, and Left Mensheviks in another issued leaflets jointly. The SR-Mezhraionka proclamation, aimed at the soldiers, urged them not to disperse or return to their barracks but rather to seize all telegraph stations, telephone networks, railroad stations, electric power stations, banks, and ministries. As noted, it mentioned nothing about the soviet, stating only, "Elect repre-

sentatives to the Provisional Revolutionary Government." The SR-Mezhraionka-Left Menshevik leaflet "To the workers," however, stated:

The Provisional Revolutionary Government is replacing the tsarist government. It must be created by the representatives of the proletariat and the army. Comrades! Immediately undertake the elections to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The army is already conducting elections of their representatives. Tomorrow the Provisional Government will finally be formed.⁸⁰

The parties most active in the Left Socialist Informational Bureau distributed massive quantities (Iurennev claimed 300,000 copies) of this leaflet throughout the city. As in the case of earlier documents, the leaflets gave appropriate advice and became factors in the developing revolution. Quite late in the evening of 27 February, the Bolshevik Bureau of the Central Committee published the last proclamation of the day for distribution the next morning. Like the earlier SR-Mezhraionka leaflet "To the soldiers," the Bolshevik document failed to mention the soviet, referring instead only to the "Provisional Revolutionary Government."⁸¹

Regardless of what Left socialists attempted to do, the Petrograd Soviet at the Tauride Palace was viable, whereas the idea of the Finland Station as a revolutionary center was moribund. Soldiers and then workers reported en masse to the Tauride Palace. The names of the Right socialist Duma tribunes Chkheidze and especially Kerensky were quite well known to the masses, whereas underground revolutionaries such as Aleksandrovich, Shliapnikov, Iurennev, and Ermanskii were understandably obscure. Just before and on 27 February, liberals and moderate socialists intensely propagandized several important units, some of which had officers sympathetic to the Duma; these officers simultaneously led their units to the side of the revolution and directly to the Tauride Palace, which was literally across the street from the Volynskii and other large barracks. The Tauride Palace had a central location and a certain governmental cachet sorely lacking in a suburban railroad station. Finally and perhaps crucially, during the day of 27 February the Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet issued a series of printed appeals to the population to feed the soldiers; this call also appeared on the front page of *Izvestiia* (News), the only paper

printed that day, immediately under the Provisional Committee's call for workers to send deputies to the Tauride Palace (the Provisional Committee also advised soldiers to do the same). Presumably, the rebellious soldiers, who could hardly go back to their mess halls, hearkened to the appeals of the institution that showed concrete concern for their welfare.⁸²

Still, a question arises as to why the workers gathered at the Tauride Palace against the wishes of Left socialists to whom they usually looked for leadership.⁸³ The specifics given probably provide sufficient answer, but other factors may also have been involved. By 27 February the capital's entire work force and huge garrison contingents had joined the movement; as opposed to the smaller corps of politically conscious workers and students who followed Left socialist recommendations on earlier occasions, the crowds of 27 February would not have distinguished clearly between Left and Right socialists. By definition, the huge mass of humanity—workers, soldiers, and students—in the streets on the twenty-seventh was less radical than those who habitually followed Left socialist admonitions to strike and demonstrate. When the moderate socialists returned to a revolutionary position on 25 February, the coalition of forces necessary for the overthrow of tsarism came into being, but the price was a somewhat more moderate outcome than the leftists wished.

In any case, with the rise of the soviet at the Tauride Palace, the Left Menshevik Kapelinskii, who seems to have been the first leftist at the scene, telephoned the Left SR Mstislavskii with the request that he come as well. The leftists were probably trying to create a counterweight to the numerous moderates on the Executive Committee. Finally, during the late afternoon leftist leaders such as Iurennev and Aleksandrovich also made their pilgrimages to the Tauride Palace to take their places in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. In the company of Tikhonov and Sukhanov, whom he met at Gorky's place, Shliapnikov arrived somewhat later.⁸⁴

This development resulted in a striking and as yet little noted circumstance. By the evening of 27 February 1917, when the tsarist government had fallen, the membership of the All-Socialist Informational Bureau, with a few additions, had become the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Even if the preliminary meetings of the group had consisted only of the attempts of the Right and

Left socialists to keep track of one another, the matter deserves attention. Shliapnikov thought the bureau was important; Zenzinov called it "the general staff of the revolution," and expanded on this theme by explaining that, in the presence of numerous groups and cells and in the absence of normal political life, "the masses sought leaders," as a result of which the interparty bureau "actually was able to exert a certain influence on the course of events."⁸⁵ If so, then our definition of the nature of the February Revolution requires overhauling. Regardless, the fact remains that virtually the entire original Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which in the early months of the revolution became the arbiter of Russia's fate, had been meeting together regularly days and weeks before the final collapse of the old regime.

Meanwhile, the leftists still did not give up their quest for a revolutionary government of the masses. Late on the evening of 28 February, a coalition of radical SRs and SDs in the soviet attempted to defeat the resolution that created the Duma-oriented liberal Provisional Government, but the moderate socialist leaders convinced a large majority of the fledgling soviet to support the fateful measure. Even then, the leftist leaders continued to exert pressure on the soviet to declare itself the provisional government. On 1 March Aleksandrovich and Iurenev wrote, printed, and distributed a scorching proclamation to the soldiers that urged them, "Take power into your own hands" and "Obey only the deputies dispatched by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."⁸⁶ With the soviet refusing to take power and in the process of transferring command of the armed forces to the new liberal-oriented Provisional Government, this proclamation was especially provocative. It represented an attempt by the Mezhrainka and the Left SRs to influence the armed soldier masses to negate decisions just made by the Petrograd Soviet itself. One is reminded of a scene a few months later, during the July Days, when a soldier, having entered the same Tauride Palace and happening on a meeting of the Soviet Executive Committee, which was in the process of again refusing to declare itself the government, slammed his rifle on the terrazzo floor and shouted, "Take power, you sons of bitches, when we tell you to!" In any case, the Right socialists were incensed at this leaflet: Practically in tears, the Right SR Flekkel' showed it to Zenzinov, who agreed that it "could not be allowed," since it was, he recalled, "written in an almost Pugachevist style."

Chkheidze attacked this leaflet bitterly at a session of the soviet and advised the soldiers "not to obey orders from agents of the old government," a remark derived from the old canard that all defeatists were agents provocateurs. Aleksandrovich and Iurenev demanded and got an apology (of sorts) from Chkheidze, but Aleksandrovich got a reprimand from the new SR committee.⁸⁷

None of this changed the basic fact that the soviet would not seize power and the government was not socialist, an outcome numerous SRs, Mezhraiontsy, and Bolsheviks (as noted, the Left Mensheviks preferred a radical liberal government) had feared and struggled against. Thus the stage was set for the long agony of 1917.

Summary and Commentary

Several closely related points about the role of underground activists in the factories and armed forces during the February Revolution require emphasis. Throughout the February days, revolutionary activists of the various Left socialist parties involved themselves effectively in the mass movement in the factories and streets; they also coordinated their plans and activities in such a way that the leadership they provided was in almost all cases collective in nature. Furthermore, the various parties held meetings individually and, more importantly, jointly; local party leaders participated in meetings, reached agreements with like-minded leaders of other parties, repeatedly issued leaflets using agreed-on slogans, and carried out other plans on this basis.

In January 1917, Minister of the Interior Protopopov claimed that Russia was in the "preparatory stage for an uprising of unified revolutionaries." A month earlier, Tsivin had informed German intelligence of the SRs' appeals to "all Russian revolutionaries to put aside their former differences in order to unite their forces against the government" and noted that their joint work (he emphasized SR and Bolshevik cooperation) "enjoyed more and more success each day." One recent Soviet study of the February Revolution, with only a slight bow to traditional protocol in giving an obligatory syntactical primacy to the Bolsheviks, has stated the matter as follows: "A united revolutionary front formed from below. Along with the Bolsheviks many rank-and-file Mensheviks and SRs entered into the

struggle." Other Soviet histories have contained similar formulations: "On the streets of Petrograd, Menshevik, SR, and non-party workers struggled along with worker-Bolsheviks. In the struggle an identity of goals and unity of action arose." Another has stated, "Menshevik-Internationalists, Mezhrainitsy, [and] groups of Left SRs participated in street demonstrations with anti-government slogans. . . ." ⁸⁸ These various evaluations are consonant with the chain of evidence produced in this chapter regarding the role of activists in the February Revolution. Similarly, Hasegawa emphasizes the role of middle-level party activists in the factories and streets; he believes, however, that, of the socialist groups, the Bolsheviks were the best organized and the most effective. This study focuses on the SRs and on joint socialist action, a set of priorities that I believe more securely fits the primary evidence. The historical record also indicates that socialist leaders, and not just activists, played a direct role in the working out of the revolution. ⁸⁹

Both Soviet and Western historiography face certain dilemmas in explicating the overthrow of tsarism. With the partial exception of Burdzhakov, Soviet histories normally portray the February Revolution in terms of long- and short-term Bolshevik leadership; consequently, they have never been able to account for Bolshevik weakness in numerous workers' and soldiers' soviets and other social organizations immediately after the revolution and for long months thereafter. Western histories emphasize the spontaneous nature of the events and (with the exception of Hasegawa) do not explore the interaction between the masses and the socialist parties before and during the February crisis, a set of research priorities that offers little prospect of explaining why, immediately on the overthrow of the old regime, Russia's workers, soldiers, and peasants turned immediately to socialists for leadership and elected members of the various parties in large numbers to the soviets, a form of organization long specifically tied to socialist programs.

The circumstance that the first day of the February disorders was a socialist holiday, International Women's Day, promoted entirely by socialists is a symbol of the central reality of socialist involvement in the February Revolution. Although spontaneous in its specific moment, form, and locale of outbreak, the revolution arose from a decades-long interaction among workers, soldiers, students, and

peasants on the one hand and the revolutionary parties on the other. The interaction became most intense during the February crisis itself. These factors shed light on the general paths the revolution took, for instance, that all over Russia the revolutionary masses created soviets and elected thousands of socialists into the soviets. Relative Bolshevik weakness accompanied by relative SR and Menshevik strength reflected more or less accurately the actual degrees of influence of those parties at the time of the revolution.

The specific record of SR activities during the February crisis is interwoven in the general texture of the various processes that constituted the revolution: they helped reach decisions at joint conferences of party leaders, they participated in issuing proclamations that disseminated the decisions in the form of slogans, and they agitated in the factories, garrisons, schools, and streets. Because of their special role among the soldiers and their large number of factory cells, the SRs arguably had the widest role in the February Revolution, thus explaining their powerful presence in revolutionary organizations during the early months of 1917.

A final historiographical dilemma, one created by this study, remains to be discussed and, if possible, solved. If the Left socialists were as influential among workers and other mass social elements and if they were as crucially involved in the creation of antitsarist sentiment and in the actual onset of revolutionary disturbances as this study claims, how did they fall so precipitously from influence after the successful revolution, leaving the Right socialists firmly in command of the soviets and other social organizations? Part of the answer lies in matters already discussed. The revolutionary masses of 27 February, which comprised more or less the entire population of workers, students, soldiers, and many others, were not comparable with the smaller, if still sizable, numbers of radical workers and students who normally responded to Left socialist agitation. The Left socialists could provide sparks, which would usually lead to a brief flareup: they could bring 80,000 to 160,000 demonstrators into the streets for a day or so, or, as happened in September 1915, even a week. They could not, however, create a general conflagration. For that, moderate socialist support, with tacit or explicit liberal approval, was required.

The political disposition of the normally quiet two-thirds of the

mass population is difficult to discern. Some doubtlessly had loyalties to the moderate socialists, who were active in the cooperatives and other organizations, or to the liberals; their failure (or willingness) to strike and demonstrate can be defined in terms of conscious decisions; other large segments of people were truly politically passive, ciphers who joined a mass movement once it was under way and whose behavior was unpredictable. The participation of all of these was necessary for a general strike. Still, even a general strike did not suffice: the soldiers also had to come over. This required fate's intervention (in this case, the government's decision to fire on the demonstrators), although Left and Right socialist agitation was a factor in the soldier's unrest. Regardless of how this came about, once the entire population rose up, it would not necessarily follow the radicals.

Even this, however, does not explain the paltry handful of votes the leftist resolutions received in the Petrograd Soviet during its early fateful meetings. The Right socialist speakers Chkhaidze and Kerensky were extremely persuasive when they warned against radical moves that might summon a reactionary counter-revolution. The moderates promised that the liberal-oriented Provisional Government, under the watchful eye of the soviets, would fulfill the commitments of the revolution; the mass elements of society and the new leaders they had elected into the soviets had no reason to doubt these plausible reassurances. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the new phenomenon of revolutionary defensism created the basis for an early realignment of forces even within the Left socialist movement. Refusing to defend tsarist Russia was quite different from refusing to defend revolutionary Russia. During the first euphoric weeks and months of the new regime, only a handful of socialists—hardened Left SR, Bolshevik, Mezhrayonka, and Left Menshevik activists—retained their antiwar convictions; all the rest, including numerous internationalists of all the parties, succumbed to the siren call of revolutionary defensism. The idea of protecting hard-won gains by defending revolutionary Russia against the Germans and by allowing the bourgeoisie to have its day in the Provisional Government took precedence over seemingly adventurist appeals for a socialist soviet government and an immediate end to the war.

Epilogue: Continuity or Discontinuity?

This study's approach to the record of the SRs and other leftist parties between July 1914 and February 1917 offers answers to some questions about the February Revolution but raises others. If the standard Western interpretation that socialists displayed little energy during the war is accurate, why did Russia's masses turn to these same socialists immediately on the overthrow of tsarism? If the Soviet view (sometimes indirectly supported by Western studies) that the Bolsheviks were the most active of the parties in promoting the revolutionary cause is true, why did the masses turn first and foremost to SRs and Mensheviks for leadership? If, as this study maintains, the SRs (and Mensheviks) were not only active but radical before and during February, why did they evidently become so moderate so quickly after February? Furthermore, if the left-wing socialists (plus the anarchists) worked together so closely, why did not this spirit of cooperation survive the overthrow of tsarism? Finally, if the SRs wielded such influence among the Russian Empire's proletariat, why did they not retain this support? Both the conventional interpretations and those of this study involve problems of continuity that require further comment.

The Masses and the Socialists after the Revolution

A question, already partially addressed, arises about why, having overthrown tsarism, Russia's masses turned exclusively to socialists

for leadership. Some scholars have noted that during the first half of 1917 the workers, peasants, and soldiers did not usually distinguish clearly among the various socialist programs. Whatever the accuracy of this interpretation, the Russian masses certainly distinguished between socialists on the one hand and liberals and conservatives on the other. A plausible explanation, consonant with this study's findings, is that the workers, soldiers, peasants, and large portions of the intelligentsia elected socialists to represent them because the SRs and SDs had been involved not only in underground organizations but in other groups such as unions, health funds, cooperatives, factory circles, student organizations, and zemstvos and had taken part in strikes, demonstrations, and campaigns such as the movement against (and for) the election of WIC worker's groups. The socialists and their programs were familiar to the mass segments of society. Dramatic proof of this arose when, on the very first day of the revolution in each locality, workers and soldiers (followed a little later by peasants) elected individual SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks, in many cases from among their midst, to represent them in soviets and other political bodies. Thus their socialist preferences were not only clear but instantaneous. Only longtime socialist activism on a mass basis would account for this development. From this perspective, a profound continuity exists between pre- and post-February events, whereas an interpretation that fails to recognize an already-existing vital link between the socialists and the various elements of society creates a mystery about mass behavior starting on 27 February.

The Masses and the SRs and Mensheviks

Soviet histories face a similar problem in accounting for why after the February Revolution the SRs and Mensheviks did so well in soviets and other organizations, whereas the Bolsheviks initially (and in some cases for many months) did poorly. Close examination of the historical evidence in the years just before the February Revolution and during the revolution itself provides good clues: the 1912–1914 popularity of the Bolsheviks quickly waned and the upturn of revolutionary sentiment during 1915 and 1916 profited the

left wings of the Menshevik and, most of all, the SR parties. Although this leftist SR and Menshevik popularity may have had a variety of (difficult to document) explanations, it probably issued first and foremost from the fact that, on a nation-wide basis, these two groups did the most to bring anti-war and antigovernmental messages to the broadest mass of people, who in turn elected into the soviets those whom they knew best to achieve the radical goals of the February Revolution. Therefore, they entrusted the SRs and Mensheviks to end the war, get the land, and give the workers control over their lives and workplaces. When the mass elements of society later perceived that the SRs and Mensheviks, for whatever reasons, were not fulfilling their promises, they began to shift their allegiance elsewhere.

The SRs: Post-February Moderates or Radicals?

Whatever the case for the Mensheviks, history played a strange trick on the SRs. By theory and temperament they had always favored a rapid movement toward socialism. Earlier in the party's history, those who opposed the party's radical outlook either left the party entirely (the Popular Socialists in 1906) or withdrew from active involvement in underground activities (the *Pochin* group, including Argunov, Sletov, Avksentiev, and Breshko-Breshkovskaia, between 1909 and early 1917). As noted, after the February Revolution, the virtual split between the revolutionary and reformist (anti-war and pro-war) forces temporarily healed on the basis of "revolutionary defensism," a position that appealed to all but a few of the most radical SDs and SRs; the enormous euphoria experienced by all socialists with the downfall of tsarism also contributed to a sort of idealism and optimism that convinced them that no obstacles now lay in the path of those who wished to create a better world. Consequently, the moderate leaders, with all their considerable following among the intelligentsia, came streaming back into SR organizations all over Russia. Furthermore, Chernov, followed by all those enormous party forces loyal to him, temporized after February and, for much of the year, shifted his allegiances by making common cause with the party's right wing rather than with the left. Thus the leadership

organs of the party had a rightist tilt, but as Radkey pointed out decades ago, the rank and file was not conservative; that is, it still expected a rapid end to the war (as articulated after the February Revolution, revolutionary defensism entailed immediate efforts toward peace, accompanied by defense—and only defense—of revolutionary Russia), the speedy transfer of land to the peasantry, and a quick fulfillment of workers' demands. Much of the defection from the PSR during late summer and fall 1917 reflected the party membership's dissatisfaction with the policies of the conservative Central Committee on these and other issues.¹

The defections were only one reflection of the leftward leanings of the SR party masses. My research on the topic of the Left SRs during 1917 shows that from February on many urban and provincial organizations entirely ignored moderate SR Central Committee directives; by summer the number of leftist-dominated organizations had grown; and by fall the overwhelming majority of party organizations were staunchly and openly for soviet power. A partial count of organizations that supported a leftist program (soviet power, all land to the peasants, peace, and so on) immediately after February or soon thereafter includes (more or less chronologically) those in Kharkov, Kronshtadt, Ufa, Kazan, Tomsk, Voronezh, Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan, Penza, and Petrograd. In many other locations, Left SRs split from local Right SR committees or openly defied their orders. As noted, by late summer and fall, the leftist wave was overwhelming. In some major centers, such as Moscow, Saratov, and Baku, the local Left SR movements took longer to coalesce, but even in these cities, by late 1917 the left had won the field or were playing on even terms with the moderates.² Thus the apparent discontinuity in outlook between SRs before and after February is misleading. Regardless, the evident conservatism of the PSR as a whole led to massive shifts of support from the SRs to the Bolsheviks. (Lacking as powerful a left wing as the PSR, the Mensheviks lost the most support of all.)

Allies or Enemies?

If, as the evidence of this study suggests, the leftist parties worked together closely before and during the February crisis, what hap-

pened to the spirit of cooperation afterward? Of course, the Right SR-Right Menshevik bloc (plus the Popular Socialists and Trudoviks) is legendary. What about on the Left? Here the evidence is equally clear, if less familiar. The Left SRs and Left Mensheviks, as factions of their respective parties, worked very closely with the Bolsheviks (and the Mezhraiontsy and anarchists) who had previously been their allies. In soviets, at conferences and congresses of soviets and other organizations, and in soldiers' and peasants' committees, the Left bloc carried on the struggle with the Right SR-Right Menshevik alliance that initially predominated almost everywhere. Leftist resolutions, usually inaccurately characterized as "Bolshevik," were often joint resolutions of a coalition of leftist parties and factions. Furthermore, all the leftists, especially the Bolsheviks, constantly emphasized the necessity for cooperation with and, where possible, union with other internationalists. For example, the Petrograd Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* repeatedly and assertively advocated close work with all internationalists, including the Left SRs.³ Soviet historians, by the way, have investigated the "Left Bloc" much more closely than their Western counterparts.

The SRs and the Workers during 1917

If the PSR was as active and influential among workers as the chapters of this study indicate, what happened during 1917? By and large, histories of 1917 recognize that the soldiers, sailors, and peasants gave heavy support to the PSR, whereas little is known about SR influence among the urban workers, especially in workers' soviets. The Soviet historians Tokarev and Andreev have provided indirect indications that the SR faction in the workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet attained considerable size. (District workers' soviets in the capital often had SR leadership, as was the case in the Petrogradskii, Petergofskii, Vasileostrovskii, and First Gorodskoi soviets.) Although precise numbers for the various party factions in the Petrograd Soviet, especially during the first months, are not available, an examination of results in individual factories confirms and expands on the picture Tokarev and Andreev provide. Many plants of all sizes sent SRs to represent them in the Petrograd Soviet. A by no means complete survey indicates that the SRs from the following

plants had sizable and in many cases predominant contingents in the soviet: Nobel, Aivaz, Novyi Lessner, Staryi Lessner, Arsenal, Treugol'nik, Skorokhod, Obukhov, Putilov, Metallicheskii, Kersten Thread, and Petrograd railroad workshops.

Looked at from another perspective, memoirists and other sources reveal overwhelming SR influence in most of the plants in the Moskovskii District and in all of the major plants of the adjacent Narva District, including the Putilov, Treugol'nik, Anchar, Langenzippen, and Chemical plants. In some plants where either Mensheviks (Vulkan, Feniks) or Bolsheviks (Rozenkrants, Erikson) predominated, SRs nonetheless had significant cells. In others, SR organizations were enormous, whereas Social Democratic and especially Bolshevik groups were quite small: during the period after February the Nevskii Shipbuilding plant had five hundred SRs and fifteen Bolsheviks; Izhorskii Factory, eight hundred SRs and twenty-seven Bolsheviks; Obukhov, five hundred SRs and twenty Bolsheviks. SR groups at the Treugol'nik, Trubochnyi, Baltic shipbuilding, and Metallicheskii plants were similarly overwhelmingly large. Later in the year, of course, the Bolsheviks drastically increased their following in the factories and in workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet, but this sheds no light on the first half of 1917.

The situation was similar in many other (but not all) cities of revolutionary Russia. SRs had very large contingents in the Baku and Voronezh workers' soviets (the SR S. Saakian chaired the Baku Soviet and the SR M. Kogan-Bernshtein chaired the Voronezh Soviet). In many other cities, such as Kharkov, Kiev, Nikolaev, Odessa, Krasnoiarsk, Ufa, Kazan, and Tomsk, SRs had sizable contingents and considerable prestige in their local soviets. In Kiev, where the SDs outnumbered the SRs in the soviet, from February until late September 1917 the popular SR printer N. Nezlobin chaired the workers' soviet. Evidence exists about SR influence among workers in the Urals, Siberia, and other parts of the country. For example, at the First Regional Conference of Labor Unions of the Urals, which took place in late August when the SRs were already fading, twenty-eight Bolsheviks, twenty-six SRs, nine Mensheviks, and one anarchist represented the numerous unions in the Urals. Soviet studies show that the SRs played a major role in the unions, cooperatives, and factory committees throughout Siberia. Even in Moscow, where

the SRs did not do very well in elections to the workers' soviet, once party identities became clear after the February Revolution, D. Koenker reports, "The SRs became the most influential party among workers until sometime during the summer," including among metalworkers. This assertion finds support in the memoirs of several Bolshevik memoirists who recall that at the Mastiazhart munitions plant, the Zamoskovoretskii streetcar repair park, and the Sokol'nicheskii wagon repair plant, all metalworking concerns, the SRs, Mensheviks, and anarchists were the best organized, with the SRs enjoying complete predominance at the first two. In Samara by late summer the huge Trubochnyi plant had an SR organization that counted over twelve thousand workers, whereas the Bolsheviks had two thousand and the Mensheviks several hundred. As during the 1907 Second Duma elections, during early 1917 the SRs won much of their worker support from the empire's largest metalworking concerns.⁴

Of related interest, in one of his articles about the February Revolution the Soviet labor historian Leiberov comments on the key role of the factory-elected strike committees, which, he states, alone found support from wartime workers (that is, workers followed the leadership of these elected joint-party groups, rather than any particular party). Leiberov also comments, however, that the wartime and February 1917 strike committees often served as a basis for the factory committees that workers elected after the February Revolution.⁵ If so, this too testifies to long-standing SR influence in the factories of Petrograd and elsewhere, since during the first half of 1917 the SRs did just as well in the factory committees as in the soviets.

The process by which workers and then soldiers began to turn away from supporting SRs (and Mensheviks) and toward supporting Bolsheviks and to a lesser degree Left SRs is a complicated one. Close examination of the platforms associated with the initially popular revolutionary defensist position suggests, however, that even in the early post-February era of socialist cooperation, few workers, soldiers, and peasants understood it as involving long delays in the accomplishment of certain concrete demands (peace, land, humane working conditions), the lack of which led them to

overthrow tsarism in the first place: A liberal republic that would block or even delay the achievement of these aspirations clearly would not long satisfy Russia's masses. Confusion about what the workers, soldiers, and peasants meant when they seemed to support positions passionately espoused by the moderate socialists led these same moderate socialists to temporize fatefully in implementing reforms. Naturally, full exploration of the various themes just mentioned must await a full-scale study of the Left SRs during 1917. Preliminary findings suggest, however, that in my version pre- and post-February continuities outweigh the discontinuities as regards the SRs and their leftist allies. This approach to the revolutionary movement in fact helps explain many hitherto mysterious aspects of the February-October era.

Notes

Introduction

1. Oliver Radkey, *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism* (New York, 1958) and his *The Sickle under the Hammer* (New York, 1963); K. V. Gusev, *Krakh levykh eserov* (Moscow, 1963); K. V. Gusev and Kh. A. Eritsian, *Ot soglashatel'stva k kontrrevoliutsii* (Moscow, 1968).

2. Maureen Perrie, *The Agrarian Policy of the Socialist Revolutionary Party* (Cambridge, 1976); Manfred Hildermeier, *Die Sozialrevolutionaere Partei Russlands: Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich* (Cologne, Vienna: 1978); Christopher Rice, *Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Through the Revolution of 1905-1907* (New York, 1988). My articles are: M. Melancon, "The Socialist Revolutionaries from 1902 to 1907: Peasant and Workers' Party," *Russian History*, 12, no. 1 (Spring 1985); "Athens or Babylon?: The Birth and Development of the Revolutionary Parties in Saratov, 1890-1905," in Rex Wade and Scott Se-regny, eds., *Politics and Society in Provincial Russia: Saratov, 1590-1917* (Columbus, Ohio; 1989); and "'Stormy Petrels': The Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia's Legal Labor Organizations, 1905-1914," *The Carl Beck Papers*, no. 703 (June 1988).

3. M. Melancon, "Marching Together!: Left Block Activities in the Russian Revolutionary Movement, 1900-February 1917," *Slavic Review* (July 1990), no. 3.

4. George Katkov, *Russia 1917: The February Revolution* (New York, 1967), p. 256; T. Hasegawa, *The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917* (Seattle, Wash., 1981), *passim*.

5. N. Sukhanov, *The Russian Revolution, 1917: A Personal Record*, ed., abr., and trans. by Joel Carmichael (Princeton, 1983), p. 59; E. N. Burd-zhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1967), 1:319.

6. Burdzhakov, *Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsia*, 1: 304–5; I. G. Tseretelli, *Vospominaniia o fevral'skoi revoliutsii*, 2 vols. (Paris, The Hague: 1963), 1:6.

Chapter 1

1. V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 4th ed., 40 vols. (Moscow, 1951–57), 14:47.

2. For a fuller development of the various themes of pre-war SR history, see M. Melancon, "Peasant and Workers' Party," "'Stormy Petrels'"; "Athens or Babylon?"; "Marching Together!"; and "The Socialist Revolutionaries from 1902 to February 1917: A Party of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers," Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1984, chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1–131.

3. *Protokoly pervoi obshchepartiinoi konferentsii partii sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov, avgust 1908* (Paris, 1908), pp. 96–97. For discussions of the extent of police-inflicted damage to the PSR, see Manfred Hildermeier, *Sozialrevolutionaere Partei Russlands*, pp. 309–17; and Oliver Radkey, *Agrarian Foes*, pp. 79–80.

4. Melancon, "Peasant and Workers' Party," pp. 29–34; "'Stormy Petrels,'" pp. 1–31.

5. Melancon, "'Stormy Petrels,'" pp. 4–11; "Marching Together"; O. Anweiler, *The Soviets: The Russian Worker, Peasant, and Soldiers Councils 1905–1921* (New York, 1974), pp. 93–94; G. M. Derenkovskii, S. V. Tiutiukin, "Rabochii klass v revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* (henceforth *I.Z.*), no. 94 (1978), pp. 90–94; A. Leont'eva, "Iz proshlogo, 1905–1910," *Krasnaia letopis'* (henceforth *K.L.*), no. 11 (1924), p. 119; B. Peres, "Arest Peka na Udel'noi," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* (henceforth *P.R.*), nos. 18–19 (1923), pp. 166–67.

6. Melancon, "Peasant and Workers' Party," pp. 35–41.

7. "Marching Together."

8. *Ibid.*; K. Argun, *Bor'ba Bol'shevistskoi partii za soiuz rabochego klassa i krest-ianstva v period mezhdu dvumia burzh.-dem. revoliutsiiami v Rossii (1907–fevral' 1917)* (Sukhumi, 1974), p. 200.

9. "'Stormy Petrels,'" pp. 5–10.

10. Radkey, *Agrarian Foes*, passim; Hildermeier, *Sozialrevolutionaere Partei Russlands*, pp. 324–35. Among the party publications that adhered to traditional SR programs were *Zemlia i volia*, *Znamia truda*, and *Za narod*; the SR-Liquidators published their own journal, *Pochin*, which alone espoused the new moderate approach.

11. V. Zenzinov, "Iz nedalekogo proshlogo," *Delo naroda*, no. 126 (31 August 1917); A. Bakh, et al., *God russkoi revoliutsii (1917–1918): Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1918), p. 112; K. V. Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, p. 75.

12. Zenzinov, "Iz nedalekogo proshlogo"; Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, p. 77; Perrie, *Agrarian Policy*, pp. 195–96; I. A. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie voennykh godov* (Moscow, 1925), p. 49; Hildermeier, *Sozialrevolu-*

tionaere Partei Russlands, p. 315; L. M. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny," in A. L. Sidorov, ed., *Pervaia Mirovaia Voina* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 323-24.

13. Perrie, *Agrarian Policy*, pp. 187, 195; Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 49.

14. Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, p. 77; M. Perrie, "The Social Composition of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1917," *Soviet Studies*, no. 2 (1972), p. 244; A. N. Stepanov, "Kritika V. I. Leninym programmy i taktiki eserov v period novogo revoliutsionnogo pod"ema (1910-1914 gg.)," in *Bol'sheviki v bor'be protiv melko-burzhuznykh partii v Rossii* (Moscow, 1969), p. 28; A. Popov, *Iz istorii zabastovchnogo dvizheniia v Rossii nakanune imp. voiny. Bakinskaia zabastovka 1914 goda* (Leningrad, 1925), pp. 135-42; A. K. Drezen, "Baltiiskii flot v gody pod"ema (1910-1913 gg.)," *K.L.*, no. 36 (1930), pp. 126-63, and no. 37 (1930), pp. 123-56; I. Egorov, "Materialy o revoliutsionnom dvizhenii vo flote v 1910-1911 gg.," *K.L.*, no. 5 (1923), pp. 371-92; Melancon, "Socialist Revolutionaries from 1902 to February 1917," pp. 92-95.

15. Melancon, "Marching Together"; "'Stormy Petrels,'" pp. 21-31; I. Pushkareva, *Zheleznodorozhniky Rossii v burzhuzno-demokraticeskikh revoliutsiiakh* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 314-15.

16. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 50; G. Arutiunov, *Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v period novogo revoliutsionnogo pod"ema 1910-1914 gg.* (Moscow, 1975), p. 349; Pushkareva, *Zheleznodorozhniky*, pp. 314-15; K. Eremeev, "Burevestniki (Podgotovlenie k vosstaniem v Baltiiskom flote v 1910-1912 gg.)," *P.R.*, nos. 77-78 (1928), pp. 199-217; M. K. Korbut, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii pered voinoi v otsenke Departamenta Politsii, 1911-1913 gg.," *Uchenie zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta*, 86, no. 2 (1926), p. 358.

17. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 50-51; N. Kopytovskii, "Eshche o nashikh gazetakh," *Delo naroda*, no. 13 (30 March 1917); G. Arutiunov, *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 223; N. Poletaev, "V kolybely 'Zvezdy' i 'Pravdy'," *P.R.*, no. 16 (1923), pp. 3-7; R. Arskii, "Epokha reaktsii v Petrograde," *K.L.*, no. 5 (1923), pp. 96-98; I. P. Khoniavko, "V podpol'e i emigratsii (1911-1917 gg.)," *P.R.*, no. 16 (1923), p. 162.

18. Melancon, "'Stormy Petrels,'" pp. 31-40.

19. *Za narod*, no. 61 (1914); S. M. Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," unpublished manuscript in Nicolaevsky Archive, Hoover Institution, Box 11, File 8, p. 14.

Chapter 2

1. *Otkliki zhizni*, no. 5 (7 May 1916); I. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 48-49; Georges Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War* (Oxford, 1973), p. 261.

2. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The February Revolution in Russia* (Seattle,

1981), p. 135. The minutes of the Beaugy Conference are in the Nicolaevsky Archive, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Box 377, File 1, "Protokol'naia zapis' zagranichnogo soveshchaniia tsentral'nykh rabotnikov PSR po voprosu o linii povedeniia v usloviakh mirovoi voiny," pp. 1-38; and in V. V. Rudnev, "Iz istorii partii (zagranichnoe soveshchanie tsentral'nykh rabotnikov P.S.-R. po voprosu o linii povedeniia v usloviakh mirovoi voiny)," *Svoboda* (Prague), no. 4 (December 1935). For commentary, see Rudnev's "Dvadtsat' let tomu nazad'," *Sovremennye zapiski*, no. 56 (1934), pp. 375-92; and Oliver Radkey, *Agrarian Foes*, pp. 91-94.

3. *Archive of the Imperial Russian Secret Police (Okhranka)*, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, SR File (henceforth *Okhranka SR File*), XVI b (3), Box 1, reports dated October 1914 and November 1914.

4. *Okhranka SR File*, reports dated November 1914 and 27 November 1914. Pro- and anti-war SRs had already held separate meetings, but before November they had continued to meet together as well; *Mysl'*, no. 38 (30 December 1914).

5. Additional contributors to Chernov's *Mysl'* were Inessa Rytina, Ivan Derevenskii, Sl. Savich, S. Astrov (a Left Menshevik), St. Volzhskii, N. Lazarkevich, A. Nikolaev, E. Fortunatova, I. Tsyngovatov, A. Dobrovol'skii, E. Lazarev, I. Smirnov, D. Anichkin, A. Rosenberg, E. Evgen'ev, V. Dikii, and M. Natanson; Lazarev and Evgen'ev were moderates. For information on the various SD papers, see I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed* (New York, 1965), pp. 216-25; M. Shaw, "The Nashe Slovo group and Russian Social Democracy during World War One: The Search for Unity," Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1975; B. Dvinov, "Pervaia mirovaia voina i rossiiskaia sotsial-demokratiia," *Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement*, no. 10 (1962), p. 25; and I. Kuznetsov and S. Matvienko, *Gazeta Sotsial-Demokrat* (Moscow, 1960).

6. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 55 vols. (Moscow, 1959-65), 49:37; in a letter to V. A. Karpinskii dated 13 September 1915 (vol. 49, p. 143), Lenin complained: "I have quit receiving *Zhizn'* for some reason. Can it be that we don't have an exchange? Can you check into it?"

7. *Mysl'*, no. 30 (19 December 1914); no. 31 (20 December 1914); no. 32 (22 December 1914); no. 49 (13 January 1915).

8. *Mysl'*, no. 40 (1 January 1915); no. 77 (14 February 1915).

9. *Mysl'*, no. 12 (28 November 1914); no. 49 (13 January 1915).

10. During the first months of the war, numerous socialists and anarchists joined the French Foreign Legion to fight for the Allied cause. Reports of execrable conditions and high casualties soon dampened their enthusiasm and enlistments dropped off. Among prominent SR volunteers were Sletov (who was killed), A. Iakovlev, and the SR Maximalist G. Nestroev; G. Nestroev, "Na voine," *Katorga i ssylka* (henceforth *K.iSS.*), no. 30 (1927), p. 132. Volunteerism struck into the heart of the Bolshevik Central Committee Abroad, four of whom enlisted. Nadezhda Krupskaiia (Lenin's wife) wrote, "In Paris our Bolshevik group wavered. Although a majority . . .

came out against the war. . . , some of the comrades, Sapozhkov, Kazakov, Edisherov, Moiseev . . . and others joined the French Army. Bolshevik, Menshevik, and Socialist Revolutionary volunteers (about eighty in all) adopted a declaration. . . . Before they left Plekhanov made a farewell speech"; N. K. Krupskaya, *Memoirs of Lenin*, 2 vols. (New York, n.d.), 2: 143. Other prominent Bolshevik enlistees were Antonov (Britman), Popov, Davydov, Ekk, Zelenskii, and Bogushko; Antonov and Bogushko were killed. Bolshevik Ekk wrote the volunteer group's declaration, which staked out a typical defensist case for supporting England, France, and Russia in the war against "aristocratic-feudal" Germany-Austria; "Aline," *Lenine à Paris (souvenirs inédits)* (Paris, n.d.), pp. 110–13. On the subject of Bolshevik volunteerism, see also N. Iadov, "Parizhskaia emigratsiia v gody voiny," *K. i. SS.*, no. 3 (10) (1925), p. 200; Shaw, *Nashe Slovo* group, p. 3; and Nestroev, "Na voine," p. 132. Significant SD-SR volunteerism notwithstanding, in the early months of the war most Russian socialists called for "peace at all costs"; A. A. Abramov, "Bor'ba bol'shevistskikh organizatsii protiv sotsial-shovinizma v Rossii (1914–Fevral' 1917 g.)," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 11 (1963), p. 52.

11. *Mysl'*, no. 1 (15 November 1914).

12. *Mysl'*, no. 25 (13 December 1914); no. 35 (25 December 1914); no. 51 (15 January 1915); and no. 52 (18 January 1915).

13. *Mysl'*, no. 4 (19 November 1914); no. 5 (20 November 1914); and no. 6 (21 November 1914).

14. *Mysl'*, no. 25 (13 December 1914); no. 42 (5 January 1915); no. 65 (31 January 1915); no. 71 (7 February 1916); and no. 76 (13 February 1915). The Right SRs B. Savinkov and B. Moiseenko provided an example of the defensist mentality when they wrote in a letter to *Mysl'*: "We are Russian, Russia is in danger, we can't help but want a Russian victory. We can't help but want an Allied victory—we are democrats and republicans"; *Mysl'*, no. 20 (8 December 1914). Noteworthy is the self-image of the two erstwhile "socialist revolutionaries" as "democrats and republicans." *Mysl'* scornfully replied, "The writers' main argument is 'We are Russians!'"

15. *Mysl'*, no. 4 (19 November 1914); no. 10 (26 November 1914); no. 11 (27 November 1914); no. 17 (4 December 1914); no. 18 (5 December 1914); no. 38 (30 December 1914). Chernov, Rakitnikov, A. Ronsin, and Kamkov polemicized with the pro-war socialists Kautsky, Plekhanov, and various Right SRs (see nos. 3, 16, 21, 24, 32, 42, 45, 50, 62, 65, 66, 73, 100, and 101).

16. *Nashe ekho*, no. 6 (6 August 1915).

17. Many commentators emphasize pro-war over anti-war sentiment among SRs; see Radkey, *Agrarian Foes*, p. 91; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 135. Although both sides of the war issue could claim impressive lists of leaders, the pro-war group had considerably less following. Among the important party leaders who sided and worked with the internationalists were Ia. A. Iudelevskii, who had played a great role in party debates on the issue of terrorism during 1908–1910, and P. Karpovich, who lived in

England during the war and who later perished when the ship on which he was returning to Russia was torpedoed by the Germans; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 377, File 7, "Materialy iz arkhiva porazhenskoi s.-r. partiinoi gazety "Zhizn'" (byv. "Mysl'") 1915 g"; V. Chernov, "Dalekie i nedavnye" (typewritten manuscript), Box 378, Files 2-5, p. 338; and Nicolavsky Archive, *Okhrana*, Index No. XVII g, Viktor Mikhailovich Chernov, Folder 1, report dated 23 February 1916. Inside Russia, much of the party intelligentsia was defensist, but few cadres from the mass elements of society supported the war.

18. See *Mysl'*, no. 79 (17 February 1915); no. 84 (23 February 1915); no. 94 (6 March 1915); and Ia. G. Temkin, *Bernskaia konferentsiia zagranichnykh sektsii RSDRP* (1915 g.) (Moscow, 1961), p. 31. The resolution offered by the Right SRs Argunov and Rubanovich read in part: "In this war the interests of Russian democracy fully coincide with the interests of European democracy. . . . The victory [of the Allies] would strengthen the advanced European democracies, suppress one of the main reactionary powers of Europe, . . . and could serve as the starting point for an energetic struggle against militarism"; quoted in K. V. Gusev, "Taktika partii bol'shevikov po otnosheniiu k eseram nakanune Fevral'skoi revoliutsii i v period dvoevlastiia," in *Bol'sheviki v bor'be protiv melko-burzhaznykh partii v Rossii* (Moscow, 1969), p. 35.

19. *Mysl'*, no. 87 (26 February 1915); Gusev, "Taktika," pp. 35-36.

20. *Mysl'*, no. 74 (11 February 1915); *Nashe ekho*, no. 1 (22 April 1915).

21. *Mysl'*, no. 78 (16 February 1915).

22. *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (3), Box 1, report dated 28 May 1915; *Zhizn'*, no. 2 (23 March 1915), no. 19 (13 April 1915), and no. 21 (15 April 1915).

23. Alfred Senn, *The Russian Revolution in Switzerland* (Madison, Wisc., 1971), pp. 78-79. One of the public affairs that the SR Internationalists used to raise funds for their cause was a public concert with a buffet and a lottery that took place on 9 May 1915 at a rented hall in Paris. Among those handling tickets were O. Chernov, B. Kamkov, and N. Lazarkevich; Lazarkevich reported a profit of 1,119 rubles. See *Bakhmeteff Archive*, Columbia University Libraries, Manuscript Division, Socialist Revolutionary Party, Box 5, Folder 1—Miscellaneous Accounts (1908-1915), report dated 7/VI/1915.

24. Senn, p. 79. *Zhizn'* closed with its 2 January 1916 issue.

25. See articles by G. Dalin in *Zhizn'*, no. 28 (23 April 1915), and no. 29 (24 April 1915).

26. *Zhizn'*, no. 67 (18 July 1915), no. 74 (5 September 1915), no. 80 (17 October 1915), no. 87 (5 December 1915), and no. 89 (2 January 1916).

27. *Za rubezhom*, nos. 1-3 (22 March-1 July 1915).

28. The prompt anti-war responses of many SRs and Mensheviks and the early disunity of Bolsheviks on the issue of the war are not supportive of the view sometimes met in Soviet histories that anti-war SRs (and Mensheviks) adopted their positions under Bolshevik guidance. As regards the Bolshe-

viks, one participant of the Berne Conference (February 1915) recalled, "Only one small section [supported] the Central Committee [that is, Lenin]" on the war issue; "Bernskaia konferentsiia 1915 g.," *P.R.*, no. 5 (1925), p. 158.

29. See, for example, Rudnev, "Iz istorii partii," *Svoboda*, no. 4.

30. Shaw, "*Nashe Slovo* group," p. 84, note 2; 98; and 107, note 21. Before the war and during it, SRs often called for alliances of like-minded socialists; see, for example, *Zhizn'*, no. 50 (21 May 1915). For further information on meetings at which Chernov and Lunacharsky spoke for the same internationalist cause, see A. V. Lunacharsky, *Velikii perevorot* (Petrograd, 1919), p. 53. One SR who attended meetings addressed by the various anti-war socialists thought that Lenin was sincere in his views but boring; Trotsky brilliant but not profound; and Lunacharsky confused in nonaesthetic matters. Unfortunately, he did not evaluate Chernov and other members of his own party. K. M. Oberuchev, *V dni revoliutsii* (New York, 1919), pp. 13–17.

31. Shaw, "*Nashe Slovo* group," p. 84, note 2; *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (31), report dated 30 June 1915; *Zhizn'*, no. 86 (28 November 1915).

32. *Prizyv*, no. 1 (1 October 1915) The *Prizyv* group mustered only fifteen members in Paris, eighteen in Zurich, and twelve in Geneva, a total of forty-five.

33. *Prizyv*, no. 1 (1 October 1915); no. 2 (9 October 1915); and no. 14 (1 January 1916). The resolution passed by the Lausanne Conference of Right SRs and Right Mensheviks stated: "The path to victory is the path to freedom. . . . This expresses the interest of the peasants and workers in Russia. . . . This union of [pro-war SRs and SDs] will lead to a united socialist movement—a future united Russian socialist party. . . . [We are] coming together to publish *Prizyv*. We express at the same time a firm desire about the necessity to direct all our efforts toward the accomplishment of agitational-propagandistic work in Russia, and for the constant and lively contact with leaders of the revolutionary movement." For especially eloquent statements of the ideas behind *Prizyv*, see the articles by Plekhanov and Avksentiev in no. 52 (1 October 1916).

34. *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (3), Box 1, report dated 25 September 1915; and File on Groups in Switzerland, report dated 18 November 1915.

35. *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (3), Box 1, report dated 6 October 1915.

36. See I. G. Temkin, *Tsimmerval'd-Kiental'*; *iz istorii bor'by V. I. Lenina za ob"edinenie sotsialistov-internatsionalistov* (Moscow, 1967), p. 50.

37. Quoted in D. Baevskii, "Bol'sheviki na podstupakh russkoi i mezhdunarodnoi revoliutsii," in "*Tverskaia*" i "*Severnaia*" gruppy *Moskovskoi organizatsii RSDRP* (Moscow, 1930), p. 13. Both Baevskii and Temkin create an impression, much like the one in Lenin's remarks, that the Bolsheviks disdained working with the other parties but did so out of sheer necessity; Temkin, *Tsimmerval'd*, p. 100. An incident that more accurately suggests the tone of interparty relations occurred shortly after the Zimmerwald Con-

ference, when the Left SR Aleksandrovich forwarded through Kollantai a letter to Lenin on the subject of SR-SD cooperation. Lenin replied: "If you will be working in Russia and you want to render help to Left Socialist Revolutionaries and Left Social Democrats, I would advise you to aid one and the other separately, help *establish communications* with the groups of one and the other—both among various places and with the centers abroad. Separately Social Democrats, separately Socialist Revolutionaries. Then benefits will be greater. Rapprochement, *when possible*, will proceed more normally. Trust will be greater. I wish you every success and all the best. With socialist greetings, Lenin P.S. It is possible to write me at the address in our Geneva *Sotsial-Demokrat*"; Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie*, 49:150-52. Lenin showed here his usual passion for organizational distinctions, which revolutionaries inside Russia more or less ignored. Of interest are the existence and cordiality of the contacts.

38. *Sotsial-Demokrat*, nos. 45-46 (11 October 1915).

39. Senn, *Russian Revolution*, p. 92. Natanson described the conferences in those terms in a speech to the Third SR Congress in May 1917; see *Volia naroda* (Petrograd), no. 30 (3 June 1917).

40. *Biulleten' izdavaemyi ob'edinennymi gruppami P.S.R.* (Geneva), no. 1 (June 1916), p. 12. Natanson claimed that since no general party conference on the war had taken place, he and Chernov represented both factions; R. Grimm, "Die Zimmerwald Bewegung," *Archiv International Institut voor Sociale Geschiedenis* (Amsterdam, n.d.), 2:56.

41. Senn, *Russian Revolution*, pp. 112-13.

42. *Prizyv*, no. 14 (1 January 1916).

43. *Prizyv*, no. 14 (1 January 1916); *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (3), File on Groups in Switzerland, report dated 8 February 1916. The Right SRs' depth of feeling about Left SR attitudes and activities was extreme. In an interview with Oliver Radkey over two decades later, Argunov stated that Chernov's views, although less strident than Lenin's, were for that very reason more dangerous since they were accepted in quarters deaf to Lenin; similarly, Rudnev told Radkey, "What Chernov had done to extinguish national sentiment in the breasts of the armed defenders of a youthful and immature people was the one thing that could never be forgiven him"; Radkey, *Agrarian Foes*, pp. 122-23.

44. *Zhizn'*, no. 78 (3 October 1915); *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (3), Box 1, report dated January 1916.

45. *Delo naroda*, no. 107 (22 July 1917). Aptekman later recalled that during the war years Natanson's home in Lausanne "served as a center jam-packed with numerous emigrants. . . . [He] was a central figure, around which gathered, solidified, and organized revolutionary and oppositionist elements"; O. V. Aptekman, "Dve dorogikh teni," *Byloe*, no. 16 (1921), p. 8.

46. Z. Zeman, *Germany and the Russian Revolution, 1915-1918: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry* (London, 1948), pp. 18-23. According to reports for internal consumption, the German rep-

representative Romberg claimed that Tsivin was in an awkward position regarding funds the Germans wished to funnel through Tsivin to the Left SRs; he could not spend large amounts without accounting for their source but could not reveal their source to the SRs who did not know of his Austro-German contacts, and as a result the German plan fell through. In fact, later in 1916 Tsivin fell into obloquy in émigré SR circles because of his lavish life-style, which, however, they attributed to his irregular relations with older wealthy women; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, various documents and correspondence about Tsivin. The Left SRs apparently did not knowingly accept money from the Central Powers. Financial problems experienced by both the Left SRs and the Bolsheviks in Switzerland also suggest that neither émigré group received significant support from outside sources.

47. Temkin, *Tsimmerval'd*, pp. 86–87 and 99, note 7.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

49. *Biulleten'*, pp. 3–7.

50. *Biulleten'*, pp. 7–12; Temkin, *Tsimmerval'd*, pp. 108–9.

51. *Otkliki zhizni*, no. 1 (12 March 1916).

52. L. M. Shalaginova, "Esery-internationalisty," p. 328.

53. *Otkliki zhizni*, nos. 1 (12 March 1916); and 5 (7 May 1916). For brief comments on this SR Internationalist paper by one of its associates, V. Kalachev (Budagovskii), who later went over to the Bolsheviks, see *Pravda*, no. 68 (10 June 1917).

54. *Otkliki zhizni*, no. 9 (2 July 1916).

55. *Delo naroda*, no. 118 (4 August 1917), letter of M Levinson. According to K. Oberuchev, who joined the group, the Russian authorities were well aware of the society's tendencies and attempted to cut off donations to it from Russia; upon his legal return to Russia a few days before the February Revolution (his term of exile having ended), Oberuchev, during 1917–1918 a perfectly respectable and quite prominent Right SR, was immediately rearrested by tsarist officials, who had evidently found out about his association with the leftist SRs in Switzerland. Oberuchev, *V dni revoliutsii*, pp. 17–18.

56. *Delo naroda*, no. 107 (22 July 1917), letter of V. Vnorovskii; Senn, *Russian Revolution*, pp. 136–37.

57. *Na chuzhbine*, nos. 1–14 (14 January 1916–17 March 1917).

58. Senn, *Russian Revolution*, p. 137.

59. *Delo naroda*, nos. 109 (25 July 1917), letter of N. Sviatitskii; 112 (28 July 1917), letter of Boris Kamkov; and 117 (3 August 1917), letter of A. Shreider.

60. Letter of Vnorovskii, *Delo naroda*, no. 107 (22 July 1917); letter of Schreider, *Delo naroda*, no. 117 (3 August 1917). Zeman, *Germany and the Russian Revolution*, pp. 18–23; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, various German documents stamped "Ganz geheim!" (Top secret) concerning Tsivin.

61. Letter of Vnorovskii, *Delo naroda*, no. 107 (22 July 1917).

62. G. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 489; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, and Box 496, File 3. The former SR M. N. Pavlovskii, who resided in Western Europe, took an interest in the Tsivin case and amassed much information and numerous documents, a great part of which mysteriously disappeared after his death during the 1960s. Hoping to clear the SRs of the suspicion that they had had contacts with the Germans during the war, Pavlovskii maintained that Tsivin had misrepresented himself to the Germans and Austrians as an SR, whereas, Pavlovskii thought, Chernov and Natanson did not even know him, an assertion disproved by numerous documents about the wartime SRs in the emigration.

63. *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (3), File on Groups in Switzerland, report dated 15 April 1916.

64. *Okhranka SR File*, XVI b (3), report dated 15 April 1916; L. M. Shalaginova, "Esery-internationalisty," p. 328.

65. Zeman, *Germany and the Russian Revolution*, pp. 18–23; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, Secret Report dated 6 December 1916 and submitted by Romberg to Reichkanzler von Bethmann Hollweg. Among other verifiable information he submitted, Tsivin informed the Austrians and Germans that the legal Voronezh cooperative newspaper *Zavety zhizni* was in fact under the control of an anti-war SR organization (see chapter 4). The methods by which the SRs in exile maintained contact with party organizations inside Russia are not all known, but the émigré party records in the Columbia University Library contain suggestive evidence. The numerous files consist largely of evidently personal correspondence; included, however, are code ciphers that show that the mundane subjects of the letters in fact concealed conspiratorial information. For instance, the comment "The other day I saw Sasha M. at the Green Owl Café" might mean "A meeting is scheduled for next week," and so forth. Included in the files of party documents is a Swiss Post Office Registry Book that records all of the mailings of L. Oberuchev (Oberutcheff) from Lausanne (one of the SR Internationalist centers). Between October 1915 and June 1916, Oberuchev (several members of this family were prominent SRs) mailed literally hundreds of letters and packets to addresses all over Russia; among his correspondents were S. Mstislavskii (Maslovskii), V. Figner, A. Kerensky, various departments of the Unions of Zemstvos and Cities, several cooperative associations, and a number of newspapers. The inclusion of the registry book in party files suggests that this massive "personal" correspondence probably concealed letters encoded according to the method described; presumably other individuals among the émigré SRs also engaged in this sort of communication with Russia. See *Bakhmeteff Archive*, Socialist Revolutionary Party, Box 5, Folder—SR Party Documents: Personal.

66. A. Shliapnikov, *Kanun semnadtsatogo goda*, part 1 (Moscow, Petrograd, 1923), pp. 208–9; Michael Futrell, *Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scan-*

danavia and Finland (London, 1963), p. 110; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," *K. i. SS.*, no. 75 (1931), pp. 40–41. Little information is available about Aleksandrovich, as he was commonly known in the party, before his involvement in the anti-war movement. Of worker origin, he was Petr Aleksandrovich Dmitrievskii. As a leader of the Petrograd worker contingent in the party, Aleksandrovich played a key role for the SRs in the February Revolution, became a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, and was one of the behind-the-scenes organizers of the Left SR movement and party. He became Dzerzhinskii's assistant in the Cheka, was accused of being involved in the 1918 assassination of Mirbach, and was summarily executed along with a number of other Left SRs.

67. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie*, vol. 49, p. 221.

68. Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, Report dated 24 August 1916 and signed by Romberg; Zeman, *Germany and the Russian Revolution*, pp. 18–23.

69. D. Zaslavskii, "Temnoe delo (Askol'd)," *Byloe*, vol. 22 (1923), pp. 191–96.

Chapter 3

1. See chapter 1, note 38.

2. A. Kiselev, "V iiule 1914 goda," *P.R.*, no. 7 (1924), pp. 51–53. Burevoi was the Left SR chairman of the Voronezh Peasant Soviet in 1917. Semin chaired *Nauka i zhizn'*, an important Petersburg educational society, and after the outbreak of the war he and Moshchin became involved in anti-war activities in Moscow. During 1917 Krylov was a well-known Petrograd Left SR; Mitkevich was a Left SR delegate from Kiev at the Second Congress of Soviets in October 1917.

3. Kiselev, "V iiule," pp. 51–53; D. Baevskii, "Bor'ba bol'shevikov protiv imperialisticheskoi voiny 1914–1918 gg.," *Bor'ba klassov*, no. 9 (1934), p. 8. Somewhat later, Lenin, Chernov, and other anti-war leaders urged all socialists to join the Russian army with specifically revolutionary goals, but none of the socialists had this as a unanimous position when the war broke out.

4. V. Vasilevskaia, "Rabochee dvizhenie v Petrograde po agenturnym dannym," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1923), p. 55.

5. N. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," *K.i.SS.*, no. 75 (1931), p. 10; V. Kaiurov, *Petrogradskie rabochie v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny* (Moscow, 1920), p. 93; Postnikov, "V gody voiny," p. 21.

6. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 9; this author claims that, of the Petrograd SR intelligentsia, only Ivanov-Razumnik, the famous literary critic and historian, opposed the war from the very beginning. He might also have mentioned the SR university and gymnasium students, most of whom opposed and agitated against the war. Postnikov seconds Sviatitskii's

observations about Ivanov-Razumnik and adds that he himself sympathized with Ivanov-Razumnik's views but did not venture to express this openly; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," pp. 15–16.

7. Shliapnikov, *Kanun*, p. 293.

8. I. P. Leiberov, "Deiatel'nost' petrogradskoi organizatsii bol'shevikov i ee vliianie na rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny"; A. L. Sidorov, *Pervaiia mirovaia voina*, pp. 285–86.

9. Aleksandr Fedorovich Kerenskii (*Po materialam Departamenta Politsii*) (Petrograd, 1917), pp. 11–12.

10. T. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 135.

11. I. P. Leiberov, "Revoliutsionnoe studenchestvo Petrogradskogo Universiteta nakanune i v period pervoi mirovoi voiny (mart 1914–fevral' 1917 g.)," *Ocherki po istorii Leningradskogo Universiteta*, 2 vols. (Leningrad, 1968), 2:19; S. Dianin, *Revoliutsionnaia molodezh' v Peterburge 1897–1917* (Leningrad, 1926), pp. 167–72; *Revoliutsionnoe iunoshestvo 1905–1917 gg. Peterburg* (Leningrad, 1924), pp. 112–17.

12. Before fleeing the city, Moshchin met with Kerensky but, when he learned that the police were on his trail, had to cancel his planned meeting with Bolshevik Duma deputy Petrovskii; agents had raided his hideout, confiscated his suitcase full of illegal literature, and arrested the apartment owner, Zugrin, whom they mistook for Moshchin; I. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie voennykh godov*, pp. 142–44. Menitskii's book, a gold mine of information on the wartime Moscow SRs, consists of raw data culled from the police archives, interspersed with the author's not necessarily accurate commentary, and is, therefore, a superb primary source and a poor secondary one, probably Menitskii's intention.

13. L. M. Shalaginova, "Esery-internationalisty," pp. 324–25; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," p. 17. Ekaterina Evreinova, an activist in the Vyborg District insurance funds, had summoned the workers.

14. Shalaginova, pp. 324–25; *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, p. 14.

15. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 143; *Mysl'* (Paris), no. 10 (26 November 1914). When Moshchin had been in the capital early in October, he had volunteered his services as editor of the SR workers' paper, which was then in the planning stage; the eventual editor, Ivanov, spent six months in jail for his involvement.

16. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 142–44; *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, pp. 13–15.

17. Richard Abraham, *Alexander Kerensky, The First Love of the Revolution* (New York, 1987), p. 79.

18. *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, pp. 14–15; A. I. Spiridovich, *Partiia sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov i eia predshchestvenniki, 1886–1916* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 540–43.

19. *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, p. 13; Abraham, *Kerensky*, p. 82.

20. *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, p. 14; Abraham, *Kerensky*, p. 83.

21. T. Sapronov, "Is zapiski maliara," in N. N. Ovsiannikov, ed., *Naka-*

nune revoliutsii; sbornik statei, zametok, i vospominanii (Moscow, 1922), pp. 56–57.

22. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 126–27.

23. Ibid., pp. 244–46.

24. Ibid., pp. 127–28. The successful resolution recommended only war-time cultural-educational work for SRs, an outlook about the current role of socialists identical with that of émigré Right SRs. Since Right and Left SRs inside and outside Russia immediately defined their respective wartime positions, these positions must have reflected pre-war tendencies.

25. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 129–30; see also I. Menitskii, “Presnenskaia gruppa,” in Ovsiannikov, *Nakanune*, pp. 78–79.

26. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 130–31.

27. Ibid., p. 132.

28. See, for example, Shalaginova, “Esery-internatsionalisty,” pp. 323–24. The future Left SR leader I. N. Shteinberg, who lived in Moscow during the war, later claimed that he opposed the war from the beginning. Sviatitskii’s memoirs confirm this, but some Right SRs asserted that before 1917 Shteinberg’s views were respectably defensist. Regardless, both before and after February 1917, the Moscow party intelligentsia was conservative.

29. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 130–37.

30. *Mysl’* (31 December 1914); Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 136–37; T. Sapronov, *Iz istorii rabochego dvizheniia (po lichnym vospominaniiam)* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1925; reprint ed. Newtonville, Mass., 1976), p. 47; and Sapronov, “Iz zapiski,” p. 64.

31. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 137–42. Bolshevik memoirists recalled that the Moscow SRs issued leaflets that espoused neither a German nor a Russian victory; V. Ter, “Nakanune velikoi revoliutsii,” in Ovsiannikov, *Nakanune*, pp. 8–12. Sapronov recalled that the Moscow Bolsheviks published nothing during this period; Sapronov, *Iz istorii*, p. 47.

32. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 143–45.

33. Ibid., pp. 144–45.

34. Ibid., pp. 144–45. The Samara SRs voted by a two-thirds majority to issue this proclamation. The stated SR intention to prevent Russian defeat and Russian victory seems hopeless of accomplishment. Yet precisely this occurred: the Allies defeated Germany, but, having been taken out of the war by revolution, Russia enjoyed none of the fruits of victory.

35. Ibid., pp. 145–49.

36. Ibid., p. 145.

37. *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, pp. 14–29; Abraham, *Kerensky*, pp. 85–86 and 90.

38. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 149–52. Inside Russia, open calls for Russia’s defeat could not be used. Instead defeatism was characterized by calls for ending the war by means of revolution, which both socialists and the Okhranka identified (with various nuances) as a potential defeat for tsarist (feudalist-capitalist) autocracy. But, since by any measure

Germany was defeating Russia on the battlefield, any government that negotiated peace would have to be willing to pay the price of defeat. To obtain the Brest-Litovsk peace, the Soviet government had to accept onerous consequences. Conservatives, liberals, and moderate socialists always bitterly opposed any outcome that involved "defeat."

39. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 152–54. The Bolshevik activist Sapronov remembered the tailors' union, with which the Moscow group of SRs had very close connections, as perhaps the best organized and most active in Moscow during 1915; Sapronov, "Iz zapiski," p. 65.

40. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 152–54.

41. Ibid., pp. 156–58.

42. Sapronov, *Iz istorii*, p. 78.

43. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 158–60.

44. Ter, "Nakanune," pp. 12–13; Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 160–62.

45. V. Chernov, *Chuzhimi putiami: sbornik statei* (Geneva, 1916), p. 58.

46. Sapronov, "Iz zapiski," p. 68; his *Iz istorii*, p. 84; Ter, "Nakanune," pp. 17–25. Within the student-intelligentsia milieu around Moscow's universities and institutes, numerous illegal SRs, SDs, and anarchists, many of them deserters, eked out a meagre and hazardous existence by working in the cooperatives or in the zemgor organizations, which produced supplies for the military; they called themselves "the commune of the downtrodden" (*kommuna brodiag*) and constituted a center of experienced revolutionaries always ready to participate in anti-war activities.

47. Sviatitskii, "Voina," p. 12.

48. M. Akhun, and V. Petrov, *Bol'sheviki i armia v 1905–1917 godakh* (Leningrad, 1929), p. 154; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," p. 21; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324–30. Shalaginova notes that during the year after July 1914 the Petrograd SRs set up five printing presses.

49. Kerenskii (*Po materialam D. P.*), p. 17.

50. Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," p. 16; N. Sukhanov (N. N. Gimmer), *Marksizm i Narodnichestvo* (n.p., n.d.); his *Nashi levye gruppy i voina* (Petrograd, 1915); his *Pochemu my voiuem?* (Petrograd, 1916); and his *Proiskhozhdenie mirovoi voiny* (Moscow, 1916).

51. Kerenskii (*Po materialam D. P.*), p. 17; Abraham, *Kerensky*, p. 85.

52. Hasegawa, *February*, pp. 135–37.

53. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 325; Chernov, *Chuzhimi putiama*, p. 58.

54. Hasegawa, *February*, p. 137; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," p. 19.

55. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 27:244.

56. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 325.

57. Kerenskii (*Po materialam D. P.*), pp. 19–20; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 325; Hasegawa, *February*, p. 137.

58. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 326; Kaiurov, *Petrogradskie rabochie*, p. 75; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," pp. 17–18.

59. Kaiurov, *Petrogradskie rabochie*, p. 75; *Biulleten'* (Geneva), no. 1 (1916), p. 17; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voyny," pp. 17–18; *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Geneva), no. 47 (13 December 1915). According to Lenin's paper, the joint SR-Bolshevik conference worked out a common resolution "regarding the struggle with the government"; more specifically, it reached joint decisions about the strike movement and the WIC workers' group campaign.

60. B. Glebov, "Putilovskie bol'sheviki v gody imperialisticheskoi voyny," *K.L.*, no. 59 (1934), p. 62; I. P. Leiberov, "O vozniknovenii revoliutsionnoi situatsii v Rossii v gody pervoi mirovoi voyny (iiul'–sentiabr' 1915 g.)," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 6 (1964), p. 53; Leiberov, "O revoliutsionnom vystuplenii," p. 70; *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, p. 20; M. Mitel'man, B. Glebov, A. Ul'ianskii, *Istoriia Putilovskogo zavoda*, 3 vols. (Moscow, Leningrad, 1941), 1:510–14. On the evening of 30 August 1915, police arrested six SRs, one Menshevik, and a number of Bolsheviks, including five members of the Bolshevik PC.

61. Leiberov, "O vozniknovenii," p. 53; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voyny," pp. 12–13; A. Efimov, "Iz istorii partiinogo kollektiva na Petrogradskom zavode Staryi Parviainen," *K.L.*, no. 3 (1926), p. 41; A. Kondrat'ev, "Vospominaniia o podpol'noi rabote v Petrograde Peterburgskoi Organizatsii RSDRP(b) v period 1914–1917 gg.," part 1, *K.L.*, no. 5 (1922), pp. 228 and 233; part 2, no. 7 (1923), p. 56; Hasegawa, *February*, p. 136. S. Ustinov was one of the major spokespersons at the Staryi Parviainen plant during 1917 and became an advocate of soviet power shortly after the February Revolution. Estimates of the total number of members of SR factory cells (and those of the other parties) are from Soviet sources, who have used police and party archives but who may have made inaccurate estimates, especially about the SRs. Hasegawa estimates that the five hundred to six hundred SRs makes them one of the smaller groups in the worker milieu, whereas I believe that the PSR had perhaps the largest network of cells in the factories. Only full access to the archives can settle the matter.

62. I. P. Leiberov, *Na shturm samoderzhavii: Petrogradskii proletariat v gody pervoi mirovoi voyny i fevral'skoi revoliutsii (iiul' 1914–mart 1917 g.)* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 52–71 and 288, note 125; *Ocherki istorii leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS* (Leningrad, 1962), pp. 309, 420–21. For studies that emphasize Bolshevik influence in sickness funds, see E. I. Kashchevskaia, "Bol'nichnaia kassa Putilovskogo zavoda (1914–1917); vospominaniia," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 8 (August 1963), pp. 100–104; Sandra Milligan, "Petrograd Bolsheviks and Social Insurance, 1914–1917," *Soviet Studies*, no. 3 (1968–1969), pp. 369–74; and I. I. Krylova, "Deiatel'nost' rabochikh upolnomochennykh v bol'nichnykh kassakh Petrograda," *Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta*, no. 20 (1959), pp. 33–34.

63. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, p. 61–64; S. Gruzdev, *Trud i bor'ba shveinikov v Peterburge 1905–1916 gg.* (Leningrad, 1929), pp. xviii–xix; I. Markov, "Kak proizoshla revoliutsiia," *Volia Rossii* (Prague), nos. 5–6 (1927), pp. 67–

73; F. Bulkin, *Soiuz metallistov: 1906–1918 gg.* (Moscow, 1926), pp. 170–75; Sapronov, *Iz istorii*, p. 64; A. E. Suknovalov, *Fabrika “Krasnoe znamia”* (Leningrad, 1967), p. 350.

64. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 64–69.

65. B. S. Seiranian, “Za pravil’noe osveshchenie bol’shevistskoi taktiki boikota voenno-promyshlennykh komitetov,” *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 2 (1966), pp. 112–16; Dvinov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina i rossiiskaia sotsial-demokratiia,” p. 149. Although Sieglebaum’s account of the WIC workers’ group elections differs in some specifics (he reports that Kerensky supported the workers’ groups and that the Petrograd SRs came out for an election boycott), in general it is similar to the version I provide; Lewis Siegelbaum, *The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914–1917: A Study of the War-Industries Committees* (New York, 1983), pp. 161–70.

66. A. Kondrat’ev, “Podpol’naia rabota v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny,” *K.L.*, nos. 2–3 (1922), pp. 127–29; his “Vospominaniia o podpol’noi rabote,” p. 49; see also V. Zalezhsii’s remarks in *Revoliutsiia i RKP (b) v mat. i dok.* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1928), 7:198–99; and *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, p. 25. Kerensky told one meeting of worker SRs at his apartment that entering the WICs was useless and that they should announce that only an all-Russian workers’ congress could speak on the war for the working class.

67. Kondrat’ev, “Vospominaniia o podpol’noi rabote,” p. 49; his “Podpol’naia rabota,” pp. 127–29. Many factories passed Bolshevik inspired resolutions, including Putilov, Parviainen, Novyi Lessner, Franko-Russkii, Erikson, Shorokhod, Vulkan, Feniks, Geisler, and Semenovtza. Other factories, such as Staryi Lessner, Petrograd Metallurgical, Aivaz, Nobel, Diuflon, and Treugol’nik, passed leftist instructions evidently offered by the SRs; M. Pokrovskii, ed., *Ocherki po istorii oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii*, 2 vols. (Moscow, Leningrad, 1927), 1:400.

68. “Iz perepiski Russkogo biuro TsK s zagranitse v gody voiny (1915–1916 gg.),” *P.R.*, nos. 7–8 (1930), pp. 185–86; and *Ocherki istorii leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS*, p. 411.

69. Pokrovskii, *Ocherki*, p. 401; V. Zalezhsii, *Iz vospominanii podpol’shchika* (Kharkov, 1931), p. 52; S. Kuper, “Bol’sheviki zavoda Erikson v bor’be s sotsial-shovinistami,” *K.L.*, no. 61 (1934), p. 83; Zalezhsii, *Iz vospominanii*, p. 52; Zalezhsii, *Revoliutsiia*, p. 198; Postnikov, “V gody mirovoi voiny,” pp. 19–21. The Bolshevik candidate collected sixty votes, including those of the Bolshevik and Mezhraionka electors.

70. Pokrovskii, *Ocherki*, pp. 402–3; Shalaginova, “Esery-internatsionalisty,” p. 329, note 30; Postnikov, “V gody mirovoi voiny,” pp. 19–21.

71. Zalezhsii, *Revoliutsiia*, pp. 199–201; “Iz perepiski,” pp. 185–86; and *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Geneva), no. 1 (1916), p. 69.

72. Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, pp. 38–39; Shalaginova, “Esery-internatsionalisty,” pp. 329–30; *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, no. 1, pp. 67–68; Hasegawa, *February*, p. 136.

73. *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, no. 1, pp. 68–74; Postnikov, “V gody mi-

rovoi voyny," pp. 19–21; M. Fleeer, ed., *Rabochee dvizhenie v gody voyny* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 269–73. The number of SRs in the workers' group to the Petrograd WIC mentioned here is considerably larger than that provided by Soviet sources, who usually indicate that all ten city delegates were Mensheviks and that two of the six regional delegates were also SDs; to reach these figures, the Soviet sources count even well-known worker SRs such as Shilin as SDs. On the basis of data provided him by the worker-SR I. Markov and from his own recollections, Postnikov counted two SRs on the city committee and six on the regional. Since he failed to include Iakovlev, an SR from Putilov, in his city count, I have expanded Postnikov's figures by one.

74. D. I. Erde, "Moskovskaia organizatsiia bol'shevikov v period revoliutsionnogo krizisa 1915–1916 gg.," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR*, ser. ist. i filos., VIII, no. 6 (1951), p. 511; *Biulleten'*, no. 1 (1916), p. 15; *Na chuzhbine*, no. 1 (16 January 1916), pp. 19–25; Seiranian, *Bor'ba*, pp. 85–86; his "Za pravil'noe osveshchenie," pp. 114–16; Siegelbaum, *Industrial Mobilization*, pp. 168–69.

75. "Obshchee polozhenie k iiuliu 1916 g. Zapiska departamenta politsii," *Byloe*, no. 15 (1918), p. 28; *Biulleten'*, pp. 14–15; Hasegawa, *February*, p. 137; Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 17–18.

76. Pokrovskii, *Ocherki*, p. 404; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," pp. 327 and 330; Gusev, "Takitka partii bol'shevikov," p. 39.

77. Sviatitskii, "Voina," p. 24; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 327; *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, pp. 25–37; Abraham, *Kerensky*, pp. 94–100; Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, p. 89; V. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," (unpublished manuscript), Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 392, Files 2–3, p. 16. Abraham believes that Kerensky's declaration was adopted "with amendments." Other sources indicate that, after bitter debate, a new more radical declaration, only perfunctorily based on Kerensky's draft, received majority support. Worker SRs were especially critical of Kerensky's version on the grounds that it "compromised among various tendencies."

78. Sviatitskii, "Voina," p. 24; *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, pp. 25–37.

79. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 327; Abraham, *Kerensky*, p. 99.

80. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 327; *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, pp. 37–39; Abraham, *Kerensky*, chapter 5, pp. 75–102. In evaluating striking new evidence about Kerensky's wartime revolutionary activities, Abraham has somewhat exaggerated his role. Indeed, the primary sources Abraham evaluates often create misleading impressions. During 1915 one Okhranka official wrote that Kerensky was "the central figure and initiator of the re-creation of the local organization of the SR Party." In 1961 Kerensky himself testified, "There in Petersburg . . . I restored the S.-R. organization," and Sukhanov recalled, "Kerensky took the most direct part in SR Party affairs." Similarly, a 1915 police report went so far as to describe

Kerensky as "the chief ringleader of the present revolutionary movement." Abraham concludes, "Kerensky was able . . . to consolidate an SR organization inside Russia far stronger than the party had been since 1907"; Abraham, *Kerensky*, pp. 81, 90, 94. Unquestionably, Kerensky devoted enormous energy to the task of rebuilding the party; of great help was his status as Duma deputy, which offered him both public fame as revolutionary spokesperson and a degree of private immunity from arrest. But SR activists also used Kerensky for their own purposes; once with his help they had re-established the organization, they forged ahead with activities and programs of which he disapproved and in which he took no part. A realistic evaluation would note both his crucial role as catalyst, gadfly, and organizational sponsor-protector and its limitations as regards overall vision and ongoing leadership.

81. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 327; *Biulleten'*, p. 18; Fleer, *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 233–35; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," p. 14. Postnikov recalled, "During the war era . . . the SR and Bolshevik workers carried out several joint endeavors."

82. Fleer, *Rabochee dvizhenie v gody voiny*, pp. 232–35.

83. *Biulleten'*, p. 13; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," p. 21.

84. *Biulleten'*, p. 15; Abramov, "Bor'ba bol'shevikov," p. 19; *Materialy po istorii profdvizheniia v Rossii*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1925), 3:315–18; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," pp. 18, 21.

85. *Biulleten'*, pp. 15–16.

86. *Biulleten'*, pp. 17–18.

87. *Biulleten'*, pp. 18–19.

88. Kaiurov, *Petrogradskie rabochie*, p. 41. Kaiurov also noted that when unity prevailed, the parties could bring out up to 250,000 workers for a specific demonstration, whereas without agreement only a smaller number would strike and march.

89. The SRs were the best-established party at the Putilov Works, Russia's largest industrial enterprise. They had organized their cells there in 1902; SRs founded and administered several Narva District schools and educational societies, where hundreds of Putilov workers became literate and converted to socialism. During the war they cooperated with the SDs to found the Putilov workers' cooperatives *Trudovoi put'* and *Ekonomika*; Glebov, "Putilovskie bol'sheviki," p. 76. After the February Revolution, Bolshevik memoirists recalled an "SR flood" at Putilov, a development that reflected their long-term activism and influence.

90. K. Shelavin, *Rabochii klass i VKP(b) v fevral'skoi revoliutsii* (Leningrad, 1929), p. 45.

91. V. Bystrianskii, "V nachale 1916 goda," *K.L.*, no. 7 (1923), pp. 208–11; Katkov, *Russian Revolution*, p. 90; Fleer, *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 262–66; I. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1924), p. 129. The full edited text of the letter went as follows: "I rush to inform you of the latest events. . . . On the example of . . . June 1914, the PCs of the [Bolsheviks] and the SRs

have called a protest strike for 1 March, which would not be limited to a strike only but, if necessary, would turn into an armed rising; the protest is being carried out under the slogan "Down with the war" and arose out of a conflict at the Putilov works, which struck two weeks ago over the arrest of several sailors. . . . The [Mensheviks] were mostly afraid to strike. The [SR] PC . . . were not unanimous; some were for the strike and some against out of fear of excessive losses. The anarchists opposed the strike. The . . . [Bolshevik] PC split; part suggested striking, part not striking, and as a result [some of them] did not strike, and brochures only mentioned the day, although reports and discussions occurred at all factories."

92. Leiberov, "Revoliutsionnoe studenchestvo," pp. 20–25; G. D. Zaks, "Roshal'," *Revoliutsionnoe iunoshestvo*, pp. 112–17.

93. *Biulleten'*, pp. 21–22.

94. *Biulleten'*, pp. 21–22; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 328.

95. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 328; Sviatitskii, "Voina," pp. 39–40; Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, p. 95; Spiridovich, *Partiia sots.-rev.*, p. 544.

96. One of the rare histories, besides Shalaginova's study, that notes the SR role in the anti-war movement is the multivolume *Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do velikogo oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii*, 12 vols. (Moscow, 1968), 11:599, which states, "In the party of the SRs, the leftist international wing, reflecting the interests of part of the workers and the radical intelligentsia, was much more highly developed than among the Mensheviks. . . . In Russia by the end of 1914, leftist SRs issued not less than fifteen anti-war proclamations (in Petrograd, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Irkutsk, and other cities) with slogans calling for the overthrow of the autocracy, the democratic republic, armed uprising, land and freedom. By February 1917, the number of such proclamations, by incomplete count, reached 100." Shalaginova notes that the Soviet counts include only leaflets the SRs issued solely on the war and therefore omit the large number they issued for specific occasions (for 9 January, the Lena massacre, May Day, and so forth), even though these documents invariably contained anti-war statements and slogans. An exhaustive total just for the party's larger urban organizations would run into several hundred.

Chapter 4

1. Besides those offered in this chapter, citations to sources bearing on this important subject can be found in chapter 6.

2. A. Pireiko, *V tylu i na fronte imperialisticheskoi voiny (Vospominaniia riadovogo)* (Leningrad, 1926), p. 11; S. G. Kapshukov, *Bor'ba bol'shevistskoi partii za armiiu v period Pervoi mirovoi voiny, 1914 g.–Mart 1917* (Moscow, 1957), p. 61; A. L. Sidorov, ed., *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v armii i na flote (1914–fevral' 1917 gg.)* (Moscow, 1966), p. 189.

3. M. Akhun and V. Petrov, "Petrogradskii garnizon i severnyi front v

gody imperialisticheskoi voiny," *K.L.*, no. 3 (1927), pp. 165-66; S. E. Rabinovich, *Bor'ba za armiiu 1917 g.* (Leningrad, 1930), p. 11 (after noting the role of the other parties, Rabinovich concludes, "As the only consistently revolutionary party, the Bolsheviks displayed the greatest energy," a philosophical rather than historical observation).

4. *Kratkii otchet deiatel'nosti Vserossiiskogo zemskogo soiuzna na zapadnom fronte, 1915-1917 gg.* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 4, 93, 169-70; Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," p. 16; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 267, File 1, clipping from *Novoe russkoe slovo* (15 January 1953); Hoover Institution Archives, M. A. Krol' Archive, Box 1, "Stranitsy moei zhizni" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 110-45.

5. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie voennykh godov*, pp. 160-61; *Bulleten'*, no. 1, pp. 14-18.

6. Z. Zeman, ed., *Germany and the Russian Revolution*, pp. 18-23.

7. B. B. Grave, *K istorii klassovoi bor'by v Rossii v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny: Proletariat i burzhiazii, iiul' 1914 g.-fevral' 1917 g.* (Moscow, Leningrad: 1926), pp. 130-31. Playing on the worker's emotions in every possible way, the SR agitators continued: "Indeed who could be persuaded by lying phrases about the benefits the war brings to workers? Those workers who have been snatched away to war and who perish by the thousands from unsanitary conditions, from the stupidity and venality of commanders, and simply from treachery? Or those workers who, 'saving Russia' by the production of shells, see their children and wives starving from insufficient food because inflation [has made it too costly]? Or, perhaps, the soldiers' wives, sisters, and children, who [are forced to] while away their time as prostitutes?"

8. Grave, *K istorii klassovoi bor'by*, pp. 130-31. The distrust of the Mensheviks and Trotsky of the backward Russian peasantry is well known. Of interest in this regard are the comments of the Western scholar of the Menshevik movement Ziva Galili y Garcia, who notes in an article about the Mensheviks of the war era that Tsereteli was unusual among the SDs in his trusting attitude toward the peasantry; similarly, Michael Shaw, who studied Trotsky's wartime writings closely, describes Trotsky's "heavy trust in the proletariat." Z. Galili y Garcia, "The Origins of Revolutionary Defense: I. G. Tsereteli and the 'Siberian Zimmerwaldists,'" *Slavic Review*, vol. 41, no. 3 (Fall 1982), p. 454; M. Shaw, "Nashe slovo," p. 74. Lenin's wartime writings are collected in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vols. 26, 27, 30, and 49. Rare references to the peasantry can be found in "Voina i rossiiskaia sotsial-demokratiia," *Sotsial-Demokrat*, no. 33 (1 November 1914); "Rech' na s'ezde shveitsarskoi sotsial-demokraticheskoi partii, 4 noiabria 1916 g.," *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 30:180-83; and "Doklad o revoliutsii 1905 goda," 30:322, 327. In the last document, Lenin again implies a relationship between 1905 and the current situation in Russia and blames the failure of the 1905 Revolution on the poor organization of the

peasantry (a shaft at the SRs?). During the war, Lenin rarely emphasized the need for propagandizing the Russian peasants and soldiers. For synopses of SD leaders' writings about the war, see Kh. Argun, *Bor'ba bol'shevistskoi partii za soiuz rabocheho klassa i krest'ianstva v period mezhdu dvumia burzhuazno-demokraticeskimi revoliutsiiami v Rossii (1907–fevral' 1917)* (Sukhumi, 1974), pp. 237–47; I. Deutscher, *Prophet Armed*, pp. 211–46; I. Getzler, *Martov, a Political Biography of a Russia Social Democrat* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 138–68; A. Ascher, *Pavel Akselrod and the Development of Menshevism* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 302–40. See also M. A. Tsialovskii, ed., *Bol'sheviki; dokumenty po istorii bol'shevizma* (Moscow, 1918), p. 152.

9. See chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of wartime SD organizations.

10. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 155–56.

11. Ibid., pp. 156–57.

12. Ibid., pp. 157–59.

13. Ibid., pp. 163–64.

14. Akhun and Petrov, "Petrogradskii garnizon," p. 165; M. Akhun, *Tsarskaia armiia v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny* (Moscow, 1929), pp. 79–80; Akhun and Petrov, *Bol'sheviki i armiia*, p. 158; Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 155–56, 163–64; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, Report signed by Romberg and dated 6 December 1916; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 332.

15. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 163–64.

16. *Biulleten'*, no. 1, pp. 22–23.

17. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 189; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, reports signed by Romberg, dated 24 August 1916 and 6 December 1916. According to the police, other literature came from the "RSDRP," a designation that applied to four separate organizations in Petrograd. At various times, all of them got propaganda to the fronts. In discussing the SRs' efforts to revolutionize Russia's armed forces, Tsivin asserted that the SRs maintained several smaller military organizations and two large ones: the northern, centered in Petrograd, and another in Moscow. At one point, he claimed that the Moscow SR military organization was especially well organized; no corroboration of the claims about Moscow has surfaced.

18. N. V. Kamenskaia, ed., *Ocherki kommunisticheskoi partii Belorussii* (Minsk, 1965), pp. 192–93; L. P. Lipinskii, and E. P. Luk'ianov, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Belorussii v period mezhdu dvumia revoliutsiiami* (Minsk, 1972), p. 210; L. P. Lipinskii, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Belorussii v 1914–1917 gg.* (Minsk, 1975), pp. 113–15.

19. E. M. Savitskii, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Belorussii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny i vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii (iiul' 1914–mart 1917)," doctoral dissertation, Minsk, 1968, pp. 136–37. This unusually frank author

provides a savage critique of certain Soviet studies that claim that the Minsk Military-Revolutionary Union was defensist or lukewarm in its internationalism.

20. Savitskii, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie," p. 156.

21. Lipinskii, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie*, pp. 114-15; A. V. Shestakov, *Ocherki po sel'skomu khoziastvu i krest'ianskomu dvizheniiu v gody mirovoi voiny i pered oktiabrem 1917 g.* (Leningrad, 1927), pp. 160, 173; Savitskii, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie," pp. 134-35.

22. V. Astrov, *Bolsheviki v Smolenske do oktiabria 1917 g.* (Smolensk, 1924), pp. 15-16. For information about SR strength in Smolensk since 1900, see Melancon, "Socialist Revolutionaries from 1902 to 1907."

23. Reported in Astrov, *Bol'sheviki v Smolenske*, p. 17.

24. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

25. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 71; Iu. Kotsiubinskii, "Chernigovskaia organizatsiia bol'shevikov vo vremia voiny", *Letopis' revoliutsii* (henceforth *L.R.*), no. 2 (1927), pp. 181-82.

26. Iu. Kotsiubinskii, "Chernigovskaia organizatsiia," p. 185; this author remarks that further Bolshevik anti-war work "fell through" for lack of a printing press.

27. A. K. Drezen, "Baltiiskii flot," no. 36, pp. 126-63, and no. 37, pp. 125-56; I. Egorov, "Materialy po revoliutsionnomu dvizheniiu vo flote," pp. 371-92.

28. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 314-16.

29. Ibid., pp. 317-22. Pelikhov also told the sailors about the spread of revolutionary propaganda in nearly Kolpino, where some of the members of the local SR committee, including several students, had been arrested.

30. Ibid., pp. 34-37, 345, and 356-57. For information on Pelikhov's party allegiance, see *Pamiatnik bortsam revoliutsii*, 2 vols. (Leningrad, 1924), 2:162-63.

31. P. E. Dybenko, *Miatezhniki; iz vospominanii o revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1923), p. 14. Some Bolsheviks later claimed that the initiative for the formation of sailors' collectives came from the Bolshevik PC; see F. N. Samoilov, "Besporiadki na 'Gangute'", *Krasnyi Baltiets*, no. 8 (1921), pp. 33-34. Contemporary police reports indicate that initial support came from the Petrograd SRs. One Bolshevik memoirist later claimed that the Kronshtadt Military Organization "fully sympathized" with the Bolsheviks but "were prepared to establish and maintain ties even with the SRs in order to have contact with the outside world"; Kuznetsov-Lomakin in Egorov, "Materialy po revoliutsionnomu," pp. 371-92.

32. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 384. Through September 1915 police reports noted the "activities of cells of SR and SD tendencies" who "conduct propaganda under non-party slogans"; I. V. Egorov, "Matrosy-bol'sheviki nakanune 1917 goda," *K.L.*, no. 3 (1926), p. 17.

33. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 385; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 325; P. Z. Sivkov, *Kronshtadt: Stranitsy revoliu-*

tsionnoi istorii (Leningrad, 1972), pp. 67-83; N. Tochenyi "Kronshtadtsy i Vremennoe Pravitel'stvo," in *Voennye moriaki v bor'be za pobedy oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1958), p. 313; I. Egorov, "Matrosybol'sheviki nakanune 1917 g.," in P. F. Kudelli, ed. *Oktiabr'skii shkval (moriaki Baltiiskogo flota v 1917)* (Leningrad, 1927), pp. 11-17.

34. Ever since 1900, the SRs were the most ardent proponents of joint work and interparty committees; organizational questions always plagued the SDs more than the SRs. See M. Melancon, "Marching Together!"

35. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324; Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, pp. 78-96.

36. *Rabochee dvizhenie na Ukraine v period pervoi mirovoi voiny, iiul' 1914-fevral' 1917* (Kiev, 1966), p. 33; P. G. Plugatyrev, "Khar'kovskaia organizatsiia RSDRP(b) v gody voiny," doctoral dissertation, Kiev, 1950, pp. 201-14.

37. *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 33; Buniakin, "Khar'kovskie zhelezno-dorozhniki," *L.R.*, no. 1 (1927), p. 9; Pokrovskii, *Ocherki*, pp. 406-7; B. S. Seiranian, *Bor'ba bol'shevikov protiv voenno-promyshlennykh komitetov* (Erevan, 1961), pp. 85-86.

38. V. Chernevskii, "Studencheskie volneniia pered revoliutsiei," *L.R.*, no. 1 (1927), pp. 13-14. This memoir is of special interest since it is one of few written by (former) SRs.

39. Buniakin, "Khar'kovskie zhelezno-dorozhniki," pp. 7-12; Chernevskii, "Studencheskie volneniia," pp. 13-14.

40. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 333.

41. N. Brigadirova, "Tul'skaia organizatsiia v period voiny (1914-1917 gg.)," *Revoliutsionnoe byloe* (Tula), no. 3 (1924), p. 11; V. Krutikov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Tul'skoi gubernii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Tula, 1964), p. 34.

42. Brigadirova, "Tul'skaia organizatsiia," p. 13; Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 142-45; Shestakov, *Ocherki*, p. 172.

43. Bragadirova, "Tul'skaia organizatsiia," p. 19; A. Puzakov, "Vokrug soiuzha metallistov (1912-1917 gg.)," *Revoliutsionnoe byloe*, no. 3 (1924), pp. 123-24; Krutikov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 24-25.

44. *Revoliutsionnaia bor'ba rabochikh Brianskogo zavoda i Mal'tsovshchiny v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny (1914-1916 gg.)* (Briansk, 1926), p. 10; G. K. Shokhanov, "K 10-letiiu stachki na Brianskom zavode," *P.R.*, no. 9 (1926), pp. 201-2, 212-22.

45. Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 117, 165; V. Valiavka, "Iz istorii revoliutsionnoi deiatel'nosti ekaterinoslavskikh rabochikh s 1914 g. po 1917 g.," *L.R.*, no. 2 (1923), pp. 146-47; O. T. Aleshkin, *Revoliutsionnaia rabota bol'shevikov v massakh v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny i vtoroi revoliutsii v Rossii (iiul' 1914 g.-fevr. 1917 g.)* (Odessa, 1965), p. 19.

46. K. F. Shatsillo, "Zabastovka Nikolaevskogo sudostroitel'nogo zavoda Naval' v ianvar'-fevral' 1916 g.," *I.Z.*, no. 74 (1963), p. 281; *Rabochee dvizhenie na Ukraine*, pp. 162-65; Fleer, *Rabochee dvizhenie v gody voiny*,

p. 247; "Anti-voennaia zabastovka 1916 g. v g. Nikolaev," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 5 (1955), pp. 97–109 (paradoxically, with its reference to an anti-war strike, this article's title contradicts its own economic interpretation of the affair); Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 240–42; M. G. Skorokhodnikov, *Aleksandr Kastorovich Skorokhodov* (Leningrad, 1965), pp. 119–22.

47. S. Zav'ialov, *Istoriia izhorskogo zavoda* (Moscow, 1934), pp. 333–51, 355–73; Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 384.

48. M. Siniazhnikov, *Desiat' let bor'by* (Kostroma, 1958), p. 96; Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 142–45; V. S. Platov, *Tverskoe bolshevistskoe podpol'e* (Kalinin, 1963), p. 95.

49. S. Kuznetsov, "Krasnoe Sormovo v 1915–1917 gg.," in *Materialy po istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia*, 4 vols. (Nizhnii Novgorod, 1921–1922), 4:161–63; P. Premudrov, "Moi vospominaniia o Sormove," *Materialy*, 2:151.

50. Shliapnikov, *Kanun*, p. 282; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324.

51. G. Nelson Armitage, "Red Kazan: The Russian Revolution on the Volga," M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1985, pp. 19–23; E. Grachev, ed., *Kazanskii oktiabr' (Materialy i dokumenty)* (Kazan, 1926), p. 30; I. M. Ionenko, *Soldaty tylovykh garnizonov v bor'be za vlast' sovetov (po materialam Povolzh'ia i Urala)* (Kazan, 1976), pp. 18–26; I. I. Mints, ed., *Oktiabr' v Povolzh'e* (Saratov, 1967), pp. 38–43; N. Ezhov, *Voennaia Kazan' v 1917 godu: Kratkii ocherk* (Kazan, 1927), pp. 13–15; E. Medvedev, "Kazanskii proletariat v gody voiny," *Istoriia proletariata SSSR*, no. 7 (1931), p. 151.

52. V. P. Antonov-Saratovskii, *Pod stiagom proletarskoi bor'by: otryvki iz vospominanii o rabote v Saratove za vremia—1915 g. do 1918* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1925), pp. 7, 43.

53. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," pp. 324, 331; *Na Chuzhbine* (Geneva), no. 7 (1916), p. 28.

54. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324; Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 144–45; Pokrovskii, *Ocherki*, pp. 406–8; F. G. Popov, *Letopis' revoliutsionnykh sobytii v Samarskoi gubernii 1902–1917* (Kuibyshev, 1969), pp. 385–86; Shestakov, *Sel'skoe khoziaistvo*, p. 172.

55. Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, reports signed by Romberg and dated 5 October 1916 and 6 December 1916.

56. *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, p. 28; E. N. Khaziakhmetov, *Sibir'skaia politicheskaia ssylka (1905–1917 gg.)* (Tomsk, 1978), p. 141 (this author notes that the South-Russia Committee maintained ties with Krasnoiarsk, Irkutsk, Baiandaev, Bodaibo, Eniseisk, and other regions); Iu. Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga Rossii, 1914–fevral' 1917* (Moscow, 1971), p. 142; Radkey, *Agrarian Foes*, p. 91; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 13 (Sviatitskii claims that the South-Russia Committee's position was "starkly internationalist"); A. N. Tatarchukov, *Istoricheskii ocherk professional'nogo dvizheniia v Voronezhskoi gubernii: Chast' pervaiia: Do oktia-*

bria 1917 (Voronezh, 1921), pp. 52–53; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324.

57. M. Maiorov, *Iz istorii revoliutsionnoi bor'by na Ukraine (1914–1919)* (Kiev, 1922), pp. 6–29; V. L. Kharitonov, "Propaganda bol'shevistkoi organizatsii Ukraini . . . v gody . . . voiny," *Uchenie zapiski Khar'kovskogo gos. universiteta* (Khar'kov), 103 (1959), p. 71; Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, p. 142; Radkey, *Agrarian Foes*, p. 91; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 13.

58. Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 142, 162–64, 229.

59. I. Nikolaenko, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Luganske* (Kharkov, 1926), p. 77; Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 157–59; his "Krest'ianstvo stepnoi Ukrainy v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny 1914–1916 gg.," *Osobennosti agrarnogo stroia Rossii v period imperializma* (Moscow, 1962), p. 237; T. Khorechko, "Nakanune fevral'skoi revoliutsii v Donbasse," *L.R.*, no. 4 (1927), pp. 176–79; A. Gambarov, "Ocherki po istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Luganske (1901–1921 gg.)," *L.R.*, no. 4 (1923), p. 8. Arrested Bolsheviks were sent to Siberia, whereas the SRs were sent to the front.

60. Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 168–69; S. Gopner, "1916 god v Ekaterinoslave," *L.R.*, no. 2 (1923), p. 140.

61. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324; Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 124, 133–35, and 142, note 127; Valiavka, "Iz revoliutsionnoi deiatel'nosti," p. 155.

62. Kirianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 176–78, 187, 217–18.

63. I. L. Sabadyrev, *Bor'ba bol'shevikov za leninskuiu agrarnuiu programmu na iuge Ukrainy i v Moldavii* (Kishinev, 1927), p. 336; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," pp. 324, 328–29, note 27; G. Koff, "S.D. organizatsiia v Odesse v period imperialisticheskoi voiny," *L.R.*, no. 25 (1927), pp. 208–9; Aleshkin, *Revoliutsionnaia rabota*, p. 19.

64. V. Komin, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie trudiashchikhsia mass Stavropol'skoi gubernii nakanune i v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny," *Uchenye zapiski Kabardino-Balkarskogo gos. un-ta* (Nal'chik), 1 (1957), p. 195; V. A. Ulanov, A. I. Klimov, "Revoliutsionnaia rabota stavropol'skikh bol'shevikov v masakh v period imp. voiny (1914–fevral' 1917 gg.)," *Materialy po izucheniiu Stavropol'skogo kraia*, 11 (1964), p. 215. Delegates from this area reported to the April 1917 Bolshevik conference in Petrograd about their extreme weakness in the Stavropol area before February 1917; their remarks allow for no possibility that the local Bolsheviks could have had any significant role in wartime revolutionary activities.

65. Chernov, *Chuzhimi putiami*, p. 58; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," pp. 324, 332; V. V. Pokshishevskii, *Polozhenie Bakinskogo proletariata nakanune revoliutsii 1914–1917 gg.* (Baku, 1927), p. 77; Gusev, "Taktika," p. 39.

66. N. Bol'shakov, "Zavod Zingera pered oktiabrem i v oktiabre 1917 g.," *Bor'ba klassov*, no. 11 (1932), pp. 146–50.

67. P. I. Khitrov, "Sostoianie i deiatel'nost' partiinykh organizatsii na

Urale nakanune i vo vremia fevral'skoi revoliutsii", *Nauchnaia sessiia posviashchennaia k 50 letiiu sverzheniia samodershaviia v Rossii*, seksiiia III (Moscow, Leningrad, 1967), pp. 49-54.

68. A. P. Taniaev, ed., *Rabochii klass v gody i revoliutsii: Dok. i. mat.*, 3 vols. (Sverdlovsk, 1927), 1:227-30.

69. A. Kuchkin, "V polpol'e v Ufe v 1911-1915 gg.", *P.R.*, no. 1 (1929), pp. 240-41; V. Trotskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v sredne-volzhskom krae* (Samara, 1930), p. 101; A. S. Il'in, *Zlatoustovtsy: nauchno-istoricheskie ocherki* (Rostov, 1967), pp. 98-111; *Ocherki istorii permskoi oblastnoi partiinoi organizatsii* (Perm, 1971), pp. 104-110; K. Sidorov, "Rabochee dvizhenie v gody imp. voiny," in Pokrovskii, *Ocherki po istorii oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii*, 1:317-18; *Nash krai v dokumentakh i illiustratsiiakh* (Sredneural'skoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1966), p. 473; A. Taniaev, *Rabochee dvizhenie na urale v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny* (Sverdlovsk, Moscow, 1931), pp. 8, 36-37, 40-42; *Ocherki istorii Sverdlovskai* (Sverdlovsk, 1958), p. 132.

70. E. M. Khaziakhmetov, "Sibirskaiia politicheskaiia ssylka 1905-1917 gg.", *Nekotorye voprosy rasstanovki klassovykh sil nakanune i v period velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii* (Tomsk, 1976), p. 39. This study presents interesting information about Siberian political exiles' attitudes toward the war. During spring 1915, the SDs elicited opinion on the war and the WIC workers' groups by distributing a questionnaire among socialists in the Eniseisk area. Of those answering, fifty-two Bolsheviks opposed the war and one had no opinion; eight Mensheviks opposed the war and one supported it; twenty-five SRs opposed the war, two supported it, and three had no opinion. About the workers' groups, fifty-two Bolsheviks opposed them; the Mensheviks split four, four, and one; and the SRs split twenty-three, three, and four; A. Tsvetkov-Prosveshchenskii, *Mezhdru dvumia revoliutsiiami* (Moscow, 1957), p. 137; Vardin, "Politicheskaiia ssylka," *P.R.*, no. 5 (1922), p. 119. Khaziakhmetov provides an interesting sidelight; police reported that during the war era illegal literature arrived at 597 Siberian addresses, of which 160 were SRs, 103 were Bolsheviks, and 97 were Mensheviks; Khaziakhmetov, "Sibirskaiia pol. ssylka," pp. 44-49.

71. V. Kosarev, "Voenno-sotsialisticheskii soiuz," *Sibirskie ogni*, no. 1 (1922), p. 65; N. Avdeev, "Bol'shevistskaia rabota vo flote i armii," *P.R.*, no. 6 (1924), p. 93; Kapshukov, *Bor'ba bol'shevistskoi partii za armiiu*, p. 108.

72. Kosarev, "Voenno-sotsialisticheskii soiuz," p. 65; A. Petrenko, "Nakanune fevral'skoi revoliutsii 1917 g. v Tomske," *K. i SS.*, no. 1 (1927), p. 91; Avdeev, "Bol'shevistskaia rabota," p. 93; Kapshukov, *Bor'ba*, p. 108; Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 241; A. N. Batalov, *Bor'ba bol'shevikov za armiiu v Sibir'. 1916-fev. 1918* (Novosibirsk, 1978), p. 57; E. Khaziakhmetov, *Bol'sheviki v narymskoi ssylke* (Novosibirsk, 1967), pp. 154-55.

73. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 300-6; A. A. Mykhin, "Bol'sheviki-rukovoditeli rabocheho dvizheniia v Irkutskoi gubernii v naka-

nune fevral'skoi revoliutsii 1917 g.," *Zapiski irkutского oblastnogo kraevedcheskogo muzeia: Sbornik statei i mat.* (Irkutsk, 1965), pp. 78-79.

74. Batalov, *Bor'ba bol'shevikov*, pp. 60-61.

75. A. Lipkin, "Proval soiuzs Sibirskikh rabochikh", *K. i SS.*, no. 8 (1927), pp. 74-75; V. I. Vel'man, "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Sibiri", *P.R.*, no. 3 (1925), p. 176; S. Papernikov, "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Irkutske", *K. i SS.*, no. 30 (1927), pp. 93-98; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," pp. 324, 330-33; Krol', "Stranitsy moei zhizni," pp. 110-45; Khaziakhmetov, *Sibirskaiia politicheskaiia ssylka*, pp. 142-43; Batalov, *Bor'ba bol'shevikov*, pp. 52, 59; A. P. Meshcherskii and N. N. Shcherbakov, *V. I. Lenin i politicheskaiia ssylka v Sibiri* (Irkutsk, 1973), p. 157; A. K. Tsvetkov-Proshchensenskii, *V izgnanii* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 19, 50, and 89-90; V. Bystrianskii, "Iz istorii partiinoi raboty v Sibiri v period imperialisticheskoi voyny", *K.L.*, no. 1 (1924), p. 189; S. L. Cherniavskaia, *Bol'shevistskaia fraktsiia IV Gosudarstvennoi dumy v sibirskoi ssylke* (Krasnoiarsk, 1942), pp. 22; I. Buzulaev, "Bol'sheviki v Minusinske," *K. i SS.*, no. 4 (1930), p. 68.

76. I. G. Lashkov, *Bol'sheviki Novonikolaevska v bor'be protiv tsarizma (1895-fevral' 1917 g.)* (Novosibirsk, 1961), pp. 68-77; Batalov, *Bor'ba bol'shevikov*, pp. 60-61.

77. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324; *Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen*, 11: 599.

78. *Mysl'*, no. 7 (22 November 1914), no. 10 (26 November 1914), no. 11 (27 November 1914), no. 19 (6 December 1914), and no. 87 (26 February 1915); *Zhizn'*, no. 69 (1 August 1915).

79. *Mysl'*, no. 18 (5 December 1914), no. 41 (3 January 1915).

80. *Mysl'*, no. 3 (18 November 1914), no. 5 (20 November 1914).

81. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 129-30, 156-58, and 160-62; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 325; *Kerenskii (Po materialam D. P.)*, pp. 19-20; Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 155-57.

82. Shestakov, *Sel'skoe khoziaistvo i krest'ianskoe dvizhenie*, p. 173.

83. Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 130-37; Kotsiubinskii, "Chernigovskaia organizatsiia," pp. 181-82; Brigadirova, "Tul'skaia organizatsiia," p. 13; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 324.

84. Perrie, "Social Composition and Structure," pp. 223-50; Manfred Hildermeier, "Zur Sozialstruktur der Fuehrungsgruppen und zur terroristischen Kampfmethode der Sozialrevolutionaeren Partei Russlands vor 1917," *Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas* (1972), pp. 516-50.

85. Perrie, "Social Composition," pp. 239-41; C. Rice, "'Land and Freedom' in the Factories of Petersburg: The SRs and the Workers' Curia Elections to the Second Duma, January 1907," *Soviet Studies*, 36, no. 1 (January 1984), pp. 87-107. Hildermeier ("Sozialstruktur," pp. 294-96) provides a chart that indicates that of the PSR's total membership, the intelligentsia were about 50 percent; workers, 23 percent; and peasants, 4 percent. The lack of sources and dates of applicability of this estimate render judging its

accuracy difficult. Perrie analyzes a sample of one thousand SRs who were arrested before 1917 and who filled out questionnaires after the revolution. Whether or not the social profile of arrested SRs was similar to that of the party as a whole is not certain but Perrie's estimates plausibly fit other data. Lutz Haefner of the University of Hamburg informs me that recent Soviet research suggests a somewhat greater peasant component in the PSR's membership than previous studies show.

86. *Ssyl'nye revoliutsionery v Sibiri (XIX v.—fevral' 1917 gg.)*, 1 (Irkutsk, 1973), pp. 222, 232-33; I. Bogomolov, "Fevral'skii perevorot v Iakutske," *Na voliu iz tsariskikh tiurem: Sbornik vospominanii, 1917-1922* (Leningrad, 1927), pp. 54-58; "Pamiat' o Iakutskoi politicheskoi ssylke," *K. i SS.*, no. 2 (1925), pp. 72-78.

Chapter 5

1. See Melancon, "Marching Together!"

2. A. M. Sovokin, "K voprosu ob ob"edinenii internatsionalistov protiv melkoburzhuznykh posobnikov voyny (1914-1917 gg.)," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 11 (1983), pp. 62-63.

3. B. Dvinov, "Pervaia mirovaia voina i rossiiskaia sotsial-demokratiia," pp. 70-75. This is the most complete study of the Menshevik-Internationalists before 1917; based on the author's recollections, it also uses other historical sources and is both a primary and a secondary study.

4. Dvinov, "Pervaia mirovaia," pp. 74-75. The Right socialist *Prizyv* pointed out that, although it was logical that internationalists should oppose the workers' groups, many internationalists supported entry into the groups with the aim of utilizing them "for organization of workers against the war," a policy that *Prizyv* disapproved since it "disrupted defense efforts"; *Prizyv*, no. 5 (30 October 1915). Most of these internationalists were Mensheviks, although some SRs and Bolsheviks entered workers' groups with anti-war goals.

5. Dvinov, "Pervaia mirovaia," pp. 74-75.

6. *Obzor deiatel'nosti Rossiiskoi sotsial-demokraticeskoi rabochei partii za vremia s nachala voyny Rossii s Avstro-Vengriiei i Germaniei po iiul' 1916 goda* (n.p., 1916), p. 91. The Ministry of the Interior prepared and published this study for circulation in government circles.

7. Iv. Kir'ianov, *Rabochie iuga*, passim.

8. *Obzor*, p. 91.

9. O. A. Ermanskii, *Iz perezhitogo, 1887-1921 gg.* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1927), pp. 117-20.

10. *Pamiatnik agitatsionnoi literatury ross. sots. dem. rab. partii* (Moscow, Petrograd, 1923), 7, no. 1. To the great misfortune of historians, this issue, which covered the second half of 1914, was the last to appear. The editors' catholic approach may have contributed to the demise of the series.

11. *Marksizm-Leninizm i Pitserskie rabochie* (Leningrad, 1977), pp. 291-92.

12. *Petrogradskii proletariat i bol'shevistskaia organizatsiia v gody imperialisticheskoi voyny: Sbornik dok. i mat.* (Leningrad, 1939), pp. 180-81.

13. T. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 104-45.

14. B. A. Skripov and A. S. Smol'nikov, "Iz istorii revoliutsionnogo studencheskogo dvizheniia v Moskovskom universitete (1914-1917 gg.)," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, ser. istoriia, no. 2 (1979), pp. 3-13; A. Batov, "V donbasseinskom podpol'e," *L.R.*, no. 1 (1930), p. 148.

15. S. D. Chkhartishvili, "Bor'ba bol'shevikov Zakavkaz'ia protiv imp. voyny," in *Bor'ba klassov i partii v gody pervoi mirovoi voyny* (Moscow, 1964), p. 52.

16. A recent exception is Sovokin, "K Voprosu," pp. 59-66.

17. E. A. Anan'in, "Iz vospominanii revoliutsionera 1905-1923 gg.," *Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement*, no. 7 (1960), p. 49.

18. Of interest in this connection was an incident at the Second International Conference at Kienthal. At the opening of the conference, Lenin moved that the credentials of the Menshevik representatives not be accepted since they belonged, in his words, "to the social-patriotic movement in Russia." As a representative of the Menshevik *Organizatsionnyi Komitet* in the emigration, Martov refuted this statement by pointing out that the number of Mensheviks adhering to the patriotic view was quite small and that demonstrably most Menshevik committees inside Russia subscribed to the planks of the Zimmerwald Manifesto. No one challenged this statement and Martov participated fully in the Left socialist Kienthal Conference; Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," p. 78.

19. The most important single source on the Mezhraionka are the memoirs of Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 114-43, and *Bor'ba za edinstvo partii* (Petrograd, 1917).

20. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 114-43; see also *Marksizm-Leninizm*, pp. 291-2.

21. *Pamiatnik agitatsionnoi literatury*, pp. 80-121.

22. Examples of Mezhraionka leaflets addressed to soldiers are in *K.L.*, no. 2 (1924), pp. 130-64; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," p. 123; Iurenev, *Bor'ba za edinstvo partii*, pp. 10-11.

23. For this and other information on the Mezhraionka's very active role in the September 1915 strike, the 9 January 1916 demonstrations, and the February 1916 strikes, see *Obzor*, *passim*.

24. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 114-43.

25. For recent Soviet commentary on this circumstance, see Sovokin, "K voprosu," p. 63.

26. Kiselev, "V iiule 1914 goda," pp. 49-50.

27. Quoted in V. Vasilevskaia, "Rabochee dvizhenie v Petrograde," p. 55. For similar comments, see Taras Kondrat'ev, "Peterburgskaia organizatsiia RSDRP(b): Otdel'nye momenty raboty v nachale voyny 1914-1915," *Petro-*

gradskaia Pravda, no. 57 (14 March 1923). Kondrat'ev specifically notes the "silence" of the Bolshevik PC after the war's outbreak; meanwhile a group of Bolshevik workers from various factories who attended a certain night school wrote and somehow published a leaflet and an issue of an eighteen-page newspaper, *Rabochii golos* (Workers' voice), both of which opposed the war.

28. R. Arskii, "V Petrograde vo vremia voiny," *K.L.*, no. 7 (1923), p. 77.

29. *Pamiatnik agitatsionnoi literatury*, 6, no. 1.

30. Vasilevskaia, "Rabochee dvizhenie," p. 55.

31. For a full discussion of this incident, see Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," pp. 34–37.

32. M. G. Fleer, "P. K. bol'shevikov v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny," *K.L.*, no. 5 (1926), pp. 112–13. The memoirs of Kondrat'ev and Iurago confirm the weak state of the Bolshevik organization during the year or so after the beginning of the war. Occasionally, self-appointed Bolsheviks called themselves a "PC," but when they contacted Bolshevik workers' circles in factories, the circles refused to believe a PC existed. Consequently, when representatives from the Mezhraionka, which issued numerous proclamations and showed other signs of organizational life, contacted the same circles, some of them associated themselves with the Mezhraionka. In May 1915 a handful of Bolshevik workers, including Kondrat'ev, attempted to build a PC, but they had no presses, no intelligentsia help, and no contact with the districts. Finally in late July, a Bolshevik conference met in Oranienbaum with representatives from several districts in attendance. A more believable PC began to function after this, but, emphasizes Kondrat'ev, it still had no press and no one to write leaflets. Kondrat'ev emphasizes that Bolshevik literary types had gathered around the legal insurance newspaper *Voprosy strakhovaniia* (Problems of insurance) and refused to become involved with illegal work "because of the risks." Kondrat'ev's repeated noting of the circumstance that, even after its reconstitution in late summer 1915, the PC had no press and no one to write leaflets stands in conflict with the later assertions of Soviet histories about numerous PC leaflets from this and other periods. Iurago's much later testimony both confirms Kondrat'ev's picture of organizational weakness and asserts that the PC issued numerous anti-war leaflets (over 300,000), claims that seem mutually exclusive. See Kondrat'ev "Peterburgskaia organizatsiia," p. 9; and M. Iurago, "Bor'ba peterburgskikh bol'shevikov za prevrashchenie imperialisticheskoi voiny v grazhdanskuiu," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 39 (1939), pp. 65–70.

33. *Sotsial-Demokrat*, no. 47 (13 December 1915); Fleer, "P.K.," pp. 112–113.

34. Fleer, "P.K.," part 2, *K.L.*, no. 22 (1927), p. 116.

35. *Obzor*, p. 90; Fleer, "P.K.," no. 22, p. 125.

36. *Obzor*, p. 90.

37. In two studies of the pre-February period, Shliapnikov has provided

much information on the final Bolshevik Petersburg Committee: *Kanun semnadtsatogo goda*, passim, and "Sotsial-Demokratiia i voina (1914–1917 gg.)," *P.R.*, no. 3 (1923), pp. 178–95.

38. Sidorov, "Rabochee dvizhenie v gody imp. voiny," *Ocherki*, p. 269.

39. Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," pp. 53–56.

40. D. Baevskii, "Partiia v gody imp. voiny," in Pokrovskii, *Ocherki*, 1: 275–83.

41. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, 1: 37.

42. Kuchkin, "V podpol'e v Ufe," pp. 240–41; Il'in, *Zlatoustovtsy*, pp. 98–111; Trotskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v sredne-volzhskom krae*, p. 101; *Ocherki istorii permskoi . . . organizatsii*, pp. 104–10; Taniaev, *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 8, 36–37, 40–42; *Ocherk istorii Sverdlovskai*, p. 132; Sidorov, "Rabochee dvizhenie v gody imp. voiny," pp. 317–18; *Nash krai*, p. 473.

43. V. M. Samosudov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v zapadnoi Sibirii* (Omsk, 1970), p. 228; in some areas of Siberia, Bolsheviks left the workers' groups under direct orders from the Central Committee. See also E. Iaroslavskii, "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Iakutii," *100 let Iakutskoi ssylky; sbornik iakutskogo zemliachestva* (Moscow, 1935), p. 281.

44. See the discussion of Saratov in chapter 4.

45. O. A. Ermanskii, *Iz perezhitogo*, p. 117.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 117; B. Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," pp. 53–56; T. Sapronov, *Iz istorii*, pp. 78–79; and Menitskii, *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 34–35. This conference was analogous to the July 1915 populist unification conference that caused such a scandal. In this case, twenty-five leading Bolsheviks and Mensheviks who covered the entire spectrum of social democracy up to and including the extreme right-wing pro-war faction attended the SD unification conference. The decision of the conference to allow the Menshevik Duma faction to speak for social democracy signified approval of the faction's defensist position. Considering what many Bolsheviks inside Russia were doing, Lenin had little call to criticize those SRs and Mensheviks who supported the war.

47. Menitskii, *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 34–35.

48. M. Latsis, "Posledniaia nelegal'naia tipografiia," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1923), pp. 235–38.

49. D. I. Erde, "Moskovskaia organizatsiia," pp. 513–14. There are other indications of Bolshevik organizational weakness in Moscow. The Northern Organization was one of two Bolshevik circles at the Dinamo plant: the Northern Organization of Petrograd Bolsheviks and the Southern Organization of Moscow Bolsheviks. When a strike broke out at Dinamo in 1915, these two circles at the same factory did not even have contact with one another; I. Menitskii, "Zavod 'Dinamo' v 1915 g.," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1923), pp. 243–46. See also the memoirs in N. Ovsiannikov, ed., *Nakanune*.

50. V. Knorin, *1917yi god v Belorussii i na zapadnom fronte* (Minsk, 1925), p. 9.

51. S. Agurskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Belorussii (1863-1917)* (Minsk, 1928), p. 205.

52. L. G. Shidlovskii, *Tovarishch' Rakov* (Leningrad, 1926), pp. 14-15, 24-25.

53. *Partiia bol'shevikov v gody mirovoi imperialisticheskoi voiny: Vtoraia revoliutsiia v Rossii* (Moscow, 1966), p. 57.

54. Because of his execution at the hands of the Japanese forces in the Far East during the civil war, Commander of the Far Eastern Front Lazo has become a folk hero in the Soviet Union. Until after the uprising in July 1918, he was a member of the Left SR party. In Krasnoiarsk in January 1916, as a young officer with no previous revolutionary experience, he was converted to the SR party by the Left SRs Mazurin and the beautiful Ada Lebedeva, whom he subsequently married. The tendency of Soviet histories to "appropriate" members of other parties in building their case for Bolshevik anti-war work weakens rather than bolsters their case, since it suggests that evidence for such Bolshevik work is sparse.

55. A. Sheliubskii, "Bol'shevistskaia propaganda i revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie na Severnom fronte nakanune 1917 goda," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (1947), p. 73.

56. D. I. Grazkin, "Revoliutsionnaia rabota v XXI armii nakanune oktiabria (1916-1917)," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 9 (1957), pp. 3-4; Grazkin, *Okopnaia Pravda* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 26-39.

57. A. Pireiko, *V tylu*, p. 41.

58. Zalezhsii wrote a lengthy introduction to Pireiko's memoir, in which, besides the remarks quoted in the text, he claimed, "No socialist party carried out systematic agitation in the army. The revolution occurred spontaneously"; Pireiko, *V tylu*, pp. 3-4. Evidence indicates, however, that other socialists did conduct systematic agitation at the fronts.

59. For the traditional Soviet interpretation of Herculean Bolshevik efforts at the fronts, see any selection of studies in S. V. Shestakov, *Istoriografiia deiatel'nosti bol'shevistskoi partii v period pervoi mirovoi voiny i fevral'skoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1977).

60. I. Bas, *Bol'shevistskaia pechat' v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny* (Moscow, 1939); F. S. Besrodnyi, "Bor'ba bol'shevikov za soldatskie massy deistvuiushchikh armii v period provedeniia fevral'skoi revoliutsii," *Trudy Saratovskogo instituta mekhanizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva imeni M. I. Kalinina*, no. 23 (1969), p. 19; I. M. Dzhina, "O nelegal'noi bol'shevistskoi pechati v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 2 (1961); her "Nelegal'nye bol'shevistskie listovki—istoricheskii istochnik Fevral'skoi revoliutsii," *Sverzhenie samoderzhavii* (Moscow, 1970), p. 249; *Partiia bol'shevikov*, pp. 117-18; Shliapnikov, *Kanun semnadtsatogo goda*, pp. 20-26, 86; his "Fevral'skie dni v Peterburge," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1923), p. 73; Sidorov, "Rabochee dvizhenie," p. 268; N. Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii: khronika sobytii," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1923), p. 7; Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," p. 137; *Pamiatnik agitatsionnoi literatury*, Vyp. VI, pp. 126-

27, 292; *Listovki Moskovskoi organizatsii bol'shevikov 1914–1920 gg.* (Moscow, 1940); *Listovki Moskovskoi organizatsii bol'shevikov 1914–1925 gg.* (Moscow, 1954); Latsis, "Posledniaia nelegal'naia tipografiia," pp. 235–38; Ter, "Nakanune," 33; *Bol'sheviki Ukrainy v period mezhdu pervoi i vtoroi burzh.-demokraticeskoi revoliutsiiama v Rossii iun' 1907–fevral' 1917* (Kiev, 1960); I. Bazanov, "Sem' mesiatsev partiinoi raboty v Khar'kove (1915)," *P.R.*, no. 9 (1922), pp. 93–95; Kir'ianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 130–31; S. V. Shestakov, *Bol'sheviki vo glave rabocheho dvizheniia Rossii v gody pervoi voiny 1914 g.–fevral' 1917 g.* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 41–47; M. Akhun and V. Petrov, "Sotsial-Demokratiia latyshkogo kraia v 1914–1916 gg.," *K.L.*, no. 1 (1930), p. 192; Sheliubskii, "Bol'shevistsksaia propaganda," p. 73. See also Melancon, "Who Wrote What and When?," pp. 479–500.

61. Baron, *Plekhanov*, pp. 316–36; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 121–22; Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 22–27; A. Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Marxism* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 302–19.

62. David A. Longley, "The Russian Social Democrats' Statement to the Duma on 26 July (8 August) 1914: A New Look at the evidence," *The English Historical Review*, 102, no. 404 (July 1987), pp. 599–621.

63. See chapter 3.

64. *Obzor*, pp. 91–93; "Politicheskoe polozhenie," pp. 31–33; Siegelbaum, *Industrial Mobilization*, pp. 161–69; Galili y Garcia, "Origins of Revolutionary Defensism," pp. 454–76; Rex A. Wade, *The Russian Search for Peace, February–October 1917* (Stanford, Calif., 1969), pp. 17–24; his "Irakli Tsereteli and Siberian Zimmerwaldism," *Journal of Modern History*, 39, no. 4 (December 1967), pp. 425–31. The writings of Plekhanov and other Right socialists (most of whom were somewhat to the Left of him) are in *Prizyv* (1915–1916).

65. Siegelbaum, *Industrial Mobilization*, pp. 161–69; "Obshchee polozhenie k iuliu 1916 g. Zapiski departamenta politzii," *Byloe*, no. 19 (1918), pp. 27–28.

66. *Obzor*, pp. 88–93; "Politicheskoe polozhenie," pp. 31–33.

67. Occasional glimpses of anarchist activities can be found in chapters 3 and 4. See also Akhun and Petrov, "Petrogradskii garnizon," p. 165; Ter, "Nakanune," pp. 30–33; "Politicheskoe polozhenie," pp. 34–35.

Chapter 6

1. The liquidation of the SR organization probably was a consequence of its activism and the radicality of its propaganda. Dvinov notes that Bolshevik leaflets from 1916 cannot be distinguished in terms of their positions and slogans from those of the Left Mensheviks; that is, their leaflets opposed the war but failed to call for the Third International, the overthrow of capitalism, or civil war; Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," pp. 136–38. SR leaflets from 1916 contained the radical slogans on the New

International, the war, the regime, socialism, and capitalism and, on one occasion, employed the wording "Civil war against the bourgeoisie and landowners" (see chapter 4). "Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune fevral'skoi revoliutsii v zhandarmskom osveshchenii: S predisloviem M. N. Pokrovskogo," *K.A.*, no. 17 (1924), p. 30; N. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 39-47; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, various documents from December 1916 signed by Bethmann-Holweg and Romberg.

2. Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," pp. 22-23; A. G. Shliapnikov, *Kanun*, p. 235; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 39-47; V. Ivanov-Razumnik, *Pered grozoi* (Petrograd, 1923), p. 135; V. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," *Novyi zhurnal*, no. 34 (1953), pp. 190-92; T. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 137. Sviatitskii's somewhat vague chronology places Aleksandrovich's first arrival in Petrograd during December. Evidence from Shliapnikov and from Tsivin's German contacts suggests that he had arrived months earlier and, after a brief absence, returned in December; thus, he would have begun to organize activities in SR workers' circles during the late summer, a circumstance that sheds a different light on the role of the SRs in the Petrograd movement during fall and winter 1916-1917.

3. R. Pearson, *The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism 1914-1917* (New York, 1977), pp. 115-39; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 172-97; E. N. Burdzhakov, *Russia's Second Revolution: The February 1917 Uprising in Petrograd*, tr. and ed. by Donald J. Raleigh (Bloomington, Ind., 1987), pp. 41-71; Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 219-31; "Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii," pp. 17-36; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 39-47; A. Blok, "Poslednie dni tsarizma," pp. 13-15.

4. Postnikov, "V gody mirovoi voiny," pp. 15-29; V. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" unpublished manuscript in Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 392, File 3, pp. 1-29 (a much briefer version of this manuscript appeared under the same title in *Novyi zhurnal*, no. 34 [1953], pp. 188-211; no. 35 [1953], pp. 208-40); Krol', "Stranitsy moei zhizni," pp. 110-45. Many SR and Menshevik intelligenty worked in the cultural associations of workers' cooperatives; among the SR-oriented and basically defensist journals that appeared in wartime Petrograd were *Narodnaia mysl'* (The people's idea) with the participation of A. Gizetti, S. Maslov, Pitirim Sorokin, I. Il'inskii, B. Kovarskii, Dziubinskii, and N. Oganovskii; *Ezhemesiachnyi zhurnal* (The monthly journal), edited by V. Mirolubov; and *Severnye zapiski* (Northern notes), edited by Ia. Sakker. The broadest meeting ground for the socialist intelligentsia were the zemgor offices; in Petrograd alone, this institution employed, in part, the SRs Dobrovol'skaia, Ia. Dedusenko, M. Petrov, D. Skvortsov, I. Kraevskii, and A. Turba; the Mensheviks Garvi-Bronshtein and Shupak; and the Bolsheviks Iu. Steklov, N. Podvoiskii, V. Nevskii, N. Aivilov, and, as a low-ranking statistician, the infamous Iagoda, later head of the secret police. Of course, as suggested by the use of zemgor institutions at the front for anti-war agitation, many left-wing socialists utilized their zemgor employment for underground purposes.

5. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," 332-33; Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 73.

6. A. Shliapnikov, ed., "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v dokumentakh," *P.R.*, no. 13 (1923), pp. 259-69 (includes texts of the Mezhraionka and Left Menshevik proclamations); P.K.F., "PK(b) v kontse 1916-nachale 1917 v osveshchenii okhrany," *K.L.*, no. 42 (1931), pp. 32-39; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 175, 203; Burdzhakov, *Russia's Second Revolution*, pp. 78-79. In an informational bulletin for internal party use, the Bolsheviks reported that several thousand Mezhraionka and "some" Left Menshevik leaflets had been distributed in the factories.

7. Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 73; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 17; P.K.F., "PK(b)," pp. 32-39; Ferro, *Russian Revolution*, p. 41.

8. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 202-3.

9. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 39-40; "V ianvare i fevrale 1917 g. iz donesenii sekretnykh agentov A. D. Protopopova," *Byloe*, no. 13 (1918), p. 95. According to Sviatitskii, Surin was an SR activist with long experience and wide connections in the proletariat "without whom no attempt to rebuild the party apparatus could be carried out." See also Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 206; and Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 220.

10. E. B. Genkina, "Fevral'skii perevorot. . .," in Pokrovskii, *Ocherki po istorii* 2:25-35. See also citations in note 4.

11. Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," p. 139; M. Rafes, "Moi vospominaniia," *Byloe*, no. 19 (1922), pp. 179-80.

12. Genkina, "Fevral'skii perevorot," pp. 20-27; Rafes, "Moi vospominaniia," pp. 180-81. Most of those arrested were Mensheviks but a few were SRs. Shliapnikov described the arrestees as "Right SRs and Mensheviks who took the illegal path with the bourgeoisie against the government"; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 35.

13. Genkina, "Fevral'skii perevorot," pp. 20-27; Rafes, "Moi vospominaniia," pp. 183-90; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 132-34; his *Bor'ba za edinstvo*, pp. 12-13; Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v dokumentakh," pp. 271-74; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 50-60; Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii," p. 10; *Pravda* (Petrograd), no. 1 (5 March 1917); Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," (unpublished archival version), pp. 20-25.

14. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 59-60; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 40-45.

15. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 40-50; Marc Ferro, *The Russian Revolution of February 1917* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972), p. 41.

16. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 57.

17. Genkina, "Fevral'skii perevorot," pp. 20-27; "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia i okhrannoe otdelenie," *Byloe*, no. 1 (1918), p. 160; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 43-47; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 40-45.

18. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 50; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 43-44; "V Petrograde nakanune fevral'skoi revoliutsii," *K.L.*, no.

22 (1927), p. 47; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 205–11; Burdzhakov, *Russia's Second Revolution*, pp. 87–96; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 20–25; Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v dokumentakh," pp. 269–81; Iurenev, *Bor'ba za edinstvo*, pp. 12–13; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," p. 133. Apparently wishing to establish retroactive unity with the Bolsheviks, Iurenev later criticized the Left Mensheviks for breaking "internationalist solidarity" by coming out in favor of a 14 February strike and inaccurately implied that his own group was in agreement with the Bolshevik tactic of arranging alternative strike dates. Iurenev also later wrote that the strike organized by the WIC workers' group on 14 February was "quite successful"; if he meant that the strike fulfilled the WIC workers' group's goals, his evaluation was not supported by the opinion of the Right socialists and the police.

19. "V Petrograde nakanune," pp. 41–42, 44; N. Avdeev, "Khronika Fevral'skoi revoliutsii," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1923), p. 13; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 55–57; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 50.

20. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 206; Burdzhakov, *Russia's Second Revolution*, p. 91.

21. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 57. Kerensky is quoted in Pearson, *Russian Moderates*, p. 137; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 183.

22. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 209–11; Burdzhakov, *Russia's Second Revolution*, pp. 101–2.

23. "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 44.

24. The SR text is reported and quoted in Burdzhakov, *Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia*, 1:88; his source is TSGAOR SSSR, f. DPOO 1917, d. 9, ch. 46, lit. B, 1.11. The secret police report is quoted in Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 201.

25. "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 44.

26. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 50; Shliapnikov, *Kanun*, p. 294; I. Iurenev, *Bor'ba za edinstvo partii* (Petrograd, 1917), p. 13; Ermanskii, *Iz perezhitogo*, pp. 126–27.

27. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 50; Shliapnikov, *Kanun*, p. 294.

28. "V Petrograde nakanune," pp. 44–45.

29. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 189; and his "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 27–28; Burdzhakov, *Vtoria russkaia*, 1:87. Fearing arrest, the workers met with Kerensky at the Duma; another contingent of Putilov workers met with Chkheidze.

30. For Right SR attitudes toward Aleksandrovich, see Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 190–92.

31. Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 40–46; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 45–50; "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 44; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 114–43.

32. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 136.

33. Boll mistakes V. M. Levin for a Bolshevik; M. Boll, *The Petrograd Armed Workers Movement in the February Revolution (February–July 1917)* (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 100.

34. Kh. M. Astrakhan, "O taktike' sniatii s raboty v Peterburge v pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii 1917 g.," in *Sverzhenie samoderzhavii* (Moscow, 1970), p. 121. Astrakhan claims that because they were under the influence of powerful SR and Menshevik organizations, the Vyborg metallurgical plants were not in the vanguard of the February movement. His point seems to be that "by definition" the Vyborg plants could not have been in the vanguard if they were under SR-Menshevik influence, a philosophical assertion in no way altering the obvious fact that, under the guidance of many Left SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks, these plants played an enormous leadership role in the February crisis. Information about growing SR strength in Petrograd factories during the war can be found in Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," p. 138; *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 6 (1964), p. 43; M. Rozanov, *Obukhovtsy* (Leningrad, 1938), pp. 353-54; Kondrat'ev, *K.L.*, no. 5 (1922), pp. 228, 233; and no. 7 (1923), p. 56; Efimov, *K.L.*, no. 3 (1926), p. 41; Suknovalov, *Frabrika "Krasnoe znamia,"* pp. 60-65.

35. Ermanskii, *Iz perezhitogo*, p. 142.

36. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 114-43.

37. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 179-80, 198-99; E. N. Burdzhakov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, p. 170; N. Kaiurov, "Shest' dnei revoliutsii," *P.R.*, no. 1 (1923), pp. 160-65; Ia. Iakovlev, "Fevral'skie dni 1917 g.," *P.R.*, nos. 2-3 (1927), p. 97 ("The Bolshevik Biuro of the TsK did not and could not provide any real leadership in the progress of the revolution under the conditions [of the February Revolution]"); V. A. Kuvshinov, *Partiia bol'shevikov posle sverzheniia samoderzhavii (mart-nachalo apreliia 1917)* (Moscow, 1975), p. 96 ("The Biuro so composed [of three members] could not supply sufficient leadership of party work").

38. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 19, 66-67.

39. Ter, "Nakanune velikoi revoliutsii," pp. 40-52; Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, report signed by Romberg and dated 6 December 1916.

40. Ter, "Nakanune," pp. 28-52; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 25, 57; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 333; A. Shevko, "Ot 1905 goda k fevral'skoi revoliutsii," in S. Chernomordik, ed., *Put' k oktiabriu: Sbornik statei, vospominanii, i dokumentov* (Moscow, 1923), p. 109.

41. Ter, "Nakanune," pp. 33-40, 47-49. With Rosa Luxembourg, Liebknecht formed the anti-war wing of the German Social Democratic party; Adler, son of the Austrian socialist leader, had made a terrorist attack on the head of the Austrian government to protest the war. In an interesting sidelight about the status of the SR organization in Moscow, the memoirist Ter, who by his own account worked very closely with the SRs, noted that a certain "I. S-in" headed the Moscow SRs. This sounds very much like A. Semin, formerly a Petersburg labor activist, who arrived in Moscow shortly after the outbreak of the war and who during fall 1914 worked closely with the Moscow group of SRs. If "I. S-in" was Semin, then throughout the war he was the éminence grise of the Moscow SR organization and, as police files revealed after the February revolution, a provocateur.

42. Ter, "Nakanune," pp. 48-49; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 333.

43. Ter, "Nakanune," pp. 49-52; Burdzhlov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, pp. 14-15 (Burdzhlov points out that the leaflet was printed on the SR printing press); see the memoirs of I. Menitskii, V. Ter, and T. Saponov in N. Ovsiannikov, ed., *Nakanune revoliutsii*.

44. I. M. Dazhina, "Nelegal'nye bolshevistskie listovki," p. 249; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 333; "V ianvare," p. 96; Koff, "S.D. organizatsiia v Odesse," pp. 208-9; Kir'ianov, *Rabochie iuga*, pp. 136-37.

45. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 15:265. *Delo naroda* (Petrograd), no. 22 (12 April 1917); "Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune," pp. 38-50.

46. Sidorov, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, p. 212; Robert Eideman, *Armiia v 1917 g.* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1927), pp. 28-29; M. Akhun, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie nakanune burzhuaznoi demokraticheskoi revoliutsii" (dokumenty), *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 1 (1937), pp. 90-95. See Ruzskii's letter dated 8 February 1917 and other related material in V. Dziubinskii, ed., "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v voiskakh vo vremia mirovoi voiny," *Krasnyi arkhiv*, no. 4 (1923), pp. 417-24; and Avdeev, "Bol'shevistskaia rabota," p. 86.

47. G. P. Fedotov-Dvinets, *Dvintsy v proletarskoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1927), p. 12; Eideman, *Armiia*, pp. 28-29.

48. In an Aesopian turn of phrase, the Bolshevik leader Shliapnikov later claimed, "The Bolsheviks had no knowledge of SR or Menshevik organizations or work among the armed forces . . .," thereby creating the impression that such activities took place; Shliapnikov, *Semnadsatyi god*, pp. 160-61. V. Leont'eva, "B riadakh Mezhraionki (1914-1917 gg.)," *K.L.*, no. 2 (1924), pp. 130-64; *Biulleten'*, (Geneva), no. 1 (1916); *Byloe*, no. 1 (1918), pp. 160-61; Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," p. 138. Wildman holds, "The mutinies at the front can be regarded as having no serious revolutionary intent"; A. Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army* (Princeton, N.J., 1980), p. 122.

49. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, p. 44; A. Ivanov, "Volnenie v 1916 g. v 181-m zapasnom pekhotnom polky," *K.L.*, no. 1 (1924), pp. 170-73; Dvinov, "Voina," p. 138; V. Shklovskii, *Revoliutsiia i front* (Petrograd, 1921), pp. 7-8. When soldiers of the 181st greeted strikers from several Vyborg District plants, a dialogue arose between the workers and soldiers. When police attempted to separate them, the soldiers began to throw stones and surrounded several policemen, shouting "Hit the police!" Several injuries resulted.

50. "Fevral'skaia revolutsiia," p. 173-74; Fleer, *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 314-15.

51. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 100; Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," pp. 91-93; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, p. 48. During the last five months of the old regime workers at Staryi Parviainen struck six times for political reasons and four times for economic ones; in the same period, Nobel workers carried out five economic and four political strikes.

52. B. B. Grave, ed., *Burzhuaziia nakanune fevral'skoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1927), pp. 127–30; "Politicheskoe polozhenie," p. 6; D. Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution* (Princeton, N.J., 1981), p. 97. During fall 1916, leading bourgeois figures in Moscow agreed, "The temperature in Moscow is immeasurably higher than even in 1905–1907"; G. G. Kasarov, "Stachennoe dvizhenie v Moskve v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (19 iulia 1914–25 fevralia 1917 g.)," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, ser. istoriia, no. 6 (1970), p. 38.

53. Burdzhhalov, *Vtoraia russkai*, 2:8–9; *Kanun revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 37, 58–59.

54. M. Fleer, "Peterburgskii komitet (b) v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny," *K.L.*, no. 19 (1926), pp. 103–4.

55. Ibid., "Politicheskoe polozhenie," p. 30; "Vo vremia imp. voiny," *K.L.*, no. 10 (1924), p. 122; Grave, *Burzhuaziia*, pp. 127–30; Dvinov, "Voina i sotsial-demokratiia," p. 139; Skorokhodnikov, *Skorokhodov*, p. 125.

56. Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," pp. 330–34.

57. Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 73; Avdeev, "Pervye dne," p. 7; Burdzhhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, 1:95; "Anti-voennaia rabota bol'shevikov v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny" (dokumenty), *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 5 (1961), pp. 97–98.

58. G. Maksimov, "V gody voiny" (iz zapisok anarkhista) (fragment of unpublished manuscript), Nicolaevsky Archive, Box 198, File 11, pp. 58–81.

59. "V ianvare," p. 95.

60. "Politicheskoe polozhenie," pp. 9, 31–34.

61. "V ianvare," p. 95; Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, pp. 134–35; Grave, *K istorii klassovoi bor'by*, pp. 130–31; *Biulleten'*, pp. 18–19; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsaty god*, p. 19.

Chapter 7

1. N. N. Sukhanov, *The Russian Revolution 1917*, ed., abr., and tr. by Joel Carmichael (Princeton, N.J., 1984), p. 3; L. Haimson, *The Making of Three Russian Revolutionaries: Voices from the Menshevik Past* (New York, Paris, 1987), p. 390. Noteworthy accounts of the mass demonstrations during the February Revolution from varying viewpoints can be found in Burdzhhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia*; Ferro, *Russian Revolution*; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*; Katkov, *Russia 1917*; Leiberov, *Na shturm*; and Wildman, *End of the Russian Imperial Army*.

2. See chapter 6 for citations to these and other SR proclamations. Evidence about the Left Menshevik radicalization exists in many sources, including police reports about their activities around International Women's Day. The Menshevik movement as a whole (as well as the entire socialist movement) was moving to the Left, as suggested by a growing consensus

among Mensheviks just before the January 1917 arrest of members of WIC workers' group to withdraw entirely from this organization, which formerly Mensheviks had ardently espoused. Somewhat later, during the February crisis itself, the Left Menshevik Initiative Group unsuccessfully attempted a unification with the Bolshevik PC to prepare for the expected disturbances. N. Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii," *P.R.*, no. 13 (1923), p. 14; *Pervyi Vserossiiskii s'ezd sovetov R. i S. D. Stenograficheskii otchet zasedanii* [Moscow, Leningrad, 1930], p. 463.

3. Burdzhhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, p. 155.

4. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 183, 204–6; Pearson, *Russian Moderates*, p. 137; "K istorii poslednikh dnei tsarskogo rezhima," *K. A.*, no. 1 (1926), pp. 245–46.

5. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 201; "Politicheskoe polozhenie," p. 6.

6. A. G. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god* [Moscow, Petrograd, 1922], pp. 306–8; "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 45–46; *Oktiabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie: Semnadtsatyi god v Petrograde*, 2 vols. (Leningrad, 1967), 1: 50; Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 252–54; "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia i okhrannoe ot-delenie," p. 162; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 216; Ermanskii, *Iz pe-rezhitogo*, pp. 138–39.

7. "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 45. For an analysis of the various parties' printed agitation in association with the February disturbances, see Melan-con, "Who Wrote What and When?," pp. 479–500.

8. Excerpts from Burdzhhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, translated and published in *Soviet Studies in History*, no. 3 (Summer 1979), pp. 11–13; Genkina, "Fevral'skii perevorot," p. 57; Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 80–82; Kaiurov, "Shest' dnei revoliutsii," pp. 160–65; T. Hasegawa, "The Bolsheviks and the Formation of the Petrograd Soviet in the February Revolution," *Soviet Studies*, 29, no. 1 (1977), pp. 86–107; James D. White, "The Sormovo-Nikolaev zemliachestvo in the February Revolution," *Soviet Studies*, no. 4 (1979), pp. 475–504; A. Longley, "The Divisions in the Bolshevik Party in March 1917," *Soviet Studies*, 24, no. 1 (1972), pp. 61–76; E. N. Burdzhhalov, "O taktike bol'shevikov v marte-aprele 1917 goda," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1956), pp. 38–56.

9. Melancon, "Who Wrote What and When?," pp. 479–80; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 215–16; David Longley, "The Mezhraionka, the Bolsheviks and International Women's Day: In Response to Michael Melancon," *Soviet Studies*, no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 625–45; Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 254; Ferro, *February 1917*, pp. 35–36.

10. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 162.

11. Markov, "Kak proizoshla," p. 67; Burdzhhalov, *Russia's Second Revolution*, p. 100; Kaiurov, "Shest' dnei," p. 158; Ermanskii, *Iz perezhitogo*, pp. 138–39; N. Sveshnikov, "Otryvki iz vospominanii," *Petrogradskaia Pravda*, no. 57 (10 marta 1923), p. 10; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 137–38. Iurenev claims that strong debates over slogans occurred in the interparty

planning commission for 23 February, as a result of which the members decided to issue their proclamations separately. Since the Bolsheviks officially opposed slogans calling for strikes and demonstrations, the others must have supported the militant slogans (otherwise, what were they debating about?).

12. *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima: Stenograficheskii otchet doprosov i pokazanii, dannykh v 1917 g. v Chrezvychainnoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo Pravitel'stva*, edited by P. E. Shchegolev (Leningrad, 1925), 1:188; I. P. Leiberov, "Nachalo fevral'skoi revoliutsii (Sobytiia 23 fevralia 1917 g. v Petrograde), in *Iz istorii velikoi oktiabr'skoi sots. rev. i sots. stroit. v SSSR* (Leningrad, 1967), p. 9; Kaiurov, "Shest' dnei," p. 158; Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 80.

13. Iurenev, *Bor'ba za edinstvo*, p. 13; his "Mezhraionka," p. 136; Shliapnikov, *Kanun*, p. 294; "Politicheskoe polozhenie," pp. 29-30.

14. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," p. 136.

15. Ermanskii, *Iz perezhitogo*, pp. 136-37; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," p. 136; his *Bor'ba za edinstvo*, p. 13. At the first all-socialist meeting, one of the moderate socialists (either Gorky or Sokolov) recounted the story of an incident that had occurred recently at an officers' club. A colonel asked a young officer what he would do if he were sent to arrest the chairman of the State Duma. The young officer replied that he would place himself at the disposal of the chairmen of the State Duma, an answer that won general approval from the officers present. The underground activists such as Iurenev and Aleksandrovich thought that stories about what officers would or would not do regarding the Duma were irrelevant.

16. Sukhanov, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 3-33.

17. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 325; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 139-40.

18. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 162.

19. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 162; Burdzhhalov in *Soviet Studies in History*, pp. 11-13.

20. I. Mil'chik, *Rabochii fevral'* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1931), pp. 61-62; Burdzhhalov, *Soviet Studies in History*, p. 14; Kaiurov, "Shest' dnei," p. 158; his *Petrogradskie rabochie*, p. 118; Sveshnikov, "Otryvki iz vospominanii," p. 10.

21. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 162; Kaiurov, *Petrogradskie rabochie*, p. 118; Mil'chik, *Rabochii fevral'*, pp. 60-61; *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia*, p. 126; Leiberov, "Nachalo fevral'skoi revoliutsii," p. 9.

22. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 164; Astrakhan, "O taktike 'sniatiia'," pp. 123-25; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 85; Burdzhhalov, *Soviet Studies in History*, p. 13; Markov, "Kak proizoshla revoliutsiia," pp. 67-73.

23. Sviatitskii's memoirs imply that the leftist parties may already have begun agitation aimed at urging demonstrators to "go to the Nevskii"; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 40-46. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, p. 124; Markov, "Kak proizoshla," pp. 67-73.

24. Astrakhan, "O taktike 'sniatiia,'" p. 125; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 124-25; "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 165; Markov, "Kak proizoshla," p. 74.

25. Markov, "Kak proizoshla," pp. 76-86.

26. Ibid., pp. 92-95; Kondrat'ev, "Vospominaniia o podpol'noi rabote," p. 63; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 128-29. Mstislavskii, whom Markov met at the cooperative association, was chairman of the organization. Other evidence corroborates that Mstislavskii, although a leftist in daily contact with workers, may have entertained doubts as to where the workers' movement would lead. A defensist SR intelligent, Mark Slonim, who arrived in Petrograd in 1916 and who became involved in the SR underground, recalled that he heard that SR leaders in the capital, such as V. Zenzinov, Prince Sidamon Eristov, Evgenii Kolosov, and S. Mstislavskii, maintained that a popular movement leading to revolution could be expected only at the end of the war. Of the leadership, according to Slonim, only Kerensky adamantly maintained that revolution was imminent. See the memoirs of M. Slonim in "Papers of the Fourth International Conference of the Study Group on the Russian Revolution," University of Birmingham, England, January 1978, *Sbornik*, no. 4, p. 72.

27. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 160; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," p. 50.

28. Astrakhan, "O taktike 'sniatiia,'" p. 126; Markov, "Kak proizoshla," pp. 95-96; Leiberov, "Nachalo fevral'skoi revoliutsii," p. 11.

29. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 139-40; Iu. S. Tokarev, *Petrogradskii Sovet rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov v marte-aprele 1917 g.* (Leningrad, 1976), p. 37.

30. Markov, "Kak proizoshla," pp. 95-96; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 30-31.

31. Markov, "Kak proizoshla," pp. 95-96.

32. Ibid.; Mil'chik, *Rabochii fevral'*, p. 65.

33. Genkina, "Fevral'skii perevorot," p. 45; I. P. Leiberov, "Vtoroi den' Fevral'skoi revoliutsii (sobytiia 24 fevralia 1917 g. v Petrograde)," *Sverzhenie samoderzhavii*, pp. 104-5.

34. Leiberov, "Vtoroi den'," pp. 104-5.

35. Ibid., pp. 105-6; Genkina, "Fevral'skii perevorot," p. 45; N. Afinogonov-Stepnoi, *Etapy velikoi revoliutsii* (Samara, 1918), pp. 8-9; "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 167.

36. Markov, "Kak proizoshla," pp. 100-3.

37. Ibid., pp. 101-7. Markov described an incident in which after marching for a while on the Nevskii, he met SR comrades from the Putilov and Khimicheskii plants of the Narva District. They all dropped in for tea at a nearby dining hall (*stolovaia*), where they discussed the origin and development of the strike movement and agreed to go to the Moskovskii District in order to bring out its workers.

38. Leiberov, "Vtoroi den'," pp. 112-16.

39. V. S. Diakin, ed., *Istoriia rabochikh Leningrada*, 3 vols. (Leningrad,

1972), 1:522; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 140; I. P. Leiberov, "Petrogradskii proletariat vo vseobshchei politicheskoi stachke 25 fevralia 1917 g.," in *Oktiabr' i grazhdanskaia voina v SSSR* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 32, 41; A. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsaty god*, 2 vols. (Moscow, Petrograd, 1923), 1:87-88; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 32-34; I. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," p. 140; P. A. Lur'e, "Listy—dnevnika 1917 g.," in *V ognе revoliutsionnykh boev: Sbornik vosp.* (Moscow, 1971), p. 101; Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii," pp. 23-24.

40. Kondrat'ev, "Vospominaniia o podpol'noi rabote," p. 64; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 159-60.

41. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 168-70; E. P. Onufriev, *Za nevskoi zastavoi (Vospominaniia starogo bol'shevika)* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 128-30.

42. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 166, 170-71; Mitel'man, Glebov, Ul'ianskii, *Istoriia Putilovskogo zavoda*, pp. 550-51; *Petrogradskie bol'sheviki vo trekh revoliutsiakh* (Leningrad, 1966), pp. 177-78; K. V. Notman, "Trubochnyi zavod na oktiabr'skikh putiakh," *K.L.*, nos. 5-6 (1932), pp. 241-43.

43. "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 45; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 203-4; his "Petrogradskii proletariat . . . 25 fevralia 1917 g." pp. 41-42; Mil'chik, *Rabochii fevral'*, p. 60; Efimov, "Is istorii partiinogo kollektiva," pp. 41-42; P. P. Aleksandrov, *Za narvskoi zastavoi* (Leningrad, 1963), p. 127; *Russkoe slovo* (2 March 1917).

44. D. M. Kukin, I. A. Aluf, and I. P. Leiberov, *Partiia bol'shevikov v fevral'skoi revoliutsii 1917 goda* (Moscow, 1971), p. 149.

45. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 154-55; Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii," p. 17.

46. Burdzhlov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, p. 85; *Soviet Studies in History*, p. 24.

47. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, p. 217; N. Sukhanov, *Zapiski o revoliutsii*, 7 vols. (Berlin, Petersburg, Moscow, 1922-1923), 1:35.

48. Leiberov, "Vtoroi den'," pp. 117-18; "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 47; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsaty god*, p. 117.

49. Burdzhlov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, p. 158; "Soviet rabochikh deputatov," *Den'*, no. 1 (5 marta 1917), p. 4.

50. Burdzhlov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, pp. 158-59; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 35-36; Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v dokumentakh" pp. 294-300 (includes a detailed police summary of the evening city Duma session); his "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 91-92; Sukhanov, *Zapiski o revoliutsii*, p. 51; Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii," pp. 23-24.

51. Burdzhlov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, p. 170; *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima*, 1:190-91; Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii," p. 25; Leiberov, "Petrogradskii proletariat . . . 25 fevralia 1917 g.," p. 40.

52. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 139-41; E. B. Genkina, "Fevral'skii pe-reverot," p. 58; Shalaginova, "Esery-internatsionalisty," p. 333; Kukin, Leiberov, and Aluf, *Partiia bol'shevikov*, p. 149.

53. Tokarev, *Petrogradskii Sovet*, p. 37.

54. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 171.

55. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 233, 239; Sukhanov, *Russian Revolution*, pp. 36-37; his *Zapiski o revoliutsii*, 1:83. Although he indicates that socialists played a role in the soldiers' uprising, Sukhanov remarks that, not being an eyewitness, he can provide no details. Several eyewitnesses also scrupulously eschew the subject: T. Kirpichnikov, "Vosstanie l. gv. Volynskogo polka v fevrale 1917 g.," *Byloe*, nos. 5-6 (27-28) (1917), p. 5; O. Sipol', "Iz vospominanii," *Petrogradskaia Pravda*, no. 57 (12 marta 1920), p. 2; and the pamphlets by I. Lukash, *Litovtsy*, *Pavlovtsy*, *Preobrazhentsy*, and *Volyntsy* (Petrograd, 1917).

56. A. Tarasov-Rodinov, *February 1917* (New York, 1931), pp. 167-77; V. Ia. Gurevich, "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Krasnoiarske," *Vol'naia sibir'*, no. 2 (1927), pp. 112-33.

57. Sipol', a soldier stationed in the city, recalled tension in his unit beginning on 25 February; Sipol', "Iz vospominanii," p. 2; Kirpichnikov, a sergeant in the Volynskii Regiment, claimed that already on 24 February members of his unit had shouted to strikers, "Don't be afraid; we won't shoot," but were worried about what their officers would do; then even the officers waved the crowds by: "*Prokhodi; prokhodi*" (Go on by, go on by); Kirpichnikov, "Vosstanie," p. 5; Markov, "Kak proizoshla," pp. 54-67; "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," pp. 160-61.

58. Melancon, "Who Wrote What and When?" p. 480; Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 140-41; R. Kovnovator, "Nakanune fevralia," in *Revolutsionnoe iunoshestvo* (Leningrad, 1924), p. 189; Afinogenov-Stepnoi, *Etapy velikoi revoliutsii*, pp. 9-11; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, p. 227.

59. "V Petrograde nakanune," p. 47.

60. P. Zalutskii, "V poslednie dni podpol'nogo Peterburgskogo komiteta bol'shevikov v nachale 1917 g.," *K.L.*, no. 2 (1930), pp. 36-37; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 225-40; Ermanskii, *Iz perezhitogo*, p. 146; Kaiurov, "Shest' dnei fevral'skoi revoliutsii," pp. 166-67; Melancon, "Who Wrote What and When?," pp. 482-83.

61. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," pp. 169-71; Leiberov, *Na shturm*, pp. 207-8.

62. Tarasov-Rodionov, *February 1917*, pp. 177-90. The first issue of *Izvestiia* published a proclamation of the SR-SD student organization that called for soviet power.

63. Leiberov, *Na shturm*, p. 236.

64. Iurenev, *Bor'ba za edinstvo*, p. 13; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 208-9.

65. Iurenev, *Bor'ba za edinstvo*, p. 13; "Sovet," *Den'*, p. 4; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 209.

66. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 320-25.

67. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 208-9; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 43-45; A. F. Kerensky *The Crucifixion of Liberty* (New York, 1934), pp. 236-37; Abraham, *Kerensky*, p. 129. Sukhanov's tes-

timony suggests that the leftists indeed had a much more radical position than they revealed at this meeting. Sukhanov was an anti-war leftist, but as a Left Menshevik he wanted a radical bourgeois government, which, he thought, could best defend Russia's revolutionary gains. During these days, writes Sukhanov, the SR Zimmerwaldists and the Bolsheviks alarmed him by not sharing his concerns; instead they "concentrated on immediate agitation . . . and the furtherance of the movement." With the Right socialists the leftists wrung their hands and pretended it was all over, whereas to fellow leftists like Sukhanov they revealed their radical intentions. Sukhanov, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 14, 18–26.

68. Burdzhakov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, p. 213; Blok, "Poslednie dni," p. 28.

69. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," pp. 139–40; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 122.

70. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," pp. 173–74.

71. Because of the shootings during the day, by the evening of 26 February some leftist leaders feared, in the words of one activist, "that the workers' movement had gone up a blind alley and was doomed to wane"; Kaiurov, "Shest' dnei," pp. 158–65. According to some reports, the Nevskii was empty on the morning of 27 February. Katkov concludes that the workers' movement had run out of steam and that some of the revolutionary leaders "were thus losing faith in the success of their cause"; Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 271. The police had again succeeded in cutting off the Vasileostrovskii District from the center of the city; Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, p. 133. On publishing documents from the police archives in early 1918, the editors of the revolutionary journal *Byloe* found evidence of police activity and records of successful crowd dispersal by Cossacks on 27 February; "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 175. Wildman has noted a great scarcity of sources about workers' districts other than the Vyborg on 27 February, an odd circumstance for the last day of the old regime; Wildman, *End of the Russian Imperial Army*, p. 146, n. 48. One eyewitness from the Narva District recalls how a large crowd of workers gathered around the Rechkin and Skorokhod plants and, even though rumors had already circulated that military units were in mutiny, watched in apprehension as a column of soldiers marched from the direction of the Putilov Works toward them, only to realize suddenly that the soldiers were "nashi" (ours)! The unit's newly chosen commander gave an impromptu speech: "Long live the soldiers and workers!" see "Rabotnitsa," "Iz vospominanii," *Petrogradskaia Pravda*, no. 57 (12 March 1920), p. 2.

72. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 337–38.

73. Shliapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 337–38.

74. "Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia," p. 176; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 60–61; Avdeev, "Pervye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii," p. 28; Sukhanov, *Zapiski o revoliutsii*, 1:86–89. Shortly after the February Revolution, a Right Menshevik noted that during the morning of 27 February deputies from units that had mutinied began to report to the state

Duma; "Sovet," *Den'*, p. 4. Sipol' recalled how his unit, the Sixth Sapper Battalion, joined the *Volyntsy* and *Litovtsy* and headed out into the city, where they "called out" the Orudyni plant on strike and freed the district jail, at which point they ran into a patrol headed for the Tauride Palace "to defend the Duma." The officer of the patrol claimed that there were already plenty of soldiers at the Tauride and the place was secure. Masses of soldiers then went to the Finland Station, which the Left socialists were promoting as a revolutionary center, but, claimed Sipol', "The central place was the Tauride Palace"; Sipol', "Iz vospominanii," p. 2. Shliapnikov claimed that during the course of 27 February, using their ties with unit commanders, "bourgeois circles" won some units to their side; the advocate Sokolov (a prominent SD close both to the Bolsheviks and to Duma circles) succeeded in leading part of the soldiers to the Tauride Palace to defend the state Duma; G. Shliapnikov, "Martovskie dni," *Petrogradskaia Pravda*, no. 57 (12 marta 1920), p. 1. Later a liberal writer recalled that, when the revolution that everyone expected finally came, there was "only one authority that the people trusted completely. This was the State Duma"; see memoirs of M. S-K, in *Revoliutsiia v Petrograde* (Petrograd, 1917), pp. 3–5.

75. Burdzhhalov, "Vtoraia russkaia, 2:8–9; *Kanun revoliutsii*, pp. 37, 58–59; P. P. Aleksandrov, "Ot fevralia k oktiabriu," *V ogne revoliutionnykh boev*, p. 53.

76. Leiberov, "Vtoroi den'," pp. 117–18.

77. Hasegawa, "Bolsheviks and the Petrograd Soviet," p. 97.

78. *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie posle sverzheniia samoderzhaviia* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 4–5.

79. "Fevral'skie i martovskie dni 1917 g.," *Istoricheskii vestnik*, 147, no. 2 (March 1917), p. 19; Hasegawa, "Bolsheviks and the Petrograd Soviet," p. 99; Melancon, "Who Wrote What and When?," pp. 489–93; Iurenev's remarks in *Protokoly s'ezdov i konferentsii Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii(b); s'ezdy avg. 1917–mart 1939* (Moscow, Petrograd, 1919), p. 49; *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie posle*, p. 5; D. O. Zaslavskii, V. A. Kantorovich, *Khronika fevral'skoi revoliutsii* (Petrograd, 1924) "Fevral'skie i martovskie dni," p. 19.

80. Iurenev, "Mezhraionka," p. 142; *Izvestiia*, no. 1 (28 February 1917); Burdzhhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, p. 211; *Shestoi s'ezd RSDRP(b): Protokoly* (Moscow, 1958), p. 149; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, p. 332.

81. Kh. M. Astrakhan, "O pervom Manifeste TsK RSDRP(b) 'Ko vsem grazhdanam Rossii,'" *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 6 (1964), pp. 54–55; Burdzhhalov, "O taktike Bol'shevikov," pp. 38–56.

82. V. Bulgakov, "Revoliutsiia na avtomobiliakh (Petrograd v fevrale 1917 g.)," *Na chuzhoi storone*, no. 6 (1924), pp. 8–9. Bulgakov, who served in a unit stationed in the capital, recalled arriving at 7:00 P.M. on the Nevskii Prospekt, where he—and presumably thousands of other soldiers—saw the Provisional Executive Committee's proclamation and copies of *Izvestiia*, both with the appeal to feed soldiers. Various sources suggest that F. Linde, a nonparty radical later associated with the Left Mensheviks, either first led

troops to the Tauride Palace or first organized groups of soldiers there; Shklovskii, *Revoliutsiia i front*, p. 7; Burdzhakov, *Russia's Second Revolution*, p. 181.

83. Sukhanov, *Russian Revolution*, p. 37; Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 256–60; *Izvestiia* (27 February 1917), reprinted in P. M. Chechin, ed., *Petrograd v dni revoliutsii 1917 g.* (Petrograd, 1917), p. 16 (certain Petrograd journalists issued this newspaper, only one number of which appeared). About the fateful movement toward the Duma, an observer with eyewitness status, Sukhanov, speculated, "It may have been a purely spontaneous drift, or a conscious effort on the part of leaders to make the bourgeois 'patriotic' Duma the political centre of the movement and of future events." Katkov places heavy emphasis on the propaganda emanating from the Duma.

84. S. D. Mstislavskii-Maslovskii, *Piat' dnei* (Berlin, St. Petersburg, Moscow, 1922), pp. 4–9; Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 132; Shliapnikov, "Martovskie dni," p. 1; Sukhanov, *Zapiski o revoliutsii*, 1:95. For Left socialists the trip to the Tauride Palace was bitter. Shliapnikov recalled that while the Bolsheviks (he might have said the Left socialists) were at their posts, "Menshevik diplomats were cutting a deal with the bourgeoisie to create a Committee of the State Duma [later the Provisional Government] with representatives from all the [Duma] factions, including Chkheidze and Kerensky."

85. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 208–9; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 41–42 (this author evaluates the all-socialist bureau slightly differently in the two versions of his article, but the general sense is the same). Hasegawa describes "informal meetings of the socialist intelligentsia" gathered "in the comfortable dining room of Gorky's apartment. . . . Despite their great political differences, [they] had more in common with one another than with the masses in the streets"; T. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 324–25. But on 5 March, *Den'* noted that the socialists who had met together on 26 February reconvened the very next morning at the Tauride Palace to summon the Petrograd Soviet, an obviously important matter.

86. Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 132–34; his *Semnadtsatyi god*, pp. 339–40; of the four hundred or so delegates in attendance, only nineteen voted for the resolution in favor of Soviet power. Zenzinov claims that, at least in the Soviet's Executive Committee sessions, the leftists never mentioned a soviet-based government, an assertion that receives support from Trotsky, whose non-eyewitness version suggests that no one proposed soviet power at this time; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), p. 72; L. Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1980) pp. 153–79. Regardless, various data indicate that the issue of power was a lively one.

87. Shliapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni," pp. 133–34; Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 330–40; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni" (unpublished version), pp. 67–68.

88. Kukin, Aluf, and Leiberov, *Partiia bol'shevikov*, pp. 146, 149; Nico-

laevsky Archive, Box 614, File 7, unsigned report beginning with the sentence "Die Sotsial-Revolutionaere Partei ist eine der maechtigsten Parteien in Russland"; *Oktiabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie*, vol. 4, p. 63; Burd-zhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia*, 1:156.

89. Hasegawa, *February Revolution*, pp. 132-33, 208-9, 324-25. The Left SR leader S. Mstislavskii, a witness of the Petrograd crisis and revolution, wrote a much-quoted epigram: "The revolution caught us sleeping like the sevel vestal virgins"; Mstislavskii, *Piat' dnei*, p. 3. Mstislavskii's remark is not unique. The SR Sviatitskii claimed that when socialist leaders met just before and during the crisis they were unaware of the seriousness of the situation; Sviatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e," pp. 50-55. The SR Zenzinov wrote, "The Revolution was a great and joyous surprise for us"; the Left Menshevik Sukhanov claimed, "Not one party was prepared for the great overturn"; and the Bolshevik Kaiurov recalled, "No one thought of such an imminent possibility of revolution"; all quoted in W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, 2 vols. (New York, 1963), 1:73. Whatever their motivations for claiming surprise in later years, these statements simply do not square with what these and many other socialist leaders and activists were actually *doing* during the February crisis. Shliapnikov recalled that the obvious revolutionary situation necessitated that the socialists coordinate their actions; the same Zenzinov who wrote that the revolution "was a great . . . surprise" contradictorily reported that the joint socialist informational bureau was the "general staff of the revolution." Zenzinov also claimed that although SRs called for revolution, they did not believe in its possibility, a remark more revealing of the profound ambivalence of the party intelligentsia than of the PSR as a whole; Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 195.

Epilogue

1. Radkey's two studies of the SRs during 1917 has a wealth of information about the positions and relative influence of Right, Left, and centrist SRs; see Radkey, *Agrarian Foes* and *Sickle under the Hammer*.

2. Documentation of the research leading to these conclusions is enormous. Among the relevant sources are the SR and Left SR newspapers, such as *Delo naroda*, *Zemlia i volia*, *Znamia truda* (all of Petrograd), and *Volia naroda* (Moscow).

3. Virtually on a weekly basis, writers in *Pravda* raised the question of the absolute necessity of Left bloc (internationalist) work.

4. A. M. Andreev, *Sovety rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov nakanune oktiabria* (Moscow, 1967), p. 44; Tokarev, *Petrogradskii Sovet*, pp. 121-30; Boll, *Petrograd Armed Workers*, pp. 31, 36, 40; G. I. Zlokazov, *Petrogradskii Sovet rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov v period mirnogo razvitiia revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1969), pp. 141-42; Tokarev, *Petrogradskii Sovet*, p. 31;

Zlokazov, *Petrogradskii Sovet*, pp. 225, 239; Andreev, *Sovety*, pp. 43–44; Markov, "Kak proizoshla revoliutsiia," p. 61; Aleksandrov, *Za narvskoi zastavoi*, pp. 66, 100; B. I. Shabalin, *Fabrika na obvodnom* (Leningrad, 1948), pp. 58–63; 301; Suknovalov, *Fabrika "Krasnoe znamia,"* p. 350; S. D. Okun', ed., *Putilovtsy vo trekh revoliutsiiakh* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1933), p. xxxvii; Onufriev, *Za nevskoi zastavoi*, pp. 126–37; *Bastiony revoliutsii* (Leningrad, 1957), pp. 30, 138, 193–220, 273. Okun', *Putilovtsy*, p. xxxvii; Aleksandrov, *Za narvskoi*, pp. 66–67. G. Borisov and S. Vasil'ev, *Stankostroitel'nyi zavod im. Sverdlova* (Leningrad, 1962), p. 76; S. Lobov and I. Gavrilov, "Iz istorii partiinoi organizatsii na 'Krasnom Vyborzhtse'," *K.L.*, no. 5 (1926), p. 137; Andreev, *Sovety rabochikh*, p. 42; Zlokazov, *Petrogradskii Sovet*, p. 142; Boll, *Petrograd Armed*, p. 167. Ia. Ratgauzer, *Revoliutsiia i grazhdanskaia voina v Baku* (Baku, 1927), p. 1; *Imeni lenina: Ocherki istorii voronezhskogo mashinostroitel'nogo zavoda* (Voronezh, 1968), p. 28; Koenker, *Moscow Workers*, p. 193; *Moskva v oktiabre 1917 g. Sbornik vospominanii*, ed. by O. Chaadaeva (Moscow, 1934), pp. 33, 47–49, 65; *Istoriia profsoiuzov Urala: 1905–1984 gg.* (Moscow, 1984), pp. 38–39; V. T. Agalakov, *Sovety Sibiri: 1917–1918 gg.* (Novosibirsk, 1978), pp. 32–42; and D. M. Zol'nikov, *Raboochee dvizhenie v Sibiri v 1917 g.* (Novosibirsk, 1969), pp. 151–68.

5. Leiberov, "Petrogradskii proletariat . . . 25 fevralia 1917 g.," p. 41.

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